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ABSTRACT 
On 20 March 2003, the United States Army participated in the invasion of Iraq as part of 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).  Despite the announcement from the deck of the USS 
Abraham Lincoln of the end of major combat operations on 1 May 2003, the U.S. Army is still 
conducting maneuvers and missions throughout the cities and desert plains of Iraq.  
Fundamentally, the U.S. Army was incapable of translating initial combat success into the 
accomplishment of strategic objectives and political victory.  What emerged from tactical and 
operational victories against Iraqi forces was not a stable democratic peace; instead, Iraq plunged 
into a long and complex insurgency that fused the spectrum of conflict into a single beam where 
the full range of military operations had to be performed nearly simultaneously. 
Combating and defeating this insurgency required a capacity for conducting simultaneous 
full spectrum operations in a competitive environment populated by highly adaptive foes.  But 
the U.S. Army was unprepared for this task.  A Cycle of Mutual Adaptation between hierarchical 
and vertically integrated organizations and networked and horizontally integrated competitors 
ensued.  The latter was predisposed to organizational adaptation and conducting networked 
operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to quickly vanquishing threats 
along prescriptive plans with centralized command and control systems.  How this competition 
unfolded and the implications of this process are the subject of this study. 
Although the insurgency in Iraq has largely been quelled, the cyclical and competitive 
process producing this tenuous stability has raised serious questions regarding the efficacy of 
post-Cold War and post-9/11 strategies, force structures, doctrine, training, and the U.S. Army’s 
organizational capacity for adaptation in light of national interests, strategic requirements, and 
institutional legacies.  This study charts the historical factors contributing to the Cycle of Mutual 
 v 
Adaptation in OIF, analyzes this cycle, gives an assessment of the international security 
environment in the wake of this conflict, and concludes with policy recommendations for 
improving the U.S. Army’s capacity for organizational adaptation in the 21st
 
 Century. 
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 1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
“Man the knower pursues two related but distinct kinds of knowledge.  As homo sciens, man 
the knower of scientia, he tends to matters of fact, quantity, matter, and the physical realm; as 
homo sapiens, man the knower of sapientia, he shows his interest in the qualities of meaning, 
purpose, value, idea, and the metaphysical realm.  If we are to have truth, neither kind of 
knowledge can be denied or ignored.  The denial of the reality and importance of scientia is 
characteristic of the radical transcendentalism of Eastern religions, but today the even greater 
and more damaging imbalance is found in the pervasive radical immanentism of much 
Western culture and thought that attributes validity only to scientia.  Enthusiasts of scientism 
fail to see that scientia is utterly dependent on sapientia for direction and meaning; their 
fervent attempts to pursue scientia in isolation from sapientia amount to a tragic rush into the 
meaningless.” Aeschliman1
 
 
“The enemy’s only answer to militia actions is the sending out of frequent escorts as 
protection for his convoys and as guards on all his stopping places, bridges, defiles and the 
rest.  The early efforts of the militia may be fairly weak, and so will these first detachments, 
                                                 
1 Aeschliman, Michael D., The Restitution of Man: C.S. Lewis and the Case Against Scientism, William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, Cambridge, UK, 1998, p. 48. 
 2 
because of the dangers of dispersal.  But the flames of insurrection will be fanned by these 
small detachments, which will on occasion be overpowered by sheer numbers; courage and 
the appetite for fighting will rise, and so will the tension, until it reaches the climax that 
decides the outcome.”  Clausewitz2
 
 
“The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely 
technical superiority over any other form of organization.  The fully developed bureaucratic 
mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-
mechanical modes of production.”  Weber3
 
 
“We sleep safe in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to visit violence on 
those who would do us harm.”  Orwell 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) has challenged many assumptions regarding the use of the 
U.S. Army in supporting national political objectives.  Failures and even successes in the 
employment and use of the force in OIF have led to manifold questions regarding the efficacy 
                                                 
2 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1993, p. 581. 
3 Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1946, p. 214. 
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and sustainability of presidential doctrines, U.S. strategy, and the design and use of the U.S. 
Army in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 international security environment. 
Unexpected changes to the international security environment, the rise of previously 
contained organizations with new dexterities, and an unusual amalgam of political and military 
objectives in strategy all intersected in Iraq in early 2003.  This intersection resulted in the U.S. 
Army conducting simultaneous full-spectrum operations in the truest sense of the concept: 
stability, support, reconstruction, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, high-intensity combat, 
and low-intensity combat (to name a few) were no longer neatly separated bands of the spectrum 
of combat.  Instead, these bands were fused into a beam as the U.S. Army, in order to achieve 
organizational success in OIF, had to conduct each, usually simultaneously, in the effort to 
successfully accomplish the missions dictated by strategy and by circumstance. 
Adapting to the challenges posed by OIF was an unparalleled endeavor for the U.S. 
Army. As Stephen Cimbala argues, “the American way of war has traditionally assumed, as did 
Clausewitz that armed forces tasked by responsible governments are given missions that are 
clearly set apart from political and social variables.  The contamination of military operations by 
nonmilitary aspects of conflict drives generals and admirals to despair and confounds the 
Clausewitzian universe of force and policy.  Today, more than ever, the ‘exception’ of 
specialized and politicized military operations is becoming the norm for U.S. and other armed 
forces.  But this ‘renorming’ of expectations about depoliticized war flies in the face of military 
service traditions.  The U.S. Army’s military staff culture, for example, is still dominated by the 
branch cultures of infantry, armor, and artillery and, therefore, by the conventional military—
 4 
Clausewitzian perspective on the separation of politics and operations.”4
Although, in comparison to the U.S. Army, the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
poorly resourced and far less lethal, they have been successful in stymieing the realization of 
U.S. political, strategic, and military goals in both these countries, and have thus been successful 
in the accomplishment of many of their organizational objectives and sub-objectives.  OIF is 
therefore not significantly different than Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and other 
complex contingencies facing states in the 21
  As an organization, to 
achieve the combat and non-combat (or military and political) objectives requisite to success in 
OIF, the U.S. Army has had to make significant changes to its entire institution: conceptually, 
structurally, and cognitively.  In addition, the Army has had to accomplish this while in 
competition with an insurgent organization remarkably dissimilar in structure and capability but 
significantly more adept at making adjustments in response to a rapidly changing environment. 
st
                                                 
4 Cimbala, Stephen J., The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 1997, p. 123. 
 Century.  OEF, like OIF, also challenges the U.S. 
Army to fuse the spectrum of conflict into a beam to achieve organizational success while 
defeating a competitive and networked enemy, albeit under different circumstances and in 
operations reduced in scope and scale.  Moreover, both operations require mutual adaptation by 
competing organizations where the organization that can more rapidly adapt (by adjusting 
organizational inputs and outputs) achieves levels of organizational success greater than that of 
the slower organization.  If U.S. strategy continues to require the U.S. Army to maintain an 
ability to support national objectives pertaining to international stability (combining military, 
political, and social skills) in environments where highly adaptive and networked foes operate 
and in environments where traditional foes might exert their will, the U.S. Army will have to 
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maintain an ability to adapt to a highly diverse and a sometimes fused mission set.  Designing, 
resourcing, training, and educating a force capable of fighting and winning in combat but 
incapable of translating this victory into political and strategic success will not suffice.     
 The ability of the U.S. Army to adapt to changing environments while slowing the 
adaptive capacity of real and potential foes is paramount to achieving organizational success as it 
supports the prosecution of strategy and the achievement of national objectives in the post-Cold 
War, post-9-11 world.  This study will illuminate this process and offer recommendations as to 
how the U.S. Army can enhance its capacity for adaptation as it moves forward into the 21st
1.2 HYPOTHESIS 
 
Century. 
When two organizations, sharing the same environment but unequal resources, adapt to one 
another, the organization that can adapt faster will achieve levels of organizational success 
greater than those of the slower organization (this is the state of disharmony).  When these two 
organizations adapt at the same or nearly the same speed (harmony), the organization that has 
greater resources, and uses these resources to promote adaptation, will achieve levels of 
organizational success greater than those of the less-resourced organization.  The Cycle of 
Mutual Adaptation analyzed in this research favors the organization that adapts faster, despite 
levels of resources, and thus the organization that remains pro-active rather than reactive. 
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Figure 1. Adaptation Cycle 
1.3 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• How do antecedent conditions and structural persistence affect organizational adaptation 
in the reactive sequence (OIF)? 
• How do opposing and competitive tactical organizations (the U.S. Army and the Iraqi 
insurgency) adapt to each other in Iraq? 
• To what extent does the reactive sequence affect the legacy of the organization? 
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• How do hierarchies and networks adapt and how do they adapt to each other in a 
competitive environment? 
1.3.1 Supporting Research Questions 
• How did the Antecedent Conditions of the post-Cold War international security 
environment and the interpretation of this environment shape potential adaptation in the 
U.S. Army? 
• To what extent did the attacks of 11 September 2001 affect potential adaptation in the 
U.S. Army? 
• To what extent did OEF affect potential adaptation in the U.S. Army? 
• To what extent did structures of organizational legacy affect potential adaptation in the 
U.S. Army? 
• To what extent and how does Organizational Context and Group Design & Culture affect 
organizational adaptation in Iraq? 
• To what extent and how do Operational Material & Technical Resources and External 
Assistance affect organizational adaptation in Iraq? 
• To what extent and how do Organizational Group Processes affect organizational 
adaptation in Iraq? 
• To what extent and how does Organizational Learning occur in Iraq? 
• How has the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation changed in Iraq since the invasion? 
• How can the speed at which the U.S. Army adapts be increased most effectively? 
• How can the speed at which the insurgency adapts be decreased most effectively? 
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• What is the role of organizational adaptation in the future international security 
environment and to what degree will legacy structures persist? 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
This study explores the phenomenon of mutual organizational adaptation (in Iraq) by analyzing a 
single-case study (Cycle of Mutual Adaptation) nested within a path dependence model.5
1.4.1 Case Study 
 
Although there are benefits to using a multiple-case study design (comparison, greater yield of 
observations, independent variable variation, greater generalizability, etc.), “the single-case 
design is eminently justifiable under certain conditions—when the case represents (a) critical test 
of existing theory, (b) a rare or unique circumstance, or (c), a representative or typical case or 
when the case serves a (d) revelatory or (e) longitudinal purpose.”6
                                                 
5 Steven Metz argues that “the Iraq experience is instructive if counterinsurgency operations become a 
major or the major facet of U.S. Army operations in the 21st century.”  See, Metz, Steven, Rethinking Insurgency, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2007, pp. 90-91.  Recent projections by the 
Department of Defense indicate that the conduct of counterinsurgency will at a minimum be a major facet of U.S. 
operations for the near term. 
  The Iraq case fulfills all of 
the aforementioned conditions: (a) it not only tests current organizational theories, it also 
6 Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
2003, p. 46. 
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compliments the literature by adding another case where significant, rapid organizational 
adaptation occurs; (b) it is unique because of the speed at which organizational adaption occurs; 
(c) it is representative of modern combat environments and particularly of complex 
insurgencies/counterinsurgencies where technology intersects with networked and hierarchical 
organizational forms; (d) it reveals the process and Cycle of Mutual Adaptation and; (e) it 
examines this cycle over time (from 2003 through mid-2008).  Although only one case is being 
explored in this analysis, this type of “no-variance research design can be quite useful in theory 
development and testing using multiple observations from a single case.”7
This research also qualifies as an instrumental case study where “a particular case is 
examined to provide insight into an issue…the case [Iraq] is of secondary interest; it plays a 
supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else.”
 
8  The ebb and flow of the 
ongoing adaptation in Iraq helps to illuminate the process of mutual adaptation where variables 
are myriad and difficult to isolate and where the data that is forthcoming is captured through 
“personalistic observation.”9
                                                 
7 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005, pp. 32-33. 
  Even though this research only focuses on one case, and the 
context of events and decisions preceding this case, the number of observations contained herein 
is high.  These observations elucidate the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation and will aid in answering 
the central research questions (and supporting questions) forming the core of this study. 
8 Stake, Robert E., “Case Studies,” Handbook of Qualitative Research, Eds. Denzin, Norman K. and 
Yvonna S. Lincoln, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Ca, 1994. 
9 Ibid, p. 24. 
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The key to understanding the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation is effectively to investigate and 
demonstrate the process by which this phenomenon occurs.  This case study will use a form of 
process tracing to achieve this goal.  Process tracing, as conceived by George and McKeown, is 
the systematic connection of data points to “enable the investigator to identify the reasons for the 
emergence of a particular decision through the dynamic of events.”10
 
  Utilizing process tracing in 
a case study format, nested in a path dependence model (gathering data points to contextualize 
the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation), ensures that the conclusions drawn from this research are 
holistic and grounded in decisions made throughout the dynamic events preceding and during the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Brady, Henry E. and David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield, Boulder, CO, 
1994, p. 173-174. 
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Figure 2. The Cycle of Mutual Adaptation11
                                                 
11 This process is described in further detail in Chapter 2.  The cycle consists of a competition between two 
organizations operating in the same environment (in this case, tactical units of the U.S. Army (brigade and below) 
and the Iraqi insurgency) and includes the following elements: Organizational Context; Group Design & Culture; 
Material & Technical Resources; External Assistance; Critical Group Processes; Performance; Learning and; 
Adaptation.  In an academic sense, each competitor (and the decisions it makes regarding how to adapt) acts as an 
independent variable affecting the decision-making of its counterpart.  This back-and-forth between independent 
variables is critical to formalizing, understanding, and elucidating the process of mutual adaptation.  Equally, 
understanding this interaction is important for deciphering the effects of organizational design, methods of learning, 
and decision making on each competitor’s adaptive process and success in achieving organizational goals.  Although 
it is enormously difficult if not impossible to link actions with reactions among competitors conclusively and for 
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1.4.2 Path Dependence Model 
 
Figure 3. Path Dependence Model 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
fully articulating the impetus behind individual decisions made, demonstrating the process by which this occurs can 
illuminate how the cycle works and indicate the salience of inputs and outputs to this interaction. 
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In this analysis, a path dependence model is used to frame the context within which the Cycle of 
Mutual Adaptation occurs.  “Path dependence refers to a specific type of explanation that unfolds 
through a series of logically sequential stages.  With this formulation, antecedent historical 
conditions define a range of options available to actors during a key choice point.  This key actor 
choice point, or what can be called a ‘critical juncture,’ is characterized by the selection of a 
particular option (e.g., a specific policy, coalition, or government) from among two or more 
alternatives.  The selection made during a critical juncture is consequential because it leads to the 
creation of institutional or structural patterns that endure over time.  In turn, institutional and 
structural persistence triggers a reactive sequence in which actors respond to prevailing 
arrangements through a series of predictable responses and counterresponses.  These reactions 
then channel development up to the point of a final outcome, which represents a resolution to the 
conflicts marking reactive sequences.”12
 Path dependence constrains the analysis by demonstrating how historical decisions (i.e., 
the selection of force structure, development of strategy, decisions to employ military force, etc.) 
limit the range of options for organizational adaptation (in the U.S. Army) as time and 
circumstance progress and evolve.  Collier and Collier describe the persistence of these decisions 
as a ‘legacy’ that endures in and through future policies and decisions.
 
13
                                                 
12 Mahoney, James, The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central 
America, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2001, p. 6. 
  For the purposes of this 
analysis, this legacy recurs and manifests in future policies, decisions, and within the 
organization affected by these policies and decisions.  Simply put, decisions made that affect an 
13 Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, University of Notre Dame Press, 
Indiana, 2002, pp. 30-31. 
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organization are difficult to reverse or change.  Thus, for organizations like the U.S. Army, 
history does matter and has a significant effect on how the organization adapts to changing 
environmental stimuli and to other organizations.  As Page argues, “path dependence requires a 
build-up of behavioral routines, social connections, or cognitive structures around an 
institution.”14
1.4.3 Unit(s) of Analysis; Unit(s) of Observation
  The institution analyzed in this model is the U.S. Army.   
15
The units of analysis in this research are the tactical-level organizations of the U.S. Army 
(Brigade, Battalion, Company, Platoon, Squad, Section, and Team, with particular emphasis on 
the Company level as the locus of significant tactical action and adaptation) and the Iraqi 
insurgency.
 
16  The units of observation are the individuals that comprise these organizations.  
Lee defines a researcher’s Unit of Analysis as “the phenomenon under study.”17
                                                 
14 Page, Scott E., “Path Dependence,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006, p. 89. 
  In this analysis, 
the interaction between the Units of Analysis (forming the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation) is the 
phenomenon under study.  The context, setting, and frame of reference for the Units of 
15 This research is limited to the U.S. Army and to the broader Iraqi insurgency.  Except where noted, other 
individual organizations (i.e., the Mahdi Army and the U.S. Marine Corps) are not examined in depth. 
16 This analysis reflects the fact that “most units focused not on the national insurgent network but on those 
elements active in their AOR.”  Wright, Donald P. and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II, Transition to the New 
Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003—January 2005, Combat Studies Institute 
Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2008, p. 115. 
17 Lee, Thomas W., Using Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research, Sage, Thousand Oaks, Ca, 
1999, p. 59. 
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Observation are essential to understanding how the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation proceeds.  
Examining these characteristics is also requisite to developing conclusions that will assist 
policymakers, academics, and students of organizational adaptation in better understanding the 
iterative succession of action and reaction in these cycles and in shaping pro-active policies that 
circumvent or shorten this repetitive back-and-forth cycle. 
1.4.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
The primary sources of empirical evidence for this analysis are derived from strategy documents, 
doctrine, congressional testimony, organizational/unit review documents, and interviews with 
participants in OIF.  This analysis also takes advantage of manifold secondary sources of 
information provided by OIF participants and scholars that variously examine organizational 
adaptation, insurgency, and the U.S. Army. 
This research is supported by over 40 interviews and directed conversations on the 
subject of organizational adaptation in Iraq.  The interviews conducted for this analysis were 
semi-structured so as to allow for further exploration of experiences and discussion that elaborate 
and clarify the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation.18
                                                 
18 See Appendix C, Semi-Structured Interview Questions.  These questions formed the basis of the 
interviews conducted with soldiers deployed throughout OIF.  Many of these interviews were conducted in 
confidence so as to conceal the identity of the soldier being interviewed.  This allowed for more open and critical 
remarks than may have been otherwise attained.  It should be noted that collecting data on the insurgency is 
significantly difficult: illicit organizations do not readily share information, conduct few interviews, do not easily 
divulge information on their members or structures, and most government information about these organizations is 
  The semi-structured interview allows the 
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researcher greater flexibility in data collection, is adaptable, and “is capable of being used with 
all kinds of respondents in many kinds of research, and is uniquely suited to exploration in 
depth.”19  The data points of importance to this research (those that substantiate the central 
research question and supporting questions in this study, inform process tracing, and reveal the 
sub-parts of the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation) formed the core of the semi-structured interview 
questions.  The responses to these interview questions, were of course, left open.20
1.5 EXPLANATION OF THE CHAPTERS 
 
Chapter 2 (Organizational Adaptation) examines the process of organizational adaptation in 
general and specifically addresses adaptation in hierarchical and networked organizations.  The 
capacity for adaptation is fundamental to an organization’s ability to respond to changing 
environmental stimuli and is also instrumental to the process of realigning organizational inputs 
and outputs for the achievement of organizational goals. 
 
Chapter 3 (Antecedent Conditions: Constraining Organizational Adaptation after the Cold War) 
examines changes in the international security environment in the post-Cold War period and the 
effect of these changes on U.S. Army policy and the organization’s ability to adapt.  Reducing 
                                                                                                                                                             
classified.  See Ressler, Steve, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present and 
Future Research,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume II, Number 2, July 2006, p. 3. 
19 Kerlinger, Fred N., Foundations of Behavioral Research, Hold, Reinhart and Winston Inc., New York, 
1973, p. 487. 
20 Flick, Uwe, An Introduction to Qualitative Research, Sage, London, 2002. 
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the size of the force combined with the U.S. Army’s cultural and doctrinal penchant for high-
intensity conflict significantly reduced the organization’s ability to adapt to emerging threats in 
the post-Cold War world at a time when strategy required closer and more frequent interaction 
with these emerging threats. 
 
Chapter 4 (Cleavage and Critical Juncture: Setting the Conditions and Potential for Adaptation in 
Iraq) charts the decisions made following the attacks of 9/11, the emergence of the Bush 
Doctrine, the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and how these decisions, when combined with 
the U.S. Army’s Transformation21
 
 program, created a highly capable combat force that was 
equally unprepared for stability operations and the full execution of the tenets of the Bush 
Doctrine. 
Chapter 5 (Structural Persistence: the Invasion of Iraq and Compelled Adaptation) takes a look at 
the persistence of previous decisions affecting the employment of the U.S. Army and how the 
use of transition models adopted from a previous era exposed the weakness of the force in 
achieving organizational objectives at the end of major combat operations in Iraq.  The 
assumptions of what the role the U.S. Army would play in Iraq and the emergence of a complex 
insurgency compounded the difficulties facing the organization as it entered the stability phases 
of the operation. 
 
                                                 
21 Any references to the Defense or Army Transformation program, abbreviated as Transformation, will be 
capitalized so as to distinguish references to this program. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 (Reactive Sequence: U.S. Army Adaptation and; Reactive Sequence: Insurgent 
Adaptation) examine the process of organizational adaptation for both the U.S. Army and the 
insurgency in Iraq and expose the differences and similarities between these groups as they try to 
achieve organizational objectives in a shared but competitive environment. 
 
Chapter 8 (The Cycle of Mutual Adaptation and the Stability of the Legacy) discusses how these 
organizations mutually adapt to one another in a shared, competitive environment; the strengths 
and weaknesses of each organization as they try to modify inputs and outputs to achieve 
organizational success; how an understanding of this process illuminates past, present, and future 
cases given past, present, and projected strategies in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 
international security environment and; how the legacy of past decisions (despite events and 
lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere that have challenged the assumptions underlying 
these decisions) still reverberate and affect current, and likely future, decisions regarding the 
U.S. Army’s ability to adapt. 
 
Chapter 9 (Implications and Conclusion) outlines the implications of this study, suggests changes 
in policy based on this research, and poses subjects for future research that will aid current and 
future policymakers’ understanding of the process of mutual adaptation and the fusion of U.S. 
Army missions in the post-9/11 international security environment. 
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2.0  ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
“To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.”—Winston Churchill 
 
As organizations, the U.S. Army22 and the insurgency23
                                                 
22 Certainly, and particularly, the U.S. Marine Corps contributed to the adaptation of the U.S. military as a 
whole and had influence on U.S. Army adaptations (for instance, in the development of doctrine and joint doctrine).  
In order to provide focus, this paper will only examine the U.S. Army’s adaptation, particularly at the tactical level 
and will exclude explicit references to other peer and allied organizations. 
 in Iraq adapt as events, circumstances, 
and organizational missions change and evolve.  For any organization to remain an on-going 
concern and achieve mission success, it must adapt to some degree; sometimes radical and total 
adaptation is required while at other times incremental adaptation will suffice.  The amount of 
adaptation required varies according to changes in the environment, the effects of these changes 
on organizational capabilities (particularly in relation to goal and mission accomplishment), and 
the degree to which the organization is out of phase at the start of the adaptation process.  
23 The insurgency in Iraq will be treated singularly for the purposes of this paper.  Although the differences 
in insurgent organizations (temporal, ideological, origin, etc.) are significant for many reasons, this paper will not 
stress those differences in its analysis.  Instead, this paper will examine characteristics common to many if not all 
insurgent organizations in Iraq acting as networks and resisting the Iraqi government and the U.S. Army in its efforts 
to support this government.  For instance, an organization like the Mahdi Army (Mahdi Militia, Jaish al Mahdi 
(JAM)), will not be addressed specifically despite its influence on the conflict in Iraq. 
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Without adaptation organizations can wither, lose relevance, or cease to exist because they are no 
longer capable of accomplishing their assigned goals. 
 Throughout its history the U.S. Army shielded itself from making significant and 
revolutionary change, sometimes consciously and at other times reflexively.  Codified rules, 
norms, dogma, culture, and tendency have all contributed as buffers to radical change.24  In this 
sense, the U.S. Army is not so different from other large organizations: “Many organizations 
encounter great problems in dealing with the wider world, because they do not recognize how 
they are a part of their environment.  They see themselves as discrete entities that are faced with 
the problem of surviving against the vagaries of the outside world, which is often constructed as 
a domain of threat and opportunity…this kind of egocentrism leads organizations to become 
preoccupied and to overemphasize the importance of themselves, while underplaying the 
significance of the wider system of relations in which they exist.”25
                                                 
24 Some of the impediments to organizational adaptation that the U.S. Army faces are designed and 
structural: 1) Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to raise and support armies; 2) 
Article 2, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution designates the President as commander in chief of the armed forces; and 
3) the War Powers Act of 1973 gives Congress the power to declare war.  Additionally, Congress oversees the 
actions and programs of the U.S. Army and approves spending for the Army’s budget.  These controls were 
established in part to ensure civilian control over the military.  Consequently, the U.S. Army plays a much smaller 
role in shaping policy than it might otherwise.  The U.S. Army is also constrained by acts of Congress and broad 
doctrinal evolution and modifications.  The National Security Act of 1947, various joint doctrinal publications, and 
the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (for example) all partially constrain the U.S. Army by ensuring some level 
of ‘jointness’ in operational planning and budgeting.  Thus, the U.S. Army’s inherent flexibility is reduced by a 
significant number of codified restraints on the organizations’ range of options when choosing how to adapt to its 
environment and to potential and real adversaries.   
  Adaptation in the U.S. 
25 Morgan, Gareth, Images of Organizations, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA, 1986, p. 243. 
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Army is only made grudgingly, tends to be ephemeral, and usually falls within prescribed norms 
favored by the organization as a whole.  When significant adaptation occurs, the U.S. Army 
takes steps to mitigate its effects by binding the radical elements of change to more accepted and 
orthodox elements of the organization.  The tendency to ‘return’ to a state of normalcy and 
‘balance’ after a period of adaptation is overwhelming.  Bureaucratic inertia and organizational 
dynamics serve to mute and suppress significant or threatening change. 
The long term effect of these organizational attributes (particularly after the end of the 
Cold War) led the U.S. Army into a precarious balancing act of its own design where 
increasingly irregular roles were poised against the central task of war-fighting.26
                                                 
26 Johnson, Wray R, “Warriors without a War: Defending OOTW,” Military Review, December 1998-
February, 1999. 
  This did not 
pose too significant a problem until post-9/11 strategy elevated and conflated the role of the 
irregular with the regular and fused these formerly antipodal tasks into a single encompassing 
mission.  In the past the U.S. Army could be content and successful in mission accomplishment 
with short-term adjustments and adaptations: contingencies were not so important as to require 
comprehensive change and the central mission of the U.S. Army, war-fighting, was not 
threatened.  In contemporary warfare (if warfare is the appropriate term) rapid and regular 
adaptation is the norm.  This style of conflict favors the quickly adapting networked organization 
and disfavors the more sclerotic hierarchical organization.  As Klitgaard argues, “organizations 
designed to implement a particular set of activities often have trouble addressing contingencies 
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outside the norm.”27
In comparison to the U.S. Army an insurgency, as an organization, is an almost perfect 
contradiction.  Modern insurgencies rarely operate as vertically integrated hierarchies, have little 
if any organizational tradition, quickly recognize and respond to changes in the operational 
environment, and must adapt constantly to maintain relevance and in some cases, merely exist.  
Adaptations are not permanent but form part of a corpus of experiential and tacit knowledge that 
informs future organizational change.  Few if any rules govern the insurgency’s actions or limit 
its ability to rapidly adapt. 
  Whether rejected or embraced, irregular conflict is now a central 
component of fighting and winning our nation’s wars and is now more the norm than the outlier. 
As this paper will demonstrate, the insurgency in Iraq is a loose confederation of groups, 
organizations, and individuals with competing (and cooperating) agendas.28
                                                 
27 Klitgaard, Robert, High-Performance Government, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, CA, 
2005, P. 114. 
  The diverse nature 
of the insurgency contributes to its ability to adapt to changes in the environment and to the 
actions of the U.S. Army.  The rather monolithic and hide-bound nature of the U.S. Army retards 
adaptation to changes in the environment and to the actions of the insurgency.  Thus, the cycle of 
adaptation that occurs between these two organizations is likely to be out of synch: inherently, 
the insurgency has the capacity to adapt more rapidly than the U.S. Army. 
28 See Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
New York, 2006, pp. 170-176, Record, Jeffrey, Why Insurgencies Win, Potomac Books, Washington DC, 2007, 
White, Jeffrey, “An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting Adversary Networks in Iraq,” Policy Focus #58, September, 
2006, and International Crisis Group, “In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” Middle East Report No. 
50, 15 February 2006, pp. 1-3. 
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This is a significant problem.  Traditional methods of organizational learning, analysis, 
and change simply do not occur rapidly enough to enable counters to insurgent adaptations.  This 
is most true for doctrinal and home-station training adaptations.  Significant changes to the norm 
require levels of analysis and examination by the institutional Army prior to being broadly 
implemented.  Risk aversion and broad attempts to homogenize lessons learned significantly 
slows institutional adaptation.  The effect of this slowdown cascades through organizational 
levels and is eventually exposed in more deliberate and less innovative cycles of tactical learning 
and adaptation. 
Compounding these problems are the lexicon and methods used and applied in analyzing 
the insurgency.  The informality and networked structure of the insurgency creates an inherent 
resistance to classification and subdues the efficacy of applying conventional terminology to the 
organization.  Strategies, tactics, and methods of analysis developed for formalized and 
hierarchical organizations are insufficient for fighting or understanding the dynamic and 
amorphous nature of the networked insurgent organization.29
This chapter will examine the structural capacity for organizational adaptation and the 
process of organizational adaptation for networked and hierarchical organizations alike.  
Hierarchies and networks are examined in general because these two organizational varieties 
typify two of the organizations competing in OIF: the U.S. Army and the Iraqi insurgency, 
 
                                                 
29 Steve Metz argues that certain traditional terms of reference do not apply to insurgencies.  Although the 
concept of a center of gravity makes sense when examining a hierarchical organization, it has far less relevance for 
networked organizations where there may be no center of gravity or multiple centers of gravity.  Metz, Steven, 
Personal Interview, 6 November 2008. 
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respectively.  The strengths and weaknesses of each type of organization will be reviewed and 
the process of adaptation (examined in context in chapters 6 and 7) will be detailed. 
2.1 STRUCTURAL CAPACITY AND NEED FOR ORGANIZATIONAL 
ADAPTATION 
Both hierarchies’ and networks’ capacity for adaptation is structurally limited.  Hierarchies and 
large organizations (particularly governmental organizations like the U.S. Army) are loathe to 
change, subject to inertial forces, and ill-suited for rapid response to environmental stimuli.  
Networks, which tend to be small and organized for short-term goal accomplishment of limited 
scope, maintain few structures that contribute to inertial forces, and change frequently based on 
environmental stimuli.  But networks, particularly illicit networks like the insurgency in Iraq, are 
structurally limited in their effect and durability over the long term.  Size, capacity for action, an 
inability to coordinate sub-group action and behavior for common objectives, and the need to 
remain mostly anonymous significantly restrict the capabilities of an illicit network.  Thus, a 
tradeoff exists between structure and capacity. 
The U.S. Army’s capacity for adaptation is impeded by a number of bureaucratic faults 
that plague large, hierarchical organizations.  Defensive routines employed by large 
organizations hide errors made by the organization and complicate the adaptive process.30
                                                 
30 See Argyris, Chris, Strategy, Change, and Defensive Routines, Pitman, Boston, 1985 and Argyris, Chris, 
Overcoming Organizational Defenses, Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1990. 
  
Methods employed for maintaining strict organizational control (to include the chain of 
 25 
command, the orders process, an almost complete submission to authority, and management 
techniques that suppress subordinate innovation) also limit opportunities for adaptation.31  The 
embedded, inflexible culture and rigid standard operating procedures common to the U.S. Army 
reduce the prospects of realizing considerable organizational gains through change.32  
Additionally, “most militaries (ours included) prepare for the last war they fought, especially 
victories.  Peacetime rarely sees much innovative action, though some good thinking can come 
up between wars.  When we again fight, we have to be able to pull off Sir Michael Howard’s 
idea of getting things right quickly, or at least faster than our adversary.”33  These attributes are 
particularly pernicious in the current international security environment: “large, conservative, 
bureaucratic organizations can be highly successful in stable environments, but in turbulent and 
unpredictable environments, they do not learn or change fast enough.”34
                                                 
31 Argyris, Chris, “Initiating Change that Perseveres,” American Behavioral Scientist, Volume 40, Number 
3, 1997.  See also, Nirenberg, John, The Living Organization: Transforming Teams into Workplace Communities, 
Pfeiffer & Co., Homewood, IL, 1993 and Milgram, Stanley, Obedience to Authority, Harper Torchbooks, New 
York, 1974. 
  The U.S. Army, 
32 Argyris Chris, Reasoning, Learning, and Action, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1982.  See also, Deevy, 
Edward, Creating the Resilient Organization, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1995, Nystrom, Paul C. and 
William H. Starbuck, “To Avoid Organizational Crises, Unlearn,” Organization Dynamics, Volume 12, Number 4, 
1984 and, Meyer, Marshall W., Environments and Organizations, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1978. 
33 Major General Bolger, Dan, E-mail Interview, 13 September 2008. 
34 Carroll John S., Jenny W. Rudolph, and Sachi Hatakenaka, “Learning from Organizational Experience,” 
The Blackwell Handbook or Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, Eds., Easterby-Smith, Mark and 
Marjorie A. Lyles, Malden, MA, 2003. 
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because of its organizational design is often the “victim of change rather than an agent of 
change.”35
Networks on the other hand adapt quickly but lack the organizational and analytical girth 
to comprehensively estimate environmental changes and assess the effects of these changes on 
the network and on organizational effectiveness (data collection and analysis elements are not 
explicitly designated in this type of organization).  Although sensitive to changes in the 
environment because of heightened risk awareness and an inherent survival instinct that affects 
individuals and organizations, networks do not maintain the structural capacity for significant 
analysis, rigorous testing of competing hypotheses, or controlling the adaptation process.  While 
this might present as a strength when the organization makes a rapid adaptation to change, the 
adaptation made might not have been the best available out of a range of possible options in 
support of organizational goals.  Only if the changes made enhance organizational effectiveness 
in accomplishing the organization’s mission are they of any value.  Adaptation for the sake of 
adaptation, even or especially if for organizational survival, is not necessarily impressive or 
significant in and of itself. 
 
The size of an organization is not necessarily a determinant of an ability to learn or to 
adapt.  Networks are often credited with a structural ability to learn and adapt quickly because of 
the organization’s size (i.e., less time is required to transfer knowledge and lessons to fewer 
members) and intimacy (bonds tend to be stronger in networks, particularly illicit networks like 
an insurgency).  But Brown and Luguid argue that “large, atypical, enacting organizations have 
                                                 
35 Dearth, Douglas H., “Operationalizing Information Operations: C2W…RIP,” Cyberwar 3.0: Human 
Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict, Eds. Campen, Alan D. and Douglas H. Dearth, AFCEA 
International Press, Fairfax, VA, 2000. 
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the potential to be highly innovative and adaptive.”36  Correspondingly, Huber contends that 
even large organizations can learn to adapt and innovate if their administrators better understand 
how organizations learn.37  However, while an understanding of how organizations learn is 
necessary to developing an effective process of or system for adaptation, it must also be 
understood that learning and adaptation might be, and usually are, two different processes.38
Organizational learning occurs when action results in an addition to the organization’s 
knowledge and value base that contributes to an increase in an organization’s problem-solving 
capability.
  An 
organization can learn but if it fails to correctly implement changes to inputs and outputs in the 
adaptation cycle, adaptation will not occur. 
39  Organizational adaptation occurs when an action results in procedural and physical 
adjustments that help an organization better match its inputs and outputs with desired goals and 
objectives.40
                                                 
36 Brown, John Seely and Paul Duguid, “Organizational Learning and Communities of Practice: Toward a 
Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation,” Organization Science, Volume 2, Number 1, February, 1991, 
pp. 53-54. 
  Comparatively, hierarchies tend to be entrenched, conservative organizations that 
shun unorthodox learning and adaptation in favor of more traditional and approved methods of 
top-down change management based on the analysis of lessons within the framework of the 
37 Huber, George P., “Organizational Learning,” Organization Science, Volume 2, Number 1, 1991. 
38 Fiol, C. Marlene and Marjorie A. Lyles, “Organizational Learning,” Academy of Management Review, 
Volume 10, Number 4, 1985. 
39 Probst, Gilbert J. B. and Bettina S. T. Buchel, Organizational Learning: The Competitive Advantage of 
the Future, Prentice Hall, London, 1997. 
40 Ibid.  See also, Marquardt, Michael J., Building the Learning Organization, McGraw Hill, New York, 
1996. 
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organization as it exists; networks, on the other hand, tend to inculcate various methods of 
learning and are more receptive to lessons that challenge prevailing concepts of effectiveness.  
This is at least partly due to the structure of each organization: the larger, hierarchical 
organization can continue to exist even after repeated failures; the much smaller network might 
only need to fail once to no longer be a viable entity.  Therefore networks tend to not view 
learning opportunities (when recognized) as challenges to the organization but as occasions to 
improve organizational efficacy while hierarchies tend to view learning opportunities as mistakes 
to be avoided. 
For the majority of its history, the U.S. Army has viewed challenges to traditional war-
fighting competencies (such as operations other than war (OOTW)) as challenges to the 
organization’s raison d’etre and not as opportunities to learn and adapt but as irregularities to be 
dismissed or ignored.41
                                                 
41 Tierney, John J., Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History, Potomac Books, 2006.  
See also, Beckett, Ian F. W., Armed Forces & Modern Counterinsurgency, Croom Helm, London, 1985, Cassidy, 
Robert M., Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, Praeger Security International, London, 2006, and 
Cassidy, Robert M., “Back to the Streets without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and other Small 
Wars,” Parameters, Summer, 2004. 
  Bottom-up learning from episodes in the irregular has not been 
completely dismissed though.  These experiences are captured by the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned (CALL), at the U.S. Army’s training centers and schools, and are informally maintained 
as tacit knowledge throughout the force.  But tactical learning from experience and training has 
not been a locus of organizational change and adaptation.  Organizational change in the U.S. 
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Army tends to be driven by significant strategic concerns, bureaucratic mandate, or major 
changes in the international security environment.42
The challenges posed by OEF and OIF defy conventional U.S. Army wisdom and have 
forced the Army to do more than just learn, make footnotes, and plan for the next conflict.  These 
operations and the strategy that guides them mesh strategic concerns and bureaucratic mandates 
with the reality of the international security environment.  What is required is rather certain 
knowledge of how networked insurgencies adapt, how the U.S. Army adapts, and how these 
organizations adapt to each other.
 
43  Clearly, there are no off-the-shelf solutions to this problem 
and applying lessons from previous and similar conflicts is necessary but not sufficient.44  
Instead, there is an urgent requirement for an emphasis on and understanding of institutional 
adaptability.45
                                                 
42 This is not to suggest that these changes are always the most appropriate or that change always occurs.  
The U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division has changed from an Airborne unit, to a Pentomic unit, to an Air Assault 
unit over the past 60 years.  The U.S. Army also maintains the XVIII Airborne Corps without a significant mandate 
for large airborne insertion operations.  Too, the U.S. Army was reduced in strength from 18 divisions to 10 
following the end of the Cold War and to date has not significantly increased in size despite a considerable increase 
in operations tempo.   
 
43 Brimley, Shawn, “Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks,” Parameters, Summer, 
2006. 
44 Desch, Michael C., Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain, Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2001. 
45 Hoffman, Frank G., “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?,” Parameters, Summer, 2007. 
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2.2 ELEMENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
Framing and defining how an organization adapts is fundamental to understanding the 
phenomenon and to understanding how the phenomenon can be adjusted to favor or disfavor the 
organization under review.  This is even more important when examining how and the rate at 
which organizations adapt to each other in a competitive environment.  The basic framework of 
this adaptive cycle flows from inputs, to processes, to outputs, to assessment, and finally to 
adaptation.  
2.2.1 Group Design & Culture (composition, norms, and tasks) 
Organization and group design is an integral component of any insurgency.46
First, an organization, over time, typically manifests some form of hierarchy or 
leadership structure.  In smaller organizations this might not have a particularly noticeable effect 
  Organization and 
group design is equally important to the U.S. Army, particularly when considering how difficult 
it is to manage an effective counterinsurgency.  Without a coherent and deliberate design for 
promoting adaptation, an organization might find it impossible to learn and apply lessons to 
effectively accomplish group tasks and goals.  While group design is essential to the 
effectiveness of any organization and for fostering adaptation, it can also present a number of 
significant drawbacks that are difficult to detect. 
                                                 
46 Singh, Bajit and Ko-Wang Mei, Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Asia Publishing 
House, New York, 1971.  See also, Valeriano, Napoleon D. and Charles T. R. Bohannon, Counter-Guerrilla 
Operations: the Philippine Experience, Federick A. Praeger, New York, 1962. 
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but in large organizations a hierarchy tends to ensure that freedom of thought, action, and 
maneuver is progressively proscribed.47  Second, a designed organization also suffers from 
“forces holding it in check…sharply circumscribing the capacity of organizations to react to new 
conditions.”48  Lastly, any organization with a strong leadership structure tends to develop 
frames of reference that support instinctive and reflexive reaction without full comprehension of 
the environmental change that is causing this reaction.49
 Organizational culture develops over time and shares a symbiotic relationship with 
organizational design.  “Cultures are the repositories of what their members agree about.”
  Smaller organizations, particularly 
networks, do not necessarily rely on a hierarchy or centralized leadership for control, tend to be 
safeguarded from the negative effects of organization design flaws and also tend to develop more 
open organizational cultures amenable to change and adaptation. 
50  
Cultures are also the “unique set of organizational and behavioral outcomes of an established 
work group.”51  Cultures can be emotionally charged, historically biased, and inherently 
symbolic and fuzzy, but they can also be dynamic and can be shaped by their environment and 
by learning.52
                                                 
47 Lang, Kurt, “Military Organizations,” Handbook of Organizations, Ed. March, James, Rand McNally & 
Company, Chicago, 1965. 
  Although culture helps shape how an organization is composed, what it believes, 
48 Kaufman, Herbert, The Limits of Organizational Change, University of Alabama Press, Alabama, 1971. 
49 Hamel, Gary and C. K. Prahalad, Competing for the Future, Harvard Business School, Boston, 1994. 
50 Trice, Harrison M. and Janice M. Beyer, The Cultures of Work Organizations, Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, 1993, p. 5. 
51 Elsmore, Peter, Organizational Culture: Organizational Change?, Gower, Burlington, VT, 2001, p. 193. 
52 Trice and Beyer, Op Cit. 
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its norms, and how it goes about task achievement, culture probably has its greatest effect on 
how an organization perceives itself and how it conducts its operations. 
Individuals in an organization, especially a martial organization, are particularly disposed 
to the socializing forces of organizational culture.53  Additionally, culture can either “support or 
nullify the best network designs” despite the design’s apparent flexibility and inherently adaptive 
qualities.54
2.2.2 Organizational Context (goals, rewards, information, training, constraints) 
  Many of the choices that an organization makes as it attempts to adapt are either 
accelerated or impeded by organizational culture. 
Traditionally (and this is especially true for military organizations), organizational form and 
effectiveness relies on the redundancy of the individuals in the organization where each person is 
replaceable by any other individual in the group.55  Furthermore, organizational design implies a 
modicum of constancy in how the organization conducts operations and achieves goals.  A 
typical organization is designed to accomplish the operations that it is expected to prosecute and 
not for ones that might appear in a contingency.56
                                                 
53 Argyris, Chris, On Organization Learning, Blackwell Business, Cambridge, MA, 1993 and Huntington, 
Samuel, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1957. 
  Training within an organization is tailored to 
54 Cross, Rob, and Andrew Parker, The Hidden Power of Social Networks, Harvard Business School, 2004, 
p. 127. 
55 Cherns, A., “The Principles of Sociotechnical Design Revisited,” Human Relations, Volume 4, Number 
3, 1987. 
56 Galbraith, Jay R., “Designing the Innovating Organization,” Organizational Dynamics, Volume 10, 
Winter, 1982. 
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these operations and therefore, because of its heightened importance in OOTW, training 
packages and initiatives must underscore and foster the ability to adapt.57  But in order to achieve 
any sort of innovation, much less adaptation, organizations must be designed for and must 
function in a fashion that supports these initiatives.  Goals and rewards must be linked to 
adaptive conduct, bureaucratic constraints must be relaxed, training must fit the circumstances of 
the mission and environment, and available information must reflect an emphasis on change.  
Innovation will only be adopted because it promotes an advantage; the adopters’ characteristics 
might affect how this advantage is realized.58
In order for an organization to remain vibrant and capable of adaptation, it must be able 
to “develop internal processes that provide the means to handle large-scale and discontinuous 
change.”
  Redundancy and the ability to replicate are 
characteristics that must be replaced with innovation and originality in the adaptive organization. 
59  The Iraqi insurgency has proven to be relatively adept at responding to discontinuous 
change and has demonstrated this in its alternating choice of targets.60
                                                 
57 Metz, Steven and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2004. 
  A steady procession of 
targeting changes (from coalition bases, convoys, national police, civilian targets, infrastructure, 
58 Rogers, Everett M., Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press, New York, 2003, p. 229. 
59 Kiel, Douglas, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, p. 39. 
60 Walter Laquer argues that urban insurgents are indiscriminate in their choice of targets and that their 
targeting choices reflect a desire to create a climate of insecurity.  This allows insurgents to be adaptive in not only 
what they attack but how and when.  This type of adaptation significantly reduces the capabilities of the 
counterinsurgent force (in this case, the U.S. Army) since it forces the observation and protection of various and 
distant target sets.  See Laquer, Walter, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study, Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1976.   
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etc.) evidences how agile and adaptive a networked insurgent organization is in its ability to 
adopt tactics and shift its focus from hard to softer targets as circumstance allows or dictates.  
Conversely, the slower pace of action, reaction, and adaptation demonstrated by the U.S. Army, 
particularly at the higher echelons, highlights an ongoing resistance or inability to change.  These 
differing levels of change and adaptive acumen are likely the result of organizational design, 
culture, and context.  
2.2.3 Material & Technical Resources (equipment, funds, intelligence, operational 
support) and External Assistance (consulting, direct action, cooperation) 
Resources enable and enhance an organization’s ability to conduct missions and to audit its 
performance both during and after mission completion.  This is as true for a hierarchical 
organization as it is for a networked organization.  Ensuring the optimal application and use of 
resources is essential for mission accomplishment.61
                                                 
61 Tomes, Robert R., “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Parameters, Spring, 2004. 
  Equipment can take the form of weaponry, 
bomb making materials, fuel, or tools for recording and transferring information.  Funds can 
appear in the form of tangible goods or currency depending on how each supports mission 
requirements.  Intelligence is vital to generating insight into the likely unfolding of a mission 
before it occurs and might be the most important resource provided by operational level sources.  
Knowledge of the population and social networks as well as accurate and detailed information 
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and support from sources external to the organization helps establish a valid or invalid hierarchy 
or network.62
Consulting occurs when an organization receives information or advice from external 
organizations that are either from within the organizational hierarchy, an extended network, or 
from an external agency.  Direct action is the assistance that an organization might receive from 
local supporters, government agencies, or coalition partners (in the case of the U.S. Army), or 
other insurgent groups (in the case of the insurgency) during the conduct of their missions.
 
63
2.2.4 Critical Group Processes (application of skills and knowledge; task performance 
competency; command, control, and communications; cognition and behavior) 
  
Cooperation can include any form of collaboration with partners from within or from outside the 
organization. 
Each of these processes is instrumental to how an organization accomplishes its goals and is 
critical to the overall performance of the organization.  Collectively, these processes are the 
fundamental enablers of organizational achievement in cooperative action.  A combination of 
                                                 
62 Wesensten, Nancy J. et al, “Cognitive Readiness in Network-Centric Operations,” Parameters, Spring, 
2005.  See also, Zeytoonian, Dan, “Intelligent Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis,” 
Military Review, September-October 2006, and Hamilton, Donald W., The Art of Insurgency: American Military 
Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1998. 
63 Austin Long postulates that an insurgency must rely on either active or passive population support for 
supplies, information, and personnel.  This is also important, but to a lesser degree, for the U.S. Army.  See, Long, 
Austin, On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research, RAND, Santa Monica, 
CA, 2006. 
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decision-making, communications, control of information, and forms of interaction, 
understanding, and behavior are all critical to the effective realization of critical group processes.  
Evaluating and understanding the fundamentals of these critical group processes helps to enable 
greater comprehension of the effect of organizational inputs and facilitates a refinement of 
organizational outputs. 
One aspect of how organizations conduct collective action is the processing of 
information transmitted and received during a mission or activity.  Processing information 
quickly and accurately enables an organization to manage uncertainty and to reduce ambiguity as 
a mission unfolds.64  How this information is processed is a function of organizational structures.  
“Transactional structures are both the products and shapers of information flow.  Where such 
flows are stable and recurrent, such structures will metamorphose into institutions.”65
The interpretation of mission-related information is further shaped by organizational and 
individual cognition and behavior.  Cognition and behavior are important factors in the reception 
and processing of information.  Determining the sources and indicators of cognition and behavior 
are crucial elements of any program designed to improve overall group processes.  As Garvin 
  These 
institutions form a persistent architecture that shapes how information is sent, received, 
processed and consequentially, understood. 
                                                 
64 Daft, Richard L. and Robert H. Lengel, “Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness, and 
Structural Design,” Management Science, Volume 32, Number 5, May 1986. 
65 Boisot, Max H., Information Space, Routledge, New York, 1995, p. 232. 
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asserts, changes in cognition and behavior typically precede any improvements in overall 
performance and are the sine qua non of increasing organizational effectiveness.66
Another component of collective organizational processes is task performance 
competency.  Increasing task performance competency requires an increase in the speed and 
frequency of information flows, a flattened organizational structure freed from the strictures 
associated with layered decision-making, decreased evaluation time on mission success or 
failure, and increased individual and organizational knowledge transfer.  As Khalizad and White 
argue, “reducing the number of management layers not only speeds up the flow of information 
from initial acquirer to ultimate user (since it has fewer stops along the way) but can also 
increase its accuracy (since there are fewer opportunities for distortion, either inadvertent or 
deliberate).”
 
67  In addition to increasing the speed and accuracy of information flows, Khalizad 
and White contend that the U.S. Army, as a component of the U.S. armed forces, must 
experiment with new methods of conducting operations, perform careful assessments of 
operations, and be willing to make small and incremental changes to how operations are 
conducted as new information becomes available.68
                                                 
66 Garvin, David A., “Building a Learning Organization,” Harvard Business Review, Volume 71, Number 
4, 1993. 
  Raising task performance competency 
requires a process facilitated by smaller and flatter organizational structures, the ability to 
incorporate new information, and the ability to rapidly respond to changing circumstance 
67 Khalizad, Zalmay M. and John P. White, The Changing Role of Information in Warfare, RAND, Santa 
Monica, CA, 1999. 
68 Ibid, p. 346. 
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(characteristics that are being improved by the hierarchical U.S. Army but might already be 
present in networked insurgent organizations). 
Despite the fact that organizational communications networks are now so intricate and 
interrelated that they form self-organizing complex systems,69 these systems still require 
organizational and individual input to be optimally effective and mission-relevant.  Part of this 
input is derived from lessons learned through the trial-and-error application of organizational and 
individual skills and knowledge.  Skills and knowledge, abetted by the aforementioned critical 
group processes, are the key determinants of group performance.  The application of skills and 
knowledge affects the group’s ability to exercise these critical processes but are also a major 
determinant of how their supporting structures are formed and exercised.  Collectively, 
individual and group skills and knowledge enable and shape all critical group processes; 
proficiency and competency (or a lack thereof) is reflected in the groups’ overall level of task 
performance.70
                                                 
69 Monge, Peter R. and Noshir S. Contractor, Theories of Communications Networks, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2003. 
 
70 Performance is the measure of the outputs of the organization against a level of inputs and challenges.  
The inputs vital to the performance of both hierarchies and networks (or counterinsurgents and insurgents) include 
all the aforementioned critical group processes. 
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2.2.5 Learning (knowledge collection, knowledge transfer, knowledge integration)71
Learning is a process of acquiring new information and knowledge either through 
instruction or experience.  Organizational learning typically presents in one of two ways:  1) 
Single Loop—“instrumental learning that changes strategies of action or assumptions underlying 
strategies in ways that leave the values of a theory of action unchanged” or; 2) Double Loop—
“learning that results in a change in the values of theory-in-use, as well as in its strategies and 
assumptions” and can even occur within organizations through sub-organization cooperation.
 
72  
The U.S. Army has been, like other large hierarchical organizations, historically prone to 
employing Single Loop learning: while its actions might change, the underlying assumptions and 
hypotheses supporting these actions remain intact.73
A key component of the organizational learning process is organizational knowledge, 
which exists within the organization as a whole (unlike individual knowledge) and is increased 
  Although unproven, this might be true of 
insurgent organizations as well. 
                                                 
71 Jackson, et al, makes the point that understanding how organizations learn can enable anticipatory 
capabilities and create proactive opportunities for analysts and practitioners.  See, Jackson, Brian, et al, Case Studies 
of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Volume II), RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2005. 
72 Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schon, Organizational Learning II, Addison-Wesley Publishing, Reading, 
MA, 1996, pp. 20-21.  See also, Knudsen, Daniel C., The Transition to Flexibility, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Boston, 1996. 
73 Michael Kenney discusses how the organizations involved in counter-drug actions conducted Single 
Loop learning and how this type of learning minimized refinements of organizational goals and prevented 
experimentation with newer or better methods of action.  See Kenney, Michael, From Pablo to Osama, The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 2007. 
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through new types of behavior and though experimental practice.74  An integral element of 
organizational knowledge is the knowledge gained and possessed by individuals as a result of 
organizational instruction, experience, or that gleaned from interaction with external 
organizations.  Differences in both knowledge bases and levels can lead to diverse interpretations 
of events resulting in multiple lessons being learned via the same organizational action.75
Knowledge transfer is vital to the process of improving the learning capacity of an 
organization.  Knowledge transfer requires that an organization be capable of capturing and 
diffusing knowledge throughout the organization or at least to interested parties or individuals.
  This 
can have an unexpected effect on organizational learning and can lead to robust changes if 
captured and incorporated into the organizational dataset via knowledge transfer. 
76  
While all transfers of knowledge require some degree of effort, structures supporting the transfer 
of knowledge tend to remove some of the friction associated with knowledge diffusion77
                                                 
74 Easterby-Smith, et al, Organizational Learning and the Learning Organization, Sage, London, 1999. 
 and are 
75 March, James G., et al, “Learning from Samples of One or Fewer,” Organization Science, Volume 2, 
Number 1, February, 1991. 
76 Campbell argues that rapid knowledge transfer, especially from the lower echelons in the form of lessons 
learned, should become a standard for all of the armed forces.  See Campbell, James D., Making Riflemen from 
Mud: Restoring the Army’s Culture of Irregular Warfare, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA, 2007. 
77 Szulanski, Gabriel and Rossella Cappetta, “Stickiness: Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Predicting 
Difficulties in the Transfer of Knowledge within Organizations,” The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational 
Learning and Knowledge Management, Eds. Easterby-Smith, Mark and Majorie A. Lyles, Blacwell, malden, MA, 
2003. 
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indispensable to capturing the experience gained through experiment or chance occurrence.78  
But even when these structures are in place some knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge, 
cannot be “captured, translated or converted, but only displayed, [or] manifested in what we 
do.”79
Michael Kenney discusses two methods for gaining and integrating knowledge: Metis 
and Techne.  Metis encompasses the skills used to adapt to the environment and is largely 
intuitive (knowledge gained through experience).  Techne refers to abstract and codified 
knowledge like that gained through formal instruction.  Metis and Techne are combined for 
application across a range of activities and reinforce each other by expanding general and 
specific knowledge for practical exercise.  Metis and Techne, although they are differential 
knowledge collection and absorption methods, are mutually reinforcing, fungible to a degree, 
and enhance operational knowledge of specific activities while expanding the pool of skill-based 
knowledge applicable to a range of activities.  Both Metis and Techne are critical components of 
individual knowledge collection and transfer, organizational knowledge collection transfer, and 
organizational adaptation.
 
80
                                                 
78 Carley, Kathleen, “Organizational Learning and Personnel Turnover,” Organization Science, Volume 3, 
Number 1, February, 1993.  This process has become easier for the insurgency and the counterinsurgency in Iraq 
because of popular access to the internet and through the availability of recording and display devices like laptop 
computers, DVDs, cell phones, etc.  See, Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levee en Masse, 
Parameters, Summer, 2006. 
  Thus, experience, in conjunction with knowledge, structures for 
79 Tsoukas, Haridimos, “Do We Really Understand Tacit Knowledge,” The Blackwell Handbook of 
Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, Eds. Easterby-Smith, Mark and Marjorie A. Lyles, 
Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2003, p. 426. 
80 Kenney, Michael, Op Cit. 
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capturing knowledge, transfer capabilities, and integration, form the fundamentals of 
organizational learning. 
In dynamic conditions, such as those that prevail in conflict environments, the timely and 
accurate transfer of information and knowledge from the individuals and organizations involved 
in a mission or event is an essential part of maintaining organizational flexibility and 
adaptability.81  Increasing flexibility and adaptability, in turn, can lead to an opportunity for 
organizations, and their members, to be inured to the process of capturing the lessons of a 
particular event or mission.  Adaptive learning is particularly important in the non-linear and 
complex environment.  But, as Max Boisot maintains, adaptation is not just a process of learning 
but also of unlearning.  “Knowledge may be progressive in the sense that successive 
approximations may give us a better grasp of the underlying structures of reality, but…it is not 
necessarily cumulative.  Subsequent hypotheses cannot always reliably build on preceding ones 
to create a single monolithic edifice.”82
2.2.6 Adaptation 
  For the adaptive organization, the ability to forget the 
lessons of the past is nearly as important or, perhaps, more important than is learning the lessons 
of the present. 
Organizational adaptation refers to a complex process of learning and change.  To be adaptive, 
an organization must take an action to support a particular organizational goal or mission, assess 
                                                 
81 Comfort, Louise, “Self-Organization in Complex Systems,” Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory, Volume 4, Number 3, 1994. 
82 Boisot, Max H., Knowledge Assets, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 99. 
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the performance of this action, and then adjust organizational inputs and outputs to better match 
the goals or mission of the organization based on this prior assessment.83  Conversely, a non-
adaptive system can be characterized as being “low on technical structure, low on organizational 
flexibility, and, for the most part, low on cultural openness.”84  Adaptation at the organizational 
level is achieved through a series of incremental changes throughout the organization.85
There are many factors affecting an organization’s ability to adapt.  “Adaptive lag” can 
occur when an organization must make major changes requiring numerous resources and copious 
amounts of time.
  To be 
effective, these changes must support the furtherance of the organization’s goals or mission and 
must be supported by the aforementioned components of the adaptation process. 
86  Hierarchical organizations tend to make both small and large changes slowly 
while networked organizations tend to make comprehensive and striking changes rather quickly.  
This is true for the U.S. Army (especially at the higher echelons) and for the insurgency in Iraq, 
respectively.87
                                                 
83 Probst, Gilbert J. B. and Bettina S. T. Buchel, Op Cit.  See also, Marquardt, Michael J., Op Cit. 
  In part, this might reflect differences in risk calculation (the insurgents have 
84 Comfort, Louise, Shared Risk, Pergamon, Amsterdam, 1999, p. 68. 
85 Edmondson, Amy C. and Anita Williams Wooley, “Understanding Outcomes of Organizational Learning 
Interventions,” The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, Eds. Easterby-
Smith, Mark and Marjorie A. Lyles, Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2003. 
86 Adapting too quickly can cause an organization to incur unnecessary costs in the form of mal-adaptation 
or adapting to the wrong signals in its external environment.  See, Miller, Danny and Peter H. Friesen, 
Organizations: A Quantum View, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984, pp. 216-217. 
87 This pattern more closely follows that of interwar innovation where organizations tied change to past 
experience and assessed experiment.  See, Knox, MacGregor and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military 
Revolution, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001. 
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fewer inhibitions and structurally imposed constraints),88 the cost of resources (the U.S. Army 
has enormously higher costs of operation and change than does the insurgency), or the U.S. 
Army’s tendency, like many large organizations, to focus on short-term goals without making 
corresponding changes to long-term objectives.89  The habitual use of successful methods 
(causing the organization to prefer their continued use at the expense of other experimental 
methods) and a lack of peer competitors also affect the rate and occurrence of adaptation in an 
organization.90
In complex environments like that in Iraq or in other real or potential counterinsurgency 
environments, the ability to rapidly adapt might determine success or failure for the 
organizations involved in any contest of competing missions.
 
91
                                                 
88 Rabasa, et al, argues that successful counterinsurgency requires “unfettered adaptability” and this can be 
achieved by granting counterinsurgents local autonomy.  See, Rabasa, et al, Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned 
from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, pp. 69-70.  Mockaitis agrees 
and argues that “tight control of operational units does not work well in a counterinsurgency.”  See, Mockaitis, 
Thomas R., The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future, Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2007, p. 41. 
  Adaptation in these 
89 Holling, C. S., “From Complex Regions to Complex Worlds,” 2004, ecologyandsociety.org, Volume 9, 
Issue 1, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss1/art11, accessed 17 December 2007. 
90 Sitkin, Sim B., “Learning Through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses,” Organizational Learning, Eds. 
Cohen, M. D. and L. S. Sproull, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994.  See also, Gunderson, Lance H. and C. S. Holling, 
Panarchy, Island Press, WA, 2002. 
91 Metz, Steven, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern 
Warfare, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2000.  See also, Metz, Steven, Learning 
from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 
PA, 2007. 
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environments must occur, at a minimum, at the tactical level where opponents are pitted in their 
struggle and, for the counterinsurgent, this adaptation must be resourced and nourished by higher 
command authorities.92
2.3 CONCLUSIONS 
  Valuable organizational lessons can be drawn from this adaptation that 
affects not only the lower echelons but the middle and higher ones as well.  Acquiring and 
ensuring adaptability as a core competency will promote success in regular and irregular 
conflicts alike. 
The previous description of the process of organizational adaptation must be put into proper 
context.  While understanding, detailing, and revealing the process of organizational adaptation 
is in itself valuable it is not nearly as useful as when it is set within a larger framework of 
environmental perception and decisions made based on this perception.  Perception and broad 
organizational planning based on this perception constrain, limit, and in some rare cases, expand 
organizational opportunities for adaptation.93
                                                 
92 Nagl, John A., Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002. 
  When large hierarchical entities arrive at decisions 
93 The rare cases are where adaptation is not treated as a happenstance or reaction but instead is targeted 
and accelerated by the design of the system.  Individuals and organizations naturally adapt but this process can be 
augmented (if carefully implemented and monitored) by creating structures and processes that enable adaptation.  
For example, if used accordingly, communications can enable an organization to obtain greater self- and situational 
awareness.  This awareness, combined with sound decision making and proper execution, can lead to greater 
organizational effectiveness, enhanced learning opportunities, and accelerated adaptation.  But there are many 
unforeseen drawbacks to planned structural adaptive accelerants and these drawbacks can lead to a reduced ability to 
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that encompass the entire organization, future decisions and thus the ability to adapt are 
necessarily circumscribed.  For instance, if the U.S. Army were to make the choice, plan, budget, 
and implement acquisition and training for an entirely armored force, it cannot quickly or easily 
reverse this decision, particularly once the decision has been acted on by the force.  The funds, 
knowledge base, and structures supporting such a decision are durable and encumber the 
organization for a significant period of time.  Additionally, the intangible, tacit, cultural, and 
cognitive aspects derived from and related to this choice further constrain future options for 
change, learning, and adaptation.  The choices made either position the organization closer to or 
further from the ideal organizational form for organizational mission achievement.94  Proximity 
to or distance from the ideal is significant for the process of organizational adaptation.95
                                                                                                                                                             
adapt.  For instance, an overloaded communications system can cause system-wide failure, mission failure, or can 
effect an inundation of the intended recipient(s).  In this case, the implementation of a system to enhance adaptation 
may actually serve to reduce its realization. 
  
94 This is important in the current (or any for that matter any) environment.  As Nagl argues, “The demands 
of conventional and unconventional warfare differ so greatly that an organization optimized to succeed in one will 
have great difficulty in fighting the other.”  Ibid, p. 219. 
95 Of course, the ideal (a Platonic ideal) organizational form is impossible to achieve but it is a useful 
yardstick for measuring an organization’s ability to accomplish its objectives and for its ability to adapt.  For 
instance, perfect (or ideal) organizational adaptation would occur instantaneously and automatically.  Each degree of 
separation from the ideal indicates an organizational flaw.  Even if these flaws cannot be corrected (hence, no 
organization is ideal) they do indicate weaknesses.  Where flaws are significant, they can be improved on a spectrum 
approaching as near to the ideal as possible.  The conceptual ideal is important for recognizing flaws that cannot be 
repaired and flaws that can be repaired and for indicating what repairs/corrections should or should not be attempted 
or made.  This helps clarify changes to organizational inputs and outputs in the adaptive process. 
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Encompassing decisions either expand or contract options for future change and thus determine 
the level of adaptation required by the organization. 
The further removed an organization is from the ideal, the more that organization will 
have to adapt to achieve organizational success as defined by mission accomplishment or goal 
realization.96
The ability to adapt and the proper resourcing of this adaptation is fundamental to the 
process of achieving organizational success in a dynamic environment and when competing 
against another organization (or organizations) in this environment.  The decisions made prior to 
engaging in this competition are significant determinants of the ability to adapt and thus the 
ability to achieve organizational success.  The next two chapters will examine decisions made in 
regard to the U.S. Army as it restructured in the wake of the end of the Cold War period and as it 
  This poses a significant problem for any form of organization.  For example, if an 
organization needs greater size in order to achieve organizational goals but cannot increase its 
membership because of security concerns or insufficient resources, then the organization will 
either have to make significant changes to its inputs or will have to adjust outputs to better reflect 
capacity.  Likewise, if an organization is well resourced and large but is too cumbersome to enact 
rapid changes either to structure, training, equipment, etc., then the organization will also have to 
adjust either inputs or outputs or both. 
                                                 
96 For example, Austin Long argues that, “a force that is structured to fight a high-intensity conflict against 
another nation-state’s military is ill-equipped to adapt to the challenge of COIN.  It is not just physically ill equipped 
but, much more importantly, mentally ill equipped.” Also, “by virtue of long years of training and education, 
officers are inculcated with patterns of thinking that reflect this culture.  In the case of the U.S. military, these 
patterns are both incredibly useful in high-intensity conflict (the mission of most of the military) and incredibly 
inappropriate in COIN.”  See, Long, Austin, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Paper 6, 2008, p. 27. 
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progressed into the 21st century, through the events of 11 September 2001 and OEF, and as it 
embarked on OIF.   
 49 
3.0  ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS: CONSTRAINING ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
AFTER THE COLD WAR 
“Neither a wise man nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of 
the future to run over him.”—Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 
The closing stages of the Cold War can be viewed as the beginning of the end for monopolized 
control of the international security environment by nation-states.  Although states have never 
had complete control over the dispensation of violence within or across their borders nor over the 
behavior of other actors and organizations within the system of states, they have, for at least the 
majority of the 20th century, been recognized as the principal arbiters of exchange in war, 
conflict, and negotiation.  For example, states and state-based organizations created the post-
World War II system of inter- and intra-state security maintenance as well as the rules and laws 
of war governing state- and non-state based violence through various international conventions 
and accords.  International forums for negotiation, cooperation, and rule enforcement, like the 
United Nations (UN) and the UN Security Council, were also established by states for the 
creation and maintenance of binding international agreements drafted by member nations.  These 
creations modified state and non-state organizational behavior (through internationally imposed 
and accepted rules and procedures) and created barriers to entry into the international security 
environment by competitors not sanctioned by a state or the system of states (states and their 
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proxies were, for the most part, the only officially recognized entities in the international security 
system during the Cold War).  States have also been instrumental in brokering agreements 
between and amongst other states as well as between and amongst states and sub-state actors.97
Although this system by no means collapsed alongside the Soviet Union in 1991, it 
certainly lost saliency with the global retreat from superpower rivalry and with the rise of 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) filling many of the roles traditionally 
played by states, particularly in the Third World or spaces formerly occupied with a U.S. or 
Soviet presence.
 
98
In conjunction with and as a contributor to the demise of monopolistic state control over 
the international security environment has been the viral spread of the tools and forces associated 
  Organizations that were once suppressed by states, either by design or 
through circumstantial means of control imposed by the framework of the international security 
system, were now much freer to organize, operate, and evolve. 
                                                 
97 For instance, the United States negotiated ceasefires and peace accords between Israel and Egypt and 
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization and took an active part in dozens of UN sponsored actions around 
the globe. 
98 The rise of international NGOs has been attributed to the vacuum created by the end of the Cold War, 
particularly in respect to declining foreign aid, the opening of Eastern Europe, the UN legitimization of cross-border 
NGO intervention in humanitarian crises, and the prevalence of democratic elections in the post-Cold War period in 
much of the Third World.  See Lindenberg, Marc and Coralie Bryant, Going Global: Transforming Relief and 
Development NGOs, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2001, pp. 9-11.  It is not that international NGOs and illicit 
organizations did not exist during the Cold War but an increase in their size, scope, and freedom of maneuver has 
been correlated with the fall of the Soviet Union.  It should be noted that the vacuum following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union also allowed for the rise of more nefarious organizations as well: transnational criminal groups, 
transnational terrorist organizations, and multiform ethnonationalist organizations.  See, Pillar, Paul, Terrorism and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, Brookings, Washington DC, 2003, pp. 41-43.   
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with globalization.99
The weakening of the international state system combined with the previously mentioned 
forces of globalization led to a new era of international order (or disorder) where state- and non-
state agencies and organizations are in competition with one another for, through various means, 
  Of particular importance to the international security environment has been 
the increased incidence and ease of travel (aided by the removal of many formal and informal 
restrictions placed on travel to and from formerly communist countries, reduced costs of travel, 
and the increased availability of forms of international travel) and the exponential growth, 
availability, and use of communications devices (aided by ubiquitous cell phones and laptop 
computers, various miniaturized data storage devices, pervasive internet accessibility, and 
manifold encryption technologies).  The increased access to and use of various forms of 
international travel and communication made borders less relevant and put peoples and states in 
closer propinquity.  Organizations of various types and functions were enabled by and adapted to 
this expanded freedom of communicative means and movement. 
                                                 
99 Gompert and Gordon comprehensively argue that globalization provides “the easy flow of information, 
technology, ideas, people, substances, and money; vulnerability of world markets, links, infrastructure, and 
commons; the rise of dissatisfied nonterritorial communities that transcend, defy, and weaken national identification; 
antipathy toward the values and effects of globalization, especially among its ‘losers’; revival of old identities and 
communities, especially religious ones, kept in check by the nation-state system; growing viability and capabilities 
of nonstate actors; the significance for all states of fragile and failed states; turbulence and disorientation that come 
with rapid change; connectivity and mobility that can be controlled only at great difficulty and cost; the immediacy 
and amplification of the impact of actions due to global media, making the ‘propaganda of the deed’ more important 
than the material effects of the deed.”  See Gompert, David C. and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means: Building 
Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. 25. 
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control of geography, people, and ideas.100  The post-Cold War international security 
environment leveled the field of competition insofar as non-state agencies and organizations can 
spar at various levels, if not yet equally, with their state-based counterparts.101  While states and 
the coercive arsenals they maintain still act as price-setters in the international market of security 
provision, the use of force, and of negotiation among people and groups of people, and will 
likely maintain this position of prominence for quite some time, the end of the Cold War and the 
concurrent spread of the forces of globalization marked a weakening of and departure from many 
of the constraints once created through and imposed by the international state system.  This is 
important for the development of any organization that is international or intends to be 
international in disposition and scope.  As Brian Jackson asserts, “The environment in which any 
given group operates is perhaps the dominant factor influencing both the group’s incentive and 
its capacity to learn.  The environment defines the group’s operational opportunities and the 
types of learning it might pursue to take advantage of them.”102
                                                 
100 Thomas Barnett argues that “the sources of mass violence have migrated downward, or from the state to 
the individual” and that “traditional economic power and competition have migrated upward, or from the state to the 
system.”  This is a truly disturbing trend in the post-Cold War international security environment and represents a 
marked shift from the bipolar security system that evolved out of World War II and its focus on states and state 
power.  See, Barnett, Thomas P.M., The Pentagon’s New Map, Berkley Books, NY, 2005, p. 85. 
  At the end of the Cold War, 
states and sub-state organizations were entering a new security environment where the erosion of 
traditional borders and other means of state control were forcing a revaluation if not redesign of 
101 As Phil Williams notes, “Nonstate actors are generally able to use the Internet as a force multiplier in 
their competition with states.”  See, Williams, Phil, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of 
the State and U.S. Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2008, p. 30. 
102 Jackson, Brian A., et al, Op Cit, pp. 43. 
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“existing paradigms.”103  Organizations operating in the post-Cold War environment, be they 
state-, sub-state, or transnational in nature, would have to create and/or maintain an ability to 
adapt to a rapidly changing and unpredictable international security system in order to survive 
and accomplish organizational objectives.  Existing paradigms would not be adequate in the 
post-Cold War world.  As Washington would find out, “mutual annihilation meant reliance on 
principles that were not easily transferred from one security era to the next.”104
This chapter will examine how the emergence and interpretation of the post-Cold War 
international security environment affected U.S. Army organizational development and how the 
decisions made regarding the structure, focus, and employment of the U.S. Army in this 
environment limited or expanded its capacity for organizational adaptation in the post-9/11 
world.  These antecedent conditions are of significant import, indeed instrumental, in shaping 
how organizational forms evolved in the post-Cold War environment.  Additionally, the choices 
made in response to the changes occurring in this period critically constrained (as will be 
demonstrated in this chapter) and enabled (as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters) the 
future ability of the U.S. Army to adapt organizationally following the attacks of 9/11 and 
subsequently, during OIF. 
 
                                                 
103 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, NDP, December 
2007. 
104 Lambakis, Steven J., “Reconsidering Asymmetric Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 36, 2004. 
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3.1 THE POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, 
PART I (THE THIRD WORLD) 
It is difficult to calculate the total effect that the end of the Cold War had on the international 
security environment although part of this effect was obvious:  “the demise of the Cold War 
lessened fears about dangers that might stem from a massive confrontation of the military forces 
of the two sides in Europe, the Soviet-American nuclear arms race spiraling out of control, or the 
initiation, spread, and escalation of proxy wars fought in developing countries as part of the 
broad ideological struggle.”105  Another partial effect of the end of the Cold War was less 
obvious: “policymakers and academics who focused on superpower competition often failed to 
recognize that in the long term it is regional and local factors—not necessarily related to 
superpower competition—that have determined and will determine the course of politics in the 
transitional area where the majority of the world’s population live, and in many cases barely 
survive.”106  Additionally, because the forty odd years of international tension that the Cold War 
created had now for the most part come to an end, some assumed that the end of superpower 
rivalry would usher in an era of unprecedented and persistent peace.107
                                                 
105 “Introduction,” Violent Conflict in the 21st Century, Eds. Charles Hermann, Harold K Jacobson, and 
Anne S. Moffat, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Midwest Center, Chicago, IL, December, 1997, p. vi. 
  Others offered a less 
sanguine and countervailing viewpoint insofar as the end of the Cold War signaled a new, less 
predictable, era where persistent conflict would prevail and where proxy and smaller wars would 
106 Sloan, Stephen, “Introduction,” Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, Eds. Edwin G. 
Corr and Stephen Sloan, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1992, p. 4. 
107 See for instance, Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, Avon Books, New York, 
1992. 
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continue, albeit without their superpower sponsors:  “the perception that the Cold War released a 
pent-up torrent of ethnonationalist conflict was, however, to a significant degree illusory, for 
such conflict had been pervasive during the Cold War period.”108  Steven R. David went so far as 
to link the states of the former Soviet Union with those of the Third World in their inherent 
ability to sow disorder in the international security environment merely by failing to be 
democratic and therefore bereft of the “peace-inducing effects that this form of governance 
provides.”109
Although the end of the Cold War did lessen the chances of a general, world war, either 
on the Eurasian landmass or through a massive nuclear exchange, its end also contributed to the 
eruption of various destabilizing dynamics as the superpowers’ control over and maintenance of 
the international security system waned.
 
110
                                                 
108 Freeman, Michael, “Theories of Ethnicity, Tribalism and Nationalism,” Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics, 
Ed. Kenneth Christie, Curzon Press, Surrey, UK, 1998, p. 15. 
 As Gregory O’Hayon notes, “when the Cold War 
ended, many believed that the final hurdle blocking the realization of Kant’s idealist dream had 
109 David, Steven R., “The Necessity for American Intervention in the Post-Cold War World,” The United 
States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era, The Aspen Institute, Washington, DC, 1995, pp. 40-41. 
110 One of these destabilizing factors was the re-emergence of tribal forms of governance and association 
throughout the Third World and in the transition countries of Eastern Europe.  Kenneth Christie notes that various 
tribal sentiments and other uncontrollable forces existed prior to colonialism, throughout the Cold War, and beyond.  
He links these sentiments to the existence of tribal forms that existed as an early form of human organization, well 
prior to the creation of modern nation-states.  His argument is that these tribal organizational forms have existed and 
will continue to exist regardless of the overarching system imposed upon them.  See, Christie, Kenneth, 
“Introduction: The Problem with Ethnicity and ‘Tribal’ Politics”, Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics: a Global 
Perspective, Curzon Press, Surrey, UK, 1998. 
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been eliminated.”111  O’Hayon also notes that “the peace dividend promised by the end of the 
superpower confrontation failed to materialize in many parts of the world…history had not 
ended; in fact it was fuelling the Revenge of Nations, as ideological conflicts were being 
replaced by identity-based ones.  Also, rather than dampening the sources of conflict, 
globalization was in fact fanning its flames.”112  The coincidence of the end of the Cold War 
with globalization set in motion a series of changes whereby largely unrestrained, in fact 
empowered, non- or sub-state actors and organizations emerged and states became “less certain 
of their authority and much less certain of the utility of using armed force to make war against 
other states or to ensure order and stability at home.”113
Secondary and tertiary effects of the end of the Cold War were even more difficult to 
ascertain.  Although the Cold War had ended and the fear-inducing concept of nuclear 
annihilation receded, other, perhaps more pernicious enemies, largely subdued since the end of 
World War II, gained renewed strength and an enhanced significance.  The international security 
environment had changed significantly enough to allow the emergence and, in some cases, 
reemergence of a variety of sub-state criminal, terrorist, and other armed organizations.  The 
most significant change for these organizations in the post-Cold War international security 
environment was that, because of empowering effects of globalization, they were far more 
capable of sowing disorder both domestically and abroad.  The changes wrought by the demise 
  
                                                 
111 O’Hayon, Gregory B., Big Men, Godfathers, and Zealots: Challenges to the State in the New Middle 
Ages, Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2003, p. 469. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Burk, James, “Introduction, 1998: Ten Years of New Times,” The Adaptive Military, Ed. James Burk, 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1998. 
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of the Soviet Union and processes of globalization put these sub-state organizations in a unique 
position while concurrently putting states and their militaries in a compromised position. Sub-
state actors, nefarious or otherwise, could, with relative impunity, engage in a variety of 
behaviors not in accordance with international norms and agreements because of their status. The 
Cold War international security system was built upon the assumption that states (not sub-state 
actors) and state-based or state-sponsored organizations would be the arbiters of order and 
conduct in perpetuity.  Therefore, states had no well defined mechanisms for dealing with sub-
state organizations that failed to recognize and respect the conventions of Cold War-era state-
based order.114
Robert Mandel warned of the emerging transformation of the international security 
environment due to the end of the Cold War:  “conflict in this new era does not appear likely to 
be organized, premeditated, large-scale war among the great powers over ideological 
differences…the utility of such wars has declined, while its costs have risen substantially.”
  In a weakened system where states were deemed the supreme ordering entity and 
most contracts, laws, treaties, and codes of conduct were emplaced to support the functioning of 
the state, sub-state actors, with sufficient power, could play a spoiling and undermining role.  In 
the post-Cold War, globalized environment, the system was critically weakened. 
115
                                                 
114 This problem exists yet today.  Of particular notoriety is the inability of states to properly classify and 
handle purported members or affiliates of al-Qaeda under existing law.  Even after 8 years of judicial interpretation 
and review, the proper status of ‘enemy combatants’ is still being questioned. 
  
Mandel also argued that the post-Cold War international security arrangement “appears to 
encompass a three-stage process incorporating the decline of national sovereignty, the escalation 
115 Mandel, Robert, The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis, Greenwood Press, 
Westport, CT, 1994, p. 7. 
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of global interdependence, and the proliferation of anarchic conflict.”116  In a similar vein, 
Steven Metz concluded that “the structure of the future global security system will probably 
replicate the late Cold War system in that sub-state, state, and supra-state actors will all remain 
strategically significant.  The relationship of the three elements, however, will change.”117
3.1.1 The New, Old Third World 
  
While the patent threat of superpower conflict remained omnipresent, if however unlikely in the 
post-Cold War environment, it was being augmented, if not surpassed, by other threats 
emanating from decaying backwaters of strategic importance largely ignored during the Cold 
War and almost completely forgotten in the near post-1991 period: the Third World.  The 
emergence of the Third World and various actors and organizations spawned by Third World 
states would help to muddy even further the strategic relationship between the sub-state, state, 
and supra-state organizations that Metz identified.  
Beginning with the decline of, particularly, European colonial powers after the 
conclusion of World War II, many Third World countries, especially those recently winning 
independence from colonial rule, sought or were compelled to take outside assistance and 
subsidy from the two bipolar superpowers.  Much of this assistance came in the form of 
currency, weapons, or through the covert or direct support of the aligned government against an 
                                                 
116 Ibid, p. 2. 
117 Metz, Steven, et al, The Future of American Landpower: Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century 
Army, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 12 March 1996. 
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insurgency or for the support of a guerrilla movement against a non-aligned opponent.118
The end of the Cold War affected the Third World doubly:  proxies of the Soviet Union 
and the United States were no longer beneficiaries of superpower largess as their minimal 
strategic importance declined further still in the post-Cold War security environment.  As many 
aligned Third World nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America lost their superpower sponsors 
  Other 
assistance was less tangible but no less real: political support manifested in the underwriting of 
the regime in power.  The cost of such support to the host nation was minimal and usually 
exacted no more toll than a pledged allegiance to one pole or another of the Cold War bipolar 
system.  Conversely, the loss of support by the antagonists of the Cold War, as occurred after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, imposed devastating costs on many nations of the Third World and 
to the nations that counted on these countries being stable partners in the maintenance of the 
international security environment. 
                                                 
118 Richard J. Barnett notes that the Reagan administration was the first administration to underwrite a 
global program of guerrilla action against governments aligned to the Soviet Union.  See, Barnett, Richard J., “The 
Costs and Perils of Intervention,” Low Intensity Warfare, Eds. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluth, Pantheon 
Books, NY, 1988, p. 213.  But the Reagan administration was not the first to support guerrilla movements or 
governments fighting against guerrilla movements on a case by case basis.  This occurred numerous times in Latin 
America throughout the history of the United States and to a lesser extent in Europe and Southeast Asia.  The Soviet 
Union likewise had an extensive program of supporting guerrilla movements and insurgencies throughout the Third 
World; sometimes directly as in Afghanistan and sometimes indirectly as in Angola through Cuban proxy.  What 
was noticeably different about the Reagan Doctrine was its correlation to Containment and how Containment during 
that administration was a “proactive rather than a reactive strategy.”  See, Lehman, Christopher M., “Protracted 
Insurgent Warfare: The development of an Appropriate U.S. Doctrine,” Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency, 
Eds. Richard Schultz, et al, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1989, p. 128. 
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and as globalization’s products spread to the far reaches of the planet’s population, the United 
States government and the military establishment came to identify and define the threat to the 
United States and to world order not as a nation-state, rival, or burgeoning power but as more or 
less as a concept: uncertainty.119
Despite its purported role as the ‘world’s policeman,’ supervision of the international 
security system was not a top priority of the United States and its allies immediately following 
the end of the Cold War.  Instead, the United States and other countries were busy reaping the 
‘peace dividend’ paid by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the planned reduction of resources 
that were for five decades devoted to the maintenance of the Cold War security system.
 
120
                                                 
119 Snow, Donald M., “The Shifting Threat and American National Security: Sources and Consequences of 
Change,” The Adaptive Military, Ed. James Burk, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1998, p. 118. 
  
Consequently, Third World states were largely left to their own devices.  Instead of reaping their 
own ‘peace dividend’, Third World states were now forced to provide for their own security and 
order and with their own meager resources.  Thus, the cost of peace between the United States 
and the former Soviet Union would prove high for many Third World states in the post-Cold 
War world.  As state-based control of the international security environment languished and as 
military and intelligence assets were directed away from the various areas of the globe that they 
previously occupied, the somewhat tidy and largely predictable, if frightening balance achieved 
by the superpowers during the Cold War, began to fade.  In its place was left an imbalance of 
then poorly identified strategic significance: the uncertainty and unpredictability fomented by 
120 Much to the chagrin of the U.S. Army, “the benefits of this ‘peace dividend’ were never realized.”  
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, 5 September 2008, p. 1-2. 
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various Third World states’ inability to maintain their share of order in the new international 
security environment. 
A significant portion of this uncertainty emanated from “the breakup of states, the 
creation of new ‘nation-states’, and the rise of ethno-nationalism and ultra-nationalist political 
forces in many parts of the world”121 previously kept in check by colonial or superpower 
pervasion throughout the international security environment.  As Kim Kadesch argues, the 
“dynamic nature of the international strategic environment is, in large part, a product of the 
strategy that our nation pursues.”122
 
  It should be added that the obverse is also true: the dynamic 
nature of the international strategic environment is largely a product of the strategy that the 
United States and other nations do not pursue.  As the United States grappled with defining a 
comprehensive strategy in the post-Cold War era, the Third World languished.  Despite the small 
bit part that the Third World played in defining strategy during the Cold War era and the even 
smaller role it played in the early post-Cold War era, its value in the calculus of ensuring balance 
and order in the international security system was about to change. 
                                                 
121 Posen, Barry R. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security, Ed. Michael E. Brown, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993, p. 3. 
122 Kadesch, Kim R., The Army After Next: On a Collision Course with Strategic Reality, Strategy 
Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1998, p. 9. 
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3.1.2 The Third World Evolves into a Strategic Player, Sort of 
As the United States began developing a post-Cold War strategy absent the pervasive threat of 
the Soviet Union, disorder in the international security system was starting to mount.  In the 
Horn of Africa, the Caucuses, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, the seemingly dormant 
forces of disorder were starting to marshal strength and resources as a new phenomenon 
emerged: ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states.123  There was (and still is, perhaps increasingly so) cause for 
concern.  Many of these states, although not inherently strategically valuable in their own right, 
bordered or were a part of the strategically sensitive regions of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
Union, Southwest Asia, and Eastern Africa.  Post-Cold War political breakdowns manifested in 
or were the result of poor internal governance, serious resource depletion, significantly disrupted 
economic and trade systems, and loss of control or dissolution of state police and military 
services.  Disruptions to what were, at best, the poorly functioning states of the Third World and 
the transition countries led to sub-state communal organizations seeking redress through 
alternative, and usually, less understood and less public forms of governance and order.  As Olga 
Oliker and Thomas Szayna note, “the absence of effective political institutions makes it more 
likely that public discontent will take extralegal forms.”124
                                                 
123 Although the number of failed states is low, the number of failing states is quite high. 
  Additionally, “weak institutions and 
limited central control make it more likely that dissatisfied groups will have the capacity to 
124 Oliker, Olga and Thomas S. Szayna, Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: 
Implications for the U.S. Army, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003, p. xx. 
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mobilize and acquire weaponry.”125  The burdens of basic governance and responding to the will 
and needs of the people tended to be more than many Third World countries could handle.126
Where groups of people could not seek redress for their grievances, service provision, or 
satisfactory law enforcement and dispute resolution from the state, they devolved into smaller, 
sub-state organizations and developed alternative forms of governance and rule enforcement.  
Many of these organizations and groups formed based on ethnography, kinship, community, or 
tribal relations; their allegiance to the state or the idea of a state became less important than 
group and/or organizational survival.  These organizations and groups were little concerned with 
larger, post-Cold War, strategic issues and were likely even less concerned with meeting their 
country’s (or in some cases, their former country’s) international obligations to uphold order and 
the rule of law.  When conflict erupted in these areas, “there was a general disregard for 
conventional distinctions between people, army and government.”
  
127
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
 Additionally, “virtually no 
rules of traditional warfare apply…there is normally no formal declaration or termination of 
conflict, no easily identifiable enemy military formations to attack and destroy, no specific 
territory to take and hold, no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, no 
international legal niceties such as mutually recognized national borders and Geneva 
126 Jones, Douglas D.  Understanding Measures of Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency Operations, School 
of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 
2006, p. 18. 
127 Duffield, Mark, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security, Zed 
Books, London, 2001, p. 58. 
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Conventions to help control the situation, and no guarantee that any agreement between or 
among contending authorities will be honored.”128
The new post-Cold War international security environment, with its share of traditional, 
transitional, and failed states, and relaxed international controls on state and sub-state behavior 
ensured that certain destabilizing characteristics were likely to endure: “significant complexity, 
turbulent change, wildly ranging scenarios of power centers and polarities, multiple revolutions 
across several domains and…profound uncertainty.”
 
129  As Martin van Creveld argues, “what we 
witness is not the establishment of a new disorder; instead, it represents a reversion to the old 
one.”130  In this sense, what many perceived as new actors on the international security scene 
were actually old ones that had been suppressed or co-opted by the state or the international 
security structure but were now freed from formal international or state-based tethers.  In some 
cases, control shifted from “legitimate governments to new half-political, half-criminal powers” 
that would prosper in a “failed-state operational environment.”131
                                                 
128 Fishel, John T. and Max G. Manwaring, Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, University of Oklahoma Press, 
Norman, OK, 2006, p. 45-46. 
  Failed states allowed for the 
emergence of traditional and non-traditional power centers such as sheiks, warlords, and 
chieftains, to name but a few.  Each of these power-brokers posed problems for any effort to 
129 Frost, Robert S., The Growing Imperative to Adopt ‘Flexibility’ as an American Principle of War, 
Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 1999, pp. 34-35. 
130 Creveld, Martin van, The Culture of War, Ballantine Books, NY, 2008, p. 304. 
131 Bunker, Robert J., Five-Dimensional (CYBER) Warfighting: Can the Army After Next be Defeated 
Through Complex Concepts and Technologies?, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
10 March 1998, p. 1. 
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impose ‘normal’ systems of governance in areas where traditional order had weakened or, more 
rarely, dissolved. 
The same state breakdown that produced non-traditional forms of governance and 
organization also led to the creation of significant swaths of territory, or cleavages, where laws 
and rules applied only in the vaguest sense.  Where sheiks, warlords, and chieftains emerged, so 
too did various forms of illicit organizations.  As Wyn Rees argues, “both organized crime and 
terrorism are believed to flourish in the same environments where there is disorder and an 
absence of governmental control”; i.e, failed and failing states.132
In regions where multiple transitional, failing, or failed states shared a common border, 
this devolution from formal government would prove particularly disruptive.  Local illicit 
organizations were free to join with transnational illicit organizations of criminal, terrorist, 
genocidal, or other intent.  When these organizations made their way into population centers, 
particularly in the Third World, the problem only intensified.  As is typical of most Third World 
  Crime, organized or 
otherwise, tends to be endemic in areas where government imposed order breaks down.  
Particularly vexing and dangerous in the post-Cold War era is how criminal organizations not 
only emerged in areas where government interference and control was weak but also how they 
migrated to these areas to avoid any impositions on their activities or prosecution by law 
enforcement agencies that tend exist in a more traditionally ordered society.  Aided by advanced 
communications and modes of travel, various illicit transnational groups found a welcome home 
in areas where the state was weakened or failing, particularly in the Third World and transition 
countries. 
                                                 
132 Rees, Wyn, “Linking Organised Crime and Terrorism,” ECPR Standing Group on Organised Crime 
Newsletter, Volume 5, Issue 2, May 2006, p. 8. 
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and transition countries, concentrations of people, whether clustered in a city or in homogenous 
identity-based enclaves within a city, posed significant problems for any internal or external 
agency seeking to restore order by propping up or creating a semblance of a working 
government.  Urban operations are particularly difficult for organized forces given the 
complexity of the terrain and the anonymity of the people occupying this terrain.  For military 
organizations planning to conduct operations in an urban area, the built-up, concrete jungle 
environment is the “great equalizer.”133  Also, “issues that at one time might have been classified 
as law enforcement, health, or labor issues are now emerging as threats to the nation-state and to 
international stability.”134
                                                 
133 Posen, Barry, “Urban Operations: Tactical Realities and Strategic Ambiguities,” Soldiers in Cities: 
Military Operations on Urban Terrain, Ed. Michael C. Desch, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA, October 2001, p. 151. 
  In fact, many issues that might have once been easily handled by the 
state or by a collection of states were, in post-Cold War failing and failed states, insurmountable.  
With no working government or state apparatus from which to direct resources, external states, 
militaries, and internationally sanctioned organizations were forced to make tough decisions as 
to whether to intervene in these states.  This was especially troublesome given the dearth of 
international capacity to manage operations in such an environment.  In many cases, this gap in 
service provision and in rule enforcement was naturally filled by illicit organizations: they could 
ply their trade while providing social services that the state could no longer endow.  As a result, 
the Third World, in a rather short period of time, had gone from occupying a role as a strategic 
134 Smith, Paul J., “Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military?,” 
Parameters, Autumn 2000, pp. 87-88. 
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cheerleader or pawn of or for one or the other bipolar powers, to forgotten points on the map, to 
a significant source of potential and real challenges to the post-Cold War security system. 
 
3.2 THE POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, 
PART II (THE U.S. ARMY)  
In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, consecutive U.S. presidents and 
congresses had the opportunity to interpret the post-Cold War security environment and set 
strategies that would guide the size, development, and use of the armed forces.  Of particular 
importance to these administrations and congresses was maintaining the United States’ role as 
the lone superpower and principal architect of the ‘new world order.’  Out of this interest and 
interpretation of the international security environment evolved what subsequently came to be 
known as the Clinton Doctrine. 
The Clinton Doctrine was premised on the fact that the world was increasingly 
interdependent and that the primary beneficiary of this interdependency was the United States; in 
particular, its massive global economy.  Therefore, the United States had a “vested interest in the 
maintenance of international stability, or world order.”135
                                                 
135 Jablonsky, David, “Army Transformation: A Tale of Two Doctrines,” Transforming Defense, Ed. 
Conrad Crane, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 2001, p. 61. 
  In order to shift roles from the world’s 
policeman (because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and recession of many of its ideological 
partners) to the world’s stabilizer, the Clinton Doctrine proposed that the United States needed to 
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create or sustain a force sufficient for handling multiple adversaries simultaneously while also 
maintaining a capacity to diminish instability wherever it arose.  The prevailing assumption of 
the Clinton Doctrine was that even minor threats could lead to regional or global instability and 
thus undermine the position of the United States at the precipice of the globalized post-Cold War 
world hierarchy.136  The Clinton Doctrine, implicitly, rebuked the reigning Weinberger and 
Powell Doctrines which stressed using military force only when national security was truly at 
risk.137
                                                 
136 Ibid, pp. 61-62.  Robert Scales also cites a recurring interest of the United States for engaging emerging 
threats in the Third World insofar as interests in humanitarian concerns “stem from our historical idealism and our 
democratic values and heritage.  As a nation we will continue to stand for what is good and right.  If people need our 
help, we may act because our values demand that we do so.”  See, Scales, Robert H., America’s Army: Preparing for 
Tomorrow’s Security Challenges, Army Issue Paper Number 2, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 
1998. 
  Although national security and economic security were always closely linked, the 
Clinton Doctrine was explicit in conflating the two in the early days of the post-Cold War era. 
137 The Weinberger Doctrine, as it came to be known, insisted that “the United States should not commit 
forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or 
that of our allies”.  See, Weinberger, Caspar W., “The Uses of Military Power,” Remarks Prepared for the National 
Press Club, Washington DC, 28 November 1984.  The Powell Doctrine’s first tenet rested on the question of 
whether or not national security was at risk.  Powell, Colin L., “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, 
Volume 71, No. 5, Winter 1992.  These doctrines, because of their similarity, are sometimes combined as the 
“Weinberger/Powell Doctrine”.  The chief difference between the two is Powell’s stressing of the need for broad 
international support, a logical addition to the Weinberger Doctrine in the post-Cold War, post-Persian Gulf War, 
international security environment.  Noonan and Hillen argue that during the Clinton Administration, “most 
conflicts in which the U.S. might want to use military force were for very low geopolitical stakes for which 
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The development of the Clinton Doctrine put the U.S. Army in somewhat of a bind as 
this organization was the United States’ principal military arbiter of stability and order, even if 
that mission had not yet been fully realized.  As U.S. Army forces were being reduced (through 
the post-Persian Gulf War Reduction in Forces or RIF138
                                                                                                                                                             
American s would not want to suffer casualties.”  See Noonan, Michael P. and John Hillen, “Is the Pentagon 
Preparing for the Last War?,” HNN, 18 February 2002, 
) in response to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the diminution of the threat that country previously posed, they were now 
being asked to prepare for two radically different responsibilities: two possible and simultaneous 
major regional conflict (MRC) contingencies (anywhere and at any time but most likely on the 
Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, chiefly Iraq); and random disturbances to global order 
including humanitarian crises and insurgencies.  This post-Cold War paradigm for the potential 
use of U.S. Army forces was evaluated and documented in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review 
conducted by Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin.  The Bottom-Up Review also concluded, perhaps 
in deference to the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines and despite the focus on global stability 
and peacekeeping directed by the Clinton Doctrine, that any contingency requiring the use of 
military force should be conducted and concluded rapidly, with a high probability of success, and 
http://hnn.us/articles/562.html, accessed 17 July 2008. 
138 Williams and Gilroy argue that “in response to the changed environment, most Western countries 
substantially reduced the number of people serving in uniform shortly after the Cold War ended…The reductions are 
deeply intertwined with the altered perceptions of threats and risks and new missions.  To some extent, they also 
reflect the notion that modern information technologies can serve as ‘force multipliers,’ making it possible for a 
military to become more effective even as it reduces size.”  See Williams, Cindy and Curtis Gilroy, “The 
Transformation Personnel Policies,” Defence Studies, Volume 6, Number 1, March 2006, p. 99. 
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while minimizing American casualties.139  Thus, “the message for military planners became a bit 
muddled.  Peacekeeping was important, but not a priority.”140
Despite the Clinton Doctrine’s elevation of what came to be known as Military 
Operations Other Than War or MOOTW
 
141 as a strategic mission set for which the U.S. Army 
would have to prepare, the Army’s focus would remain on the first part of the of 
recommendations made by the Bottom-Up Review: (MRC).142
                                                 
139 Davidson, Janine Anne, Learning to Lift the Fog of Peace: the U.S. Military in Stability and 
Reconstruction Operations, Dissertation, 2005, pp. 189-190. 
  The Bottom-Up Review gave 
weight, cause, and credence to a choice that the U.S. Army would have likely made in this new, 
or any, environment if left to its own devices.  Major combat operations had always been the 
focus of the U.S. Army, this despite a long history of engagements in operations that could fall 
140 Ibid. 
141 MOOTW incorporates a host of non-combat missions including but not limited to Humanitarian 
Assistance, Counter-Drug efforts, Peacekeeping, and Peace Enforcement, variously under the auspices of the UN, a 
coalition, or unilateral control. 
142 Thomas Donnely and Frederick W. Kagan develop this point further: “The confusion over American 
strategy and defense policy in the 1990s bred a proliferation of increasingly complex statements of the missions for 
which the military should be designed and maintained.  The primary mission that supposedly shaped the size and 
organization of the military in the 1990s, flowing from the premise that the requirement was to ‘fight and win the 
nation’s wars,’ was the ability to fight two nearly simultaneous ‘major regional conflicts,’ or MRCs.  MRCs were 
variously defined, but the requirement to fight two always added up, curiously enough, to a military sized and 
shaped as it was in projections and plans made in 1992 and 1993—throughout the decrease and through a 
bewildering series of changes in military operational patterns and the international setting.”  See, Donnelly, Thomas 
and Frederick W. Kagan, Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power, AEI Press, Washington DC, 2008, p. 11-
12. 
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into the category of low-intensity conflict (LIC) or MOOTW.143  Even as the pace of U.S. 
military operations increased by 300 percent between 1991 and 1997 (most if not all in MOOTW 
environments) and as the U.S. Army was beset by significant budget cuts, its focus remained on 
what was considered the greater of two evils: MRC.144
                                                 
143 The U.S. Army’s penchant for identifying conflict by its intensity (low intensity, mid-intensity, and 
high-intensity) still persists today.  This lumping of military missions into MOOTW was once grouped into low-
intensity conflict or LIC.  Brown argues that “grouping all LIC, whether insurgency or conventional, into one 
category is counterproductive for it may lead strategists and policymakers to think about them similarly.”  Certainly, 
lumping all of these operations other than war into a singular category would lead to the same conclusions.  See, 
Brown, Michael L, “Vietnam: Learning from the Debate,” Military Review, February 1987, p. 54.  Historically, 
actions against the Plains Indians, in the Dominican Republic, during the Philippines Insurrection, in Panama, 
Grenada, Sinai, and in Lebanon would all fall into the catchall category of MOOTW and would all reflect missions 
that the U.S Army would prefer not to do.  Reflexively, and almost by definition, if the U.S. Army preferred a task 
then it was war and if not, it was an operation other than war.  
  And even as the Clinton Administration 
was touting the role and necessity of MOOTW in the post-Cold War security environment, such 
proclamations had little effect on the direction of U.S. Army policy.  Convincing the U.S. Army, 
144 Operations following Operation DESERT STORM “were antithetical to the traditional concept of war.  
The contingency operations expanded ‘warfighting’ beyond the context of the traditional maneuver battles and 
engagements.  The new threats resided all along the full spectrum of conflict.”  See, Fontenot, Gregory, et al, On 
Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom Through 01 May 2003, Combat Studies Institute Press, 
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, p. 10.  Predictably, despite the increasing focus on and importance of MOOTW and 
stability in the Third World, Pentagon officials attempted to terminate the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Special Operations-Low Intensity Conflict (OASD SO-LIC) during both the Clinton and George W. Bush 
presidencies.  And, “although Congress thwarted the move, only one OASD SO-LIC official had day-to-day 
responsibility for FID-[Foreign Internal Defense] policy.”  See, Strategic Survey, “US Military Doctrine and 
Counterinsurgency,” Strategic Survey 2008, The Annual Review of World Affairs, 01 May 2004, p. 44. 
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Congress, and the American people that “political instability or outbreaks of various low-
intensity conflicts in the form of ethnic conflict, separatist movements, and other types of 
particularly ‘dirty wars’ may represent meaningful threats to U.S. security” was unlikely.145  
Unwittingly, the Clinton Doctrine, and the conclusions drawn by the Clinton Administration’s 
Bottom-Up Review146, combined with the RIF, compelled the U.S. Army to make a strategic 
choice between focusing on MRC or MOOTW as a core competency and thus enabled further 
divorce between the U.S. Army and its proper organizational role as a supporter of U.S. 
policy.147
                                                 
145 Sloan, Stephen, “Final Reflections,” Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, Eds. Edwin 
G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1992, p. 303. 
  Although the U.S. Army did plan for and conduct many MOOTW throughout the 
1990s, this mission was invariably treated as a subset of and a distraction from preparing for 
‘real’ war.  This early post-Cold War choice, despite experience, policy, various warnings, and 
evidence contradicting the wisdom of this choice, would have a significant cascading effects on 
146 “The review concluded that we will not have the forces to conduct operations in places such as Somalia 
and Bosnia and, at the same time, meet the regional conflict contingency requirements.”  See, Krepinevich, Andrew, 
“Assessing the Bottom-Up Review,” Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1993-94, p. 23. 
147 The RIF had a significant effect on the number and types of missions that the U.S. Army could 
reasonably pursue with competency with the tools at hand.  If war were the only policy option that the U.S. Army 
focused on supporting then, ipso facto, the U.S. Army would be either less capable or incapable of supporting other 
policies.  Metz argues that “war, in the American tradition, occurs when policy fails” and is thus anti-Clausewitzian 
in nature since Clausewitz stressed the interrelationship of war and policy. This distinctive tradition was expanding 
in the post-Cold War period.  See Metz, Steven, “Victory and Compromise in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, 
April 1992, p. 47. 
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the U.S. Army’s ability to adapt in the rapidly changing post-Cold War international security 
environment. 
3.2.1 The U.S. Army 
The decision by the U.S. Army to focus on the MRC contingency was not solely a reaction to 
post-Cold War defense reviews or the initiation of a new presidential doctrine.  This decision 
was remarkably consistent with the focus that the U.S. Army had throughout the Cold War, 
particularly after the Vietnam War and certainly after the successful conclusion of the Persian 
Gulf War.  As Morris Janowitz asserts, “whether the problem is missiles or manpower, planning 
toward the future tends to be a projection of existing trends, rather than an imaginative emphasis 
on revolutionary developments.”148  Victory over Iraqi forces led subsequent administrations to 
believe that the military, and by extension the U.S. Army, could accomplish any mission no 
matter how divergent from the institution’s Cold War role.149  The U.S. Army’s principle 
mission was, of course, to fight and win our nation’s wars which, by extension, did not mesh 
well with conducting OOTW, to include wars like that fought in Vietnam, and contributed to the 
Army treating all missions as war.150
                                                 
148 See Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier, MacMillan Publishing, New York, 1960, p. 29.  The 
trend for the U.S. Army was very linear following the Vietnam War and favored, almost exclusively, conventional 
combat.   
  As Conrad Crane notes regarding the Vietnam experience, 
149 Bacevich, A.J., “Learning from Aidid,” Commentary, December 1993, p. 31. 
150 The mission of the Army, as captured in the capstone Field Manual (FM) 1-0, The Army, was slightly 
but importantly different than the mission of the Armed Forces in 1948, proposed by Harry S. Truman: to uphold 
and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.  This mission is also slightly different than the 
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“Army involvement in counterinsurgency was first seen as an aberration and then as a mistake to 
be avoided.  Instead of focusing on the proper synchronization of military and political tools with 
the objectives necessary for success in low intensity unconventional conflicts, the Army 
continued to concentrate on mid to high intensity conventional war.”151
The visceral and decades’ long reaction to the U.S. Army’s involvement in Vietnam, 
since that experience was really something other than war defined in the strictest sense, 
contributed to the marginalization of the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF),
 
152
                                                                                                                                                             
one that a soldier swears to upon entering the U.S. Army, to support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.  Although the concept behind each of these missions is essentially the same, the end result of stating that the 
U.S. Army’s mission is to fight and win our nation’s wars is quite different when applied.  See, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-0, The Army, June 2005, and Truman, Harry S., Functions of the 
Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 April 1948. 
 the creation of the 
151151 Crane, Conrad C., Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2002, p. 2.  Record argues a similar point, “the Army 
ignored counterinsurgency until it encountered insurgency again in Iraq.  The Army studiously avoided any 
systematic appraisal of counterinsurgency lessons learned in Vietnam because such an appraisal would have 
suggested a responsibility to prepare for future insurgencies.  One insurgency out of sight was all insurgencies out of 
mind.”  Record, Jeffrey, “The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” CATO 
Institute, Policy Analysis No. 577, 1 September 2006, p. 15. 
152 Richard Betts, argues that the military consciously resisted involvement in the ‘politics’ of the Vietnam 
War and instead sought to focus on ‘actual combat.’  The missions of the U.S. Army Special Forces (which, blended 
politics and combat), or Green Berets, were anathema to military leaders preferring conventional strategic concepts 
and mass operations.  See, Betts, Richard K., Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1977, pp. 129-138.  The Army Special Forces (SF) are an element of Army Special Operations 
Forces (ARSOF or SOF) (including Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units). 
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aforementioned Weinberger Doctrine, the Powell Doctrine and belatedly, after the Persian Gulf 
War, a reduction in most of the unconventional capability still extant in the conventional force, 
particularly in the field of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and other specialists.153  One way to 
dodge having to participate in conflicts or operations that the U.S. Army wished to avoid was to 
eviscerate the capability to conduct these missions.  Abetting this purposeful decision was a 
noticeable absence of congressional and presidential oversight when the U.S. Army reduced the 
size and scope of the Special Forces following Vietnam and the FAO corps following the Persian 
Gulf War, despite lingering concerns of on-going insurgencies and guerrilla movements in 
various Third World locales.  As Barry Posen warns, “civilians must carefully audit the doctrines 
of their military organizations to ensure that they stress the appropriate type of military 
operations, reconcile political ends with military means, and change with political circumstances 
and technological developments.”154
By reducing the size of the force, and by highlighting the importance of the projected two 
MRC contingencies in the Clinton Doctrine, the Clinton Administration was complicit in forcing 
the U.S. Army to further specialize what forces remained.  In conjunction with the U.S. Army’s 
predilection for combat over other possible mission sets, cuts to forces that did not directly 
contribute to the MRC paradigm were of minor concern.  As Bahnsen notes, “The first defense 
budget items to be cut in cost-reduction moves are those with small numbers, few vocal 
 Despite concerns regarding an uncertain post-Cold War 
international security environment, the U.S. Army was well on its way to securing a force 
dedicated to its singular, and preferred, mission set: combat. 
                                                 
153 My thanks to Colonel G. Alex Crowther for discussing how these specialties were reduced following the 
end of the Persian Gulf War. 
154 Posen, Barry R., The Sources of Military Doctrine, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1984, p. 241. 
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defenders, low budget priority, and thus no congressional or executive branch supporters.  LIC 
and protracted war systems fall into this category.”155  The LIC (or in 1990s parlance, MOOTW) 
community had few defenders in Congress, the administration, or in the U.S. Army, especially 
since many of the U.S. Army’s senior commanders in the post-Cold War period were Vietnam 
veterans and had little interest in maintaining capabilities and forces tailored to that kind of fight.  
The forces retained in the U.S. Army after the RIF were almost exclusively conventional and 
were structured either for combat, combat support (CS), or combat service support (CSS).156  
One of the few exceptions to this rule was the retention of SF which, at that time, had been 
stripped of many of its unconventional missions and was instead being used almost solely in 
conventional support of Corps and separate operations.  Even if dramatic changes were deemed 
important following the RIF and in reaction to the changing international security environment, 
the planning and budgeting system that supported the U.S. Army moved at a ‘glacial’ pace and 
would likely be unable to support an expansion of U.S. Army capability or size, save perhaps for 
provisioning new technologies and weapon systems.157
The post-Cold War RIF and specialization of U.S. Army forces for conventional missions 
led to a perverse unintended consequence of particular import when the Army had to participate 
in unconventional or MOOTW missions: the need for greater numbers of and more generalized 
 
                                                 
155 Bahnsen, Peter, “Protracted Warfare and the Role of Technology: The United States,” Guerrilla Warfare 
and Counterinsurgency, Eds. Richard Schultz, et al, Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1989, p. 208. 
156 Many Combat Service Support units and personnel were intentionally moved into the Reserve forces 
following Vietnam.  The intent of this move was to make it more difficult to fully deploy the U.S. Army without 
broad public and congressional support and acquiescence. 
157 Builder, Carl H., and James A. Dewar, “A Time for Planning? If Not Now, When?,” Parameters, 
Summer 1994, pp. 5-7. 
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command and staff personnel and capacity.  Reducing, consolidating, and further specializing 
military occupational specialties (MOS) required more, not less personnel (for coordination and 
support) and information flow among these personnel, commands, and across the U.S. Army, 
particularly in complex MOOTW environments where many difficult and unusual decisions had 
to be made by commanders.  As Creveld argues, “the obverse side of specialization is, 
inevitably, centralization.  The more specialized the members and units of any given 
organization, the less capable any of them separately is of making independent decisions that 
may affect the whole, and the greater the need for overall direction from the top.”158  To alleviate 
decreased capability wrought by the RIF and force specialization, the Clinton Administration and 
the U.S. Army proposed to take advantage of the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
and the technologies associated with the RMA.   But, paradoxically, the U.S. Army’s 
incorporation of advanced information processing technology, sensors, and data acquisition 
devices did not relieve the pressures of centralization and specialization, it increased them.  The 
RIF, specialization, and centralization combined to necessitate greater direction from 
commanders and enhanced coordination, interpretation, and processing from their staffs.  The 
great promise of technological marvels replacing staffs and support personnel shed to realize the 
peace dividend was never realized.  Instead, the workload of remaining personnel and staff 
members increased and consequently their evaluation and cognitive capacities were reduced.159
                                                 
158 Creveld, Martin van, Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985, p. 236. 
  
U.S. Army units thus lost a significant component of their overall ability to gather and process 
159 Early, Drew N., Revisiting the Staff: Static or Dynamic, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 December 1993, p. 25. 
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information, plan, and learn when responding to what where increasingly joint and combined 
missions in complex Third World environments. 
Technology and the RMA would come to be a panacea for successive administrations, 
congressional advocates, and U.S. Army planners insofar as it inherently (and supposedly) 
increased ‘capability’ and justified expensive weapons and sensor platforms that would enable 
the U.S. Army to become the full-spectrum warriors envisioned in the Clinton Doctrine: equally 
capable of restoring stability and conducting high-intensity conflict against a near competitor 
anywhere on the planet.  Even as the RMA provided the tools necessary for increased awareness, 
communication, and precision, facile faith in the nostrums promised by the RMA would only 
lead to and justify further specialization, particularly in the U.S. Army’s preferred realm of 
combat, at a time where skills other than combat were at a premium. 
3.2.2 Invention is the Mother of Necessity 
The U.S. Army’s predilection for technological solutions to doctrinal and environmental 
conundrums paired nicely with the 1990s RMA and the emerging focus on ‘capabilities,’160
                                                 
160 “In the next several years, DoD will seek to further strengthen both the culture and the capability to 
develop and exploit new concepts and technologies in order to make our forces more responsive to an uncertain 
world.”  Also, “The U.S. Military must be a capabilities-based force that gives the national leadership a range of 
viable options for promoting and protecting U.S. interests in peacetime, crisis, and war.”  Cohen, William S., 
Quadrennial Defense Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1997. 
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especially when facing amorphous and unpredictable adversaries.161  Entering a rapidly changing 
international security environment, with new and challenging missions and a dearth of 
appropriate doctrine and personnel demanded substitutive capacity and capability.162  “This is 
the thinking that developed during the 1990s.  Improved surveillance, communications, 
information, and precision technologies could solve the problems of future war.  This muddied 
our thinking about war.”163  Conceptually, the technological advances and expanded aptitude 
promised by the RMA fit the bill for defense planners that sought to ‘illuminate’ an increasingly 
complex ‘battlefield.’164
The RMA’s arrival was quickly and thoroughly realized as new lexicon emerged 
describing the potential blending of projected military requirements with new technological 
 
                                                 
161 It should be noted that the start point for the 1990s RMA is debatable, given the rapid pace of changes in 
warfare during, at least, the 20th Century.  See, Baumann, Robert F., “Historical Perspectives on Future War,” 
Military Review, March-April 1997. 
162 “The watchword during the post-Cold War drawdown has been that a generic technological 
superiority—rather than any searching ongoing reassessment of strategic, operationsl, and conceptual possibilities—
is the key to the future.”  Murray, Williamson, and MacGregor Knox, “The Future Behind Us,” The Dynamics of 
Military Revolution: 1300-2050, Eds., Knox, MacGregor and Williamson Murray, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004, p. 192. 
163 Brigadier General McMaster, H.R., Telephone Interview, 8 September 2008. 
164 “Illuminating the battlespace will permit DOD to see and therefore defeat foes by striking from standoff 
range or by supporting local warfighters with information.  Thus DOD can cope with foes nastier than today’s 
canonical opponents.”  Libicki, Martin C., Illuminating Tomorrow’s War, McNair Paper 61, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, October 1999, p. 123. This thinking assumed that 
everything of importance in the post-Cold War international security environment could be illuminated and that little 
contact with environmental issues or factors, such as populations, was likely or warranted.  
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capabilities.  Terms such as ‘transformation,’ ‘dominance,’ and ‘decisive’ began filling the pages 
of various defense papers, journals, and doctrine.  The now much maligned term ‘Shock & 
Awe,’ perhaps most famous for its usage in describing the preliminary attacks of OIF was one of 
these terms.  The phrase Shock & Awe originated in a 1996 National Defense University 
publication of the same name.  The Shock & Awe paper described a battlefield where the U.S. 
military could achieve ‘Rapid Dominance’ by employing an “overwhelming level of Shock and 
Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to 
carry on.  In crude terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of the environment and paralyze 
or so overload an adversary’s perceptions and understanding of events so that the enemy would 
be incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels.”165  Shock & Awe would be achieved 
by “selectively denying knowledge to the enemy,” “influencing the will, perception, and 
understanding of an adversary,” and through technologies “that allow systems and entire force 
units to modify their signature from being very stealthy to being completely obvious.  An ability 
to attack enemy information systems will also be critical, encompassing system technologies 
from laser-based countersensor weapons to embedded computer viruses.”166
                                                 
165 Ullman, Harlan, et al, Shock & Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University, 1996, p. xxv. 
  Although the 
authors of Shock & Awe admit that the notion of rapidity [only] “applies through the spectrum of 
combat from pre-conflict deployment to all stages of battle and conflict resolution,” their 
avoidance of describing the effects of Shock & Awe in a MOOTW environment are curious 
especially given the prevalence of deployments to MOOTW environments throughout the 1990s. 
166 Ibid, pp. 2-3, 8-9, 70, 84, respectively. 
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The proponents of Shock & Awe certainly didn’t draw upon contemporary adversaries in 
their extrapolation to future environments.  It seems more likely that their myopic vision was 
based upon a bizarre pre-engineering of what would be possible in the future security 
environment with current and projected military technology and capability if the threat were the 
same as the one that the United States had prepared for since World War II.167  Despite the 
technology-laden language and futuristic sound of the envisioned Shock & Awe environment, 
this vision of the future was remarkably unimaginative given the range of actors in the 
international security environment of the 1990s.  Shock & Awe was founded not on a rational 
discernment of future adversaries based on the prevailing security environment but instead was 
based on a highly linear extension of the adversaries (or adversary) that the U.S. faced during the 
Cold War:  chiefly, an organized and highly technological threat from a state-based adversary.  
Barry Watts and Williamson Murray point out in their study of military innovation that true 
innovation requires a break from the past, “institutions not only need to make the initial 
intellectual investments to develop visions of future war, but they must continue agonizing over 
such visions to discern how those wars might differ from previous conflicts due to changes in 
military technology and weaponry, national purposes, and the international security 
environment.”168
                                                 
167 The U.S. Joint Forces Command explains that this is a natural tendency, “Driven by an inherent desire 
to bring order to a disorderly, chaotic universe, human beings tend to frame their thoughts about the future in terms 
of continuities and extrapolations from the present and occasionally the past.”  See, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 
The Joint Operational Environment: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force, JFC, 2008, p. 6.  
  Also, “commitment to any particular institutional vision by senior leaders 
168 Watts, Barry and Williamson Murray, “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” Military Innovation in the 
Interwar Period, eds. Murray, Willaimson and Allan R. Millett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 
406. 
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tends to have long-lasting consequences, whether for good or ill.”169
Besides spawning fancy notions of future war, the RMA also promised to deliver clarity 
to a complex and confusing world by supplying technologies capable of supporting smaller 
forces with improved communications, greater sensor and intelligence capability, enhanced 
precision and lethality, and tailored logistical capacity.  This did make sense in at least one 
fashion: increasing communicative means and processing power would enable forces to develop 
shared, or common, operational pictures while being able to deliver combat power precisely. 
Thus the RMA, given the predominant (though flawed) visions of future battlefield dispositions, 
would assist in achieving at least half of the Clinton Doctrine’s prescriptions for successful 
mission achievement in the post-Cold War security environment.  But the focus of the 1990s 
RMA was decidedly not a revolution in doctrine inspired by new technologies and new ways of 
conducting operations.  Instead, this RMA focused on various capabilities that could be provided 
by incorporating new technologies with existing doctrine, a fact which made this RMA all the 
less revolutionary. 
  A combination of a vision 
of future war, which was postulated to be highly kinetic on battlefields similar to that of the 
Persian Gulf War (the preferred battlefield), with an institutional taste for combat operations 
would have long-lasting consequences as it impeded an adjustment towards the realities of 
MOOTW and the post-Cold War international security environment.   
The capabilities promised by (or ascribed to) the RMA were given relief by the concept 
of Shock & Awe.  An ideational partner to the Shock & Awe concept was the 1997 National 
Defense Panel’s (NDP) Transforming Defense document.  The 1997 NDP offered another, and 
very similar, vision of defense Transformation and suggested a variety of requirements for the 
                                                 
169 Ibid, p. 407. 
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future battlefield environment: “we will need greater mobility, precision, stealth, and strike 
ranges while we sharply reduce our logistics footprint.”170  Remarkably, in a period where 
uncertainty was king and threats were unpredictable, the authors of the NDP, like those of Shock 
& Awe, were capable of ascertaining the appropriate capabilities necessary to managing an 
unidentified foe in an unidentified locale armed with unidentified weapons and possessing 
unidentified capabilities.  One thing that the NDP was certain of was that “if we do not lead the 
technological revolution we will be vulnerable to it” and thus assumed away any alternatives to 
the projected organized, technological, state-based foe that the U.S. Army hoped and prepared 
for.171  Additionally, and again with no reference to concrete, defined threats other than 
instability and terrorism, the NDP was capable of divining that “we must also provide the 
capabilities required for other emerging challenges.  In many cases, the training and equipment 
used to prepare forces for major combat operations will also be able to handle these 
challenges.”172
                                                 
170 National Defense Panel, Op Cit.  This sentiment was also echoed in Grinter, Lawrence E. and Barry R. 
Schneider, “On Twenty-First Century Warfare,” Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Ed. 
Schneider, Barry R. and Lawrence E. Grinter, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1998. 
  Therefore, even if other challenges arose, no matter how unpredictable, they 
could be handled with highly trained conventionally-focused forces.  It is amazing how, given a 
rapidly changing security environment with multitudinous threats emerging across the planet, 
adding ‘capabilities’ to the existing force through a ‘transformative’ effort and via an RMA 
would be possible with existing training and equipment.  This begs two questions: of what use 
there was for an RMA or transformative effort if the current force was adequate for any potential 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
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foes or contingencies and; why was any distinction made between MOOTW and combat 
operations or full-spectrum operations if all operations could be pursued with existing 
competency, capability, and forces?  Would not the current, non-revolutionary and non-
transformed force and military operations suffice? 
The U.S. Army had its own vision of the future warfare, Transformation, and capabilities, 
summarized in the 1997 Annual Report on the Army After Next (AAN) Project.  The AAN 
Project was a broad effort to define the role and structure of the U.S. Army as it evolved into a 
21st Century force.  Despite increased deployments throughout the 1990s to technologically 
crude, non-kinetic environments that could hardly be described as battlefields and a doctrinal and 
institutional knowledge vacuum in respect to these environments, the NDP projected that the 
U.S. Army would have to be able to move to and on future battlefields quickly so as to project 
combat power effectively and thus would have to advance into a force like that proposed by the 
AAN. As the AAN Project postulated, the U.S. Army of 2025 would have information 
dominance and “will achieve unprecedented strategic and operational agility by exploiting 
information technologies to create a knowledge-based Army.  But to know and see with greater 
clarity is not enough.  The Army must possess a complementary capacity to act on its superior 
knowledge by building into its structure the physical agility to move rapidly and adroitly across a 
larger and more lethal battlefield.”173
Like the recommendations made by the NDP, the AAN Annual Report advocated a 
preferred vision and capabilities more closely tied to the U.S. Army as it then existed or for an 
era that had passed 6 years prior.  This report assumed capabilities that were unlikely achievable, 
 
                                                 
173 Reimer, Dennis J., The Annual Report on The Army After Next (AAN) Project, Headquarters 
Department of the Army, 1 August 1997, p. 4. 
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regardless of any real or perceived expansion of informational capacity, in a post-Cold War 
international security environment increasingly influenced not by envisioned, technologically 
adept near-peer foes, but instead by warlords, sheiks, and chieftains in complex contingencies in 
Third World environs.  Information dominance was possible if the U.S. Army was facing the 
U.S. Army but in a world where complex contingencies were increasingly human in their 
dimensions, discerning intent and friend from foe with technological gadgetry was increasingly 
unlikely.  The AAN concept relied on ‘information supremacy’ and enhanced intelligence that 
was not likely to develop, no matter the range of advanced sensors employed, in the post-Cold 
War international security environment.174
The U.S. Army was not alone in adopting a combat-heavy, state-centric vision of future 
warfare and indeed might have been guilty of purloining justification for this view from its sister 
services.
 
175
                                                 
174 Matsumura, John, et al, The Army After Next: Exploring New Concepts and Technologies for the Light 
Battle Force, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 11.  See also, Rosenbaum, Michael D., The Battle of the Bulge: 
Intelligence Lessons for the Army After Next, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
1999, p. 25. 
  Thomas Barnett describes a 1991 meeting at the Pentagon where the ‘Manthorpe 
175 H.R. McMaster contends that, “it is as if the Army forgot that it operated on land and adopted wholesale 
the Air Force’s and Navy’s visions of future war.”  McMaster, H.R., Crack in the Foundation: Defense 
Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War, Center for Strategic 
Leadership Student Issue Paper, November 2003, p. 59.  These visions have remained intact throughout OIF and 
OEF.  For instance, the U.S. Navy and Air Force have notably disregarded or downplayed doctrinal writing for 
Counterinsurgeny operations and the Air Force “continues to focus almost exclusively on major combat operations 
or situations where it alone can be decisive.”  See, Beebe, Kenneth, “The Air Force’s Mission Doctrine: How the US 
Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency,” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2006. 
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Curve’ (a graphical representation of an aggregated vs. Soviet threat projected across time named 
for William Manthorpe, the then Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence)176 was 
unveiled: “The great Soviet threat that had dominated all strategic planning for decades was 
rapidly dissipating, but no matter how much it declined, it was unlikely to be surpassed by that of 
the aggregate rest-of-world (or ROW) threat.  In effect, the ROW threat was the Pentagon’s way 
of expressing the cumulative total of lesser-included scenarios, meaning those non-great-power 
threats not big enough to size and shape your forces around.  Instead, the normal practice at that 
time was deciding how many armored divisions or aircraft carriers America needed based on the 
biggest high-end threat you could identify—the Big One du jour.  The assumption at the time 
was that if we built for the Big One, then that same mix of forces would adequately handle all the 
smaller threats.”177
Only if the future-world prognosticators were merely being coy and were hiding their 
certain knowledge of future opponents (who were going to look remarkably similar to the 
  Assigning all less than existentially threatening cases of conflict as ‘lesser 
included’ scenarios conveniently justified the familiar Cold War force planning paradigm for the 
U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy.  Additionally, the services could portray their efforts as partial 
fulfillment of their joint responsibilities as legislated in the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986.  The 
services least likely to engage in MOOTW environments (the U.S. Navy and Air Force) assisted 
the U.S. Army in justifying and developing a force based on the other services’ preferred, if 
narrow, vision of the future international security environment and thus helped to ensure that the 
Army would be less adaptable to an environment and adversary that it was likely to, and 
eventually would, face.  
                                                 
176 Barnett, Op Cit, p. 69. 
177 Ibid, p. 67. 
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projected U.S. Army) did these reports and justifications make much sense.  This possibility was, 
however, unlikely.  Instead, by the mid- to late 1990s, the Army was on a developmental path 
clearly divergent from the realities of the post-Cold War international security environment.  The 
use of the terms ‘information dominance’, ‘combat’, and ‘battlefield’ supposed an environment 
where the U.S. Army was and would be dominant; an environment markedly different from that 
in which the U.S. Army was increasingly being asked to operate.  This quixotic vision was 
abetted by a confused misappropriation of operational terms.  Describing places like Somalia, 
Bosnia, and Haiti as ‘battlefields’ and the stability operations that occurred in these areas as 
‘combat’ demonstrated an unfortunate tendency to paint the world in terms that were familiar yet 
almost wholly inappropriate.  “Unfortunately, the U.S. Army’s experience with stability and 
support operations in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, and numerous other locations did not lead 
American Soldiers to internalize these types of operations as a core mission…U.S. Soldiers 
tended to view conventional warfighting as their main purpose, and the Army has traditionally 
reinforced that mindset.”178  Perhaps U.S. Army planners were suffering from a delusion similar 
to that which plagued the German military in 1941: they were falling victim to their own myths 
and predilections enhanced by a constant romanticizing of the Persian Gulf War and hope that 
future opponents would be just like the Iraqi Republican Guard.179
                                                 
178 Wright, Donald P. and Timothy R. Reese, Op Cit., p. 59. 
 
179 Robert Doughty argues that the Germans distorted vision of the success of Blitzkreig in France led to 
their misinformed understanding of their chances of victory in Russia in 1941.  See, Doughty, Robert A, “Myth of 
Blitzkrieg,” challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can American be Defeated?, Ed. 
Matthews, Lloyd J., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 1998, p. 71-72. 
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As Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales argue, proposed substitutions of “advanced 
technology for conventional military capabilities reflect a peculiarly American faith in science’s 
ability to engineer simple solutions to complex human problems.”180  Additionally, Van Riper 
and Scales assert that “acknowledging war’s inherent unpredictability, such a view of war 
renounces overreliance on any single capability, seeks maximum force versatility, and requires 
that military operations conform to the peculiar conditions and demands of the conflict itself.”181  
Thus, force adaptability would not necessarily benefit from the enhanced technology and 
attendant specialization of the RMA and the burgeoning Transformation program.  As Jeffrey 
Issacson claims, “technology alone does not determine military effectiveness.  Specialized 
doctrine, tactics, training, and support are generally required to integrate, or absorb, technology 
into a military organization.”182
By the end of the 1990s, the RMA, Transformation, and existing doctrine were, 
conceptually, all mutually reinforcing concepts and programs.  Invention became the mother of 
necessity, despite notable warnings contradicting the path and purpose of these programs.
  The U.S. Army was obliging this argument by ensuring that its 
plans for infusing technological gains would be met with doctrine that was sufficiently tailored to 
these new technological advantages.  AirLand Battle doctrine, a product of the Cold War, would 
suffice. 
183
                                                 
180 Riper, Paul Van and Robert H. Scales, “Preparing for War in the 21st Century,” Parameters, Autumn 
1997, p. 4. 
  But 
181 Ibid, p. 5. 
182 Isaacson, Jeffrey A., et al, Predicting Military Innovation, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1999, p. 1. 
183 Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Shelton, despite laying the common claim 
that the primary purpose of the U.S. Army has been and will be to fight and win the Nation’s wars, warned that full-
spectrum dominance would require more than just technological invention and modernization: “material superiority 
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instead of assisting in the development of an Army that was highly adaptable, as was 
recommended Joint Vision 2010184, the early Transformation effort was producing a force that 
was peculiarly and almost singularly tailored not to the post-Cold War international security 
environment but to the Cold War international security environment and an anticipated enemy 
mirroring the projected U.S. Army of the future.  Despite estimations that this force would be 
full-spectrum capable and highly versatile, it was more likely that this force would be a highly 
modernized engine of pure combat and versatile only if the mission was taking down a similarly 
constructed force on a linear battlefield.  As Antulio Echevarria argues, “the changes wrought by 
RMA will likely make warfighting more rather than less difficult.  The means, environment, and 
dimensions of future war continue to transform it.”185  The conclusions drawn from Robert 
Bolia’s study of the Yom Kippur War seem apt: “technology must not be allowed to surpass the 
development of doctrine and tactics to guide its usage, nor hailed to the exclusion of the human 
element.”186
                                                                                                                                                             
alone is not sufficient.  Of greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education, 
leaders, and people that effectively take advantage of the technology.”  See, Shelton, Henry, H., Joint Vision 2020, 
America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC, June 2000, pp. 1-3. 
  
184 “JV 2010, and its follow-on, supporting publication, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding 
Joint Vision 2010, repeatedly and pervasively use the terms ‘flexibility’ and ‘adaptability.’  This reflects the clear 
realization that flexibility is crucial to successfully negotiating the future global security environment.”  Frost, 
Robert S. Op Cit, p. 36-37. 
185 Echevarria II, Antulio J., “Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Military Theory,” JFQ 1997, 
p. 36. 
186 Bolia, Robert S., “Overreliance on Technology in Warfare: the Yom Kippur War as a Case Study,” 
Parameters, Summer 2004, p. 55. 
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3.2.3 The Three Cs of Post-Cold War Army Doctrine: Combat, Combat, and Combat 
The Clinton Doctrine, because of its emphasis on promoting stability, required an army that was 
truly full-spectrum in its capabilities.  On one hand, the U.S. Army had to be capable of fighting 
and winning two MRCs, simultaneously.  On the other hand, the U.S. Army had to be capable of 
managing a host of potential and likely interruptions to regional and global stability.  Being a 
full-spectrum capable force meant possessing the ability to support (on the left end of the 
spectrum) domestic humanitarian operations and (on the right end of the spectrum) nuclear war, 
and everything in between.  It could be reasonably assumed that the U.S. Army would begin to 
modify and develop doctrine tailored to achieve this objective principally because the Army’s 
focus throughout the Cold War was almost exclusively tempered to high-intensity, force-on-
force combat.  Doctrine is “the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements 
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.”187
 In the early post-Cold War period, U.S. Army doctrine was noticeably not full-spectrum, 
despite claims to the contrary.
  To appropriately prepare for 
instituting the directives and vision of the Clinton Administration, the U.S. Army would have to 
modify much of its old doctrine and develop new principles for the MOOTW mission in support 
of national objectives. 
188
                                                 
187 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, p. 171. 
  Even in field manuals where one would expect to find full-
188 “There can be no single, prescribed, authoritative Army doctrine for this strategic period.  Hence, in 
1993 our Army adopted a doctrine of full-dimensional operations, stressing principles to be learned and understood, 
then relying on the art of battle command to apply those principles in scenarios as they occur…this doctrine is a 
profound shift from the relatively deterministic and very appropriate scientific approach of the Cold War.”  See, 
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spectrum concepts and operational direction, the focus was decidedly in favor of only one 
narrow band of the spectrum: the one dedicated to combat.189  Field Manual 7-98, Operations in 
a Low-Intensity Environment (19 October 1992), ominously unveiled an attempt to demonstrate 
how dominant Cold War combat operational concepts could transfer to MOOTW, “the tenets of 
AirLand Battle doctrine characterize successful conventional military operations and apply 
equally in LIC.”190  Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (December 1994) reminds 
commanders that “training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit’s 
primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat.  The first and foremost 
requirement for success in peace operations is the successful application of warfighting 
skills.”191
                                                                                                                                                             
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for 
the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, Training and Doctrine Command, 1 August 1994. 
  [Emphasis in the original].  Field Manual 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces (20 September 1994) indicates that even when 
the United States avoids direct participation non-combat missions, it will train others to conduct 
combat as surrogates: “the primary mission in FID is to organize, train, advise, and improve the 
tactical and technical proficiency of these forces, so they can defeat the insurgency without direct 
189 Of the hundreds of doctrinal publications, training manuals, and pamphlets the U.S. Army published or 
followed in the 1990s, very few were dedicated to or even mentioned MOOTW.  Additionally, those documents that 
did mention or were dedicated to MOOTW were sure to describe it as a sub-set of or distraction from combat 
operations. 
190 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, 19 
October 1992, p. 1-2. 
191  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, December 1994, p. 86. 
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U.S. involvement.”192  The tendency to diminish the importance of MOOTW in favor of combat 
came naturally and was reasonable given the unlikelihood that failure in any MOOTW 
contingency during the Cold War would have truly strategic import or effect.  The consequences 
of losing a MOOTW engagement during the Cold War paled in comparison to the possibility of 
losing an engagement with Soviet forces.  Preparation during that period then favored MRC and 
justifiably so.  Thus, historically, the U.S. Army only produced doctrine for MOOTW-like 
environments when absolute necessity or strategic emphasis dictated; the post-Cold War period 
was no exception.193
                                                 
192 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, 20 September 1994, p. 1-17. 
 
193193 For example, Field Manuals addressing Counterinsurgency Operations or COIN were modified during 
periods where insurgency or Low Intensity Conflict was deemed a strategic concern of some import:  FM 100-5, 
Operations (modified 1962, ’68, ’82, ’86, ’93); FM 100-20 (modified 1964, ’67, ’72, ’74, ’90; retitled 3 times 
(Internal Defense and Development (1964-1972), Low Intensity Conflict (1981), Military Operations in Low 
Intensity Conflict (1990)); FM 31-23, Stability Operations: US Army Doctrine (modified 1967, ’72); FM 31-22 U.S. 
Army Counterinsurgency Forces (modified 1962, ’63, ’65, ’69, ’72); FM 31-16, Counterguerilla Operations 
(modified 1963, ’67, ’86 (renumbered as FM 90-8 in 1986).  The sheer volume of modifications indicates the 
difficulty of grappling with the complexity encountered in these operations; the dates indicate periods where these 
environments posed (to varying degrees) a strategic concern (Vietnam War, Reagan era, post-Cold War).  See, 
Downie, Richard Duncan, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, el Salvador, and the Drug War, 
Praeger, Westport, CT, 1998, pp. 47-53.  McClintock correctly identifies that the counterinsurgency era began 
during the Kennedy Administration and that Kennedy’s “fascination with the Special Forces and the idea of 
American guerrillas meshed neatly with his Cold War view that the small wars of subversion and insurgency on the 
periphery of the ‘Free World’ posed the greatest challenge to our national security.”  McClintock, Michael, 
Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990, 2002. 
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As the post-Cold War international security environment matured, the U.S. Army’s 
operational focus became more, not less, focused on combat, despite contemporary experiences 
in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, and to the detriment of the overall support of strategic doctrine 
and success.194  U.S. Army doctrinal guidance to not let MOOTW training and preparation 
interfere with the primary mission of combat was justified variously: “evidence suggests that 
infantry forces should not include tasks specifically focused on peace operations in the 
development of their mission essential tasks lists…infantry forces that remain battle focused and 
trained to accomplish their wartime mission would be capable to transition quickly and 
accomplish most of the tasks associated with peace operations”195; “while cognizant of the 
increased demand for land forces at the lower end of the contingency spectrum in the near term, 
we must remain vigilant of the fundamental role of the Army—to fight and win the Nation’s 
wars as the land component of the joint force”196; “at the high end of the crisis continuum is 
fighting and winning major regional conflicts.  This mission is the most stressing requirement for 
the U.S. military”197
                                                 
194 As Echevarria argues, “the current American way of war focuses principally on defeating the enemy in 
battle.  Its underlying concepts—a polyglot of information-centric theories such as network-centric warfare, rapid 
decisive operations, and shock and awe—center on ‘taking down’ an opponent quickly, rather than finding ways to 
apply military force in the pursuit of broader political aims.”  See, Echevarria, Antulio J., Toward an American Way 
of War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2004, p. 16. 
 and; opponents of separate or additional MOOTW training, “are correct in 
that when an infantry battalion conducts a peacekeeping or other MOOTW mission, rifle squads, 
195 Reilly, Gregory D., Peace Operations: A Mission Essential Task?, School of Advanced Military Studies, 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1998, pp. 36-37. 
196 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Vision 2010, Washington DC, 1996, p. 6. 
197 Cohen, William S., Op Cit. 
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platoons, companies execute the identical tasks to those required in the execution of their HIC 
[high-intensity conflict] missions.”198
The U.S. Army’s failure to adjust to the post-Cold War international security 
environment and to the directives of the Clinton Administration was due to a number of 
conceptual, structural, and cultural reasons.  Conceptually, even though the operational 
environment was changing and threats posed by breakdowns in various Third World locales 
emerged, the vigilant and constant reminders that the U.S. Army was supposed to focus on MRC 
ensured that the Army would do just that.  Structurally, the U.S. Army was neither constructed 
nor resourced for conducting MOOTW.  The Army’s post-Cold War structure was largely a 
reduced facsimile of its Cold War structure, based on the corps and division concept of 
conducting and supporting offensive and defensive combat operations with copious amounts of 
armor, infantry, and field artillery units.  Formations and units designed for combat could not be 
changed or transformed easily or even with great effort.  A sclerotic planning and acquisition 
system, bureaucratic inertia, congressional ties to lobbyists in the defense community, and 
equipment designed for combat were unlikely motive forces compelling or even enabling 
significant training and doctrinal change in the U.S. Army.  Culturally, the U.S. Army had a deep 
seated aversion to MOOTW.  The U.S. Army’s experience in Vietnam, a general dislike of 
operations that did not conform to the ethos of the U.S. Army as a war-fighting unit, and a 
  So, MOOTW was doubly cursed: deemed of distant 
second importance to combat and, if not unimportant, then sufficiently prepared for in the course 
of normal combat training and exercises. 
                                                 
198 Hamlet, Michael E., Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT), the Key to Training Combat 
Forces for the Twenty-First Century, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1999, p. 36. 
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valiant history of successful operations in true combat environments combined to produce broad 
objections to MOOTW. 
Even near the end of the 20th Century, after numerous operational deployments in support 
of MOOTW,199 doctrinal publications still doggedly dodged this increasingly important mission: 
“operations across the full spectrum of conflict with multi-national forces, other governmental 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and private volunteer organizations 
(PVO) have risen in frequency and importance yet our training doctrine neglects the subject.”200   
And as Ralph Peters concludes, “in the 1990s, our Gulf War was the sole conventional conflict 
of note.  Both lopsided and inconclusive, it confirmed the new military paradigm—the United 
States is unbeatable on a traditional battlefield—but that battlefield is of declining relevance.”201
                                                 
199 The United States military participated in operations in Northern Iraq, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, 
Somalia, Macedonia, Haiti, Liberia, Central African Republic, Albania, Congo and Gabon, Cambodia, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya and Tanzania, Liberia, East Timor, and to various counterdrug operations in Latin America and South 
America. 
  
200 Snukis, Thomas J., Training the Army After Next, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA, 1999, p. 22. 
201 Peters, Ralph, “Our New Old Enemies,” Challenging the United States Symmetrically and 
Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 1998, p. 215. 
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3.3 POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, PART III  
(HIERARCHIES AND NETWORKS) 
Although during the Cold War states had to contend with a variety of networked international 
criminal and terrorist organizations operating either independently or at the behest of or in 
collusion with a state, their chief security concerns emanated from other states’ power. 202  
During the Cold War, power typically manifested in the state’s employment of a uniformed 
armed force and the targeted violence that this force could project.  When Cold War era 
international networks challenged state power, states typically responded with police, 
paramilitary, or military force to disrupt or destroy their activities.  For the most part, states were 
successful in minimizing the growth and influence of international networks prior to 1991 by 
exerting traditional forms of state power.203   As Metz argues, “when power was strictly a factor 
of tangible resources like money and troops, the state held a distinct advantage.”204
                                                 
202 This discussion of networks refers to social networks.  “A social network consists of a finite set or sets 
of actors and the relation or relations defined on them.  The presence of relational information is a critical and 
defining feature of a social network.”  See, Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: 
Methods and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 20 
  Outside of 
the major drug and crime networks, few illicit international networks were capable of conducting 
operations without tacit or direct support from a state.  But like that of many, particularly the 
203 Arguably the drug cartels of South America were peer opponents of the states that they operated in but 
their growth and capacity was kept in at least partial check by internal or external state forces. 
204 Metz, Steven, Rethinking Insurgency, Op Cit, p. 13. 
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most disorderly Third World states, the position and potential of illicit international networks 
dramatically changed in the relaxed post-Cold War international security environment.205
3.3.1 Hierarchies and Networks in the post-Cold War International Security 
Environment 
 
The rise of internationally-capable networks was not just a symptom of the retreat of the 
state after the end of the Cold War, it was also a cause.  Networks were positioned to take 
advantage of the tools of globalization in unique ways that the state was not: “the rise of 
networks means that power is migrating to nonstate actors, who are able to organize into 
sprawling multi-organizational networks (especially all-channel networks, in which every node 
is connected to every other node) more readily than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors.  
Nonstate-actor networks are thought to be more flexible and responsive than hierarchies in 
reacting to outside developments, and to be better than hierarchies at using information to 
improve decisionmaking.”206
                                                 
205 “The growth of these networks is related to the spread of advanced information technologies that allow 
dispersed groups, and individuals, to conspire and coordinate across considerable distances.”  Arquilla, John, David 
Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, Countering the 
New Terrorism, Ed. Lesser, Ian, et al, RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, p 45. 
  As international networks, licit and illicit, grew in size, number 
and scope, the state and the system of states lost some of its power in directing resources, 
centralizing the use of force, upholding laws, and controlling the international security 
environment, particularly in the poorly governed areas of the Third World.  This was due in large 
part to the effects of globalization, and in particular, the “spectacular advances and convergences 
206 Ibid, pp. 45-46. 
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in computer and communication technology and by the collective economic, political, societal, 
cultural, and communicative processes.”207  Networks emerging in the post-Cold War 
international security environment were capable of seizing and utilizing tools once reserved for 
state-based organizations in the conduct of their activities, without the consequence of absorbing 
the roles or responsibilities formally ascribed to and incumbent upon the state apparatus.  While 
the emergence of licit international networks in the post-Cold War environment might have 
aided states in carrying out functions that were, in the post-Cold War world, largely abandoned 
by bureaucracies, the emergence of illicit networks challenged the authority of the state and 
abetted manifold security concerns and dilemmas.  Illicit international networks made the post-
Cold War international security environment less secure and even more difficult to define in 
traditional terms. “In essence, what nation-states were faced with during the old global order 
period was the threat not of shadowy transnational organizations, but rather, that of other, clearly 
identifiable nation-states.  It is supremely ironic that the Cold War now seems like a much safer, 
much more predictable time.”208
 In a sense, networks are the antithesis of the hierarchical organizational form favored by 
centralized states; they tend to lack definable form and distinction, can rapidly generate or 
dissolve, and have no particular constituency to serve outside of that of the network’s 
choosing.
 
209
                                                 
207 Monge, Peter R. and Noshir S. Contractor, Op Cit, p. 4. 
  As Phil Williams notes, “networks are far superior to traditional hierarchies in 
208 Pearlstein, Richard M., Fatal Future? Transnational Terrorism and the New Global Disorder, University 
of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 2004, p. 95. 
209 As Michael Kenney argues, “Organizationally, these enterprises are smaller and flatter than their state 
competitors, allowing them to disperse information rapidly throughout their network structures when necessary.  
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terms of organizational effectiveness, especially when it comes to innovation and 
teamwork…this is hardly surprising since network structures are resistant to disruption and have 
a degree of resilience that other forms of organization lack.”210
Unlike networks, traditional organizational forms, such as hierarchies, “typically try to 
defend against possible threats through much more conventional mechanisms such as plans, 
standard operating procedures, professional rules, and informal prescriptions” and these 
defensive mechanisms can lead to a system that is rigid and less capable of handling the 
unexpected.
  While hierarchical organizations 
trend toward adopting bureaucratic ideals that support form and constancy, networked 
organizations trend away from ideal types and tend to support function and change.  And 
whereas hierarchies try to minimize the effects of change and unpredictable undulations in the 
external environment, networks exploit these stimuli to gain organizational and operational 
advantage. Uncertainty is anathema to hierarchical organizations but can be a blessing to 
networks, particularly illicit networks preferring chaotic and shadowy environments beyond the 
state’s reach. 
211
                                                                                                                                                             
They adapt quickly to law enforcement and military efforts to disrupt their activities, using knowledge, technology, 
and experience to alter their operations.  And they stand outside the rule of law, giving them the freedom to 
disregard the normative and legalistic constraints that regulate (and slow down) their sovereignty-bound 
competitors.”  See, Kenney, Michael, “The Challenge of Eradicating Transnational Criminal Networks: Lessons 
from the War on Drugs,” Paper Prepared for Delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 29 August-1 September, 2002, p. 16. 
  Hierarchical organizations are a formal and natural extension of human tendency 
210 Williams, Phil, “The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks,” Current History, April 1998, p. 154. 
211 Weick, Karl E. and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an 
Age of Complexity, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2001, pp. 78-81. 
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toward simplification, specialization, and order in the accomplishment of tasks, particularly tasks 
requiring significant inputs.  Networks also reflect a human tendency toward simplification and 
specialization but tend to be informal in their construction and conduct tasks requiring far fewer 
inputs.  It is the nature of hierarchies to require an organization to function while networks 
require a function to organize.  While it is true that “humans use patterns to order the world and 
make sense of things in complex situations,”212
3.3.2 Order and Disorder 
 these two types of organizational forms reflect 
differing expressions of cognitive responses to complexity and uncertainty and patterns in human 
behavior.  Hierarchies are favored by organizations beholden to the state and networks are 
favored by organizations beholden to seemingly nothing but the absence of the state or any other 
ordering entity. 
Maintaining order is a much more difficult task than is creating disorder.  This is particularly true 
in the post-Cold War international security environment where previously geographically 
constrained networks are no longer limited in their reach by borders and state checks on their 
power and influence.  Order must be enforced while disorder seems to spontaneously erupt from 
where order is lacking.  Much of this condition is due to the information revolution encapsulated 
by globalization.  As Ronfeldt argues, “It seems clear that the information revolution strengthens 
and favors network forms of organization.  The new information and communications 
technologies—all that make up the Net, the Web, the Grid—are enabling dispersed, often small, 
                                                 
212 Kurtz, C.F. and D.J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a Complex and 
Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal, Volume 42, Number 3, 2003, p. 466. 
 101 
once-isolated groups and individuals to connect, coordinate, and act conjointly as never 
before.”213  While it might be easy to discern the intentions, functions, and contacts of a formal 
hierarchy like those possessed by a state’s government or military, it is much more difficult to 
discern the connections and contacts of a network, especially a criminal network since their 
“sinister connections are invisible or dormant for much of the time.”214
Networks inherently create both order and disorder depending on the perspective of the 
viewer.  For a state, networks can be subversive, difficult to track and define, and can thwart the 
state’s ability to impose rules.  For instance, illicit cyberspace networks can avoid detection by 
state-based organizations simply by rotating IP addresses, using advanced encryption, or by 
hijacking the legitimate resources and powers contained on state-based servers and storage 
systems.
  Many networks have 
developed or evolved as a response to the retreat of state power or the outright collapse of state 
authority characteristic of failing and failed states. 
215
                                                 
213 Ronfeldt, David, In Search of how Societies Work: Tribes—the First and Forever Form, RAND, Santa 
Monica, CA, December 2006, p. 9. 
  For a community or sub-state organization, networks create order out of chaos by 
latticing form and function where none existed before.  Networks in Third World countries, 
where state power has in many cases precipitously receded in the post-Cold War era, tend to 
form around familial and kinship ties or through tribes in the pursuit of a common goal, function, 
or end-state.  Ronfeldt asserts that “this is true in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia 
up into the ‘stans’ of Central Asia.  Even modern societies still have tribal cores and 
214 Lambe, Patrick, “Terrorism and Social Network Analysis,” Mapping, 2003. 
215 All of these capabilities, paradoxically, were created either by states or organizations working within 
states. 
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impulses.”216
What distinguishes modern societies from the pre-modern societies that arguably exist in 
many Third World countries is the presence of the constraining and centralizing features of the 
state where rules, authority, and specialization in function is condoned and encouraged in 
organizations.  Andre Standing contends that “unlike hierarchy…a network can be considered as 
a rather flat, flexible and informal approach to coordinating social (or specifically criminal) life.  
A network denotes interconnectedness between essentially independent entities.  Rather than via 
central authority, unity among the parts is achieved by shared objectives or trust—the central 
coordinating mechanism is mutual dependency of sorts.”
  Order does proceed from disorder, and vice versa, but the forms of organization 
that develop from either depend many times upon the existence or absence of modern state 
control and influence. 
217  These networks can “be highly 
structured and enduring in nature or they can be loose, fluid, or amorphous in character, with 
members coming and going according to particular needs, opportunities, and demands.  Some 
individuals or even small organizations will drift in and out of networks when it is convenient for 
them to do so.”218
The form and existence of networks is many times dictated by their reaction to their 
environment or their reaction to the presence or absence of state-based organizations and 
governmental control.  In failed states, networks might and many times do fill the roles that the 
state once played in ordering society.  But it is also true that networks might form and exist to 
 
                                                 
216 Ibid, p. 76. 
217 Standing, Andre, “How can Crime be Organized?,” Monograph No. 77, February 2003. 
218 Williams, Phil, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, 
Crime, and Militancy, Eds. Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, Santa Monica, RAND, 2001, p. 69. 
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exploit the absence of the ordering tendencies of states and they thus prove to be a highly 
disruptive force, not only in the host state but regionally and in the international security 
environment as a whole.  As will be examined in later chapters, this was true in many Third 
World states in the post-Cold War period and would prove to be of significant importance to the 
direction of U.S. strategy and the consequential organizational adaptation of the U.S. Army 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and throughout OIF. 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In 1992, John Lewis Gaddis wrote of the unique integrating and disintegrating conditions that the 
United States faced in the post-Cold War international security environment, “for the first time in 
over half a century, no single great power, or coalition of powers, poses a ‘clear and present 
danger’ to the national security of the United States.  The end of the Cold War has left 
Americans in the fortunate position of being without an obvious major adversary, and that—
given the costs of confronting adversaries who have been all too obvious since the beginning of 
World War II—is a condition worthy of greater appreciation than it has so far received.”219
                                                 
219 Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, 
Provocations, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 193. 
  But 
Gaddis warned that the United States’ position of security, newly found in the absence of the 
Soviet Union, would have consequences: “unfortunately, however, the forces of integration are 
not the only ones active in the world: there are also forces of fragmentation at work that are 
resurrecting old barriers between nations and peoples—and creating new ones—even as others 
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are tumbling.  Some of these forces have begun to show unexpected strength, just when it looked 
as though integration was about to prevail.”220  Implementing policies and strategies based on 
this duality-laced vision of the post-Cold War was thus a difficult proposition.  The United States 
would have to ensure flexibility and adaptability in the organizations charged with handling the 
country’s new found prominence in a world where traditional power dynamics and forces were 
in flux.  The management of post-Cold War change would in large part be influenced by how the 
United States chose to respond to this environment and how it would array its military 
capabilities to ensure stability as the country approached the 21st
Perhaps the constraining features and dynamics of the Cold War and popular theories of 
how to operate in a bi-polar, state-centric world were too powerful to overcome in the post-Cold 
War era.  As Peter Clerks contends, “The preconceived ideas that we hold about social 
phenomena shape the things we see, and subsequently what we perceive influences what we do 
about it.  No perception is possible without a theory behind it.”
 Century. 
221
                                                 
220 Ibid, p. 198. 
  Despite disintegration in the 
Third World, population concentration in urban areas, the rise of illicit., adaptive, and networked 
organizations, and a force much leaner on personnel, the U.S. Army decided to entertain a vision 
leading to the creation of a less adaptive organization: a technologically capable, hierarchical, 
combat-oriented force more attuned to state-based, Cold War enemies than to the amorphous, 
networked, and less than identifiable threats of the post-Cold War era.  While internationally 
disposed networks were slowly rising like phoenixes out of the ashes of Third World sovereignty 
221 Klerks, Peter, “The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking or a 
Relevant Doctrine for Investigators?  Recent Developments in the Netherlands,” Connections, Volume 24, No. 3, 
2001, p. 55. 
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and boundaries, the U.S. Army was developing a tightly controlled, hierarchical combat force 
almost exclusively dedicated to an included but lesser threat to post-Cold War international 
stability: the state. 
The development of this force and the doctrine to support it was neither irrational nor 
impossible to understand, even with the focused and discerning vision offered by the all-knowing 
spectacles of hindsight, but it was nonetheless constraining.  Creating a force armed with 
singularly focused capabilities and the doctrine to support those capabilities does not lend to the 
potential for adaptation; in fact, and in this instance, the likelihood of and capacity for adaptation 
significantly decreased.  The choices that policymakers and U.S. Army leadership made in the 
1990s created a highly trained yet static tool for responding to a rapidly changing international 
security environment.  Ascribing adaptability to this force, overly prejudiced for a single 
function, constricted the range of choices and changes that the U.S. Army would be able to make 
in the early 21st Century.  Large organizations with massive budgets, sclerotic resourcing, 
constrained mission sets, and a highly focused pool of personnel adapt but do not adapt 
quickly.222
                                                 
222 General Chiarelli argues that “the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] process, the system that we 
have for bringing new weapons systems on, is an industrial age system that basically says that for requirements you 
can forecast 12 years out from the time that you are going to field a piece of equipment, you are able to write a 
requirement that delivers 12 years this piece of equipment that gets you where you want to be at that particular point 
in time.”  General Chiarelli, Peter, Telephone Interview, 27 October 2008. 
  As J. Bowyer Bell argues, “A prepared mind flexible, familiar with the actual 
asymmetries of the real and perceived, coupled with experience in both the existing system and 
the history of the unconventional, offers the most effective preparation.  Too much dogma, too 
much set doctrine, too many orthodox assumptions extrapolated into fashioning a model for all 
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eventualities not only assures a flawed response but also reassures that America can each and 
every time react in a cunningly calculated, carefully calibrated commitment of tangible resources 
in a conflict that is a matter of perception that takes place in an environment shaped by ideas and 
conviction beyond easy reach.”223
                                                 
223 Bell, J. Bowyer, Dragonwars: Armed Struggle & the Conventions of Modern War, Transaction 
Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1999, pp. 419-420. 
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4.0  CLEAVAGE AND CRITICAL JUNCTURE:  SETTING THE CONDITIONS AND 
POTENTIAL FOR ADAPTATION IN OIF 
“All human situations have their inconveniences.  We feel those of the present but neither see 
nor feel those of the future; and hence we often make troublesome changes without 
amendment, and frequently for the worse”—Benjamin Franklin  
 
By the end of the 20th Century the international security environment had grown increasingly 
foreign and complex.  Familiar challengers to U.S. global and regional hegemony (Russia and 
China) were still present and were transforming for the post-Cold War world while alternative 
forms of governance emerged in Afghanistan, in the tattered failed state of Somalia, and in 
various Third World and transition country enclaves and cities.  Terrorism, as a tool and as a 
raison d’etre for various internationally-capable organizations, materialized and manifested in 
deed in the first World Trade Center bombing (1993), the Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and 
Kenya (1998), and in the bombing of the USS Cole (2000).  Additionally, Pakistan threatened an 
already unstable South and Southwest Asia with its first nuclear weapons test (1998) while North 
Korea expanded its missile program in that same year.224
                                                 
224 Munck and de Silva argue that the “plethora of conflicts that have emerged or continue to fester in the 
aftermath of the Cold War” requires that a range of actors “come to terms with the growing problems of political 
violence and armed conflicts.”  See Munch, Ronaldo and Purnaka L. de Silva, Political Violence, Identity Formation 
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In parallel to these events, the U.S. Army was busily implementing its program for 
addressing the security challenges of the 21st Century: Transformation.  The Army’s 
transformative effort began with the conceptual development of Force XXI (networked 
battlefield systems and digitization) in 1993, continued with the digitization/modernization of a 
portion of 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) in 1994, was expanded with the AAN project, and 
culminated, at least on an interim basis, in the creation of the 1st and 2nd (with more following) 
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) at Fort Lewis, WA.  The 3rd Brigade of 2nd Infantry 
Division and later the 1st Brigade of 25th Infantry Division were selected as the units to lead the 
Transformation process.  “The Army selected the 3d Brigade of the 2d Infantry Division to serve 
as the vanguard of Shinseki’s effort to make the Army more lethal but also more responsive, 
deployable, and sustainable than it had ever been.  The program had as its immediate goal the 
production of a medium-weight force to bridge the gap between easily deployable light units and 
their heavier counterparts that required significantly more time and resources to reposition.”225
                                                                                                                                                             
and Peacemaking in Comparative Perspective, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000, p. 245.  The post-Cold War 
international security environment was increasingly characterized by unconventional and unpredictable outbreaks of 
violence at the low and high end of the conflict spectrum.  Paul Smith argues that in the absence of specially created 
agencies and organizations to address transnational issues, military leaders would have to prepare to confront these 
threats.  See, Smith, Paul J., Op Cit, p. 88.  Part of this response was the U.S. Army’s pursuit of Transformation and 
the creation of the Objective Force, even if this force was constituted on largely conventional premises. 
  
The SBCT represented an actualization of the prevailing concept of future warfare where 
225 Reardon, Mark J. and Jeffrey A. Charlston, From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade 
at War, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 2007, p. 4. 
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intelligence capacity illuminated the battlefield and helped direct overwhelming firepower and 
did so with a force that was lighter and less manpower intensive than legacy units.226
As the U.S. Army was transforming forces that were arguably more lethal and 
deployable, the international security environment was becoming less responsive to these 
capabilities.  Actual and potential adversaries were realizing that faults existed in the combat-
heavy, conventionally oriented forces that the U.S. Army fielded to counter unconventional 
enemies.  As Andrew Bacevich argues regarding Mohammed Aideed and Radovan Karadzic, 
“no doubt they respect the U.S. military establishment for its formidable strengths.  They are also 
shrewd enough to circumvent those strengths and to exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in the 
rigid U.S. adherence to professional conventions regarding the use of force.”
 
227
                                                 
226 In 1996, a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College presciently discerned 
weaknesses in the Force XXI concept insofar as this concept was premised on an intelligence picture that was 
unlikely obtainable in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment and relied on the accurate delivery of 
munitions against dispersed and cellular forces: “Unfortunately, the characteristics of a UW force seem to negate 
many of the capabilities upon which the concept [Force XXI] is based.  Against an urban-based, cellular UW force 
locating discrete, critical targets will be difficult.  It will be particularly difficult to locate sufficient numbers of 
targets simultaneously, so that their destruction can paralyze the UW force; rather, operations will tend to be 
incremental, time consuming and indecisive.  Finally, Force XXI is a low manpower, high firepower force designed 
to defeat an opponent whose center of gravity is his military.  Its ability to transition to manpower intensive presence 
and security operations to counter a UW force, whose center of gravity is popular support is questionable.”  See, 
Tovo, Kenneth E., Force XXI Versus an Unconventional Warfare Threat, School of Advanced Military Studies, 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 April 1996, p. 37. 
  Many of the 
adversaries emerging in the post-Cold War era not only didn’t challenge the U.S. Army 
227 Bacevich, Andrew J., “The Limits of Orthodoxy: The Use of Force After the Cold War,” The United 
States and the use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era, The Aspen Institute, Washington DC, 1995, p. 185. 
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conventionally, they couldn’t, and in the case of Somalia and later in Afghanistan and Iraq, did 
not need to.  Anthony Zinni contends that the U.S. military resisted making adjustments in 
doctrine, organization, training and equipment throughout the 1990s and remained fundamentally 
constructed for the Cold War period, albeit with some “evolutionary modernization for certain 
capabilities.”228
 By the very nature of large bureaucratic organizations, the U.S. Army was not well 
disposed to making changes that significantly broke from its conventional moorings despite 
recent experience and evidence that the international security environment was in disarray.  As 
Chris Demchak and Patrick Allen argue, “just as the Army leadership is not demonstrating the 
will or understanding to encourage change agents, they show less understanding of the 
technologies they intend to acquire…the Army’s history with innovative organizations is not 
encouraging.  The leadership has consistently shown a tendency to attempt to shove new 
technologies into older organizational structures.  When they have not done so, they have also 
shown a gross misunderstanding of the technology-human mesh, and innovative organizations 
have not fared well as a result.”
 
229
                                                 
228 Zinni, Anthony C., A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons from the Recent Past, Strategic Forum No. 
181, National Defense University, July 2001. 
  Not only was the U.S. Army misunderstanding the 
229 Demchak, Chris C. and Patrick D. Allen, “Technology and Complexity: The Modern Military’s 
Capacity for Change,” Transforming Defense, Ed. Conrad Crane, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle, PA, December 2001, p. 114.  Wray Johnson argues a similar point, “the US military’s 
conventional heritage and predisposition will remain intact and drive decisions affecting doctrine, force structure 
and readiness and, therefore, affect the Armed Forces’ ability to effectively conduct OOTW missions.  A corollary 
position is that effective employment of general-purpose US forces in OOTW can be achieved through conceptual 
innovation.”  See, Johnson, Wray R., Op Cit, p. 68. 
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technology-human mesh amongst its own units, it did not understand the mesh of its technology 
with the human elements of the environments that it was increasingly encountering.  As Charles 
Krulak explains, “modern crisis responses are exceedingly complex endeavors.  In Bosnia, Haiti, 
and Somalia the unique challenges of military operations other than war (MOOTW) were 
combined with the disparate challenges of mid-intensity conflict.”230
Compounding the U.S. Army’s fundamental inability to adjust to new threats and 
circumstances was the fact that states and non-state actors were adapting, in particular, to the 
strengths of the U.S. military establishment.  Thomas Mahnken argues that “although some states 
may emulate U.S. military practices, others are likely to develop innovative approaches to 
achieve their political objectives.  Strategies designed to negate the effectiveness or to exploit the 
weaknesses of high-technology forces may be especially appealing to states lacking the means to 
compete head-to-head with the United States.”
  The sensors, 
reconnaissance, target acquisition, weapons, and communications capabilities engendered in the 
SBCT and the Transformation effort would not, alone or in concert, assist in making sense of 
increasingly complex environments dominated by civilians and combatants who did not wear 
uniforms or follow the Geneva Conventions.  A doctrinal and institutional shift was necessary 
for this kind of change but was not forthcoming. 
231
                                                 
230 Krulak, Charles C. “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, 
January 1999. 
  This was likely for non-state forces as well.  
Additionally, Mahnken argues, traditional measures of military power have focused on weaponry 
to the exclusion of various qualitative factors including training and doctrine.  This focus has 
231 Mahnken, Thomas G., Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 
1918-1941, Cornell University Press, London, 2002, p. 177. 
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produced “wildly inaccurate predictions of combat outcomes.”232  While the SBCT and the 
Objective Force concept did represent modest change in response to the post-Cold War 
international security environment in terms of equipment and organization, it also reflected an 
institutional bias favoring the familiar over the innovative and the quantitative over the 
qualitative.  Institutional preference persisted in the types of forces and skills, training, and 
doctrine that were used in the development of the SBCT and the Objective Force and thus 
impeded any true organizational change.233
    Creating the SBCT to be more deployable and responsive without a true enemy in 
mind ensured that previous concepts would be overlaid onto this new organization in an attempt 
to give it refined definition and purpose.  As Vertzberger explains, “problems that are ill defined 
are also poorly understood” and when faced with an ill-defined problem decision-makers will 
“unconsciously transform ill-defined problems into well-defined ones by ignoring indeterminate 
attributes.”
 
234
                                                 
232 Ibid, p. 177. 
  The U.S. Army, through the SBCT and Objective Force concept, was being 
redefined into a medium-weight conventional force to fight an ill-defined adversary with existing 
doctrine and weapons platforms.  The only ostensible change that the SBCT made to the existing 
233 As Sarkesian argues, “Whatever the organizational strategies contemplated, the fundamental problem of 
integrating American capabilities rests not solely or primarily with organizational restructuring, but with conceptual 
synthesis.”  The U.S. Army, under the direction of General Shinseki, had difficulty synthesizing the idea of the 
SBCT within the existing, larger organizational structure.  See Sarkesian, Sam C., Organizational Strategy and Low-
Intensity Conflicts,” Special Operations in US Strategy, Eds. Barnett, Frank, et al, NDU Press, Washington DC, 
1984, p. 286. 
234 Vertzberger, Yaacov, Y.I., Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1998, pp. 31-33. 
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force was a supposed deployment and redeployment capability combined with greater 
intelligence acquisition hardware than existed in a legacy brigade.  It was assumed that the 
SBCT, like its infantry and armored counterparts, would participate in operations that would be 
rapid and decisive, not prolonged and inconclusive, and would be aided by an omniscient 
intelligence apparatus.235  Thus, the SBCT was developed with little regard to evolving threats 
and the post-Cold War international security environment but with high regard for long held 
beliefs, organizational dogmatism, newly available capabilities, and emergent technologies.  As 
John Nagl asserts, “perhaps the most serious asymmetric threat to U.S. national security is the 
organizational culture of the Department of Defense and of its component services.  Accustomed 
to mirror-imaging and to creating a national security apparatus to defeat the threats which we see 
and understand, the Department of Defense continues to be held in thrall to the Iron Triangle of 
Congress, the Services, and the defense industry, devoting resources to countering future 
symmetrical threats which we already overmatch while devoting insufficient resources to 
emerging asymmetrical threats.”236
                                                 
235 Blank argues that the United States defines its “conduct of war in its entirety as the model against which 
others should be measured” and that the United States also claims “that the model of contemporary operations is or 
should be one where rapid operations leading to a decisive end are essential and indispensable attribute of victory.”  
Blank also states that enemies like as Qaeda present “immense cognitive barriers to understanding which no 
technology can fully erase.”  See, respectively, Blank, Stephen J., Rethinking Asymmetric threats, Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, September 2003, p. 18 and p. 22. 
  Additionally, Nagl argues that “today [2001], America’s 
236 Nagl, John A., Asymmetric Threats to U.S. National Security to the Year 2010, U.S. Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2001, p. 58. 
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means of security are being regulated by a remembered threat, and not by the one she is likely to 
face for the next decade.”237
Familiar concepts and derivations from these concepts, like Rapid Decisive Operations or 
RDO, pervaded the Transformation project and dovetailed well with the strategy developed after 
the attacks of 11 September 2001.
 
238
                                                 
237 Ibid, p. 77. 
  “The RDO concept aimed at enabling the military 
instrument to respond quickly with smaller, more lethal forces to bring regional conflict 
threatening U.S. interests to a rapid and decisive close.  Its central operational framework—
effects based operations—integrated the application of precision engagement, information 
operations, theater enablers, and dominant maneuver to produce a relentless series of 
multidimensional raids, strikes, and ground assaults throughout the battlespace…RDO became 
the rallying point for the Army’s march into the future.  It pervaded military thinking, equipment 
238 McMaster describes the development of RDO and the associated concept of Effects-Based Operations 
(EBO):  “a team comprised mainly of contractors used JV 2010 as the basis for their efforts.  They viewed the 
possibilities associated with information as the basis for new operational concepts.  That vision of future war took 
shape under two complementary concepts: Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) and Effects-Based Operations (EBO).  
Their names were inherently persuasive; criticism might be misconstrued as advocacy for ‘Ponderous Indecisive 
Operations’ or ‘Randomly Generated Violence.”  McMaster, H.R., Crack in the Foundation: Defense 
Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War, Op Cit., p. 73.  Shortly 
after the commencement of OIF, Batschelet argued that incorporating EBO into the force was very difficult given 
the linear training and planning regimen used by the U.S. Army: “the current approach to leader training focused too 
much on process to the detriment of outcome.  Battle drills, situational lane training and rote teaching of the military 
MDMP all contribute to the development of leaders who are able to apply proven, but limited responses to 
battlefield realities.”  This contention proved even more true in post-combat Iraq.  See Batschelet, Allen W., 
“Effects-Based Operations for Joint Warfighters,” Field Artillery, May-June 2003. 
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procurement, unit redesign, and force structure decisions regarding combat support and service 
support units.”239
Only one side of the Transformation program was ever emphasized: the ability to get 
more lethal forces to contingencies faster and with a smaller logistical footprint.
  RDO would enable the Bush Administration to form a strategy premised on 
the capability to quickly topple a state’s government, defeat its forces, or to dismember a hostile 
organization functioning on its soil.  As for any stabilization of these de-stabilized areas, RDO 
neither offered a response nor a solution.  The capabilities-based Transformation effort relied on 
enhanced combat capabilities to accomplish the combat portions of post-9/11 military strategy 
but did so at the expense of the stability that it purportedly would help to produce.  There was 
little recognition at the time that the U.S. Army’s Transformation program, instituted allegedly to 
enhance full-spectrum dominance and achieve strategic goals, was contributing to an 
institutionalized inability to provide stability and translate battlefield success into political 
victory. 
240
                                                 
239 Watson, Brian G., Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater 
Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2005, p. 4. 
  Choosing 
240 Reductions in unit size disproportionately affect the staffing and thus planning and resourcing capacity 
of headquarters units.  “While the U.S. Army has had many structural changes in its history, one constant that 
pervades the forces the Army designs institutionally is that the operational warfighting headquarters are inherently 
understaffed to accomplish the missions to which they are assigned.  Many factors such as personnel strength, 
budgetary considerations, and technology influence Army structural design, but primary among these many factors n 
designing new forces should be warfighting capabilities.  However, too often personnel and budgetary 
considerations outweigh those critical warfighting headquarters’ capabilities in building unit and force designs.”  For 
example, “currently, as operations in both OEF and OIF continue, as well as support to Combined Joint Task Force-
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the CENTCOM staff is authorized 1395 personnel, is manned at 1599, and still 
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this capability necessarily meant sacrificing other capabilities and thus reducing options for 
adaptation at the strategic and tactical levels.  “The Army must continually validate its choices 
against a healthy respect for the shadow of the future.  Choices now severely constrain future 
capabilities.  This is true with regard to choices of weapon systems and equipment.  It is also true 
with regard to the nature of recruitment, training, and development that will grow the strategic 
leaders of tomorrow’s Army from the junior members of today’s profession.”241  Through 
Transformation, the U.S. Army had made its choice and did so based on organizational 
characteristics amenable to fighting against a familiar force on a battlefield that was well-known 
throughout the Cold War.  Arreguin-Toft argues that strong actors struggle with smaller, 
arguably weaker, adversaries because strong actors are constituted to fight other strong actors 
and shifting focus is costly and difficult.242
 This chapter will examine the foundation of the U.S. Army’s Transformation program; 
demonstrate how this program was not really a transformation but instead the inculcation of new 
capabilities into old structures laden with old doctrine; assess the effects of the Bush Doctrine, 
OEF, and Transformation post-9/11 and; will argue that these events helped to make the U.S. 
  The U.S. Army’s singularly conventionally-oriented 
modernization program would become increasingly narrowed through the process of 
Transformation; the costs of adapting in future conflict would be severe. 
                                                                                                                                                             
requires 962 augmentees to conduct operations for the GWOT.”  Siltman, Frank J., Too Thin on Top: The Under-
Resourcing of Headquarters in Force Design, USAWC Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA, 15 March 2006, pp.1 
and p. 11, respectively. 
241 Lacquement, Richard A., Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdictions, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2003, p. 26. 
242 Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Cambridge 
University Press, UK, 2005, pp. 219-223. 
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Army less adaptive and less capable of achieving full-spectrum dominance as it prepared for 
OIF. 
4.1 TRANSFORMATION, PRE 9/11 
Any attempt to transform an organization and to institutionalize flexibility and the qualities of 
adaptation defies bureaucratic and organizational tendencies.  R.W. Komer examined 
organizational actions and performance in Vietnam and found that training, incentive systems, 
and conformity to bureaucratic norms all derail attempts to develop organizational flexibility.243  
Part of the problem with conducting organizational change, no matter how modest or 
incremental, is that the decisions made are usually premised on successive choices made in the 
past and are held hostage to a larger framework that is not directly part of the change taking 
place.244  The organizational change brought by the U.S. Army’s Transformation program, even 
if partially appropriate for the 21st
                                                 
243 Komer, R.W., Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in 
Vietnam, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, August 1972, pp. 152-156. 
 Century in its own right, was inhibited by doctrine, concepts, 
244 Lindblom notes that trouble with change is that “most of us approach policy problems within a 
framework given by our view of a chain of successive policy choices made up to the present.”  See Lindblom, 
Charles E., “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’,” Public Administration Review, Volume 19, No. 2, Spring, 1959, 
p. 88. 
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planning formats, equipment, and other existing organizations established for a different 
environment and to compete against different enemies.245
Even under the most auspicious circumstances and in the most predictable environments, 
the overarching architecture of the U.S. Army would have a significant and restraining effect on 
any transformative effort in smaller and subordinate units.  Additionally, it is unlikely that any 
transformative effort would be capable of creating a wholly appropriate force based on 
organization, occupational specialty, and equipment alone.  This was as true for forces in World 
War II and the Cold War as it was for forces in the post-Cold War period.
 
246
                                                 
245 Indeed, another significant source of inhibition is officer attitudes towards change.  In their 2000 survey 
of officer attitudes towards transformation and the RMA, Mahnken and Fitzsimmons point out that many U.S. Army 
officers were skeptical of any need for the force to change radically.  Certainly, if a significant percentage of the 
officer corps doubts that there is need for radical change then they are less likely to take the steps necessary to 
institutionalize change and to spawn innovations within changing organizations.  See, Mahnken, Thomas G., and 
James R. Fitzsimmons, The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs, 
Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2000, p. 108. 
  Transforming in a 
world where enemies other than states were superficially defined, at best, was a difficult if not 
impossible task and would likely result in forces that retained linear projections of legacy 
organizational characteristics.  
246 Rosen argues that in a possible war with the Soviet Union, some U.S. forces would have been 
“inappropriate for the realities of combat.”  See Rosen, Stephen Peter, Winning the Next War, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, NY, 1991, p. 261. 
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Metz posits that historically, transformation would come either from direct and persistent 
intervention by political masters or through battlefield defeat.247
 One of the assumptions underlying the SBCT concept was that training for combat 
operations and the application of force were conditionally sufficient actions for handling 
contingencies in MOOTW environments.  As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, little 
additional preparation was deemed necessary for missions in complex or MOOTW environments 
  Neither of these conditions 
necessarily prevailed upon the U.S. Army as it pursued its Transformation agenda and thus, true 
transformation did not emerge.  Additionally, environmental considerations and likely 
adversaries seemed to play only a secondary role in U.S. Army Transformation.  The 
predominant concern of Transformation appeared to be the incorporation of technological 
capabilities into a more deployable force constrained in personnel and equipment apportionment.  
The SBCT was designed to operate with lighter, more mobile vehicles, fewer personnel than 
typical of a light or armored brigade, and sensors and intelligence fusion capabilities that 
promised to make the unit practically all-knowing.  Despite claims to the contrary, even if the 
SBCT were to achieve the situational awareness promised by information age technological 
capabilities, situational awareness does not necessarily present as situational understanding, does 
not bestow predictive capacity and intent discernment, and does not allow for the protagonist in 
the conflict to act in a time, place, and manner of its choosing; the enemy, no matter the form, 
has a vote in how any situation develops and is understood.  Assuming this capability in the face 
of a similarly structured adversary is optimistic; against a crude yet wily unconventional threat 
organization, this premise is chimerical.     
                                                 
247 Metz, Steven, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern 
Warfare, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 2000, p. 94. 
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other than standard unit training on combat tasks.  Another assumption pertaining to the design 
of the SBCT was that technological superiority would provide an intelligence picture that 
increased unit survivability in hostile environments.  A third assumption was that strategic 
flexibility was warranted and required as the United States would need to bounce from one 
contingency to another as necessity dictated.  A final assumption was that future conflicts would 
be decided quickly and, by extension, protracted warfare was either unlikely or could be 
precluded by the quick and massive application of combat power.  General Eric Shinseki 
highlighted this last assumption in his testimony before the Senate in 2000, “at present, in some 
instances, we face strategic deployment challenges that inhibit our ability to negotiate rapidly the 
transitions from peacetime operations in one part of the world to small-scale contingencies or 
warfights in another.  We must provide more flexibility…we must change…The Army’s 
Transformation Strategy will result in an Objective Force that is more responsive, deployable, 
agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the present force.  Thus, The Army has 
determined to transform itself to gain strategic flexibility and to become strategically dominant at 
every point on the spectrum of operations.”248
                                                 
248 Shinseki, Eric K., Statement Before the Airland Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, United 
States Senate, On the Army Transformation, 8 March 2000.  Bates and Warrender argue that “the Army’s aging 
Cold War infrastructure was designed as a heavy obstacle to Soviet armor in Europe.  In a 21st Century threat 
environment, ground forces need to be more mobile, survivable, fully-aware and lethal.”  See Bates, Scott and 
Zachary Warrender, Agility Across the Spectrum: A Future Force Blueprint, Center for National Policy, December 
2008, p. 24. 
  Through Shinseki’s Transformation the U.S. 
Army would be ‘strategically’ flexible, full spectrum dominant, and lethal; essentially, a smaller, 
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and more quickly deployable force capable of achieving the same purpose as its light and heavy 
counterparts and mirroring their conventional structures and compositions.249
  In 2002, Shinseki was more detailed in explaining his plans for Transformation and 
argued how this program, with the creation of the SBCTs and the future Objective Force, would 
engage future enemies: “applied immediately, technological innovations can provide battlefield 
advantage, particularly when they facilitate or complement new ways to conduct war.”
 
250  The 
technological innovations the SBCT concept relied upon and that would form the basis of the 
Objective Force would enable, at the tactical level, Objective Force units to “see first, 
understand first, act first and finish decisively as the means to tactical success.  Operations will 
be characterized by developing situations out of contact; maneuvering to positions of advantage; 
engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires; 
and, as required by tactical assault at times and places of our choosing.”251
                                                 
249 The RIF seemed to either force or complement this mindset and concept of operations insofar as units 
were smaller and thus could be deployed faster and with less logistical footprint.  As Murray explains, 
“Exacerbating the Army’s difficulties in adjusting to its new role has been dealing with the difficult problems 
associated with the major downsizing of its forces.”  Certainly the RIF was problematic but judging by Shinseki’s 
vision of a smaller, networked, agile and deployable force, the U.S. Army would benefit from a smaller force.  See 
Murray, Williamson, “Introduction,” Army Transformation: a View from the U.S. Army War College, Ed. Murray, 
Williamson, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2001, p. 2-3.    
  Shinseki did give the 
obligatory nod to the two major theater conflict requirement but added that the U.S. Army must 
“remain sufficiently versatile and agile to handle smaller-scale contingencies which will occur 
250 Shinseki, Eric K., Concepts for the Objective Force, U.S. Army White Paper, October 2002, p. 2. 
251 Ibid, p. 6. 
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more often, presenting unique challenges.”252  Like the vast majority of projections from the end 
of the Cold War until the creation of the SBCTs, Shinseki’s formulations assumed that, even in 
smaller-scale contingencies, combat and engagement with weapons platforms would be the 
primary objective and means of U.S. Army forces and threat agencies.  Little if any serious 
mention was made of the challenges posed by actors other than states or state-based forces.253
The SBCT did not have any doctrine specifically designed for its operations at its 
inception and much of the doctrine forthcoming was based on existing, traditional light and 
armored targeting, maneuver, and combat concepts.
 
254  Field Manual 6-20-10, Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for the Targeting Process, describes a process that can only 
clearly be related to traditional combat and not to MOOTW environments: types of fires 
(harassing, suppression, neutralization, destruction); target selection standards (accuracy 
requirements, size of enemy activity (point or area)); the synchronization of combat power and; 
the status of activity (moving or stationary).255
                                                 
252 Ibid, p. 3. 
  Field Manual 3-0, Operations, printed in June 
253 This was reflected in doctrine: “Today, potential adversaries rely on land-based military and 
paramilitary forces to retain power, coerce and control their populations, and extend influence beyond their 
borders.”  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, June 2001, p. 1-2. 
254 Doctrine made clear that no other type of focus was necessary: “the Army’s warfighting focus produces 
a full spectrum force that meets the needs of joint force commanders (JFCs) in war, conflict, and peace.”  Ibid, p. 1-
3. 
255 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the 
Targeting Process, Washington DC, 8 May 1996.  Paul Yingling argues that “the targeting process described in FM 
6-20-10 is focused on a battlefield that is conventional, linear and mechanized” but the United States found itself 
engaged in operations confronting non-state actors on non-linear battlefields.  See, Yingling, Paul L., Using the 
 123 
2001 indicates that the purpose of the Army (and thus the SBCT) was to organize, train, and 
equip “its forces to fight and win the nation’s wars and achieve directed national objectives.  
Fighting and winning the nation’s wars is the foundation of Army service.”256  Field Manual FM 
3-90, Tactics, printed in July 2001 states that “the tactical level of war is the level of war at 
which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives 
assigned to tactical units or task forces.  Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement 
and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat 
objectives.”257  Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, published in 2002, continues with the same 
doctrinal conflation of combat and MOOTW tasks and skills that pervaded post-Cold War 
doctrine, “battle focused training is training on wartime tasks.  Many of the METL [Mission 
Essential Task List] tasks that a unit trains on for its wartime mission are the same as required for 
a stability operation or support operation that they might execute.”258  If the SBCT was implicitly 
capable of operating in MOOTW environments there was little institutional or conceptual 
support for training and planning for these environments.  The doctrine that the SBCT would 
have to use or build upon was decidedly combat-oriented and provided only scant instruction or 
guidance for operations or planning in MOOTW.259
                                                                                                                                                             
Targeting Process to Synchronize Information Operations at the Tactical Level, School of Advanced Military 
Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2002, pp. 12-13. 
 
256 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, June 2001, p. 1-2. 
257 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-90, Tactics, July 2001, p. 1-2. 
258 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-0, Training the Force, October 2002, P. 2-8. 
259 Notably, the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), particularly the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 
at Fort Polk, LA, because of deployment experiences in the 1990, did “focus on guerilla and counter-guerilla tactics, 
techniques, and procedures.  This involved operating with indigenous or partisan forces and replicated some of the 
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 Although the SBCT was designed and staffed to act as a possible Joint Task Force (JTF) 
headquarters capable of planning and executing broad mission sets, few changes were made for 
decision making and planning in other than combat environments.  No significant changes were 
made to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) since the end of the Cold War although 
the threat environment was perceptibly altered.  Chief in the assumptions of the MDMP is that 
decisions and planning will be made in a time-constrained environment similar to that which 
prevails under combat conditions.260
                                                                                                                                                             
demands of what is now called irregular warfare.”  Brigadier General McMaster, H. R., Telephone Interview, 8 
September 2008.  This development was not well reflected in official doctrine or in home-station training.  
  Temporally, the planning required in a combat 
environment can be and often times is radically different than that required in a complex 
MOOTW environment where operations might be lengthy and continuous rather than short, 
intense, and discrete.  As FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, states, the “disadvantage 
of using the complete MDMP is that it is a time-consuming process”; lengthy planning timelines 
were not considered part of regular tactical decision making and most planning exercises and 
training assumed a time-constrained environment.  Thus, planning for non-linear, extended, and 
complex MOOTW environments was typically not exercised and when it was, the prevailing 
assumption was that the planning cycle should be linear, sequential, and phased from pre-combat 
to post-combat activities.  The increased information flows inherent to the networked forces of 
the SBCT combined with complex, unorthodox environments and actors required a distributed 
260 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Washington DC, 
31 May 1997, P. 5-1. 
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decision making system that defied the linear MDMP.261
 Innovation, even in the new SBCT, was difficult to arouse.  Training, derived from 
doctrinal guidance, was highly structured and based on the Task, Conditions, and Standards 
model prepared for and perfected during the Cold War.
  Tools (such as video teleconferencing, 
networking, and satellite communications) were available for distributed decision making and 
planning but the doctrine and processes required for this were largely absent. 
262
When unconventional missions were ordered, the U.S. Army would prepare units for 
deployment with Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) tailored to the particular mission that the 
deploying unit was expected to execute.  Upon redeployment, these units would return to 
conducting combat-focused training on tasks designed for deterring or defeating conventional 
  These doctrinal tasks were almost 
strictly combat-oriented and reflected the highly conventional bias of the U.S. Army.  The Task, 
Conditions, Standards model compelled units to train to a standard that produced reflexivity 
regardless of the conditions imposed.  This model worked well when applied to the conventional 
threats that pervaded the international security environment during the Cold War but were 
inadequate when preparing for threats (such as those in a complex low- or mid-intensity 
environment) that the tasks did not address.  Despite a changing international security 
environment the preponderance of U.S. Army tasks, derived from conventional mission sets, 
remained oriented on combat and on subduing armed and uniformed foes. 
                                                 
261 See discussion of MDMP in the information age in, Littlefield, Thomas K., The Military Decision 
Process—Overlooked by the Revolution in Military Affairs, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA, 1998, pp. 15-20. 
262 I would like to express thanks to Major General (Ret.) Robert Scales for his insights regarding the U.S. 
Army’s system for training and education and the relevance of both in the post-Cold War period. 
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adversaries.263
Although general training focused on conventional combat, the U.S. Army had been 
“operating in very complex state building and peace enforcement mission environments like the 
Balkans, and also with a large security sector reform project in Bosnia and Kosovo.”
  Interestingly, when units returned from MOOTW missions, they were considered 
unprepared for combat operations as measured by Unit Status Reporting (USR) guidelines 
premised on a fairly conventional set of tasks.  Apparently, combat and MOOTW missions did 
not exercise the same skills, as U.S. Army doctrine stated, and the two shared few if any 
transitive properties. 
264  And 
although these experiences and the knowledge from these experiences were retained throughout 
the U.S. Army, chiefly in the tacit, experiential knowledge of the participants, they were only 
exploited on a case by case basis as the need arose or as mission circumstance dictated.  Notable 
exceptions to this rule were “less than formal” doctrinal publications that emerged from units 
producing after action reviews or reports detailing experiences and practices in Somalia, Haiti, 
and the Balkans.265
                                                 
263 I would like to thank Colonel Richard Lacquement for his thoughts and discussion on the subject of the 
U.S. Army’s evolution from the Cold War through OIF. 
  Significant departures from doctrinal guidance and set tasks were unlikely 
and found disfavor.  As U.S. Army Field Manual 7-1, Battle Focused Training, explains, 
“Training must be done to the Army standard and conform to Army doctrine.  When mission 
tasks involve emerging doctrine or non-standard tasks, commanders establish the tasks, 
conditions, and standards using mission orders and guidance, lessons learned from similar 
operations, and their professional judgment.  The next higher commander approves the standards 
264 Brigadier General McMaster, H.R., Telephone Interview, 8 September 2008. 
265 Wright and Reese, Op Cit, pp. 61-62. 
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for these tasks.  FM 3-0 [Operations] provides the doctrinal foundations.”266
 In addition to the suppressive effects of the Task, Conditions, Standards paradigm 
developed for training, Leonard Wong argues that that innovation in the U.S. Army was stifled 
by a leader development system that “encourages reactive instead of proactive thought, 
compliance instead of creativity, and adherence instead of audacity.”
  The systematized 
training program that the U.S. Army developed to train Tasks, Conditions, and Standards 
allowed for little flexibility outside of that provided by existing doctrine approved by U.S. Army 
headquarters.  Quickly adapting to new environments and new enemies was retarded by the need 
to establish training within the combat-focused corpus of obtainable doctrine.  The battle tasks 
that units, including the SBCT, trained upon were just that: battle tasks. 
267  Company commanders 
were required to fit 297 days of mandatory training into 256 days and this training had to fit the 
codified Task, Conditions, and Standards model that governed all large and small unit training 
exercises.268  Wong also argues that “a training façade emerges when captains at the career 
courses are taught how to plan company training per FM 25-100 and -101, yet discover when 
they take command that there are few or no opportunities to plan training.”269
                                                 
266 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-1, Battle Focused Training, September 2003, p. 
2-7. 
  The training and 
evaluation system developed during the Cold War guided all training in the post-Cold War 
environment and allowed little room for interpretation or modification even as the international 
267 Wong, Leonard, Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today, Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 2002, p. 3. 
268 Ibid, pp. 6-14. 
269 Ibid, p. 27. 
 128 
security environment changed.  Time constraints ensured that commanders would have to 
narrowly focus on the combat-oriented Tasks, Conditions, and Standards model that best fit and 
prepared units for a different era.270
Although the SBCT was an innovation designed to achieve Shinseki’s vision of future 
warfare, institutional changes that had yet to be made tempered any inter- and intra-unit 
innovation that might have been achieved through creative training and experimentation.  The 
operational orientation of the SBCT(s) became even more conventional following the attacks of 
9/11 as the Bush Administration, through the so-called Bush Doctrine, demanded a highly-
focused conventional force capable of achieving a rapid and decisive defeat of America’s 
enemies. 
 
4.2 CRITICAL JUNCTURE: 9/11 AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
The attacks of 9/11, the subsequent development of the Bush Doctrine, and the invasion of 
Afghanistan had a profound crystallizing effect on the U.S. Army’s Transformation program.271
                                                 
270 This comported with the Cold War notion that tactical commanders did not need to stray too far from 
doctrinal tasks to achieve mission success.  Planning against an enemy (the Soviets) that was also doctrinaire and 
thus largely predictable allowed for the development of programmatic and systematized top-down guidance on what 
to train and how to train; little adaptation outside of applying other tactical skills as the need arose was required.  
John Tillson argues that planning during the Cold War was fixed and tactical commanders were granted little 
latitude in training or execution; specific training events were not required.  See, Tillson, John C. F., Learning to 
Adapt to Asymmetric Threats, IDA Document Number D-3114, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, VA, 
August 2005, p. 12. 
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If the Transformation program and the development of the SBCTs once stood the chance of even 
partially altering the conventional trajectory of the U.S. Army’s modernization effort, that 
chance evaporated with the implementation of post-9/11 national security and military strategies.  
What was largely an extension of combat-oriented force structure with modern capabilities 
became an enhanced and supplementary tool for the hasty and singular purpose of destroying 
threat state’s and organizations’ offensive capacity. 
 On 20 September 2001, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and 
detailed what would become known as the Bush Doctrine.  The Bush Doctrine “fundamentally 
changed the way the United States would ensure its national security.  The shift from the 
previous ‘shape, respond, prepare’ posture to the new ‘assure, dissuade, deter forward, and 
decisively defeat’ had fundamental implications for how the armed forces, and the Army in 
particular, mans, trains, and equips itself.  The new strategy requires a fully expeditionary force 
capable of rapidly imposing America’s will on hostile foreign soil and then maintaining a robust 
presence to ensure the change is lasting…the Army offers the follow-through capability vital to 
achieving the national strategic objectives.”272
The posture of the Bush Doctrine might have been novel but the premises of the Clinton 
Doctrine were still intact:  stability in the Third World and elsewhere was a concern (now 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
271 The ‘model’ used in Afghanistan had been suggested for Iraq: “in the wake of the successful operations 
in Afghanistan against the Taliban, some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of 
special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an extensive air 
offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD 
capabilities.”  Bowman, Steve, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, CRS Report for Congress, 15 July 2007, p. 2. 
272 Fontenot, et al, Op Cit, p. 23. 
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paramount) and; the United States “must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt 
by an enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our 
allies, or our friends.”273  Whereas action was once considered an option during the Clinton 
Administration, the Bush Administration argued that the United States now had to act in order to 
promote stability: the progeny of instability had reached its shores via student visas and 
commercial aircraft in the form of terrorism.  The Bush Doctrine renewed emphasis on force 
Transformation as the vehicle for ensuring that the United States could act at a time and place of 
its choosing to deter or defeat enemies:  “the threats and enemies we must confront have 
changed, and so must our forces.  A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies 
must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when 
a war might occur.”274
 Regardless of the oddity and complexity of threat that was now clearly present, “the 
Pentagon assumed a force which could defeat advanced state militaries could inherently handle 
non-state threats” and that the enhanced capabilities brought by the modernization program, 
RMA, and Transformation, “would make armed intervention in far-flung regions easier.”
 This would mean, as Paul Ott argues, “the fight against terrorism will take 
military operations into traditional areas of U.S. national interest, but also into areas previously 
of little concern and likelihood of action.  The ability of terrorist organizations to train, sustain, 
plan, and operate in remote and unstable regions poses a clear threat now.” 
275
                                                 
273 Bush, George W., National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, p. 30. 
  
This was good news for the Bush Administration since only “modest attempts at organizational 
274 Ibid, p. 29. 
275 Metz, Steven, “America’s Defense Transformation: A Conceptual and Political History,” Defense 
Studies, Volume 6, Number 1, March 2006, pp. 11 and 16, respectively. 
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and doctrinal innovation” had been tried even with the inculcation of advanced information 
technologies throughout the U.S. Army.276
Decisively defeating enemies was not a new concept for the U.S. Army.  What was new 
was the President’s agenda of “bringing down hostile governments and creating governments 
favorable to us.”
  Implicit in President Bush’s renewed call for 
Transformation was that the previous path of Transformation was effective only for Cold War 
adversaries.  But the new emphasis on change in the military did little to alter the conventional 
focus of the U.S. Army; instead, the President’s strategy accelerated an already aggressively 
combat-oriented Transformation program. 
277  The precision combat capabilities requisite to accomplishing the first part of 
this task already existed in the U.S. Army (and in the joint force) and were being refined through 
the Transformation effort.  What the U.S. Army lacked was the unconventional and MOOTW 
skills required of this type of strategy.278
                                                 
276 See, Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, “Swarming—the Next Face of Battle,” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 29 September 2003. 
  Removing a government was the easy part of the Bush 
Doctrine.  The difficult and largely untested part of the Bush Doctrine, creating stability—the 
lynchpin of strategic success—was only lightly considered in this new strategy and incompletely 
covered in extant U.S. Army doctrine. 
277 Rosen, Stephen Peter, “The Future of War and the American Military,” Harvard Magazine, May-June 
2002, p. 31. 
278 Jeremy Black argues that the joint strike capabilities that the U.S. military developed were challenged in 
unconventional environments because joint structures and doctrines “still focus on symmetrical conflict rather than 
supporting forces in asymmetrical roles such as counterinsurgency or peace-keeping.”  See, Black, Jeremy, “War 
and Strategy in the 21st Century,” Watch on the West, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Volume 3, Number 4, 
February 2002. 
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In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld argued that “while the United States cannot predict with confidence which adversaries 
will pose threats in the future, the types of military capabilities that will be used to challenge 
U.S. interests and U.S. military forces can be identified and understood.  As in the September 
terror attacks in New York and Washington, future adversaries will seek to avoid U.S. strengths 
and attack U.S. vulnerabilities, using asymmetric approaches such as terrorism, information 
operations, and ballistic and cruise missile attacks.”279  To combat these threats, “combat 
operations will be structured to eliminate enemy offensive capability across the depth of its 
territory, restore favorable military conditions in the region, and create acceptable political 
conditions for the cessation of hostilities.”280
It is difficult to comprehend how ‘asymmetric’ adversaries would be combated with 
‘symmetric’ means, particularly when these means were designed for applying force and 
winning battles, not for shaping or creating political conditions and creating or restoring stability 
at the termination of hostilities.  Jack Shanahan contends that the Pentagon is “dominated by 
  This last statement roughly reflects the aim of any 
combat operations and contained no new direction for military planners.  Apparently, traditional 
combat operations would suffice for restoring favorable military conditions, developing stability, 
and creating acceptable political conditions; hence, no real significant change to existing 
programs, organization, or doctrine was required.   
                                                 
279 Rumsfeld, Donald H., Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 
September 2001, pp. 61-62. 
280 Ibid, p. 21. 
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Cold Warriors, obsessed with big, expensive weapons programs.”281  Michael Noonan and John 
Hillen argue that “the American military devotes the great majority of its resources to preparing 
for a symmetrical fight, retaining an establishment that seeks to fight the ‘Third World War’ but 
along fundamentally World War II or Cold War lines.”282  But the adversary that the United 
States was targeting in Afghanistan could only partially be described as conventional and was by 
no means symmetric, at least not for long.  Suggestions that the United States would have to or 
should shift away from a combat-oriented conventional force during the post-Cold War period or 
in the pursuit of the Bush Doctrine were unacceptable.  As Metz argues, “the idea that the United 
States should shift its strategy to asymmetric threats, though, was never accepted fully by a 
military and defense community focused on, even wedded to, high tech conventional war.  There 
were many discussions and admissions, but few changes to programs, organizations, or, most 
importantly, the defense budget.”283
Sloan contends that the differences between smaller, unspecialized, and networked 
terrorist organizations and larger, specialized, and hierarchical organizations, like the U.S. Army, 
are significant in that the terrorist organization can enjoy certain freedoms of maneuver that 
  The differences between the U.S. Army and the 
organizations it would encounter in Afghanistan and later in Iraq were radical, and these 
differences proved significant in the arbitration of stability in both countries. 
                                                 
281 Shanahan, Jack, et al, “Bury Cold War Mindset: Fourth-Generation Warfare Rewrites Military 
Strategy,” Defense News, 5-11 August 2002. 
282 Noonan and Hillen, Op Cit.  
283 Metz, Steven, “Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy,” Op Cit, pp. 13-14. 
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afford distinct advantage in any confrontation.284  This lesson was only slowly learned after the 
commencement of OEF as Taliban and al-Qaeda forces refused to be decisively defeated at a 
time and place of the U.S. military’s choosing.  Conversely, the Pentagon quickly learned those 
lessons that supported continued fiscal and doctrinal investment in the concepts of RDO and 
those embedded in Transformation.  The rapid destruction and evacuation of conventionally 
equipped Taliban forces allowed the Pentagon and others to tout early victory in Afghanistan as 
a singular success justifying not only the Bush Doctrine but also the rapid/lethal capability 
engendered in the U.S. Army’s Transformation program.  Christopher Bowie argued that success 
in Afghanistan (and in the Gulf War and the former Yugoslavia) suggests strongly that “to better 
prepare for uncertain events in a hostile security environment, the U.S. will need to invest in 
concepts, capabilities, and technologies to sustain its competitive advantages on the future 
battlefield.”285
This narrow view, the assumption that the U.S. military would “create a ‘whole new 
warfare environment’ with capabilities and early success in Afghanistan,”
  But battlefield success was never in question.  What was unproven was whether 
the U.S. Army had the capability to adapt to its environment and the follow-on mission of 
creating or restoring stability in unconventional environments by employing tactics suited to the 
OOTW routinely subordinated to combat operations. 
286
                                                 
284 Sloan, Stephen, “Terrorism and Asymmetry,” Challenging the United States Symmetrically and 
Asymmetrically, Can America be Defeated, Ed. Matthews, Lloyd J., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle, PA, July 1998, pp. 183-84. 
 blurred the bigger 
285 Bowie, Christopher J., et al, Future War: What Trends in America’s Post-Cold War Military Conflicts 
Tell us about Early 21st Century Warfare, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center Papers, January 2003, p. 4. 
286 Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Elements of Defense 
Transformation, October 2004, p. 9. 
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picture of creating stability and governments friendly to the United States both in principle and 
deed.  As Nagl asserts, “the Army focused on winning short campaigns to topple unfriendly 
governments without considering the more difficult tasks required to rebuild friendly ones.”287  
The Pentagon’s assumption was that stability, through a process still not understood, would 
emerge from the successful application of force through the principles of Transformation: “a 
process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new 
combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s 
advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, 
which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”288
4.3 INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL PERSISTENCE: ON A ROAD MOST 
TRAVELLED 
  The automatic transmogrification of 
combat capabilities into peace and stability in the world was never further explained. 
In the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, President Bush recognized, however 
belatedly, the changes that had occurred in the post-Cold War international security 
environment.  “The international environment defines the boundaries within which terrorists’ 
strategies take shape.  As a result of freer, more open borders this environment unwittingly 
                                                 
287 National Press Club, “Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare: A Discussion by Senior Military 
Scholars,” The National Press Club, Washington DC, 22 July 2008, p. 4. 
288 Ibid, p. 2. 
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provides access to havens, capabilities, and support to terrorists.”289  Changes wrought by 
globalization were also identified, “with the end of the Cold War, we also saw dramatic 
improvements in the ease of transnational communication, commerce, and travel.  
Unfortunately, the terrorists adapted to this new international environment and turned the 
advances of the 20th Century into the destructive enablers of the 21st Century.”290  To combat 
these threats President Bush recommended the defeat of terrorist organizations by “attacking 
their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and 
finances”; by denying “further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring 
other states accept their responsibilities to take action against these international threats within 
their sovereign territory” and; “where states are unwilling, we will act decisively to counter the 
threat they pose and, ultimately, to compel them to cease supporting terrorism.”291  This would 
be achieved by neutralizing threat organizations as early as possible and by diminishing the 
underlying conditions that permit the development and nurturing of these threats.  Combating 
multiform and transnational adversaries, in myriad environments, would require an expanded 
use of the U.S. Army in roles that were familiar and courted (HIC) and in roles that were 
foreign and eschewed (protracted stability operations).292
                                                 
289 Bush, George W., National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 6. 
 
290 Ibid, p. 7. 
291 Ibid, pp. 11-12. 
292 Ronald Newton argues that military troops are the “ultimate tangible instrument” of the state in 
maintaining its security and thus would naturally be employed to combat transnational threats.  See, Newton, Ronald 
A., Combating Transnational Organized Crime: An Emerging Special Operations Mission, Strategy Research 
Project, U.S. Army War College, 2 March 2001, p. 15. 
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The doctrinal publications that emerged after the attacks of 9/11 are revealing insofar as 
they show no appreciable respect for the complexity and depth of the explicit and implied tasks 
laid out in various national strategies post-9/11.  The publication of Field Manual 3-07, Stability 
Operations and Support Operations, in February 2003, demonstrated how little effect the U.S. 
Army’s experiences in Afghanistan had on doctrine and on the Army’s prevailing and frankly, 
hubristic, conventional mindset: “the characteristics that make our Army a premier warfighting 
organization also serve it well in conducting stability operations and support operations…the 
Army is versatile in its ability to task organize in size, structure, and functions for widely 
varying disparate missions.  The Army commands the respect of belligerents by the threat of 
force, or, if that fails, the use of force to compel compliance.”293  Field Manual 7-100, Opposing 
Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy, describes the U.S. Army’s view of the prevailing 
threat, the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE), and the training conducted for 
operations in this environment, “as a baseline for developing specific OPFORs [Opposing 
Forces] for specific training environments, this manual describes an OPFOR that is 
representative of contemporary nation-states.  This composite of the characteristics of real-
world military and paramilitary forces provides a framework for the realistic and relevant 
portrayal of capabilities and actions that U.S. armed forces might face in the COE.”294
                                                 
293 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, Op Cit, pp. 1-1—1-2. 
  
Interestingly, the U.S. Army’s universal task list for units did not substantially change following 
experiences in the post-Cold War environment and Afghanistan (even when offensive, 
defensive, stability, and support operations were delineated).  Tactical level tasks remained 
294 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-100, Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy, 
May 2003, p. xiii. 
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almost entirely combat-oriented even though the tasks being conducted in this environment 
were at least a blend of conventional and unconventional skill sets and did not fit into all four 
categories of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations equally.295  The differences 
that once separated these missions and attendant tasks were now not quite so stark; combat-
oriented tasks and training could not possibly account for all of the tactical nuances presenting 
in varied operational environments.  But Field Manual 7-1, Battle Focused Training, reminded 
soldiers at all levels, “training for warfighting readiness is the Army’s number one priority in 
peace and war.  Army leaders at all levels are responsible for success on the battlefield.”296
 
  
‘Warfighting’ on ‘battlefields’ then necessarily encompassed stability operations although this 
would be difficult to discern from the focus of these manuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
295  Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-15, the Army Universal Task List, August 2003, pp. 8-
28—33, Section V—Art. 8.5 (Conduct Tactical Mission Tasks).  “The purpose of FM 7-15 is to provide a standard, 
doctrinal foundation for the Army’s tactical collective tasks and thus includes a whole host of tasks that are to be 
accomplished across the spectrum of conflict.”  See, Herman, Bradley J., The Army’s Military Decision Making: 
Adequate or Update and Expand?,” School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 May 2008, p. 26. 
296 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-1, Op Cit, p. 1-2. 
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Table 1. The U.S. Army Universal Task List, Tactical Mission Tasks, August 2003 
 
Bypass Enemy 
Obstacles, Forces, 
Positions  
Canalize Enemy 
Movement  
Clear Enemy 
Forces  
Conduct 
Counterreconaissance  
Contain an 
Enemy Force  
Control an Area 
Defeat an Enemy 
Force  
Destroy a 
Designated Enemy 
Force/Position  
Disengage from a 
Designated Enemy 
Force  
Disrupt a Designated 
Enemy Force’s 
Formation/ 
Tempo/ 
Timetable  
Conduct an 
Exfiltration  
Fix an Enemy 
Force 
Follow and 
Assume the 
Missions of a 
Friendly Force  
Interdict an 
Area/Route to 
Prevent/ 
Disrupt/Delay its 
use by an Enemy 
Force  
Isolate an Enemy 
Force  
Neutralize an Enemy 
Force  
Occupy an Area  Reduce an 
Encircled/ 
Bypassed Enemy 
Force  
Retain a Terrain 
Feature  
Secure a 
Unit/Facility/ 
Location  
Seize an Area 
(Using 
Overwhelming 
Force)  
Support by Fire the 
Maneuver of Another 
Friendly Force  
Suppress a 
Force/Weapon 
System  
Turn an Enemy 
Force  
Conduct Combat 
Search and 
Rescue  
Conduct 
Consolidation and 
Reorganization 
Activities  
Conduct 
Consolidation and 
Reorganization 
Activities  
Reconstitute Tactical 
Forces  
Reorganize Units 
as Part of a 
Reconstitution 
Effort  
Regenerate Units 
and Organizations 
as Part of a 
Reconstitution 
Effort  
Conduct Weapon 
System 
Replacement 
Operations  
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 The inculcation of digital information systems into the force through Transformation also 
contributed to the sense that being combat prepared necessarily translated into full-spectrum 
preparedness.  Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, indicates that 
information superiority, or combat information superiority, creates conditions “that allow 
commanders to shape the operational environment and enhance the effects of all elements of 
combat power.”297  Supposedly, efficiency and effectiveness in staff and line unit operations 
were enhanced by “reducing the human labor needed to organize information and put it in a 
usable form.”298
                                                 
297 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, January 2005, 
p. 1-11. 
  There was little concern paid to the human labor needed to interpret this 
information and use it appropriately: the mere organization and processing of information would 
apparently be sufficient.  Processing speed replaced deliberation and careful consideration as a 
necessary attribute.  “Continuous connectivity to the GIG [Global Information Grid] empowers 
Soldiers to conduct full-spectrum operations.  In addition to near real time situational awareness 
in the tactical area of operations, Army personnel have access to near real time situational 
awareness in the tactical area of operations.  Army personnel have access and provide 
information to HSOCs [Home Station Operations Centers], knowledge centers, and other 
information-enabling portions of the joint team—redefining the term reachback.  This access to 
knowledge facilitates rapid and seamless transitions of missions and tasks without loss of 
298 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army 
Forces, August 2003, p. 3-7. 
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momentum.”299
The precision of the U.S. Army’s weapons and information systems seems to have 
blinded many to the complexities of the wars the United States was now entering and how both 
the human and political elements of these wars was confounding our technological advances and 
transformational efforts.  The United States’ new strategies demanded that after the cessation of 
major combat operations, stability operations would occur.  But the U.S. Army largely rejected 
the lessons learned from the stability operations of the 1990s
  Implied in these doctrinal pieces was that timely information was the principal 
requirement for transforming a vastly complex environment teeming with unorthodox foes into 
something more palatable and doctrinaire.  If and how this information was obtained and 
questions regarding the interpretation of this information only seemed to matter insofar as 
combat operations were affected.  The gathering and speeding along of combat relevant 
information during stability operations did not seem to register as a defect of the transformed 
system that had been developed and was instead considered as an enabler of full-spectrum 
capacity. 
300 in favor of combat operations 
where only the strongest wins.301
                                                 
299 Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Transformation Roadmap, 1 November 
2003, p. 10-1. 
  The mismatch between real ability and supposed ability was 
great but the capacity to adapt to circumstance and away from a conventionally-oriented, 
combat-focused mindset and operational paradigm seemed of little import to U.S. Army planners 
300 Meigs, Montgomery C., “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare,” Parameters, Summer, 
2003, p. 13. 
301 Wilson, G. I., et al, “4GW: Tactics of the Weak Confound the Strong,” Military.com, 8 September 2003, 
http://www.military.com/NewContent?file=Wilson_090803, accessed on 18 October 2008. 
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and strategists.  As Colin Gray asserts, “the traditional American way of war was designed to 
take down regular enemies, and was not overly attentive to the strategic effect and political 
consequences of military action.  That legacy makes the task before the agents of transformation 
and adaptation even greater than perhaps they have realized to date.”302
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The apparent short-term success of the U.S. Army’s Transformation program and of high-
intensity operations in Afghanistan led the Pentagon to assume that this model of warfare could 
translate to almost any circumstance and thus provide full-spectrum dominance.  Not only would 
little adjustment have to be made to the defense Transformation program in pursuit of national 
defense strategies and the Bush Doctrine, little adaptation was required by the U.S. Army as it 
pursued objectives in enormously hostile, doctrinally foreign locales and situations.  But 
Becevich contests, “the generals and admirals who touted the wonders of full spectrum 
dominance were guilty of flagrant professional malpractice, if not out-right fraud.  To judge by 
the record of the past twenty years, U.S. forces win decisively only when the enemy obligingly 
fights on American terms.”303
                                                 
302 Gray, Colin S., Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2006, p. 55. 
  It is surprising, given the post-9/11 interest in failed and failing 
states and the threat organizations emerging from these areas, that the Pentagon would be so 
quick to confer full-spectrum dominance on a force that was almost strictly conventionally 
303 Bacevich, Andrew J., The Limits of Power, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2008, p. 130. 
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capable and had only completed the first phases of a long campaign.304  The new assessment of 
threats to American security, i.e. shadowy organizations operating in or coming from failed and 
failing states, “quickly became conventional wisdom within US foreign policy and national 
security circles, and weak states were increasingly associated with real or perceived transnational 
threats, including drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime that could have serious 
consequences for the United States.  In an age of global threats, national security was 
increasingly tied to internal conditions within other states.”305  But even if the international 
security environment had changed, dramatically, “war itself remained the same for the Pentagon.  
There was little disagreement among the senior U.S. military leadership over their view of future 
war: the major protagonists were states, and victory came through overwhelming military 
force.”306
                                                 
304 See discussion of failed and failing states in, Bush, George, National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, 2002, p. 1. 
  As Thomas Edison once famously quipped “vision without execution is 
hallucination.”  The Pentagon and the U.S. Army envisioned the achievement of full-spectrum 
dominance, stability provision, and the quelling of failing or failed states by transforming, 
305 Stewart, Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?: Assessing the ‘Whole of 
Government’ Approaches to Fragile States, International Peace Academy, 2007, p. 33. 
306 Shultz, Richard H. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of 
Contemporary Combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 9.  Peter Mansoor argues a similar point 
regarding the prevailing institutional belief that the U.S. Army “existed only to fight the kind of wars it wanted to 
fight.  The kind of wars we did so well in: WWII and high-end conventional combat of Desert Storm.  So, we didn’t 
teach it [COIN] in our professional military education systems, we didn’t study it as professionals and we weren’t 
prepared to fight it when we went into Iraq.”  Colonel (Ret.) Mansoor, Peter, Telephone Interview, 12 September 
2008. 
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training for, planning, resourcing, and executing only one phase of the spectrum: combat 
operations against state-based or similar forces.  Full-spectrum dominance could be achieved by 
applying the principles of combat.  Thus, any requirement for significant adaptation was 
obviated:  this was the hallucination. 
The U.S. Army Transformation program enabled the transfer of the preferred vision of 
future warfare amongst states and state-based actors to a force that was already highly 
predisposed to this vision.  Hierarchical, centralized, and specialized units readily accepted and 
inculcated information-age technologies into the conventional force with aplomb and applied 
these capabilities with exactitude in Afghanistan and thus reinforced the premises of the 
Transformation program.307
                                                 
307 Nagl and Yingling correctly argue that the U.S. Army is too hierarchical and too specialized.  See Nagl, 
John A., and Paul L. Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” Armed Forces Journal, October 2006. 
  Without deviation from the notion that this capability produced full-
spectrum dominance, Transformation became a self-licking ice cream cone justifying further 
advocacy for transforming into a military model that already existed.  But if the U.S. Army was 
not full-spectrum dominant, as was claimed, then significant adaptation would have to be made 
to ensure the success of various national strategies developed after 9/11.  A force predisposed to 
combat, both in mindset and in execution, would need to quickly master myriad other bands of 
the spectrum that were left unattended by training, doctrine, and vision.  The longer that it took 
the U.S. Army to achieve strategic success in Afghanistan after the defeat of that nation’s paltry 
conventional forces, the more likely that the spectrum would shift leaving the force to address 
tasks and conditions defying the conventions and assumptions that the post-Cold War and post-
9/11 force was based upon. 
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 Walter Lacquer, in discussing the receding fortunes of guerrilla war at the end of the Cold 
War period, described conditions that would favor its recurrence: major war, natural catastrophe, 
or the weakening of the authority of the state.308
 
  The post-Cold War weakening of state 
authority in general favored the recrudescence of guerrilla war; the Bush Administration’s call 
for regime replacement in inimical states made it a certainty.  The same combat-focused military 
power the United States built, honed, and wields to achieve conventional objectives is also 
proving to be the power that incites instability and the wrath of the lesser-includeds.  Without a 
commensurate and complementary ability to blend combat power into true full-spectrum 
dominance, the U.S. Army would not be able to adapt to the post-Cold War international security 
environment and aid in achieving strategic interests as they have so far been defined.  The 
signing of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 
1007-243) on 16 October 2002, the subsequent invasion of Iraq, and the rise of instability there 
would bring this last point into fine relief.  
                                                 
308 Laquer, Walter, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Case Study, Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick, NJ, 1998, p. 409. 
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5.0  STRUCTURAL PERSISTENCE:  THE INVASION OF IRAQ AND COMPELLED 
ADAPTATION 
“Quod cito acquiritur cito perit.”—“What is quickly gained is quickly lost.” 
 
The invasion of Iraq began on 20 March 2003.  Within 21 days of the start of OIF, the U.S. 
Army moved into the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.  On 1 May 2003, President Bush announced the 
end of major combat operations from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln by recapitulating 
how victory in combat had been achieved: “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was carried out with a 
combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had 
not seen before.  From distant bases or ships at sea, we sent planes and missiles that could 
destroy an enemy division, or strike a single bunker.  Marines and soldiers charged to Baghdad 
across 350 miles of hostile ground, in one of the swiftest advances of heavy arms in history.  You 
have shown the world the skill and the might of the American Armed Forces.”309
                                                 
309 Bush, George W., “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq have Ended,” Remarks 
by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln, 1 May 2003. 
  He followed 
this by reaffirming the central postulation of the Bush Doctrine and the apparent success of 
military operations supporting this doctrine:  “Today, we have the greater power to free a nation 
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by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime.  With new tactics and precision weapons, we 
can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians.”310
Capturing the capital city of an opponent’s country (through and by defeat of the 
opponent’s battlefield forces) has long been a benchmark of achieving victory in conflict if 
surrender was not achieved beforehand.  Certainly, this is what President Bush was referring to 
when he announced the end of major combat operations and deemed OIF a mission 
accomplished.  In the classic sense, the achievement of military objectives in combat operations 
translates into success for the whole mission.  This results from a propensity to delink military 
and political objectives and by the conflation of battlefield success to overall success in war.  It 
also stems from confusing sub-strategic and strategic objectives, mistaking the completion of 
these objectives with achieving desired end-state conditions, and from bureaucratizing the 
concept of war.
  
311  Through bureaucratization, objectives, conditions, and definitions become 
codified.  This results in the construction of concepts and perceptions that do not wither easily 
and defy translation when circumstances change.  The structures, institutions, and assumptions 
related to ‘war’ persist even when a particular conflict morphs into something other than war.312
The assumption that the mission in Iraq had indeed been accomplished in early 2003 
ignored a number of indications that the mission had only just begun and that the war, in terms of 
 
                                                 
310 Ibid. 
311 Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force, Vintage Books, New York, 2005. 
312 James Wright argues that “as the character of war changes, the requirements for winning it have 
changed as well.  The paradox of the Long War is that tactical victory does not inevitably lead to winning the war.”  
Wright, James W., Military Effectiveness in the Long War, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 May 2007, p. 28. 
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achieving strategic objectives, was far from over.  First, as the Bush Doctrine required, Iraq had 
not yet been stabilized to a degree where potential threats to stability could easily be warded off 
by the mere presence of combat forces.  Second, Phase IV (Stability, Support, and 
Reconstruction Operations (SSR), collectively)313 operations had not yet begun and security was 
only being maintained tenuously in the brief calm that followed the storm aptly named “Thunder 
Run.”  Third, the Cold War model of transferring responsibility for Phase IV operations to a 
collective of host-country, United States’, UN, and international agencies, was not yet realized.  
Lastly, the U.S. Army, largely because of inadequate resourcing for Phase IV operations (in both 
planning314 and in the structural potential for wide-scale execution315
                                                 
313 These were traditional operations in Phase IV.  Phase IV operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
much more complex and have included (at a minimum) significant combat, counter-terror, counterinsurgency, and 
population protection operations. 
), was unprepared for a 
314 Perito argues that “the U.S. experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom was remarkably similar to the U.S. 
intervention in Panama…there the United States had no security policy for the period following the use of force.  No 
thought was given to including military police in the intervention force, nor was there a plan for quickly 
reconstituting local security forces that would perform in accordance with democratic principles.”  See Perito, 
Robert M., “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” 
U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington DC, April 2005, p. 12-13. 
315 Blank argues that Army strategy “proclaims that it will be satisfied with nothing less than decisive 
victory, but if victory cannot be plausibly defined then what happens?  Our strategy does not know where it is 
going.”  Decisive victory, with the pre-OIF U.S. Army structure, was unlikely especially when considering the 
difficulties posed by the strategy requisite to the Bush Doctrine.  See Blank, Stephen J. “How we will Lose the Next 
War with Russia: A Critique of U.S. Military Strategy,” Challenging the United States Symmetrically and 
Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?, Ed. Matthews, Lloyd J., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle, PA, July 1998, pp. 243-44. 
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follow-on mission requiring unparalleled dexterity in the application of skills necessary in 
OOTW.316
The enduring characteristics of previous decisions to make the U.S. Army a highly 
conventional and lethally-focused force (even among the remaining unconventional elements of 
the U.S. Army) combined with an assumption that this force would (therefore) be full-spectrum 
dominant, put the U.S. Army in a severely disadvantageous position.
 
317
                                                 
316 Wright and Reese contend that “the US Army that entered Iraq in March 2003 accepted stability and 
support operations as operational requirements, and could even refer to published doctrine that established a formal 
approach to those operations.  However, doctrine has limited influence if it is not disseminated and practiced 
through the means of education and training.”  As demonstrated in previous chapters, doctrine was limited on the 
subject of stability and support operations and was not prioritized in education and training.  See Wright and Reese, 
Op Cit., p. 62. 
  To be sure, the U.S. 
Army had carried out its conventional mission magnificently.  But its capacity for adaptation in 
the face of significant mission change to support strategic objectives was dubious.  Structurally, 
317 The idea that the U.S. Army was still full-spectrum capable endured at the highest levels well into OIF 
despite the acknowledgement that “preventing conflict requires the capability to perform stability operations to 
maintain or re-establish order, promote peace and security or improve existing conditions” and despite the fact that 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were far from over and success across the spectrum had not been proven: “At 
present, the Armed Forces remain optimized for high-intensity conflict and combat operations in mature theaters.  
Our experience in the WOT has provided insights on both the strengths and deficiencies in our concepts for 
employing military force as well as some of the capabilities the Armed Forces must improve.  The Armed Forces 
remain fully capable of conducting major combat operations and a range of lesser contingencies.  While we have 
adapted these forces successfully in OEF and OIF, success in future operations will require further and more 
substantive change.”  Myers, Richard B., The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, pp. 
13 and 22, respectively. 
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the U.S. Army was not predisposed to conducting OOTW or for participating in an interagency 
process that required this capacity.  Cognitively and culturally (because of the influence of 
structural conditions on the reception and interpretation of mutating environmental stimuli), the 
U.S. Army was less than optimally prepared for refitting combat equipment and processes and 
for translating decades’ worth of training and indoctrination in combat into SSR operations. 
The persistence of the post-Cold War U.S. Army structure, and its almost strictly combat-
oriented focus, would have a significant effect on the organizations’ ability to adapt to the degree 
required to achieve strategic political objectives in post-combat Iraq.318  The legacy (or the core 
attributes) of decisions affecting the direction and composition of the U.S. Army would persist 
and would deleteriously influence the Army’s ability to adapt throughout OIF.319
5.1 MISTAKING STABILITY FOR STABILITY 
   
In traditional military planning it is expected that stability is supposed to follow the achievement 
of combat objectives.  According to the Pentagon (as discussed previously), success in combat 
operations would almost automatically lead to a smooth transition into peace and stability.  But 
                                                 
318 As noted variously earlier, this has been a persistent problem for the U.S. Army.  Metz argued in 1992 
that “based on our Vietnam experience, we developed strategy and doctrine that emphasized the political nature of 
counterinsurgency, the need to focus on underlying causes rather than military manifestations and the need for an 
indirect US role.  But today progress has stalled and can only be reinvigorated by breaking through some key 
intellectual barriers.  Foremost among these is an inability to smoothly link the application of force to desired policy 
outcomes.”  Metz, Steven, “Victory and Compromise in Counterinsurgency,” Op Cit, p. 47. 
319 See discussion in Chapters 8 and 9. 
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following combat in OIF, stability was tenuous and ephemeral.  A poorly resourced and 
undermanned stability plan contributed to this situation.  Paradoxically, the rapidity of operations 
and the cessation of major combat also contributed to this state of affairs and indeed, accelerated 
the potential for destabilization.  The lightning fast pace of combat operations planned for, 
trained, and executed by the U.S. Army ensured that many of the elements (CS and CSS units, 
principally) traditionally ascribed the role of providing stability prior to the introduction of UN 
and other-than-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies would lag both spatially and temporally.  
This combination did not determine the instability that followed in Iraq but certainly contributed 
to its rise.320
                                                 
320 Defense Secretary Robert Gates later criticized the much heralded ‘Shock and Awe’ at the center of OIF 
invasion plans and U.S. Army doctrine for contributing to the problems encountered during post-combat operations.  
“Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates yesterday criticized the shock-and-awe strategy of the 2003 Iraq invasion and 
said the Pentagon’s narrow focus on conventional combat operations proved costly when U.S. ground troops had to 
switch gears to try to stabilize that country.”  Tyson, Ann Scott, “Gates Criticizes Conventional Focus at Start of 
Iraq War,” Washington Post, 30 September 2008, p. 4.  Chiarelli and Michaelis also later questioned the efficacy of 
the traditional phasing of operations, “no longer is it acceptable to think sequentially through stability operations and 
support operations by believing that if you first establish the security environment, you can work sequentially 
toward establishing critical infrastructure and governmental legitimacy then drive toward economic independence.”  
Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” 
Military Review, July-August 2005, p. 15. 
  Perhaps more significant was the mistaken assumption of stability naturally 
flowing from successful combat operations.  Although poor planning, a lack of immediate CS 
and CSS unit support, and an ahead-of-schedule termination of major combat operations 
contributed to the growth of instability in Iraq, the major difficulty facing the U.S. Army was a 
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fundamental unpreparedness to understand what stability operations implied and how to conduct 
them. 
The assumption of stability being a fait accompli of combat operations led to an 
institutional disregard of training for and conducting stability operations and a mismatch between 
mission and capability.  Also lacking was an appreciation of how significant these operations are 
to translating achievements in combat into strategic and political success.  The choice by 
Pentagon and U.S. Army leaders to focus on combat operations in planning and training at the 
expense of stability operations had a cascading effect on the entirety of the force.  At the tactical 
unit level, particularly in the combat units that comprised the majority of the force in Iraq in 
early 2003, there was little understanding of what stability operations were or what agencies had 
responsibility for these operations.  Two soldiers describe their experience following the 
termination of major combat operations: 
 
“We really left our comfort zone when we got out of HIC [High Intensity Conflict] 
operations.  The simplest things we had to pick up.  Some guys had Kosovo and 
Bosnia training and experience.  We used their ideas to implement what we had to 
do after major conflict ended.  One of our guys was Ranger qualified and he 
taught us how to do room clearing drills.  We had to secure our area and make 
sure that the houses in our area were secure.  We did not have training to do 
this.”321
 
 
                                                 
321 Soldier deployed on initial invasion and to Falluja (March 2003-July 2003), Personal Interview, 20 June 
2008. 
 153 
“A SOSO [Stability Operations and Support Operations] operation?  When that 
came into play, none of us knew what they were talking about.  We first heard 
about SOSO at the beginning of operations in Samawah, in the first 2 or 3 weeks.  
It didn’t take much to get Iraq.  It was over and done with very quickly, or so we 
thought.  They told us that we were going to go into SOSO operations.  We looked 
around and said, this is not our job, this is not what we do, this is SF stuff, this is 
Civil stuff, Civil Ops should be handling this stuff.  Can we go home?  No, no, no.  
We have to stand schools up, get the government up, have town councils.  We are 
all looking at each other like what the hell are you talking about?  We’ve never 
done this before and this wasn’t part of our train-up to come here.  We didn’t 
know that this was going to happen.  Rules of Engagement came in a new level.  
You didn’t have a uniformed enemy anymore.”322
 
 
As William Phelps argues, “clearly the Army has a conflict between its charter to fight and win 
the Nation’s wars and its ever-increasing need to participate in peace operations.  The challenges 
arise from a mismatch between mission needs and the forces available to execute those missions.  
The Army must now relook its roles and missions.”323
 
  The disparity between perception and 
reality and between full-spectrum operations and what the U.S. Army was really capable of 
became very clear in the early stages of post-combat Iraq.  Assuming that stability existed or 
would exist did not make it so. 
                                                 
322 Soldier deployed on initial invasion and to Samawah, Personal Interview, 18 September 2008. 
323 Phelps, William G., “Training for War While Keeping the Peace,” Military Review, May-June 2004. 
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5.2 HANDOVERS, MODELS, AND MUSICAL CHAIRS 
The U.S. Army’s unpreparedness for Phase IV operations was exacerbated by a faulty 
inter-agency transition process premised on the linear and sequential phase model used by the 
military.  “In essence, with the exception of immediate security concerns and actions necessary 
for emergency restoration of critical infrastructure, the majority of activities required for Phase 
IV were perceived by the Department of Defense to be the responsibility of civilian agencies and 
departments.”324  This model assumed that the conclusion of force-on-force combat activities 
would result in significantly reduced levels of violence and greater security throughout the area 
of operations.325
                                                 
324 Bensahel, Nora, et al, After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, RAND, Santa 
Monica, 2008, p. 15.  Prior to the invasion of Iraq, Crane and Terrill identified 135 essential tasks grouped into 21 
mission categories arrayed across the transition period.  Crane, Conrad C. and W. Andrew W. Terrill, 
Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 2003, p. 46.  The training required for the 
implementation or supervision of these tasks doubtfully appeared in the mission essential task list of any units 
engaged in combat and later in stability operations in Iraq.  Additionally, Catherine Dale argues that, “by many 
accounts, the OIF post-war planning process did not provide commanders, before the start of combat operations, 
with a clear picture of the extent of their assigned post-war responsibilities.”  Dale, Catherine, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 22 September 2008, p. 
31. 
  A more secure environment permitted follow-on support from various U.S. and 
325 Evidence for this: 3rd Infantry Division and many implementing units (civilian and military) either did 
not have or were not briefed on USCENTCOM’s detailed Phase IV plans.  Additionally, CFLCC was replaced by a 
much smaller and more tactical V Corps charged with implementing a plan that differed from the original.  Collins, 
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international agencies for SSR operations with logistical and security support provided by the 
armed forces.  But such support is difficult to entice or maintain in an environment where 
security is low and violence is endemic.  In Iraq, at the time when these external agencies were to 
begin providing support, the security situation was dire and rapidly deteriorating.  Thus, the U.S. 
Army was left with the bulk of responsibility for all post-combat operations.  Conrad Crane 
describes how this process was supposed to work in the early stages of stability operations in 
Iraq: 
“there is supposed to be handover point where the military hands off to a national 
or international organization which then hands off to an indigenous organization.  
When they talk about fixing the interagency process, they are talking about 
making this model work.  We are like a quarterback that never has anyone to 
hand off to.”326
 
 
What this transition model does not take into account is the possibility of a total 
disintegration of host-nation security forces and the emergence of a complex insurgency like the 
one that developed in post-combat Iraq.  In the midst of a post-combat complex insurgency, the 
security situation is at best unstable; inter-agency and international support agencies either 
cannot or will not participate in SSR activities in this environment. The prevailing assumption 
                                                                                                                                                             
Joseph J., Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and its Aftermath, Institute for National Strategic Studies 
Occasional Paper 5, National Defense University, April 2005, p. 12. 
326 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Crane, Conrad C., Personal Interview, 5 November 2008. 
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that success in combat would seamlessly transform into successful post-combat operations was 
seriously misleading.327
What proved particularly disastrous to the proper functioning of this handover model was 
the emergence of an insurgency after the cessation of major combat.
 
328  In traditional, even 
irregular, operations, insurgencies are treated as subset of combat operations, not as a 
phenomenon emerging during stability operations.329
                                                 
327 The process of ‘nation-building’ through a capable interagency process, even in a complex operating 
environment, was considered entirely possible by the Pentagon.  See, Kimball, Raymond A., Transformation Under 
Fire: A Historical Case Study with Modern Parallels, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 
PA, October, 2007, p. 21.  
  Also, the standard definitions for what an 
insurgency is and why it exists became confused in post-combat Iraq; the insurgency in Iraq did 
not fit any standard pre-Cold War or Cold War paradigm.  “Most theoretical works on 
insurgency warfare make the assumption that an insurgent fights for something greater than 
military victory.  The US military’s doctrinal understanding of insurgencies certainly assumed 
that larger political goals, like the revolutionary seizure of power or the establishment of a 
particular ideology such as communism, have provided the impetus to modern insurgencies.  
328 Thus, “how the war is fought becomes crucially important to the quality and sustainability of the 
resulting peace.  Operations which could previously be clearly and conveniently labeled—for example combat, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-revolutionary warfare, humanitarian operations—can no longer be so.”  
OIF was proving immensely more complex than assumed and to a degree that models, doctrine, and experience 
could not account for.  See, Kiszely, John, Post-Modern Challenges for Modern Warriors, The Shrivenham Papers, 
Number 5, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, December 2007, p. 7. 
329 Metz describes how insurgency is seen as a variant of war in Metz, Steven, “New Challenges and Old 
Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,” Parameters, Winter 2007-08, p. 22. 
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Events in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 forced some to reconsider this definition, suggesting that it 
remained too narrow and positing the existence of insurgencies without clearly articulated and 
widely accepted political goals.”330
The 20
  The materialization of an insurgency with few definable 
goals during SSR operations was significantly problematic and caused institutional paroxysms 
that reverberate yet today. 
th Century models of insurgent ‘movements’ extant at the beginning of Phase IV of 
OIF were insufficient for understanding a complex insurgency.  This deficiency compromised 
the Pentagon’s and the U.S. Army’s understanding of and potential solutions to the burgeoning 
uprising.  The traditional model suggested that two handovers should take place: from the 
military to U.S. and international agencies and from these agencies to host-nation, indigenous 
forces and organizations.  This model would not work in the event that an insurgency developed 
or if the security situation deteriorated significantly.  But, even though an insurgency was 
developing that seriously disrupted the post-combat calculus of transferring responsibility for 
SSR operations and few if any host-nation or international agencies were available for operations 
in Iraq, U.S. policymakers tried to adapt the prevailing model to this circumstance through the 
transfer of responsibility for stability and security to host-nation forces.331
                                                 
330 Wright and Reese, op. cit., p. 104.  North argues that, “The current JP [Joint Publication] definition 
worked well in the late 20th century, when anti-colonial and communist movements were competing with sitting 
governments for political power.  Today, however, it is hard to identify such an organized movement; there are not 
only movements, but extremists, tribes, gangs, militias, warlords, and combinations of these.  These groups are 
certainly not ‘an organized movement.’  They have different motivations and objectives.”  See North, Chris, 
“Redefining Insurgency,” Military Review, January-February, 2008, p. 117. 
  This solution 
331 This policy and the difficulty of implementing it is outlined by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO): “The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued by the National Security Council in November 
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bypassed the requirement for significant U.S. and international agency support and was premised 
on the quick (but unlikely) build-up of local capacity.  But, as Steven Biddle argues, “turning 
over responsibility for fighting the insurgents to local forces, in particular, is likely to make 
matters worse.  Such a policy might have made sense in Vietnam, but in Iraq it threatens to 
exacerbate the communal tensions that underlie the conflict and undermine the power-sharing 
negotiations needed to end it.”332  Biddle also argues that “the biggest problem with treating Iraq 
like Vietnam is Iraqization—the main component of the current U.S. military strategy.  In a 
people’s war, handing the fighting off to local forces makes sense because it undermines the 
nationalist component of insurgent resistance, improves the quality of local intelligence, and 
boosts troop strength.  But in a communal civil war, it throws gasoline on the fire.”333
                                                                                                                                                             
2005, asserted the Coalition’s intention to adjust its ‘posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi 
capabilities grow,’ and for Coalition troop levels in Iraq to decrease over time as the Iraqis take on more 
responsibilities for themselves.  Some three months later, in response to the growing capability of the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) and some other indicators of progress, the Department of Defense (DOD) recommended a decrease in 
the U.S. force structure in Iraq from 17 to 15 combat brigades—a reduction of about 7,000 troops.  Following the 
bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra on February 22, 2006, however, an upsurge in violence throughout the 
country undermined political gains and challenged the Government of Iraq.”  U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces’ Units as Independent not Clear 
Because Units Support Capabilities are not Fully Developed, 30 November 2007, p. 1.  The realization that this 
policy was not working led to the development of the New Way Forward strategy based on the successful model of 
“Clear, Hold, and Build” employed by the tactical units of (then) COL McMaster’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment 
in 2005.  See also, Krepinevich, Andrew F., “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005. 
  Adapting 
332 Biddle, Stephen, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006. 
333 Ibid. 
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old models to the current conflict was a natural and understandable response but was nonetheless 
ineffective for staving off the insurgency or for allowing the withdrawal of U.S. Army forces. 
Lessons from previous insurgencies can be useful as a frame of reference but do not 
necessarily provide key insights into how to conduct SSR operations or conduct a 
counterinsurgency.334  In fact, assuming the applicability of lessons from insurgencies that 
occurred long ago might be more damaging than helpful if improperly understood or applied.  
Metz argues that analyzing recent internal wars might tell us more about the insurgency in Iraq 
than do studies of insurgencies from eras past.335  But the influence of past models and 
preconceived notions held remarkable sway in shaping policy for Iraq.  Given the dearth of 
historical examples to follow and few workable solutions to combating the insurgency in Iraq, 
the idea of a handover coupled with withdrawal became more and more attractive, even more so 
than postulated in initial planning as the levels of violence rose and the security situation 
worsened.  Despite the unsuccessful application of the pre-OIF model to handover and transition 
operations for nearly three years, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in a 2006 memorandum, urged 
“modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start ‘taking our hand off the bicycle seat’) so 
Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.”336
                                                 
334 Rosenau argues that 20th Century studies of insurgency (Galula, Kitson, Thompson, Lawrence, Gwynn, 
etc.) remain useful but “it is important to avoid the trap of seeing them as ‘skeleton keys’ of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, that is, as tools directly applicable at all times and in all places.”  See Rosenau, William, 
Subversion and Insurgency, RAND, Santa Monica, 2007, p. 17. 
  
The concept of phasing operations and conducting a handover endured: the preferred handover 
335 Metz, Steven, Rethinking Insurgency, Op Cit. 
336 Rumsfeld, Donald H., “Rumsfeld’s Memo of Options for Iraq War,” New York Times, 6 November 
2006. 
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model would not die.337
The U.S. Army (as the nation’s premier land-based force), despite numerous 
protestations, was stuck with the task of conducting both stability and security operations 
simultaneously.  The U.S. Army was assigned this task because it occupied the area of operations 
in force and numbers and because it was the only agency capable (doctrinally and in theory, at 
least) of providing for both conditions in a complex environment.  Despite a decades’ long effort 
(intentional and otherwise) to avoid responsibility for conducting these tasks and an institutional 
aversion to training for these operations, the U.S. Army would have to quickly find a way to 
adapt conventional thinking into what was quickly becoming an unconventional assignment with 
little on-the-ground interagency or international support. 
  In the meantime, the U.S. Army would have to manage the situation as 
it stood in Iraq. 
In a sense, the U.S. Army was thrust into a game of musical chairs where there were no 
other players and the music rarely stopped.  Manifold tasks foreign to the organization now 
became primary missions.  The Pentagon reacted in a surprising, but true to form, fashion: 
“recent experience highlights the need for a force capable of turning one of two ‘swift defeat’ 
campaigns, if the President so decides, into an operation seeking more far-reaching objectives.  
Accomplishing these goals requires agile joint forces capable of rapidly foreclosing an 
                                                 
337 The concept of transferring responsibility to an international agency or the host-government, even 
though the security situation was worsening, was a priority for the Bush administration and reflected the persistent 
concept of handover and withdrawal after combat: “In 2004, President Bush outlined a five-step plan to end the 
occupation: transferring sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure, getting more 
international support, preparing for Iraq’s first national election this past January, and helping to establish security.” 
See Rice, Condolezza, “Iraq and U.S. Policy,” Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Washington DC, 19 October 2005. 
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adversary’s options, achieving decisive results in major combat actions, and setting the security 
conditions for enduring conflict resolution.  We must plan for the latter to include extended 
stability operations involving substantial combat and requiring the rapid and sustained 
application of national and international capabilities spanning the elements of state power.”338
  In late 2005, the Department of Defense did submit to accepting that “stability operations 
are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and 
support”
  
The absence of national and international capabilities did not dissuade the Pentagon from 
pursuing the tenets of a failed model; the durability of the concept of ‘a combat-oriented force is 
full-spectrum capable’ and the model premised on this farce retained favor among policy-makers 
years after it was proven invalid. 
339 but with a rueful caveat:  “many stability operations tasks are best performed by 
indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.  Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be 
prepared to perform all necessary tasks to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do 
so.  Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely 
withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.”340
                                                 
338 Rumsfeld, Donald H., The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, p. 
17. 
  These statements amount to a tacit admission that the 
preferred handover model for stability operations was the ideal but did not apply to OIF. This 
model (if it could be applied) would allow the U.S. Army, and the other joint forces, to continue 
along the path of developing and enhancing pure combat capabilities.  But, despite an interest in 
making the defunct model work and the presidential order that “the Secretary of State shall 
339 England, Gordon, Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, 28 November 2005, p. 2. 
340 Ibid. 
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coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments 
and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and 
reconstruction activities,”341 the U.S. Army remained the primary agency for conducting these 
operations on the ground in Iraq.  And, “although State, USAID, and DOD have improved the 
coordination of their capability-building efforts since early 2007” there is still no lead agency 
charged with post-combat SSR operations or strategic plan to provide overarching guidance.342
5.3 CONTRACTORS AND THE U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 
  
An unusable transition model, the assumptions that flowed from this model, the rise of a 
complex insurgency, a lack of a coherent strategic plan for interagency support, and a lack of 
preparation for SSR operations all contributed to a situation requiring radical and rapid 
organizational adaptation by the U.S. Army. 
Despite the notable success of unconventional forces linking up with elements of the Kurdish 
Peshmerga in Northern Iraq, OIF was planned and conducted in a highly and thoroughly 
conventional manner with combat as its focus.  This produced two significant and relatively 
novel (in scope) changes to the traditional conduct of U.S. Army operations. 
                                                 
341 Bush, George, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, The White House, 7 December 2005, 
p. 2. 
342 Walker, David M., Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Confront U.S. Efforts to Build 
the Capacity of Iraqi Ministries, Testimony Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives, GAO, 4 October 2007, p. 4. 
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First, SF (performing their function in network centric Shock & Awe operations) was 
specifically used for deep reconnaissance missions and for targeting high-value assets.  SF 
assisted the regular forces in ‘chopping the head off the snake’ so as to thoroughly wrest control 
of Iraq from Saddam Hussein’s government.  SF continued to play this role, in conjunction with 
regular forces, throughout the combat phases of OIF and even during COIN operations.  As 
Finlan argues, “a great deal of effort was devoted by the occupation forces to hunt down and 
arrest or kill the former rulers of Iraq…the emphasis in this strategy appeared to revolve around 
the notion that if you remove the figurehead then the resistance will fade away.”343  Secondly, 
the U.S. Army was compelled to supplement its combat-centric forces with contractors 
performing a number of logistical, training, and personal protection roles formerly executed by 
special and regular forces.  The U.S. Army Transformation program that guaranteed a smaller 
logistical footprint344
                                                 
343 Finlan, Alastair, “Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counterinsurgency Strategy in Iraq,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, Volume 16, Number 1, 2005, p. 10-11. 
 and greater lethality also necessitated the wide-scale use of contracted 
support personnel to replace soldiers formerly performing these functions.  This problem was 
exacerbated by the commencement of protracted COIN operations in post-combat Iraq that 
required even more support personnel (indigenous, foreign, and U.S.) than originally estimated.  
The use of the SF in a largely conventional role and the employment of a vast network of 
344 “”While using PSPs [Private Security Personnel] to overcome fractured alliances, the United States has 
also relied on PSPs to keep the number of troops deployed to a minimum, using contractors to perform the work of 
soldiers.”  See, Collins, Kevin G., America’s Mercenaries: War by Proxy, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2006, p. 68. 
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contracted personnel were indicative of the persistent structural flaws that plagued the U.S. 
Army throughout OIF. 
The reorientation of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), to which 
SF is subordinate, from supporting geographical commands to “synchronizing Department of 
Defense plans against global terrorist networks and, as directed, conducting global operations”345 
and the decision by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to use USSOCOM as the lead agency in the 
War on Terror (WOT) typified the Pentagon’s bias towards lethal operations.346  The mission of 
USSOCOM is to “provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States 
and its interests.  Plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.”347
                                                 
345 USSOCOM, Title 10 Authorities and Responsibilities, 
  Although there 
are many unconventional elements inherent to this mission, SF’s supporting role in USSOCOM 
is distinctively different than its guiding motto: De Oppresso Liber (Liberate the Oppressed).  
Using SF in this fashion was not unnatural (given the organizations’ capabilities) and was a 
http://www.socom.mil/SOCOMHome/Pages/USSOCOM.aspx, accessed 23 May 2009. 
346 “ARSOF [Army Special Operations Forces] support the WOT [War on Terror] by providing forces 
trained and equipped to support the USSOCOM effort to the WOT.  ARSOF support the USSOCOM’s strategy for 
winning the WOT by conducting SO [Special Operations] to find, fix, and finish terrorists globally.  ARSOF employ 
their forces to shape the global informational and geographic operational environment by conducting SO to 
influence, deter, locate, isolate, and destroy terrorists and their support systems.”  Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, Washington DC, 20 September 2006, pp. 1-1—1-
2.  
347 USSOCOM, Mission Statement, http://www.socom.mil/Docs/Command_Mission_26112007, accessed 
on 20 May 2009. 
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logical extension of the conventionalization of SF since the end of the Vietnam War.348  In fact, 
by the mid- to late-1990s, U.S. Army Special Forces had adapted to their more lethal and less 
unconventional role in support of conventional operations: “in the fall of 1998, Major General 
William Boykin, the commander of US Army Special Forces Command, directed Special Forces 
group commanders to examine the relevance of UW [Unconventional Warfare] as a mission.  
The 3rd group, whose response was not atypical, concluded that UW skill sets had atrophied to 
the point that troops were far more comfortable conducting SR [Special Reconnaissance] or DA 
[Direct Action] missions.”349
 Using SF in a more conventional and lethal manner required that the unconventional 
capabilities of these forces be supplemented or replicated by conventional forces and/or 
contractors.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld described what the then current and future SF would 
be capable of and how this would affect general purpose forces: “the future special operations 
force will be rapidly deployable, agile, flexible and tailorable to perform the most demanding 
and sensitive missions worldwide.  As general purpose joint ground forces take on tasks that 
SOF currently perform, SOF will increase their capacity to perform more demanding and 
specialized tasks, especially long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in politically 
sensitive environments and denied areas.  For direct action, they will possess an expanded 
 
                                                 
348 “The ‘art’ of conducting UW [Unconventional Warfare] has been rarely practiced by most western SOF 
since the early years of the Vietnam War, and had largely become a ‘legacy mission’ de-emphasized in favour of 
other operational priorities.”  Brailey, Malcolm, Not Many Jobs Take a Whole Army: Special Operations Forces and 
the Revolution in Military Affairs, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, March 2004, p. 14. 
349 Watts, Clinton, Foreign Fighters: How are they being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models, 
22 June 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/foreign-fighters-how-are-they/, accessed 28 July 2008. 
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organic ability to locate, tag and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets 
locally.”350  But Special Forces are ‘Special’ for a reason: they are capable of conducting 
operations (particularly unconventional operations) that other individual soldiers or conventional 
organizations are incapable of performing.  As Bogart contends, “some may think that any 
quality unit can remake themselves into UW experts.  Our nation has a large kitbag full of 
organizations with different capabilities and cultures.  Most of those capabilities in the 
conventional forces as well as most of the special operations units are strike-focused.  Each force 
package can bring different capabilities to the fight.  Only SOF soldiers are recruited, assessed, 
trained, equipped, and organized primarily to fight the UW mission—by, with, and through 
others.”351
Shifting responsibility to the regular forces for many unconventional operations and 
leveraging contractors for conventional operations directly contributed to the U.S. Army’s 
inability to appropriately train and array its forces for stability operations: “one of the most 
surprising aspects of the employment of Green Berets and other overt Special Forces was the 
deliberate decision not to use them in their key roles—training indigenous forces—to help 
reconstruct a new Iraqi Army after Saddam’s army was controversially disbanded by the new 
pro-consul, Paul Bremer on 23 May 2003.  Allocating the task to Special Forces would have 
allowed much better bonding and trust to develop between the coalition forces and the new army.  
Instead, this task was given to private contractors and, ironically, not only did it squander this 
   
                                                 
350 Rumsfeld, Donald H., Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 
February 2006, pp. 43-44. 
351 Bogart III, Adrian, One Valley at a Time, Joint Special Operations University Report 06-6, Hurlburt 
Field, FL, 2006, p. 5. 
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opportunity, but it also lured many Special Forces out of the coalition forces to take ‘lucrative 
jobs’ as contractors in Iraq.”352
 Contractors filled a variety of positions in Iraq previously occupied by uniformed 
personnel: personal protection; patrolling; training; facility management and; theater network 
management and maintenance (to name a few).  Principally, contractors supported the U.S. 
Army by performing significant stability operations functions and by performing various non-
combat operations.  “The types and roles of private contractors vary widely, and there can be few 
hard-and-fast rules regarding their use.  They have proved their value to the U.S. military 
through under-taking some tasks whose performance by uniformed personnel would detract from 
skills and training of those personnel—e.g., catering and logistical transport in noncombat 
areas.”
  In this respect, Transformation was truly transformative:  SF was 
being used to direct precision-guided munitions in support of network centric operations while 
the rest of the U.S. Army, supported by contract personnel, was trying to master skills almost 
completely outside of its competency. 
353
                                                 
352 Finlan, Alastair, Special Forces, Strategy, and the War on Terror: Warfare by Other Means, Routledge, 
London, 2008, p. 156. 
  Without contracted support, the U.S. Army would be incapable of conducting many 
networked combat functions that rely on sophisticated communications and computer networks; 
operations in a post-combat environment would be nearly impossible. Metz argues, “like 
contracting in general, PMCs [Private Military Contractors] free uniformed service members for 
353 RAND, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Santa 
Monica, 2008, p. 38. 
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other tasks.”354
The expanded use of contractors (particularly personal protection contractors) in stability 
operations was accompanied by many unforeseen problems related to a lack of “well-defined 
requirements, poor business arrangements, and inadequate oversight and accountability.”
  Contracting not only freed uniformed services for other tasks (mostly combat 
related) but also enabled operations in general. 
355
                                                 
354 Metz, Steven, Rethinking Insurgency, Op Cit, p. 35. 
  
These contractors did not significantly contribute to the U.S. Army’s effort to stabilize Iraq and 
indeed, might have contributed to a number of incidents (like the 16 September 2007 Blackwater 
shootings in Baghdad) that led to condemnation of not only their efforts but of the U.S. 
government effort in general.  The failure to plan, resource, and train the U.S. Army for stability 
operations and the shifting of many unconventional tasks to the conventional forces necessitated 
the use of contractors even though the rules and regulations governing their behavior and the 
scope of their operations were thin or non-existent.  The use of contractors and a general lack of 
unconventional support from SF were symptoms of the transformed force; the length and depth 
of their use were emblematic of the Transformation pathology that made healthy adaptation that 
much more difficult to achieve. 
355 Walker, David M., “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate 
Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments,” Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, GAO, 11 March 2008, p. 1. 
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5.4 DOCTRINAIRE DOCTRINE 
As stated previously, the purpose of doctrine is to provide fundamental principles by which the 
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.  It is 
authoritative but requires judgment in application.356  Doctrine not only acts as a guide but is 
informed by actions and learning from operational experience.  “Depending on the process by 
which it is written, formal published doctrine can reflect either the goals of the military 
leadership (a ‘top-down’ dissemination) or broad institutional learning (a ‘bottom-up’ system) 
derived from real operational experience.  In either case, such doctrine reflects institutional 
learning when it is well aligned with education, training, and actual operational behavior.”357  It 
is perhaps normal then doctrine is more likely read during peacetime than during war since 
during war individuals and units are contributing to and influencing doctrine more so than 
practicing it.358
 Doctrine, by nature, does not change very often or rapidly.  If it did, few individuals or 
organizations would have the ability to learn, inculcate, and train on its principles.  As such, 
doctrine can act as a record of organizational predilections and inhibitions as it charts changes 
(or a lack thereof) in an organization.  The durability of doctrine and the standardization that it 
provides to units can be either good or bad depending on the guidance that is contained therein 
and the environment where this guidance is exercised.  But when doctrine is inflexible, is 
incompatible with other doctrine (either because of date of publication or contradicting 
 
                                                 
356 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Op Cit, p. 171. 
357 Davidson, Janine Anne, Op Cit, p. 224. 
358 Ibid, p. 227. 
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principles) or does not change rapidly enough to be applicable in operations where the 
prescriptions contained therein are being implemented, organizational adaptation can suffer.  
Although doctrine is only meant to be a guide to the conduct of operations and training for these 
operations, when enforced by regulations, doctrine becomes doctrinaire and a barrier to 
change.359
 U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, in publication throughout OIF and most recently 
updated in 2007, offers guidance on training and leader development throughout the force: 
“leaders must understand how their unit will operate and fight across the full range of military 
operations, and how to plan and execute training using FM 7-0 and FM 7-1.  Training must be 
innovative, yet doctrinally and technically sound.  Leaders must enforce individual, collective, 
and unit performance standards.”
 
360
                                                 
359 An additional problem with doctrine, as Kiszely argues, is that “some aspects of our doctrine are liable 
to be out of date almost from the day of publication.”  This is particularly true in rapidly changing or poorly 
understood environments.  The writing of doctrine takes time: lessons and learning must be captured and are usually 
standardized; writing and review is a time consuming process for any sizable document.  See Kiszely, John, Op Cit, 
p. 14.  Kilcullen makes a similar argument regarding methods in counterterrorism:  “counterterrorism methods that 
work are almost by definition already obsolete: our opponents evolve as soon as we master their current approach.  
There is no ‘silver bullet’; like malaria, terrorism constantly morphs into new mutations that require a continuously 
updated battery of responses.”  Kilcullen, David, The Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, 
p. 294. 
  To properly follow the guidance of this regulation, leaders 
and trainers have to subordinate innovative training to doctrinal principles and must ensure that 
training is standardized, to the degree possible, across the force.  Additionally, training must also 
360 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader 
Development, Washington, DC, 3 August 2007, p. 72. 
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adhere to U.S. Army standards: “the basis for training standardization is executing training using 
approved Army publications.  While ensuring tasks are performed to Army standards, 
commanders encourage trainers to exercise initiative and to create realistic and challenging 
conditions for training within the context of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops 
available and civilians.”361  Finally, trainers and leaders must ensure that training is evaluated 
according to a predetermined standard: “every training event includes an evaluation of task 
performance to standard, whether formal or informal, by internal personnel or external.”362  
Unless doctrine, standards, and evaluation techniques are indisputably appropriate for all 
scenarios, innovation and initiative will suffer.  But if doctrine, standards, and evaluation 
techniques are universally appropriate, then the need for innovation and initiative is obviated.  
Innovation is thus impeded by the principles of available doctrine, rote standardization, and an 
inflexible evaluation methodology.  This does not mean that innovation is not possible but it does 
mean that innovation will have significant limits placed upon it by the requirements of 
standardization and the principles of doctrine.  When encountering or reacting to a new 
environment or environmental phenomenon (such as a complex insurgency or even the 
requirement to conduct stability operations) restrictions on innovation can significantly reduce 
the capacity for adaptation.363
                                                 
361 Ibid. 
   
362 Ibid. 
363 Lopez argues that “in some cases, regulations even contradict emerging doctrine further preventing its 
acceptance.  U.S. Forces Command’s regulation 350-1, which prescribes training requirements for active duty units 
assigned to the continental United States, prohibits the use of training resources for stability operations outside of a 
90-day window of deployment to avoid any distraction from the unit’s primary warfighting activities.”  Lopez, 
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Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (USR), also limits the innovative 
capacity of U.S. Army units by prescribing mostly quantitative and combat relevant assessments 
for determining a unit’s operational fitness.  The USR does use a few qualitative measurements, 
provided by the tactical unit commander, to assess readiness but these are based on sub-unit 
performance of standard and doctrinal mission essential tasks.  Core tasks or core mission 
essential tasks (core METs) are identified by the commander “by using the procedures in FM 7-1 
chapter 3, to develop a mission essential task list (METL) for the mission(s) which the unit was 
organized or designed to doctrinally perform.”364
In the event that a unit receives a warning order for an upcoming mission or an execution 
order for the conduct of a mission, the commander will have to draw from another set of 
preconceived tasks to fill out unit training for the directed mission.
  Thus, a unit’s tasks are limited to organization 
and doctrine: if the unit is organized for a variant of combat or combat support, then its core 
tasks will be combat or combat support related.  Accordingly, the cognitive structures of the unit 
will reflect a bias towards conducting either combat or combat support operations. 
365
                                                                                                                                                             
Rafael, On Learning: Metrics Based Systems for Countering Asymmetric Threats, School of Advanced Military 
Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 2006, p. 29. 
  Reporting on the unit’s 
ability to accomplish these tasks and thus its preparedness for combat (or for whatever the unit 
was organized or designed to doctrinally perform) is a measurement that forces the commander 
of a unit to restrict training to prescribed, doctrinal tasks that might or might not contribute to the 
364 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, Washington 
DC, 19 December 2006, p. 63. 
365 Directed mission tasks are also known as (DMETs).  “The commander identifies directed mission tasks 
or DMETs when his unit has been formally directed by a formal warning order (WARNORD), execution order 
(EXORD), or other formal tasking from HQDA [Headquarters, Department of the Army]…”  Ibid. 
 173 
unit’s effectiveness and adaptability in a given environment.  This is particularly true for units 
that are called upon to deploy and conduct tasks that do not fit its doctrinal organization or 
design.  Thus, the following statement from Field Manual 1, The Army, is largely invalid: “the 
versatile mix of Army organizations provides combatant commanders with the landpower 
necessary to achieve objectives across the range of military operations.”366
While doctrine does change to reflect strategic, operational, and tactical realities and 
lessons, elements of older doctrine (forming the historical basis of the document) might remain 
and might conflict with updated guidance.  Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Intelligence (published 1 
year after the commencement of OIF), describes how intelligence influences operations: “the 
commander must understand how current and potential enemies organize, equip, train, employ, 
and control their forces.  Intelligence provides an understanding of the enemy, which assists in 
planning, preparing, and executing military operations…commanders must receive the 
intelligence, understand it (because it is tailored to the commander’s requirements), believe it, 
and act on it.  Through this doctrinal concept, intelligence drives operations.”
  The U.S. Army 
lacked a significant and applicable set of doctrinal guidelines or organizational types to conduct 
protracted stability operations in a complex insurgency environment.  The training and tasks 
necessary for operations in this type of environment did not exist (certainly not 
comprehensively) prior to the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 
2006 (and much later in Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, September 2008) and 
could not be easily derived from the conventional task set trained upon prior to and during the 
operations in OIF.    
367
                                                 
366 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army, June 2005, p. 1-2. 
  FM 2-0 also 
367 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Intelligence, May 2004, P. 1-1—1-2. 
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explains how contemporary adversaries might adapt to U.S. Army capabilities:  “if the US can 
dominate an adversary through its size or technological organization, and strategic capabilities, 
the adversary will resort to unconventional and adaptive ways and means to achieve his ends, 
which may themselves change at times.”368  But the recognition of new adversaries does not 
displace traditional models or methods of combating these enemies.  Guidance provided by FM 
2-0 on post-conflict operations indicates that, “upon cessation of hostilities or truce, deployed 
forces enter a new stage of force projection operations.  Postconflict operations focus on 
restoring order, reestablishing HN infrastructure, preparing for redeployment of forces, and 
planning residual presence of US forces.  While post conflict operations strive to transition from 
conflict to peace, there remains a possibility of resurgent hostilities by individuals and forces.”369 
Guidance provided by FM 2-0 also defines the role of tactical level forces in these operations, 
“the tactical level is the employment of units in combat.  It includes the ordered arrangement and 
maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential 
combat power into victorious battles and engagements.”370
Three problems emerge from this analysis of FM 2-0 that are suggestive of a general 
doctrinal infirmity that affected the prosecution of missions in the non-linear, non-doctrinal, and 
tactically ambiguous environment present in OIF: 1) the intelligence collected for the 
commander to drive operations is drawn from equipment, training, methods, and indicators 
constructed for supporting combat operations; 2) the model presented for the conduct of post-
conflict operations still presumes a linear path leading from combat to order to withdrawal even 
 
                                                 
368 Ibid, p. 1-19. 
369 Ibid, p. 1-38. 
370 Ibid, p. 2-1. 
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though the potential for ‘resurgent hostilities’ is recognized and; 3) the focus of intelligence at 
the tactical level is on combat and the translation of potential combat power into victorious 
battles and engagements.  Although lessons from OIF (and OEF) were incorporated in FM 2-0, 
the bias towards traditional models and combat remained.  Doctrine that does not properly reflect 
the realities of ongoing operations limits the commander’s ability to innovate (because of the 
restrictions posed by regulations and standards), to train appropriately for the mission, and to 
properly function once in theater.  In essence, the commander will face serious challenges when 
adapting to the operational environment when he or she is forced to follow guidelines 
constructed for phased combat operations relevant to a different era. 
The doctrinal guidance provided prior to and during OIF was developed for an enemy 
and an operational environment where linearity prevailed and uniformity was the norm.  In a 
previous era, strict adherence to doctrine and regulations ensured that units would be successful 
in a linear fight against a similarly doctrinal foe.  Because new doctrine builds upon old doctrine 
(too dramatic of a shift would disrupt the institutional balance of learning, training, equipment, 
etc.) and because doctrine is resistant to change (as is the institution producing the doctrine), the 
concepts contained in formal doctrinal guidance persist even when circumstance and objectives 
change.  Thus, doctrine can be detrimental to training and operations if adhered to strictly. 
Despite the definition of what doctrine is (a principled guide), when enforced by regulations and 
standardization, doctrine confines the adaptive capacity of a unit and of individuals.  
Inappropriate doctrine, such as that available throughout a large portion of OIF, premised on 
conventional combat-oriented operations, not only forced significant adaptation but, perversely, 
restricted the range of adaptation that was possible. 
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5.5 TRANSFORMATION IN A TIME OF WAR 
The U.S. Army’s Transformation program continued throughout OIF, largely unchanged, in spite 
of countervailing lessons emerging from two ongoing operations (OIF and OEF) and despite the 
fact that the character of these operations seriously challenged the direction and underlying 
premises of this program.371  Partly, this was a result of bureaucratic inertia: “the capabilities of 
armies and the individuals who lead them are defined by the types of problems tackled in the 
past, the nature of which are shaped by the characteristics of the institutional culture in which the 
armies and their leadership have historically evolved.”372  Furthermore, the U.S. Army’s 
Transformation program did not ‘transform’ because it was encumbered by budgetary constraints 
and a planning and acquisition system that would not or could not be quickly altered despite 
notable challenges to the efficacy of the program for current (and possibly) future operations.373
                                                 
371 The Department of the Army continued to advance the full-spectrum concept of the Transformation 
effort even after the difficulties encountered in OEF and OIF: “Transformation is a process that shapes the changing 
nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and 
organizations.  These combinations employ the nation’s advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities to 
sustain the U.S. strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”  Brownlee, R. L., 2004 
Army Transformation Roadmap, Department of the Army, July 2004, p. 1-3.  
 
372 MacGregor, Douglas A., Transformation Under Fire, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003, p. 200. 
373 The efficacy of the Transformation effort was questioned in 2002: “For the future, a key question about 
the office [the office of Force Transformation] is whether it will have enough influence to effectively alter the 
direction of the rest of the department.  DoD agencies and the military services traditionally have been skeptical of 
radical transformation, preferring slower evolutionary development.  The extent to which the OFT forces change on 
an inertia-filled profession will be the key on which its success will be judged.”  So far, the verdict would indicate 
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The durability of the U.S. Army’s Transformation program was bolstered by two 
intersecting suppositions regarding the deterrent capacity of the force as it was then formed and 
the applicability of this force in achieving victory as it was then defined.  The former assumed 
that the superiority of the conventional force deterred competition from other hostile states and 
actors.  “The US military is so successful in waging conventional war that America’s adversaries 
are, at present, seeking shelter at the extreme ends of the conflict spectrum.  At the high end, 
states like Iran and North Korea are actively pursuing nuclear arsenals.  At the lower end, hostile 
groups such as al Qaeda, the Taliban, remnants of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, splinter 
Iraqi Shi’a elements and similar groups pursue insurgency warfare.”374  The other supposition 
was that the declared policy of victory in the war on terror (a carryover concept related to the 
total victory in regular war and in low intensity conflict) was achievable with existing means.375
                                                                                                                                                             
that OFT has not been particularly successful in this effort.  See Center for Defense Information, DoD Office of 
Force Transformation, 11 September 2002. 
  
Even though the U.S. Army encountered significant problems executing missions to support 
strategic priorities in Iraq with the extant, partially transformed force, changing the trajectory of 
future Transformation was unlikely.  Planners were still wedded to the idea of accepting risk at 
the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, especially if risks at the higher end could be deterred 
with the existing conventional force or the even more lethal and future fully transformed force. 
374 Krepinevich, Andrew, The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare, CBSA, 2 June 2004, p. 2. 
375 Metz, Steven, “Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 
21st Century,” Ed. Matthews, Lloyd J, Conference Report for the Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle, 
PA, 13-15 April, 2004. 
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These two suppositions disregarded challenges posed by the growing Iraqi insurgency (as 
well as the one festering in Afghanistan) and by the force itself.  As Lyall and Wilson argue, 
“modern armies will be chronically unprepared to defeat insurgencies that may arise after 
military interventions.  Paradoxically, the mechanized force structures of modern militaries may 
contribute not just to the rise of insurgent opposition but may actually embolden it.  Insurgents, 
now thoroughly versed in the limits of mechanized forces, have incentives to adopt ‘primitive’ 
strategies that pit the strengths of the modern state against itself.”376  Douglas MacGregor argues 
that the U.S. Army encountered various problems in Iraq because of a Transformation program 
that is “not informed by the realities of modern combat or rigorous testing and 
experimentation.”377  MacGregor also argues that the various assumptions underpinning 
Transformation (the requirements of strategic deployment speed, perfect situational awareness, 
utility of a lighter force, and the efficacy of the reduced size of units) are delusional, detrimental 
to the current force, and will likely lead to more problems in the future.378
Transformation also did little to assist tactical units in the prosecution of stability 
operations in Iraq after the completion of major combat operations despite claims of enabling 
full-spectrum operations.
  
379
                                                 
376 Lyall, Jason and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, Number 63, Winter, 2009, p. 103. 
  To be full-spectrum, the U.S. Army would necessarily have to be 
377 MacGregor, Douglas, Army Transformation: Implications for the Future, Statement before the House 
Armed Services Committee, 15 July 2004, p. 2. 
378 Ibid, p. 2. 
379 Douglas Feith’s testimony to Congress fully demonstrates the persistence of the Pentagon’s faith in 
Transformation despite a year’s worth of lessons from Iraq: “military effectiveness in an age of terrorism and 
asymmetric warfare is no longer measured simply by the industrial-age concept of mass, but rather by more 
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capable of conducting not just combat operations but also stability and support operations and to 
link these operations with national, political objectives.  Kagan argues that the Transformation 
effort accomplished just the opposite and merely augmented the military’s conventional 
capacity:  “the history of U.S. military transformation efforts since the end of the Cold War has 
been the continuous movement away from the political objective of war toward a focus on 
killing and destroying things.”380
 
  Comments from three soldiers deployed to OIF illustrate how 
the transformed force structure affected units (organizationally, functionally, and in training) 
prior to and immediately after the conclusion of combat operations and how the Transformation 
program failed to enable full-spectrum capabilities: 
“Prior to OIF 1, the regiment focused mainly on high intensity conflict…The 
majority of our training occurred at the Joint Multi-Readiness Center (JMRC) in 
Germany.  There was some sparse LIC training conducted at the unit level but 
very little time dedicated to COIN.”381
 
 
 “We spent almost a month in Kuwait.  For the majority of that time, the Brigade 
Commander was trying to sign us up for a mission.  We didn’t have a mission.  
                                                                                                                                                             
advanced concepts like speed, stealth, reach, knowledge, precision, and lethality.”  Feith, Douglas J., Strengthening 
U.S. Global Defense Posture, Report to Congress, September 2004, p. 6. 
380 Kagan, Frederick W., Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy, Encounter 
Books, 2006, p. 358.  Nowhere was the aim of Transformation, despite the character of the opposing force, better 
emphasized and revealed than during the controversial Millennium Challenge 2002 exercises. 
381 Soldier Deployed to Baghdad (March 2003-August 2003 and November 2004-November 2005), 
Personal Interview, 1 July 2008. 
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Finally, they said that we’ve been getting these caches of weapons and we don’t 
know what to do with it and you guys know how to handle ammunition and by the 
way, you have a ton of trucks, so we are going to send you up there with all your 
trucks and personnel and you guys are going to blow stuff up.”382
 
 
“The ground-pounders were not very educated on non-lethal effects and second 
and third order effects of what they were doing.  They were very, very good at 
what they were trained at: light infantry tactics and how to go out and kill the 
enemy.  Their briefings before patrols were significantly different than ours.  They 
were much more willing to open fire and ask questions later instead of thinking 
about the situation.”383
 
 
The need to adapt in Iraq was apparent and the scope of this adaptation defied, almost in 
its entirety, the direction of the Transformation effort.  Colin Gray argues that:  “there is a 
traditional American way of war that, in some respects, encourages a military style far from 
optimal as an approach to the challenges posed by irregular enemies.  I am not quite arguing that 
the American way of war, a style reflecting cultural influences, will thwart the ambitions for 
transformation, though there are grounds for anxiety in this regard.”384
                                                 
382 Soldier deployed to Baghdad (early 2003, 2006-2007), Personal Interview, 18 September 2008. 
  Additionally, Gray 
concludes that “the strategic surprises that have ambushed U.S. national security performance 
383 Ibid. 
384 Gray, Colin S., National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities, Potomac Books, Washington 
DC, 2009, p. 214. 
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overwhelmingly have been political, not military, in kind.  Military transformation is close to 
irrelevant to the real problem that persistently constrains the value of U.S. strategic prowess.”385
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
  
The surprises that unfolded in Iraq and the process of the U.S. Army’s adaptation to these 
surprises (in it its effort to realize national objectives) are the subject of the next chapter. 
The end of combat operations and the failed transition to stability operations in Iraq revealed 
significant shortcomings in the U.S. Army’s ability to translate battlefield victory into strategic 
success.  The conventional, combat-oriented structure (and the cascading effects of this structure 
on training, cognition, perception, etc.) that served the U.S. Army well during combat operations 
persisted throughout OIF and made the transition to SSR operations in the midst of a complex 
insurgency much more difficult to achieve.  The inflexibility of this structure and its 
inappropriateness for SSR operations in OIF revealed manifold deficiencies in the force for 
achieving strategic objectives and necessitated significant adaptation: 
  
• Combat readiness did not translate into full spectrum dominance and enduring stability 
does not flow from success in combat.  A failure to train for stability did not obviate the 
responsibility for providing it; failing to prepare necessitated significant adaptation to 
achieve organizational goals. 
                                                 
385 Ibid. 
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• In the event of a complex insurgency emerging during SSR operations, options for a 
handoff (to U.S., UN, or indigenous agencies) might not exist, particularly if initial 
stability and security is not provisioned.  These missions cannot be neatly separated in a 
complex insurgency environment and the U.S. Army had to (and likely will have to) 
assume responsibility for this task and all attendant sub-tasks. 
• Utilizing unconventional forces for intensified conventional operations and 
supplementing regular forces with support contractors further restricted the capacity of 
the U.S. Army to conduct SSR operations. 
• Doctrine reinforced structure and provided only a limited range of options for adaptation 
(because of regulations, standards, evaluation methodology, etc.).  Doctrine (and the 
structures supporting doctrine) does not change easily or rapidly.  The cognitive patterns 
derived from doctrine are also resistant to change. 
• U.S. Army Transformation did not address the realities and necessities of achieving 
strategic success as it has been defined post-9/11: the capability of the force was more in 
tune with a single band of the spectrum of combat than it was to the whole spectrum.  
This capability was not readily fungible.  
 
What was dismissed in Transformation and marginalized in doctrine and training quickly 
became fundamental to the success of U.S. Army operations.  As Thomas Mockaitis claims, 
“The U.S. military response to the insurgency in Iraq has been profoundly shaped by preinvasion 
policy decisions, its own historical experience, and American culture.  Despite some very 
promising initiatives and a genuine effort to make the best of an extremely difficult situation, 
these factors limited the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency campaign during its first 
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year.”386  Fonetnot argues that “these operations challenged the Army’s existing capabilities and 
exposed obsolescence in the AirLand Battle doctrine.  Meeting the new reality with a smaller 
force, equipped and proficient in a doctrine that was increasingly outdated and overcome by the 
changing security environment, forced solutions that were innovative, if occasionally painful or 
disastrous.”387
 Although adaptation, particularly in warfare, is a matter of course, the adaptation required 
for success in Iraq was considerable.  The effects of past policy decisions and the course of 
Transformation all affected the rate and scope of the adaptive effort.  And, because SSR 
operations in Iraq were largely if not wholly the province of tactical units in contact with the 
population and the insurgency, these effects were magnified: the tail would have to wag the dog 
if adaptation was to occur and objectives were to be achieved.  The net result of antecedent 
conditions and structural persistence was the reactive sequence of tactical units participating in 
OIF charted in the following chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
386 Mockaitis, Thomas R., The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for 
the Future, Op Cit, p. 36. 
387 Fontenot, Gregory, et al, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom through 01 May 
2003, Op Cit, p. 11. 
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6.0  REACTIVE SEQUENCE:  U.S. ARMY ADAPTATION 
“Adapt or perish, now as ever, is nature’s inexorable imperative.”—H.G. Wells 
 
An ideal organizational form is perfectly suited to accomplishing organizational goals and 
missions in any environment and against any competitor.  The ideal organization is also perfectly 
situated to take advantage of any opportunities presented by changing environmental stimuli or 
organizational defects (in training, execution, learning, etc.) revealed by a competitor.  But each 
degree that an organization is separated from the ideal type necessitates adaptation for the 
achievement of organizational goals and missions: an adjustment of inputs, outputs, or both.  
Because an organization is unlikely to be ideal for any given environment or against any 
particular competitor it must therefore maintain a capacity for adaptation if it is to remain a going 
concern. 
For the U.S. Army, particularly during periods of deployment to hostile and 
unpredictable environments, the pace of sub-unit adaptation varies but occurs fastest in units in 
contact with the threat environment.  If an adaptation is successful, it might be transmitted from 
the bottom up through the rest of the organization.388
                                                 
388 This is not to say that the adaptation will be accepted or implemented by the institution as a whole.  The 
adaptation made by one unit may not be applicable to other units because of differing variables in other localized 
environments.  As one soldier noted, “sometimes, the lessons we learned in Iraq were not applicable even when we 
  This decentralized change occurs by 
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necessity, because the larger institution cannot adjust rapidly enough to have a timely effect on 
sub-organization performance and goal realization, and because “centralized control of change 
requires time for study, dissemination, and implementation of new ideas.”389  Intimacy with the 
environment, basic survival instincts, and direct responsibility for achieving organizational goals 
all influence the pace at which the unit in contact adapts.  Because these organizations are 
smaller sub-parts of the larger institutional Army and are charged with implementing 
organizational missions, they are required and tend to be readily capable of making quick 
adjustments to their immediate inputs and outputs.  This typically occurs without significant 
changes to resourcing patterns and in spite of potential organizational interference with the 
adaptive process.390
                                                                                                                                                             
returned to the same AOR after a period of time.  And, sometimes, the lessons we learned were not applicable across 
geography.  The situation is too fluid to apply lessons across the board.” 
  For its part, the larger institution has its greatest proactive effect on tactical 
organizations prior to deployment via organizational design, training, education, and by the 
establishment of rules and norms governing behavior.  Conversely, the institution tends to be 
reactive when tactical level organizations are deployed in an operational environment.  If and 
when the institution does modify its behavior, it does so based on cues received from units in 
contact with the environment and the enemy.  The more separated from the ideal that the 
organization is, the longer the lag time between recognition of these cues and the implementation 
of corrective changes to organizational design and procedures. 
389 Doubler, Michael D., Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe: 1944-1945, 
University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS, 1994, p. 280. 
390 Organizational interference can have a negative effect on how subordinate units adapt if the larger 
organization, either deliberately or unintentionally, impedes adaptation through the imposition of rules, procedures, 
etc., that limit adaptation. 
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Since adaptation occurs most rapidly in smaller units that are in contact with the 
environment and the enemy, the reverse must also be true: the further removed a unit or 
organizational sub-level is away from the environment and the enemy, the slower the pace of its 
adaptation.  Because the U.S. Army is a large, hierarchical organization, it has many 
organizational levels that are only tangentially connected to the operational environment and the 
enemy, if they are connected at all.  Thus, large portions of the institution are either not 
compelled to adapt or have little internal impetus for doing so.  This can have an effect on 
organizational design and resourcing and the institution’s perception of how appropriate or 
inappropriate an organizational form is for achieving its goals and missions.  This disconnect can 
prove disastrous if the institution (as a whole or through its leadership) is incapable or unwilling 
to modify itself for the achievement of organizational goals and missions. 
Combat or the employment of the U.S. Army in an operation is one telling way to test the 
appropriateness of organizational design for the achievement of organizational goals and 
missions.  Experiential data is derived from testing the organization in an operational 
environment and can be used to guide and implement broad organizational changes.  Through 
the employment of tactical units in a particular environment and against a particular adversary 
for the achievement of organizational goals and missions, the institution can discover how 
separated its design is from the ideal organizational form.  In this sense, the tactical organization, 
if in contact either in combat or in other operations, can and often times does drive 
organizational change.  This is precisely what happened as the U.S. Army struggled with 
adapting its combat-oriented force to manifold OOTW and against a variety of threats during 
OIF.  But, ironically, the pace of adaptation of the U.S. Army in OIF was significantly retarded 
by its initial organizational design and by the changes wrought by the Transformation program.  
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Any organizational change had to be driven by tactical learning and adaptation: the U.S. Army as 
an institution was too far detached from the realities and necessities of full spectrum operations.  
Tactical unit adaptation was the result of a reactive sequence among tactical units, the 
environment, and the enemy and reflected the degree of organizational separation from the ideal 
type. 
Tactical unit adaptations are instructive for the force in general when the force is 
employed in a foreign, unanticipated environment.  The further removed from the ideal 
organizational form, the more likely that successful small unit tactical adaptations will drive 
centralized and decentralized organizational adaptation.  Nagl and Yingling describe how this 
reactive process transpired in Iraq:  “not surprisingly, our adaptation to COIN began at the lowest 
echelons of the Army and is working its way to the top.  As early mid- to late 2003, individuals 
and small units deploying to Iraq recognized the need to prepare for COIN.  Battalion and 
company commanders designed training exercises to replicate conditions their soldiers would 
face in Iraq.  These small-unit adaptations were soon incorporated into brigade-level mission-
rehearsal exercises and combat training center rotations.  Somewhat belatedly, institutional 
training within the Army began to shift the focus away from MCO [Major Combat Operations] 
toward COIN.  By 2006, most branches redesigned their officer and noncommissioned officer 
training courses to include more COIN scenarios.  The COIN academies in Taji, Iraq, and Fort 
Leavenworth, Kan., now transmit lessons learned to units deploying to Iraq.  Information 
technology has enabled units in battle to pass on lessons learned to units preparing for 
deployment.  These informal and formal feedback mechanisms have ensured that pre-
deployment training is tough and realistic.”391
                                                 
391 Nagl, John A. and Paul L. Yingling, Op Cit. 
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This progression is not atypical.  Michael Doubler argues that this process occurred in 
WWII as the combined arms team “had to overcome problems in its own training, equipment, 
and organization.  Flawed prewar doctrine for the employment of certain combat formations and 
weapon systems was identified and corrected.  The American Army proved unusually adroit in 
modifying its composition and practices with new tactical techniques, technological innovations, 
and organizational changes.  Only by adapting under combat conditions was the Army able to 
overcome the enemy.”392
The U.S. Army’s combat-focused design overwhelmingly (and negatively) influenced the 
amount of adaptation required during OIF.  The process of adaptation began in May 2003 when 
OIF “became a ‘full spectrum’ campaign requiring the simultaneous use of lethal and non-lethal 
measures in an attempt to achieve US national objectives.”
 
393  At this point, “the US Army found 
itself in a conflict for which it was less than well prepared.”394
                                                 
392 Doubler, Michael D., Op Cit, p. 3. 
  In fact, the only significant 
preparation and institutional familiarity the U.S. Army had for and with the conduct of full 
spectrum operations was the experiential skills and knowledge gleaned from previous (but less 
complex) OOTW in the preceding decade.  Wright and Reese argue that “the Army’s 
experiences in Somalia and Haiti, and its ongoing rotations in Bosnia and Kosovo, created a core 
group of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)…with experience in conducting various 
types of stability and support operations.  Indeed, by the end of 2002, tens of thousands of 
American Soldiers had participated in either SFOR or KFOR.  This fact is important to the 
393 Wright and Reese, Op Cit, p. 49. 
394 Wright and Reese, Ibid. 
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understanding of the US Army’s approach to operations in Iraq after May 2003.”395
 
  Units in 
Iraq reacted initially by trying to apply experiential knowledge gained from the prosecution of 
MOOTW to the environment and enemy encountered in Iraq but did so with only modest 
returns: 
“To be fair, we went in with the wrong model.  We went in thinking Bosnia and 
Kosovo.  SFOR and KFOR do not work in an environment where you have been 
the one that has upset the entire balance of power in the country.”396
 
 
But even if the U.S. Army had been well disposed to conducting complex full spectrum 
operations the challenges that it faced in OIF would have been daunting:  OIF was not merely a 
sequenced full spectrum operation; it was simultaneously full spectrum and thus required a 
fusing of full spectrum capabilities that did not exist in either the regular or reserve forces.397
The difficulty posed by a fairly rapid transition from combat operations into simultaneous 
full spectrum operations was exacerbated by an institutional and government-wide 
 
                                                 
395 Wright and Reese, Op Cit., p. 64. 
396 Soldier deployed on initial invasion (September 2002-August 2003) and Baghdad (January 2005-
January 2006), Personal Interview, 8 October 2008. 
397 Geren and Casey argue that the reserve components of the U.S. Army “have found themselves assigned 
missions for which they were not originally intended nor adequately resourced.”  Although the reserve components 
of the U.S. Army do maintain many of the skills necessary for the conduct of full spectrum operations, these units, 
like their active counterparts, were by no means designed or prepared for type of operations needed in Iraq.  See 
Geren, Pete and George W. Casey, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2008, Submission to the 
U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, 26 February 2008, p. 6. 
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unpreparedness for most of the events that followed. “As April 2003 began, no one at 
CENTCOM [Central Command] or CFLCC [Combined Land Forces Component Command] had 
any concrete understanding of how and to which headquarters the campaign would be 
transitioned.  Staff officers at CENTCOM had attempted to clarify the issue and were reportedly 
assured that other elements of the US Government would handle the larger issues involved in 
planning of and executing PH IV [Phase Four] operations.”398  Aggravating this situation was the 
U.S. Army’s unpreparedness for recognizing and combating an insurgency.  “Not only did the 
United States fail to prepare for an insurgency, it took several months to even recognize that an 
insurgency actually was occurring, and even longer to admit it to the American public.  While 
soldiers on the ground had a more realistic understanding of what was developing, the 
administration dismissed the escalating violence as the work of regime diehards who soon would 
be defeated.”399  The effect of this unpreparedness was staggering: “the United States did not 
have a coherent COIN strategy in Iraq for more than three years.” 400
In a sense, the length of time required by the U.S. Army, as an institution, to understand 
and accept the quandary that it faced in Iraq is a temporal measurement of how separated the 
organization was from the ideal form.  It took the tactical units in contact with the environment 
and the enemy in Iraq three years to make a sufficient amount of correct adaptations to influence 
the development of an appropriate strategy to resource and reinforce this effort.  Not until late-
2005/early-2006 were tactical units suitably resourced for pairing tactical-level activity with the 
 
                                                 
398 Wright and Reese, Op Cit., p. 76. 
399 Mockaitis, Thomas R., Op. Cit, pp. 25-26. 
400 RAND, Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons from Iraq (2003-2006), Santa Monica, CA, 
2008, p. 1. 
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accomplishment of national objectives.  “In many cases combat units at the brigade level and 
below did a tremendous job, usually with outstanding support from Civil Affairs units, applying 
military resources to combat the insurgency and to improve infrastructure, restore services, and 
develop a capacity for civil society within their local areas of operation.  These actions were 
often a result of initiative and ingenuity by junior officers and noncommissioned officers rather 
than the application of doctrine or the receipt of useful guidance from higher echelons.”401
The reactive sequence in Iraq was compelled as much by the U.S. Army’s 
unpreparedness for full spectrum operations as it was by the enemy faced in OIF.  As Scales 
argues, “war against such an enemy has devolved primarily into a series of tactical engagements 
fought principally at squad and platoon levels.  As a result, joint warfare and other elements of 
military power are increasingly being applied at lower and lower levels, to the extent that combat 
leaders of much lower rank and experience are performing the functions formerly considered the 
purview of senior commanders.”
  
Adaptation in OIF was truly a tactical endeavor. 
402
Adaptation in OIF also occurred in spite of an institutionalized distaste for COIN 
operations.  In 2006, David Kilcullen recommended a simple way to adapt to this aversion:  
“what if higher headquarters doesn’t ‘get’ counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling you 
the mission is to ‘kill terrorists,’ or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base-camp 
mentality.  They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency.  This is not uncommon, since 
company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers.  In this 
 
                                                 
401 Schnaubelt, Christopher M., “After the Fight: Interagency Operations,” Parameters, Winter 2005-06, p. 
50. 
402 Scales, Robert H., “The Second Learning Revolution,” Military Review, January-February 2006, p. 37. 
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case, just do what you can.”403
 This chapter will examine the input and output components that comprise the U.S. 
Army’s adaptive process and will outline modifications made throughout the course of 
operations in OIF.  Factors inhibiting and enabling organizational adaptation will be highlighted 
and used to demonstrate how tactical-level organizational adaptation drove institutional change 
in a cyclical pattern. 
  Tactical level leaders ‘doing what they could’ led to the types of 
adaptations that changed how the institutional Army perceived the nature of the conflict in Iraq 
and how it resourced the force to better achieve organizational goals and missions as the 
operation progressed. 
6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
6.1.1 Goals and rewards 
The reward system that an organization uses is tied to the effective prosecution and 
achievement of organizational goals.  For the U.S. Army, the principal institutional goal is to 
“fight and win our nation’s wars.”  To fight and win our nation’s wars, the U.S. Army is 
organized around combat units led by members of the combat arms branches.404
                                                 
403 Kilcullen, David, Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency, March 
2006, 
  As a result of 
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com, accessed on 19 August 2008, p. 10. 
404 These branches are represented by Infantry, Armor, and the Field Artillery. 
 193 
this structuring, the evaluation and promotion system of these organizations favors and rewards 
individuals in the combat arms.405
Maintaining a combat oriented force ensures that, culturally, the predilections of the 
combat arms branches are reflected by individual membership on promotion boards and in these 
members’ selections for key leadership positions; organizationally, there is a preponderance of 
positions open to promotion by members of the combat arms branches.  Because of the U.S. 
Army’s built-in bias favoring the combat arms branches and a warrior culture that has 
historically incentivized success in combat related actions, the institution, at the highest levels, 
struggles with evaluating soldiers and officers that have demonstrated success in the types of 
operations of importance in Iraq.  Secretary of Defense Gates argues that, “one of the enduring 
issues the military struggles with is whether personnel and promotions systems designed to 
reward the command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance of advising, 
training, and equipping foreign troops—something still not considered a career-enhancing path 
for the best and brightest officers.”
 
406
One of the methods used to evaluate personnel is the Officer Evaluation Report (OER).  
The current OER (effective March 2006) is a simplified version of the previous OER (effective 
November 1979).  The OER is a relatively straight forward assessment tool that evaluates 
officers based on a set of categories that can be easily quantified and are directly related to the 
structure and purpose of the organization.  This evaluation system allows for more uniform 
assessments but minimizes opportunities for evaluating officers on attributes not directly covered 
 
                                                 
405 Many personnel policies designed during the Cold War are less relevant and effective today.  Williams, 
Cindy and Curtis Gilroy, Op Cit. 
406 Gates, Robert M., Op Cit. 
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in the format.  Since success in combat is still the primary goal and obligation of the U.S. Army, 
the metrics employed in the OER, despite their ostensible generality, are shaded by a preference 
for the achievement of success in combat-related tasks and proficiencies.  Paradoxically, the 
current OER format replaced a previous version that is arguably a better assessment tool for the 
qualities requisite to the U.S. Army’s current conflicts.407
The structure of the U.S. Army also affects how particular organizational goals are 
constructed and perceived.  Tasks that would normally be considered non-combat tend to be 
shunned, ignored, or modified in such a way as to make them more or less combat-oriented. The 
options pursued for the completion of a particular goal or mission tend to be abstractions of 
combat related tasks (usually involving force) that might not be the most appropriate for the 
mission at hand.  This occurs because the options available to a soldier or leader in a complex, 
non-linear environment are truncated by a goals and rewards system that favors combat over all 
 
                                                 
407 DA Form 67-9 (OER March 2006) evaluates officers on the following characteristics: Attributes 
(Mental, Physical, Emotional); Skills (Conceptual, Interpersonal, Technical, Tactical); Influencing (Communicating, 
Decision-Making, Motivating); Operating (Planning, Executing, Assessing); Improving (Developing, Building, 
Learning).  DA Form 67-8 (OER November 1979) evaluated officers differently: Possesses Capacity to Acquire 
Knowledge/Grasp Concepts; Demonstrates Appropriate Knowledge and Expertise in Associated Tasks; Maintains 
Appropriate Level of Physical Fitness; Motivates, Challenges and Develops Subordinates; Performs under Physical 
and Mental Stress; Encourages Candor and Frankness in Subordinates; Clear and Concise in Written 
Communications; Displays Sound Judgment; Seeks Self Improvement; is Adaptive to Changing Situations; Sets and 
Enforces High Standards; Possesses Military Bearing and Appearance; Supports EO/EEO; Clear and Concise in 
Oral Communications.  Of particular importance in the old OER is the emphasis on encouraging communication in 
subordinates and adaptability; both of these characteristics are critical in complex insurgency environments where 
rapid learning must take place and subordinates bear a disproportionate responsibility for decision-making. 
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other tasks.  If no set of alternative tasks exists and if the reward system is predicated on 
proficiency in combat then rapid and corrective adaptations are less likely to occur.  Making the 
appropriate changes would require not only that the decision-maker perceive the environment 
differently and reject the institutionalized reward system but also that decision-makers advocate 
the inappropriateness of trained tasks and methods to the current problem set.  As one soldier 
deployed to Mosul, Iraq between 2004 and 2005 argued: 
  
 “You have to be willing to accept when things don’t work.  That is a tough 
adaptation to make.  That is not a technical adaptation but a mental adaptation 
that you have to make.  That is difficult for your first couple of months.  The 
majority of our brigade had never deployed.  For them, after 15 years of being 
told that this is how the Army does things, two months later, you have to drop that 
and say, ‘this doesn’t work; what will?’  That was the biggest thing we had to 
overcome.  We had a lot of very stubborn legacy commanders under our brigade.  
It was difficult to tell them that you don’t have to bulldoze a house and that it 
might work if you knock on the door first.  They might be more willing to give you 
information if you just ask as opposed to bulldozing their house down.”408
 
 
The net result of the U.S. Army’s goals and rewards system is that it: is still biased in favor of 
success in combat; compensates the demonstration of combat related skills in the promotion 
                                                 
408 Soldier deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
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system; rewards institutional efficiency at the expense of individual accomplishment409
6.1.2 Information 
 and; 
constrains cognition and motivation in the search for alternative methods of mission 
accomplishment.  The effect of this system is not consuming but it has had and will continue to 
have an effect on individual and organizational capacities for adaptation. 
Because the U.S. Army is a bureaucratic, centrally-controlled, hierarchical system, information 
tends to be pushed from the core to peripheral units rather than pulled on an as-needed basis.  
Information is pulled from tactical units up through higher commands, is centralized, analyzed, 
processed, and then pushed back to lower commands.  Any formal requests for information are 
pulled through this centralized system in what can be a time consuming process, particularly in 
complex environments where many forms of valuable information are difficult to obtain.410
                                                 
409 As Scales argues, “Military learning must shift from an institutional to a Soldier-based system that 
rewards individual performance rather than institutional efficiency.”  See Scales, Robert H., “The Second Learning 
Revolution,” Op Cit, p. 38. 
  This 
centralized system works well when facing a uniformed enemy on a linear battlefield: 
perceptions and operations are better controlled and coordinated.  But on a non-linear battlefield 
(or some derivative thereof) saturated with manifold threat organizations, a centralized and 
hierarchical system is simply too cumbersome to deal with the speed of processing required by 
410 The bulk of higher-order intelligence work as well as information analysis occurs in echelons above 
tactical units.  The smaller the unit or the lower the echelon, the less likely that it has a significant capacity for 
information gathering, comparison, analysis, and distribution. 
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dispersed and atomized operations.411
Much of the burden of managing information in Iraq, particularly non-combat related 
information, falls to the relatively few trained, and many untrained, practitioners of Information 
Operations (IO).  Doctrinally, IO is conducted in support of combat operations: “commanders 
conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) information operations (IO) to apply the information 
element of combat power.  Combined with information management and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, effective IO results in gaining and maintaining 
information superiority.  Information superiority creates conditions that allow commanders to 
shape the operational environment and enhance the effects of all elements of combat power.”
  The amount of information available (because of an 
enhanced communications and data sharing network) in a complex environment and the type of 
information collected (and required), much of it not ‘combat’ in nature, is staggering.   
412
Wright and Reese describe the situation in Iraq in 2003: “when the Coalition invaded Iraq 
in March 2003, US Army units at battalion and brigade level did not have dedicated IO assets in 
their organizations.  As CJTF-7 transitioned to full spectrum operations in the summer of 2003, 
tactical units dearly missed this capability.  However, Soldiers quickly adapted and improvised 
  
But in Iraq IO, at times, became somewhat of a main effort in combating the insurgency.  This 
significantly altered how the U.S. Army planned and conducted IO. 
                                                 
411 Historically, the U.S. Army has maintained fairly tight control over the sharing of information so as to 
ensure that the information that was shared was accurate and fit into formats easily understood by all units 
regardless of composition.  For instance, simple acronyms are used for reporting battlefield information: SALUTE 
(Size, Activity, Location, Uniform, Time, Equipment); SALT (Size, Activity, Location, Time) and; LACE (Liquids, 
Ammunition, Casualties, Equipment) are common formats. 
412 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-13 Information Operations: Doctrine, 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, November 2003, p. 1. 
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solutions to this problem.  During that summer many units tasked the IO mission to the field 
artillery (FA) Soldiers on their staffs.  After major combat operations ended in April 2003, the 
primary FA mission to provide indirect fire support to ground maneuver units for the most part 
disappeared.”413  IO also became an additional duty for other staff elements not necessarily 
trained in this competency. “In most tactical units, PSYOP [Psychological Operations] units 
provided the only dedicated means of conducting the operations planned by the IO and effects 
cells at the brigade and division level.”414
The IO planning process tends to be deliberate and protracted.  Transferring critical, 
sensitive information and coordinating themes and messages across the theater with guidelines 
imposed by the Pentagon (and other national-level agencies) is a laborious endeavor requiring 
permissions from various higher command authorities.
  In Iraq, IO was being conducted by many untrained 
personnel and with doctrine that treated the discipline almost distinctly as a combat support 
effort.  The speed at which tactical units reacted to the environment and planned and conducted 
IO was uncharacteristic for an endeavor that is typically planned and coordinated at the highest 
levels in the military. 
415
                                                 
413 Wright and Reese, Op Cit., p. 282.  Also, “Fire support officer and staffs also changed missions.  Many 
were tasked by their commanders to lead the IO planning for their units.  IO at the lower tactical level required the 
integration of existing EW [Electronic Warfare], deception, PSYOP, PA [Public Affairs] and civil-military staff 
sections into a comprehensive whole.” 
  But in Iraq the pace of operations 
414 Wright and Reese, Op Cit., p. 284. 
415 Chiarelli and Smith argue that “unfortunately, many of our most important capabilities are implemented 
at bureaucratic speed, not at the speed required by those at user level.  We have the technology to share information 
much faster, but our legacy stovepiped approval processes can slow down the transfer of that information.”   
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required decentralization in the development of IO products.  During OIF, the overall IO 
campaign was still centrally controlled and managed but the rules regarding local IO efforts were 
relaxed.  Speed in tailoring efforts and messages to particular populations were given primacy.  
“In the summer of 2003, IO initiatives often emerged among those Soldiers that were closest to 
the Iraqi population.”416  Additionally, “speed in the production of IO was the most important 
lesson learned” and this usually occurred by spreading the message by word of mouth.417
Decentralizing the IO effort can come at a cost.  Few staff officers and certainly far fewer 
soldiers have any direct training in planning and conducting IO, particularly in a complex 
environment where the information environment rapidly changes.  But in these environments, the 
common soldier is an absolutely indispensible tool for shaping the information environment.  
“Joe is and always has been the best weapon and worst liability of the IO effort.  He has the face-
to-face access on a daily basis that more senior personnel do not have, and it is his actions, not 
the IO planner’s, that determine the local attitude toward Coalition Forces.”
 
418
One of the biggest hurdles in decentralizing the IO effort is the enormous costs posed by 
having uncoordinated and conflicting messages being sent to overlapping populations in a 
diverse environment.  For instance, a message that might be appropriate for a Kurdish audience 
in Kirkuk might be wholly inappropriate for a Sunni audience in Fallujah.  The appropriate 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chiarelli, Peter W. and Stephen M. Smith, “Learning from Our Modern Wars: the Imperatives of Preparing for a 
Dangerous Future,” Military Review, September-October 2007, p. 7. 
416 Wright and Reese Op Cit., p. 284. 
417 Ibid, 285. 
418 Paschall, Joseph F., “IO for Joe: Applying Strategic IO at the Tactical Level,” Field Artillery, July-
August 2005, p. 28.  “Joe” is a slang colloquialism for a U.S. Army soldier. 
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balance must be struck between central coordination (and a slower pace of production) and speed 
and tailoring of the effort (and any possible conflict resulting therein). 
Another problem with collecting and managing information in a complex environment 
like that found in Iraq is that the training and equipment provided to soldiers and officers has 
been tailored for combat speed, efficiency, and effectiveness and not necessarily for other 
operations.  This poses four interrelated problems that affect the adaptability of the organization: 
1) soldiers and officers might not be aware of what information is relevant; 2) the equipment and 
processes necessary for collecting and assessing this information might not exist; 3) soldiers and 
staffs might become overwhelmed with information (much of which might be irrelevant) and; 4) 
commanders might have the opportunity to become decisively involved in operations echelons 
below that for which they are directly responsible.  The fourth problem is perhaps the most 
pernicious to decentralized operations: “the military will have to deal with the seismic cultural 
shift that would result from ubiquitous connectivity and data.  During the Afghanistan war, a 
group of top-level commanders was able to watch a UAV lock in on a target via streaming video.  
Sitting inside the Pentagon, the brass gave the order to fire the missile that destroyed the target 
on the other side of the globe.  This capability has a dark side, however.  ‘It’s easier for the 
command to micromanage.’”419
The ubiquity of information and the need for decentralization in a complex environment 
poses challenges to commanders and decision makers not unlike those that IO practitioners face.  
But “allowing organizational members to follow their experience in making decisions rather than 
following standard operating procedures produces better performance in general and during 
 
                                                 
419 Business Week, “The Network is the Battlefield,” 7 January 2003. 
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crisis.”420  This defies the natural tendencies of a hierarchical and centrally controlled 
organization, particularly one dominated by leaders that are versed in the requirements and 
exigencies of combat operations, a belief in the unity of command, a reliance on near-certainty 
(that is supposed to be delivered by an omnipotent intelligence apparatus), and a concomitant 
fear of risk taking.  McMaster asserts that “the belief in near-certainty also undermines military 
culture, especially in connection with the expectations of junior leaders.  If leaders are not 
conditioned to cope with uncertainty, they are likely to experience paralysis and wait for orders 
when they confront chaotic circumstances.  While much of the transformation literature stresses 
adaptability and initiative, the force’s inability to overmatch the enemy in a close fight, a bias 
toward deductive reasoning, and the belief in dominant knowledge discourage risk taking.  
Leaders will be predisposed to wait for information rather than take resolute action…ironically, a 
force that was designed to be fast and agile will operate ponderously.”421
 But something that does not exist in a complex environment is certainty.  If certainty did 
exist, ipso facto, the environment would likely not be considered complex.  Managing 
uncertainty becomes a daily if not hourly endeavor when raw information is transmitted to 
leaders forcing them to make on the spot (many times unaided by staff analysis) decisions 
regarding unpredictable and unforeseen events.  Information might be curt and spurious and as a 
result, the conduct of operations extemporaneous: 
 
 
                                                 
420 Lin, Zhiang and Kathleen M. Carley, “Organizational Design and Adaptation in Response to Crises: 
Theory and Practice,” CASOS, 3 July 2002, p. 29. 
421 McMaster, H.R., Crack in the Foundation: Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of 
Dominant Knowledge in Future War, Op Cit, p. 90. 
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“I remember when I first heard the term IED.  Somebody drove over a garbage 
bag that blew up.  The response was that we were told not to drive over garbage 
bags anymore. That was how we received information from then on out.”422
 
  
An unpredictable environment puts the onus on junior leaders to become senior decision makers.  
The information available might be as simple as the transmission of a message telling soldiers to 
avoid driving over debris on the roadway or as complex as multiple overhead pictures of a riot in 
progress.  In either circumstance, the leader is forced to make decisions in an uncertain 
environment and to make significant (sometimes uninformed) choices regarding how to treat 
unprocessed data. 
But opportunities exist for using the vast communications architecture available to the 
U.S. Army for exploiting the information environment, reducing uncertainty, and resourcing 
junior leaders with dynamic information sharing while not increasing the size of (and 
interference precipitated by) the coordinating staff in theater.  For example, various 
geographically dispersed assets can be massed via secure communications networks: 
 
“I think that we are getting to the stage where someone else can do the analysis 
that is not located in the headquarters.  They tried that at [Fort] Lewis for awhile.  
The Stryker unit in theater was sending stuff back to Lewis and they were trying to 
leverage the headquarters at Lewis as if they were living with them and trying to 
come up with products when what they were really doing was preparing the next 
                                                 
422 Soldier deployed on initial invasion then to Falluja (March 2003-July 2003), Personal Interview, 20 June 
2008. 
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Stryker unit to deploy by being fully engaged in what they were doing.  So, we 
could start exploiting those networks without overloading them with information.  
That is the art of it.”423
 
 
A similar method was also employed in 2008 in a Sadr City operation where the brigade in 
contact was resourced by national-level assets: 
  
 “When in the last couple of months we had this Sadr City fight, in fact, that is 
what we did to the brigade that was there in Sadr City.  They were having direct 
linkages from national assets that were going straight down to the brigade.  We 
didn’t push all these analysts and big staff down to the brigade but we did push 
the products of those analysts down…so that they could use them…the brigade 
sort of had tasking ability back to the national assets to focus on this and focus on 
that.  That may be the way to get the best of both worlds.”424
 
 
Enhanced and varied communications systems also allow for the pulling of information on an as-
needed basis.  In a time constrained and rapidly developing environment, the ability to retrieve 
information from sources across the theater is invaluable: 
 
“We developed informal information sharing through MIRC-Chat [Multi-User 
Internet Relay Chat].  It is SIPRnet [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network] 
                                                 
423 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wong, Leonard, Personal Interview, 6 November 2008. 
424 Major General Perkins, David, Telephone Interview, 21 September 2008. 
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based but it is a chat room.  People’s call signs were similar to their unit call 
signs.  I would find people from old units that I was in that were serving in Iraq 
and it turns into an exchange of information about what the enemy has been doing 
in different areas.  Some of this was formalized in the INTSUM [Intelligence 
Summary].  But the INTSUM was a push.  This was a pull; people talking and 
exchanging information.”425
 
 
Additionally, maintaining a robust dual-use communications capability allows for establishing 
secure and anonymous information gathering systems critical to environments where 
confidentiality is a priority: 
 
“It was normal for our sources to email us tips or respond to questions and do it 
on the cell phone.  Technology has certainly helped the counterinsurgent.”426
 
 
 The risk to the U.S. Army (as a large organization) throughout OIF has been that 
generally, when an organization encounters an environment for which it is unprepared, it is likely 
to apply modified standard operating procedures (SOP) to problems regardless of their 
applicability.  A lack of information (or information superiority) and a preponderance of 
conflicting environmental stimuli might lead to a counterproductive situation where the U.S. 
                                                 
425 Soldier deployed to Mosul (November 2004-2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
426 Lieutenant Colonel Crider, James, E-mail Interview, 22 September 2008. 
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Army is forced to supplement operations with firepower.427  But in complex environments the 
U.S. Army will not necessarily have to fight for information in the traditional sense and might be 
able to use its vast resources to distribute information through both a push and pull system 
facilitated by advanced communications and an active information gathering and processing 
network, if the organization is willing to relax traditional controls.428  Of course, the 
responsibility for processing and acting on this information will be driven to lower and lower 
echelons because of the nature of operations and availability of information in complex 
environments.  As Gersten argues, “the Information Age will be vastly different, and therefore 
the demands on the leader will also change.  Rather than having to fight for data and information 
as in the Industrial Age, in the Information Age, the data available will be overwhelming.  The 
key will be to turn raw data and information into knowledge that can be acted upon to achieve 
stated goals and objectives, while denying this same access to adversaries.  Data will flow 
anywhere and everywhere.  The speed of the processor will have only marginal meaning as the 
hardware speeds will overmatch the human dimension.”429
Suffocating volumes of sometimes inappropriate (i.e., combat-oriented) data can render 
the human processor (trained for combat) less effective in an alternative environment.  
Experience, particularly when training is single-mission focused, is required for determining 
 
                                                 
427 Libicki, Martin C. et al, Byting Back: Regaining Information Superiority against 21st Century 
Insurgents, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. 4. 
428 Given the prevalence of communicative means, soldiers have found ways to bypass normal 
organizational channels for sharing information.  Examples include the use of white board chatting, websites 
dedicated to spreading knowledge (like companycommander.com), and other inter-netted tools. 
429 Gerstein, Daniel M., Leading at the Speed of Light: New Strategies for U.S. Security in the Information 
Age, Potomac Books, Washington DC, 2006, p. 47. 
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which data is relevant and which data can be ignored.  Experience in the complex environment 
of OIF, adaptations based upon this experience, and the relative empowerment of subordinate 
leaders enabled the human dimension of the information environment from becoming completely 
overmatched by technological capabilities and ubiquitous data flows. 
6.1.3 Training 
The training that soldiers and U.S. Army units received prior to the commencement and in the 
early stages of OIF was insufficient for successfully completing the operation’s strategic 
objectives.430
                                                 
430 For instance, “The immediate responsibility for administering post-war Iraq will fall upon the 
Commander of the U.S. Central Command, as the commander of the U.S. and coalition forces in the field.  The 
purpose of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is to develop the detailed plans that he and his 
subordinates will draw on in meeting these responsibilities.”  Feith, Douglas J., “The Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),” Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 11 February 2003. 
  Because OIF morphed into an unpredicted (and unprecedented) simultaneous full 
spectrum operation, no existing template sufficiently outlined how to resource and prepare for 
this type of fight.  To make matters worse, even if units were allotted time to conduct training for 
full spectrum operations, they were limited in their approaches to training by doctrine, 
regulations, and an institutional preference (particularly within the senior ranks of the U.S. 
Army) for conventional warfare and the industrial practices adapted to and supporting of this 
type of warfare.  As Vandergriff argues, the mobilization paradigm developed during the Cold 
War had a lasting and comprehensive effect on how units and leaders were trained for 
operations:  “to support the mobilization doctrine, the Army developed leadership training 
methods that paralleled management training practices in the corporate structures of the 
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Industrial Age.  The challenge for the Army was to get millions of citizens with little or no 
military experience and turn them into soldiers and officers in a short time.  Industry provided 
the answers, and in the aftermath of the glow of victory in several wars, these approaches 
became institutionalized.  Some modifications were applied to leader development, but they 
happened along the fringes of existing laws, regulations, policies and beliefs.”431
The gaps between the doctrine and training and the exigencies of simultaneous full 
spectrum operations began to narrow only after years of trial and error in the field with 
spasmodic episodes of legacy and adaptive thinking intermixed therein.  The range of adaptive 
responses was expansive and largely depended on how wedded a commander was to trying to 
adapt the situation to training vice adapting training to the situation.  Austin Long characterizes 
different commanders’ responses: “the U.S. military’s actual conduct of COIN in Iraq from 2003 
to 2005 can charitably be described as highly variable.  The military used an array of approaches 
ranging from firepower-intensive raids to population security.  This variation seems to have 
depended partly on understandable differences, such as the region and time period, but mostly 
appears to be due to different commanders.  Some commanders heavily emphasized the security 
and development approach called for by doctrine.  Others ‘increased kinetic activity,’ a 
euphemism for employing firepower and raids.”
 
432
                                                 
431 Vandergriff, Donald E., Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing 
Face of War, Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 11. 
  Chiarelli and Smith contend that subordinate 
leaders were obstructed by more senior commanders in their pursuit of training scenarios that 
would better prepare soldiers for the realities of operations in Iraq:  “in some units, commanders 
432 Long, Austin, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 
1960-1970 and 2003-2006, Op Cit, p. 22. 
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refused to face the realities of the post-cold-war period and continued training regimes adopted 
during the height of the Soviet threat.  Training in these units was kinetic, and those who tried to 
insert non-kinetic events into the training plan were thwarted by commanders who feared 
‘mission creep’ into roles they didn’t think belonged to the military.”433
 
  The variety of reactions 
to the shift from combat to simultaneous full spectrum operations in Iraq is indicative of the U.S. 
Army’s unpreparedness for manifold OOTW: 
“Our change of mission was not preplanned.  We had no preparatory training for 
the security mission.  We had to invent all of that stuff as we moved along.  We 
learned it from day to day.”434
 
 
 “It was pretty quiet in Falluja when we were there.  The civilians were quiet and 
pretty good.  They would trade with us.  We respected them and they respected us.  
The unit that replaced us did not understand this.  They were interested in kicking 
in doors.  Next thing you know, their vehicles started blowing up.”435
 
 
“When we were preparing to go, the thinking was that it was going to be another 
Desert Storm, another 100 hour war, that we were going to go over and we were 
                                                 
433 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Stephen M. Smith, “Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of 
Preparing for a Dangerous Future,” Op Cit, p. 12. 
434 Soldier deployed on initial invasion and to Falluja (March 2003-July 2003), Personal Interview, 20 June 
2008. 
435 Ibid. 
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going to be coming home on boats in 4 months.  We did not have any concept that 
we were going to be there for a year.  We thought that, ok, 4 months and it is 
over…We are going to go in there, blow shit up, and then go home.”436
 
 
Various interwoven factors affected whether or not a unit adapted to simultaneous full 
spectrum operations through training initiatives.  Institutionally, the U.S. Army’s system of home 
station unit training and MREs conducted at various training centers continued with standard (i.e. 
mostly conventional) individual and unit training well into OIF.  This compounded the training 
challenge that the U.S. Army faced by focusing units on tasks for which they already were well 
prepared but were irrelevant for conditions in Iraq.437  Standardized conventional training was as 
inadequate for operations in Iraq in mid-2003 (when the insurgent threat began to rise) as it was 
in early 2004 (as the insurgency evolved)438 and in 2005 (when the insurgency was in full 
effect)439
                                                 
436 Soldier deployed to Baghdad (early 2003, 2006-2007), Personal Interview, 18 September 2008. 
. 
437 Krepinevich, Andrew, The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare, Op Cit. 
438 “The OPFOR [Opposing Force] at national training centers did not prepare the unit for the threat array 
in theater.”  Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry), Op Cit, p. 75. 
439 “The brigade CTC [Combat Training Center] rotation featured a one dimensional OPFOR.  The Signal 
Intelligence (SIGINT) environment was based on a legacy threat with primarily FM communications and tactical 
control traffic.  During training Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) operations focused on clearing 
buildings and conducting cordon and search operations, but did not replicate the long periods where a lull in activity 
and no actionable intelligence existed, despite the conduct of numerous presence patrols or cordon and knock 
 210 
The array of non-standard operations necessitated by OIF forced units to work with a 
range of actors that they would typically rarely if ever train with, especially not to the level 
required by a true full spectrum capability.  Even brigades (such as the Stryker brigade) with the 
organic staff assets necessary for integrating these specialized units and agencies had difficulty 
incorporating exogenous supporting elements into their training activities.  “Units are not given 
the sufficient opportunity to adequately train with non-organic assets such as Civil Affairs (CA) 
or Psychological Operation (PSYOP) teams.”440
Problems with matching training and execution extended well beyond the capacities of 
the U.S. Army.  Many of the inter-agency and coalitional associations and working relationships 
that were developed in Iraq were rarely if ever trained on by units prior to deployment.  One 
recommendation suggested that training should better reflect the necessities of an integrated 
mission set: “home stations and pre-deployment training installations should support rather than 
control pre-deployment training and warfighting strategies.  Training scenarios should include 
working closely with Other Coalition Forces-Iraq (OCF-I) and operational detachment-alpha 
(ODA) elements as well as other joint units or governmental organizations within the brigade’s 
  These disparate units not only had to adapt to 
full spectrum operations in Iraq against an unconventional foe but also had to adapt to working 
with each other. 
                                                                                                                                                             
operations.”  Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. xiii. 
440 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry), Op Cit. 
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battle space, sharing intelligence and situational awareness.”441
A dearth of appropriate doctrine and an inability to keep pace with changes in Iraq 
hamstrung home station training efforts and those of the training centers resulting in a noticeable 
deficit in preparation for units deploying in the later phases of OIF: 
  The range of training 
requirements and lessons emerging from operations in Iraq overwhelmed an already 
inadequately designed and resourced training program. 
 
“We probably weren’t as prepared as we should have been because the training 
wasn’t developed for that area.  The training that was developed for that type of 
conflict wasn’t implemented into any of the rotations yet so we weren’t really 
trained for that.  We didn’t really have any doctrine.”442
 
 
Even tactics that were well addressed in doctrine and training were difficult to adapt to the 
complex environment encountered in Iraq: 
 
“As far as infantry tactics went, how we used maneuver, that all changed once we 
got into a real city with a real conflict.”443
 
 
                                                 
441 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit. 
442 Soldier deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
443 Ibid. 
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 The pace of adaptation in training for the institutional U.S. Army was slow (as is typical 
of a large organization making inclusive changes) but when change was made, it was fairly 
encompassing.444  Since existing doctrine was largely inapplicable for adapting training to a 
simultaneous full spectrum environment, changes were based on individual soldier and unit 
experiences in Iraq.  This occurred because the U.S. Army had no readily available guide for 
rapidly shifting training initiatives and programs across the force.  Although many of the 
significant changes made were piecemeal and discontinuous, over time, they affected a 
significant number of units and individual soldiers.  For instance, to address deficiencies in 
COIN training and doctrine, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) mandated training at a “COIN 
Academy” in country at Camp Taji, Iraq.445  Additionally, MNF-I also created the 
Counterinsurgency Handbook that elevated the importance the culture and history of Iraq and 
downgraded the value of purely kinetic operations.446
 
  Incorporating lessons into training 
occurred at home station as well: 
 “Prior to my second deployment, the unit incorporated lessons learned from 
units previously stationed in Iraq.  There were multiple mission readiness 
exercises and deliberate planning for operations.  At the individual level, simple 
                                                 
444 This was accomplished by collecting lessons from deployed and returning units, analyzing these lessons, 
and then disseminating these lessons throughout the force via the Professional Military Education (PME) system, 
unit publications, proponent publications, CALL publications, and websites. 
445 Long, Austin, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 
1960-1970 and 2003-2006, Op Cit, p. 22-23. 
446 Ibid., p. 23. 
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weapons qualification was no longer the standard.  We transitioned to close-
quarters marksmanship training and multiple IED identification classes.”447
 
 
The post-deployment report generated by 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry (SBCT) indicated that (based 
on experience) the standard training model should be altered to include untraditional and non-
standard training events for soldiers and leaders: “training outside their comfort zone can allow 
and encourage the development of instinctive leadership.  This out-of-the-box thinking can 
provide leaders with the skill sets necessary to utilize all available assets in non-traditional ways 
resulting in innovative and adaptive leaders that think faster, make decisions rapidly, and act 
quickly.  In addition junior leaders can be enabled to function at higher levels of responsibility 
than previously expected, maintaining the initiative with a proactive forward presence.”448
The archetypal doctrinal approach to training was (and still is) an obstacle to the adaptive 
capacity of the U.S. Army in general and deploying units in particular.  Tillson contends that 
“the existing concepts of training for task, condition, and standard that have become the focal 
point of most DOD training activities might be becoming less relevant to the department’s needs.  
The uncertainties are too numerous, and it is difficult to predict the capabilities and associated 
tasks, much less the conditions and standards, that DOD will need to deal with these asymmetric 
 
                                                 
447 Soldier deployed to Baghdad (March 2003-August 2003, November 2004-November 2005), Personal 
Interview, 1 July 2008. 
448 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. xvii. 
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threats.”449  He continues by arguing that “gaining the same experience repeatedly, e.g., training 
the same task to the same standard, may not aid performance in a novel situation, and it may 
even hurt performance if the individual insists on approaching the situation from a particular 
mindset that might not be appropriate.”450
Training a limited set of particular tasks to standard not only decreases the likelihood of 
adaptation (since excessive training in the same task can dull adaptive tendencies) it also ensures 
that an adversary (through contact) will become accustomed to the range of options available to 
units and individuals in any particular operation or mission.  Predictability in repeated 
engagements favors the organization that is better situated for making rapid adaptations and 
disadvantages the highly-trained but less flexible unit.  The efficiency and time savings gained 
by utilizing the task, conditions, and standards training model “militates against combined arms 
effectiveness” in operations requiring simultaneous full spectrum capabilities and the ability to 
rapidly adapt.
  Traditional training patterns emphasize the rote 
memorization of tasks more so than adapting tasks to a particular intent or situation.  The 
argument that training for a specific task to standard is necessary for predictability and 
standardization throughout units necessitates that the basic set of individual and collective tasks 
either be expanded or altered to incorporate full spectrum capabilities. 
451
                                                 
449 Tillson, John C. F., Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats, IDA Document Number D-3114, Op Cit, 
p. 20. 
  As Lopez argues, “if an organization is going to learn in a complex 
environment, it must give great thoughts as to what it measures, but it must capture and measure 
performance by some form of metric.  The metric must be open ended and qualitative, or seek to 
450 Ibid, p. 41. 
451 Ibid., p. 17. 
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measure trends from an assortment of indicators, avoiding the bureaucratic slavery of ‘tasks, 
conditions and standards,’ that inadvertently sets limits for organizations.”452
6.1.4 Constraints 
 
Conducting operations in a populated urban environment poses significant operational 
constraints upon a state-based force.  This task is made much more difficult when a state-based 
force is facing an insurgency that is neither uniformed nor wholly indigenous.  Restrictions 
imposed by treaties, conventions, and the laws of war, written and signed almost principally for 
containing the use of excessive force by state-based militaries fighting other state-based 
militaries, convolute this task even further and bind state-based forces to a codified set of laws 
that in no way pertain to the opposition and barely reflect the realities of the modern battlefield.  
Additionally, forces that are designed for high-intensity conflict (like the U.S. Army) are further 
constrained by their own training and doctrine, most of which is designed for conventional 
operations on open terrain. 
The absence of training for operations in a populated environment against an almost 
anonymous foe can either paralyze operations or lead to overly-martial responses that might only 
further exacerbate and confuse an already confounding situation.  As John Vines argues, 
“certainly a kinetic solution or a military solution is not the ultimate solution to the insurgency in 
Iraq.”453
                                                 
452 Lopez, Rafael, On Learning: Metrics Based Systems for Countering Asymmetric Threats, Op Cit, p. 57. 
  This is particularly true for a force with little or no experience in simultaneous full 
453 Vines, John, U.S. General on Winning in Iraq, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript, 14 July 2005. 
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spectrum operations that is trained for conducting fast-paced maneuvers with a prejudice for 
violence: 
 
“As an infantryman, I hate to say it, but I think that if we went in not so 
aggressive, you wouldn’t have had made so many Iraqis mad.  If you upset a 
family, for instance, and you go in and search their place and you insult them in 
the process, then there isn’t going to be much loyalty to the Americans or the 
coalition.  Then, they may go and work with the foreign fighters or the 
insurgency.  So, you go in hard to establish that we are here and the dominant 
force but it slows things down sometimes.  If we went in a bit more neutral, if you 
could, I think that you would have got the people in that area to bite off on what 
you were thinking.”454
 
 
Further constraining operations was the existence of a fairly restrictive set of Rules of 
Engagement (ROE).  ROE define (among other things) when the use of deadly force is 
permitted, the types of munitions that can be used in a given situation, proportionality in the use 
of force, and treatment procedures for detainees.  Standard ROE are many times difficult to 
understand and in Iraq, were insufficient for guiding operations in a simultaneous full spectrum 
environment.  In particular, the ROE significantly restrained the use of indirect fire and disrupted 
the entire doctrinal targeting process: “units going in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
find themselves in stability operations and support operations environment in which restrictions 
                                                 
454 Soldier Deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview, 
23 September 2008. 
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within the ROE and the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) limit the effectiveness of 
doctrinal targeting.  The ROE restricts the use of indirect fires in an urban environment because 
of secondary effects.”455  As 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry (SBCT) indicated in its post-deployment 
report, “Force on force targeting methodology works for maneuver warfare but not necessarily 
for man hunting.”456
 Initially, overly protective force protection measures (in place to avoid casualties or 
situations that might precipitate casualties), an institutional preference for conducting operations 
at stand-off distances or out of contact, and most commanders’ wariness of divesting 
organizational control all constrained the effectiveness of the U.S. Army in conducting SSR 
operations.  Thomas Mockaitis argues that “while American forces can be quite flexible in 
conventional operations, the uncertainties of unconventional conflict combined with political 
aversion to casualties encourages an American cultural tendency for those in the upper ranks to 
provide precise instructions to their subordinates.  Since insurgent guerrillas and terrorists 
operate in small units as part of a flat organization, those who oppose them must operate in 
correspondingly small units to be effective.  These units, usually led by a lieutenant or senior 
noncommissioned officer (NCO), must be free to take the initiative based on sound judgment 
and according to a broad strategy without constantly asking for instructions up the chain of 
command.”
 
457
                                                 
455 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry), Op Cit, p. 86. 
 
456 Ibid. 
457 Mockaitis, Thomas R., The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for 
the Future, Op Cit, p. 40. 
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As OIF progressed and the U.S. Army accepted and transitioned into SSR operations, 
authority for decision making did devolve to more junior leaders, force protection measures were 
relaxed, and the ROE better reflected the necessities of operating in a complex environment 
against an insurgency. 
6.1.5 Organizational Context Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
• The goals and rewards system is slow to change and still does not formally recognize the 
realities of current conflicts.  Skills requisite to simultaneous full spectrum operations are 
not appropriately incentivized in training or rewarded in evaluations.  Failing to reward 
the skills requisite to modern military operations reduces the likelihood of their 
demonstration and internalization.  Adaptation is hampered by rewarding a desired set of 
characteristics and achievements established prior to OEF and OIF. 
• Robust and diverse communications networks allow for the rapid spread of information 
and the decentralized flow of ideas and experiences.  IO is enhanced by relaxed controls 
on the production and dissemination of locally engineered products in consonance with 
broad guidelines on product and message development.  Junior leaders are empowered by 
greater information flow and a system that maintains the possibility of an informal 
information-pull system.  The greatest risk of unchecked communications flows is the 
spread of information that might be beyond the scope of comprehension of junior leaders.  
Furthermore, the amount of information being shared can overwhelm the system causing 
crashes or end-user inundation. 
• Adjustments have been made to the U.S. Army’s training focus to better reflect the 
necessities of operations in Iraq (and Afghanistan).  But (and probably not intentionally) 
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the U.S. Army’s training format still assumes a static and doctrinal environment and 
enemy.  The focus of training remains on tasks and not on mission or intent.  Thus, 
adaptation, if practiced, is not practiced as well as it could be.  Enhancing training with 
complex and realistic conditions does not promote adaptation as well as forcing soldiers 
and leaders to choose and modify tasks and tactics according to the mission or intent. 
• Relaxing constraints allowed for the decentralization of decision making and expanded 
the adaptive freedom of junior leaders as they were exposed to the environment and 
empowered/compelled to make decisions. 
6.2 GROUP DESIGN & CULTURE 
6.2.1 Composition 
The composition of U.S. Army units fully reflects the organization’s wartime tasks.  Units are 
filled per rank and occupational specialty according to a particular unit’s organizational mission.  
Additionally, units are trained, equipped, and utilized according to this composition.  Without 
monumental changes to the structure and mission of the U.S. Army and its sub-units, 
organizational composition cannot be easily altered. 
Each unit within the U.S. Army is filled with the requisite numbers and types of soldiers 
necessitated by the mission that the organization is tasked to accomplish or support.  But each of 
these soldiers must also follow a tightly regimented career path that benefits the U.S. Army as a 
whole.  As a result of the meshing of this unit manning system and the career progression path of 
officers, NCOs, and soldiers, few units maintain any particular grouping of personnel for a long 
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period of time: personnel move in and out of units on a (usually) upward linear progression 
throughout their career.  The goal of this system is to spread individual experience and 
knowledge across the U.S. Army while concurrently expanding the tacit knowledge and 
education of each individual in uniform.  This manning procedure works well for units in 
peacetime but poses drawbacks for units that are operationally deploying or will deploy multiple 
times within a few years’ time span.  Much of the tacit, experiential, and associational 
knowledge built by individuals working within a system, sharing common experiences, and 
forming attitudes under common leadership is lost when a unit shifts personnel out during a 
manning change.  Although the U.S. Army does place significant restrictions on personnel 
movement during a deployment, typically, when a unit returns to home station, individuals are 
moved according to that soldier’s career needs, educational requirements, and promotion 
timetable.  The net result of this manning system can completely alter the structure and character 
of a unit: 
 
“Large portions of our unit went elsewhere when we returned to home station.  
My platoon was completely different in 30 days; I couldn’t even recognize it.”458
 
 
 The static nature of unit composition for wartime tasks also limits the amount of change 
that can be effected by shifting personnel within the unit.  For instance, if a unit has 100 
personnel slotted and all of these personnel are infantry, armor, or field artillery soldiers, then it 
would be very difficult indeed to expect the unit to be capable of conducting a civil affairs 
                                                 
458 Soldier deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad and Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
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mission: the training and personnel types required for this mission are just not available.  One 
way of managing this inevitability is by engaging in a process called “task organization.” Task 
organization is defined as “a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular 
mission.  It is the process of allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and 
(establishing) determining their command and support relationships.”459
 
  Through task 
organization, units can coalesce manifold combinations of sub-units and personnel in order to 
best resource a particular mission.  Although the ability to task organize is useful and represents 
a built-in organizational capacity for adaptation, there are only so many types of specialties any 
given organization can draw upon, particularly if these specialties are either combat, CS, or CSS 
in nature.  Therefore, the range of mission adaptation is limited.  One soldier describes the 
difficulties associated with task organizing for mission accomplishment in Iraq: 
“It got to the point where we were seriously task organized.  We were a 
mechanized brigade that was task organized down to the company level.  Each 
company had a mechanized infantry platoon, an armor platoon, and a motorized 
platoon.  Each company and battalion was set that way.  One battalion of armor 
looked like any infantry battalion.  They did this so that every unit looked like 
each other.  The problem with this is that a tank platoon is not the same as an 
infantry platoon personnel-wise.  A tank platoon has 16 people and an infantry 
platoon has 40 people.  My company was 2 infantry platoons and a tank platoon.  
Another problem was that the infantry people assigned to a tank company were 
                                                 
459 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 
Washington DC, 30 December 1996. 
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overworked...task organization is great but you should never mix the MOSs that 
are attached because their expertise is for a specific job.  I cannot teach a tank 
platoon to clear a room or a building.  Taking 3 guys out of a tank makes no 
sense for clearing a room that requires a 4 man stack.  Some of those tank 
platoons were short on people.  It was a nice concept but it just didn’t work in a 
complicated non-battlefield environment.”460
 
 
 The limits of institutional organizational composition exposed the operational shortfalls 
of many units that were not designed to function in other-than-war environments.  One response 
to these deficits was the use of non-maneuver elements in non-standard ‘economy of force’461 
missions. 462
                                                 
460 Soldier deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad and Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
  The need to use units for non-standard missions occurs when the parent unit lacks 
the appropriate personnel (in number and type) and equipment to conduct operations for which it 
is responsible.  But assigning a unit a non-standard mission does not alleviate the problem; it 
461 Economy of Force refers to the allocation and use of all forces available and in the most effective way 
possible. 
462 In Iraq, non-standard economy of force missions were usually assigned to Field Artillery units (and 
sometimes to RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition) or ACR (Armored Cavalry Regiments) 
units).  One of the main reasons this occurred was because Field Artillery units, as combat units, understand 
maneuver concepts but have few combat missions in an other than war environment.  See, Center for Army Lessons 
Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd 
Infantry), Op Cit, p. 94.  See also, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in 
Mosul, Iraq, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. x. 
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only resolves questions of responsibility for particular tasks.  The unit assigned a non-standard 
mission inherently suffers from the same shortfalls that required its assignment/reassignment in 
the first place: it does not have the appropriate personnel and equipment to conduct the mission.  
Units composed for HIC consist of soldiers that are primarily (and as was the case in OIF early 
on, solely) trained in and resourced for HIC. 463
The compositional challenges posed by simultaneous full spectrum operations that were 
difficult for highly trained regular U.S. Army units to overcome were even more difficult for 
Reserve and National Guard units to adapt to.  Reserve and National Guard units generally 
receive lower resourcing priority and less frequently than their regular counterparts.  
Additionally, Reserve and National Guard units are many times depleted by the requirements of 
regular forces, particularly in regard to personnel.  Melvin Laird describes how using units 
structured and composed for combat in simultaneous full spectrum operations affected Reserve 
and National Guard units deployed to OIF:  “Reserve and National Guard units are understaffed 
and have been abused by deployments that have taken individuals out of their units to serve as de 
facto army regulars, many in specialties for which they have not been trained, a practice that eats 
at the morale of reservists.  Nearly 80 percent of the airlift capacity for this war and about 48 
percent of the troops have come from Reserve and National Guard units.  The high percentages 
are due, in part, to the specialized missions of those troops: transporting cargo, policing, 
  Equipment shortfalls can vary depending on the 
mission (night vision devices, carbines, vehicles, surveillance aids) and can be very difficult to 
fill because of the challenges associated with acquiring what would be non-standard, or 
unassigned equipment. 
                                                 
463 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry), Op Cit, p. 35. 
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rebuilding infrastructure, translating, conducting government affairs—in short, the stuff of 
building a new nation.  We have realized too late that our regular army forces have not been as 
well trained as they should have been for the new reality of an urban insurgent enemy.  Nor was 
the military hierarchy paying serious attention to the hints that their mission in the twenty-first 
century would be nation building.”464
The combat-oriented composition of the regular forces participating in OIF (compounded 
by the training inherent to this composition) had a cascading effect not only through active duty 
forces but also through Reserve and National Guard units.  The inability of unit composition to 
account for non-standard missions (i.e. simultaneous full spectrum missions) is also a measure of 
how separated U.S. Army units were from the ideal organizational form during OIF. 
 
6.2.2 Norms 
Norms are guides to behavior and are derived from common organizational customs, traditions, 
and practices.  Although norm change can occur through the internalization of new experiences, 
learning, and leadership methods, generally, norms are semi-permanent and reflect the collective 
thoughts and tendencies of an organization.  Even when norms are altered or adapted to new 
organizational realities, vestiges of previously accepted norms remain intact; their effect on 
decision making and behavior is enduring. 
For the U.S. Army, norms reflect the war-fighting tradition of the institution in general 
and of its sub-units in particular.  Since the U.S. Army is highly practiced in training for and 
conducting centralized, top-down directed, and sometimes unit-specific combat operations, the 
                                                 
464 Laird, Melvin R., “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2005. 
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institution’s norms overwhelmingly reflect this experience.  These operational traditions and 
standards have their purpose in an organized military but have constraining effects that can hem 
the adaptive initiative inherent to all organizations and individuals.  Despite an obvious need for 
adaptation and a deviation from traditional norms in Iraq, commanders and staffs were reluctant 
to depart from precise instructions received from higher command elements; rarely if ever was 
authority questioned.465  Despite commanders calling for adaptability and initiative in 
subordinate leaders, the centralized decision-making common to a war-fighting institution 
developed ‘undue inertia’ and curtailed violations of the organizational norms of deference and 
adherence to authority.466
War-fighting norms also had a significant effect on planning and training early on in OIF:  
“attitudes, tendencies, and unaddressed issues that shaped planning at the theater-strategic and 
operational levels had a direct impact on the tactical-level preparation for OIF.  As in Operation 
JUST CAUSE, the focus on conventional operations shaped how tactical headquarters designed 
their training and conducted overall preparation for war.  Despite the fact that the CFLCC plans 
directed units to conduct a rolling transition to stability and support operations—which implied 
that at some point in the campaign tactical units conducting combat operations would transition 
to stability and support operations—few if any of the Soldiers in these units seemed to 
understand what this meant or were aware of the general CFLCC concept for PH IV 
operations.”
 
467
                                                 
465 Aylwin-Foster, Nigel, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review, 
November-December 2005, p. 6. 
 
466 Ibid., p. 7. 
467 Wright and Reese, Op Cit., p. 77. 
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The relationship between norms, training, and behavior is symbiotic and mutually 
reinforcing.  For instance, despite foreknowledge of the inevitability of SSR operations in Iraq, 
“the Army units chosen to take part in OIF appear to have conducted little or no training for 
these operations.”468  Training for OOTW would have been a significant deviation not only from 
common practices and interpretations of doctrine but also from institutional and unit norms.  The 
patterns of behavior and perception shaped by war-fighting norms were so ingrained and 
inculcated by units and officers that they were hardly recognized and even less often corrected 
even when circumstances dictated.469
 
  Many rudimentary initial efforts to adjust norms and 
behavior to the full spectrum environment of Iraq through education and training were not well 
received: 
“When all of this started there were a lot of complaints about taking infantry units 
and putting them from a HIC to a peacekeeping mission at that point.  But, 
everybody adapts…before you didn’t care about communications and the 
language—you let your weapons do all the talking.”470
 
 
                                                 
468 Ibid., p. 78. 
469 See discussion in Long, Austin, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006, Op Cit, p. 27. 
470 Soldier Deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview, 
23 September 2008. 
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“The Army actually gave us discs with Arabic, depending on where you were 
going, Kurdish, and the response was typical, ‘I have an M4 and that is all I need 
to know.’”471
 
 
The tendency to revert to and draw upon organizational norms was natural and was 
indicative of the mindset of the U.S. Army’s leaders: “when confronted with insurgent attacks, 
the five US divisions reacted differently, but with a tendency toward conventional-style 
operations and heavy-handed tactics.  Units conducted raids based on scant intelligence and 
applied firepower loosely.”472  The commander of the 82nd Airborne Division was quoted as 
saying the following: “this is war…we’re going to use a sledgehammer to crush a walnut.”473  
Despite periods of relative freedom to conduct operations in a manner of their choosing many 
commanders, because of their unfamiliarity with OOTW, “often reverted to their conventional 
training and conducted operations that were too methodical or heavy-handed.”474  Separating 
leaders and units from ingrained norms was an insurmountable challenge for the first few years 
of OIF.475
The organizational norms of the U.S. Army, no matter how difficult they are to define 
comprehensively, have an identifiable effect on how units and individuals respond to 
 
                                                 
471 Ibid. 
472 Vandergriff, Donald E., Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing 
Face of War, Op Cit, p. 243. 
473 Ibid. 
474 Ibid, p. 254. 
475 Because of norms and other factors, not all innovations spawned positive outcomes during OIF. 
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environmental stimuli and how they react to inputs that might alter their perception.  For 
instance, the belief in the superiority of one organization’s norms and over another’s (in 
leadership, history, experience, and accomplishments, for example) can have a chilling effect on 
cross-organizational learning: 
 
 “Certain units didn’t want to learn from other units.  They didn’t want to learn 
from other units because they didn’t want to work with anyone and certainly 
didn’t want to hear what we had to say…we were interested in any lessons that 
could be learned from any unit that was on the ground.  They might not be doing 
things the way that you do it but they have been on the ground.  The information 
that they have is important.”476
 
 
Individuals predisposed to pride in one’s unit, training, and leadership, all necessary qualities in 
a war-fighting organization, might nonetheless have difficulty accepting lessons borne from 
other units’ experience despite the relevance of this experience and despite the novelty of the 
environment where the unit is expected to conduct operations. 
 Although the norms relevant to war-fighting that prevail in the U.S. Army are deeply 
embedded and contribute to unit cohesion, pride, and discipline, they are resistant to change and 
have had a significant effect on the adaptive tendencies of individual units and the institution as a 
whole.  
                                                 
476 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
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6.2.3 Tasks 
Each band of the spectrum of combat represents differing sets of missions, tasks, and training 
priorities.  In a simultaneous full spectrum operation, each band is utilized to some degree 
depending on the character of a particular mission.  For the most part, missions in OIF required 
an ability to accomplish many tasks that were complimentary, overlapped, or significantly 
differed.  The range of competencies required for mission success in OIF was enormous and 
ranged from HIC to relief operations. 
What muddied the task set required for OIF even further was the enmeshment of 
conventional and unconventional task sets.  Not only did units need to be capable of performing 
non-standard mission tasks (other than combat) they also needed to be able to conduct or support 
unconventional missions without significant training and/or proficiency in doing so.  This can be 
challenging in a static training environment but is incalculably more complex in a dynamic 
threat-infused operational environment in a foreign land. 
An organization with little experience in conducting tasks in an unpredictable and 
complex environment can either experiment with existing task sets or wait until the environment 
and enemy exude enough indicators to allow for the shaping of an appropriate response.  Without 
a base set of tasks to perform in a full spectrum environment and absent a coherent 
environmental picture an organization will remain in a reactive mode dependent on external cues 
for direction.  The ability to plan missions and remain proactive while shaping the environment 
is just not possible if the appropriate task set is un- or underdeveloped for simultaneous full 
spectrum operations.  As Mandeles argues, “the elaboration of tasks and actions is complicated 
by the degree to which performance of those tasks is contingent upon environmental stimuli—
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such as information or actions that originate outside the organization.”477
6.2.4 Group Design & Culture Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
  The ability to adapt is 
thus truncated by a task set that remains overly wedded to performance in combat. 
• U.S. Army units have a built in task organization capability that promotes adaptation.  
But this capability is largely combat-oriented.  The combat-oriented composition and 
structure of units restricts the capacity for more flexible and tailored organizational 
designs for unconventional adversaries and environments.478
• War-fighting norms are particularly resistant to change by the nature of the organization 
and its principal historical duty.  At a time when the mission of fighting and winning 
wars matched strategy, organizational norms were not quite so restrictive.  But as strategy 
and the primary mission of the U.S. Army have diverged (if not almost fully bifurcating) 
in the current international security environment, war-fighting norms have reduced the 
ability to cognitively adapt to increasing complexity and simultaneous full spectrum 
operations. 
 
• The preponderance of tasks (and thus training) is combat related.  This ensures that any 
adaptations made will draw upon a restricted set of competencies and will be less 
applicable in a simultaneous full spectrum environment. 
                                                 
477 Mandeles, Mark D., Military Transformation Past and Present: Historical Lessons for the 21st Century, 
Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2007, p. 92. 
478 The structure (Modified Table of Organization & Equipment or MTOE) of the U.S. Army has not 
significantly changed and will only modestly change in future variants of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). 
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6.3 MATERIAL & TECHNICAL RESOURCES 
6.3.1 Equipment 
Equipment is one of the most static inputs to the adaptive cycle.  Equipment is tied to strategy 
and doctrine, is used to support operations, and ultimately assists soldiers (in the environments 
and with the missions for which it is designed) in achieving organizational goals and objectives.  
The inapplicability of equipment for combat (or any military mission), intelligence gathering, 
patrols, etc., can reveal an organization’s removal from the ideal.  Since equipment procurement 
is derived from organizational design for the pursuit of organizational goals, the less useful a 
given set of equipment is for achieving these goals the more likely that there is a mismatch 
between design and mission.  This mismatch can be revealed by weapons platforms that do not 
work in a particular environment (cold, sandy, urban) or in systems that do not support particular 
missions (overhead technical intelligence platforms in an environment that requires human 
intelligence (HUMINT)).  In either case, these limitations or defects can hamper organizational 
adaptation, particularly at the lowest organizational levels where equipment apportionment is 
relatively fixed and the equipment supplied is specific and narrow in its functionality and 
applicability. 
Equipment designed for supporting regular combat operations can prove quite inadequate 
for operations in rapidly changing environments (particularly urban) against non-doctrinal 
enemies.  Employing large, burdensome, and destructive weapons platforms in a non-standard 
fashion might prove impossible.  Furthermore, training with and expectations for equipment can 
be misguided when applied in an unorthodox fashion.  The perceived, relative safety of an 
armored vehicle or tank in open terrain can morph into a liability in a close fight where mobility 
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is restricted and the enemy has access to high explosives and the Explosively Formed Penetrators 
(EFPs) in use in Iraq: 
 
"Our biggest distractions were the guys with the armored vehicles.  As light 
fighters, we were happy with HMMWVs.  The armored equipment would come 
in…these guys were like, hey, we have steel all around us, we're good.  The 
problem is that you don’t have 360 degree visibility.  So they were so confident 
that their big vehicle was untouchable.  The insurgents would walk up behind it or 
go beneath it and place an IED and walk away.  At that point, you have a 
catastrophic kill.  You don't have that person outside doing a patrol around the 
vehicle.  Their mentality is that if you stay inside then you are safe."479
 
 
Because the U.S. Army goes to war with the equipment it has and this equipment is not 
easily altered (either in form or in assignment to organizational stocks) tactical adaptations to or 
with this equipment are difficult if not impossible to make.  As Smith asserts, “we are using 
weapon systems in ways for which they were not originally designed and purchased.”480
 
  One 
soldier describes how a unit utilized what were otherwise unusable pieces of equipment in SSR 
operations: 
                                                 
479 Soldier deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview, 23 
September 2008. 
480 Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force, Op Cit, p. 299. 
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 “When we first went north to Baghdad we didn’t even take the Paladins.  We had 
all our equipment shipped over and we left it in Kuwait.  Within a month, we had 
the Paladins shipped us because you could mount crew-served weapons on them; 
we started using those as pill boxes.”481
 
 
“We started using the Paladins on patrols because they had a crew served 
capability.  The HMMWVs we had were light-skinned and we had no up-armor 
initially.  We started morphing into the up-armor HMMWVs, we started creating 
our own armor.  We started getting up-armor trucks after the fact.”482
 
 
In regard to equipment, the capacity for tactical organizational adaptation is quite circumscribed 
and limited to crucial, however simple, modifications.  Although equipment can be effectively 
bastardized or enhanced it cannot be fundamentally changed to better match the exigencies of 
missions for which the equipment was not designed.  In order to make significant organizational 
equipment changes to address non-standard environments and adversaries, the larger institution 
must adapt: the procurement and assignment of weapons platforms is a higher-order budgetary 
and acquisition function. 
In support of tactical level requests and initiatives and to offset equipment shortfalls, the 
Pentagon began a series of swift equipment procurement efforts.  Two significant and 
interrelated problems were given extensive attention: a lack of armor and the prevalent use of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).  As OIF progressed, the DOD fielded more up-armored 
                                                 
481 Soldier deployed to Baghdad (Early 2003, 2006-2007), Personal Interview, 18 September 2008. 
482 Ibid. 
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High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and produced versions of Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.  In order to evaluate countermeasures to IEDs, the DOD 
established and funded the “Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), directed by retired Army 
Gen. Montgomery Meigs, to work with various national laboratories, the Department of Energy, 
contractors, and academia.”483  JIEDDO successfully developed electronic jamming systems 
(IED Countermeasures Equipment (ICE) and Warlock) utilizing low power radio frequency 
energy to block signals from cellular telephones and long-range cordless telephones, 
Neutralizing Improvised Explosive Devices with Radio Frequency (NIRF) “which produces a 
very high-frequency field at a very short range that can neutralize an IEDs electronics,”484 and 
various electronic jammers, radars, X-ray equipment, robotic explosive ordnance disposal 
equipment, physical security equipment, and an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV).  Between 
2004 and 2006 JIEDDO spent approximately $6.1 billion in its efforts.485  Additionally, DOD 
instituted the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) to ensure that the latest versions of equipment were 
available as fast as practicable.  RFI has reduced acquisition time to weeks or days for some 
products.486
With seemingly limitless funding, the DOD and the U.S. Army can react to sub-unit 
needs and requests fairly quickly by by-passing the traditional (and slow) procurement process.  
Immediate mission-critical adjustments can be made within longer-term acquisition cycles on an 
 
                                                 
483 Wilson, Clay, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and 
Countermeasures, CRS Report for Congress, 25 September, 2006, p. 3. 
484 Ibid, p. 4. 
485 Ibid, pp. 3-6. 
486 Ibid, p. 6. 
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as-needed basis.  But short-term reactions ensure that organizational adaptability will suffer; the 
pace of operations and adaptability of the enemy reduces the adaptive timeline far within the 
development, testing, and acquisition cycles of even the most responsive institution.  Without 
significant changes to acquisition drivers (strategy and doctrine), the institution is reduced to 
reacting to environmental cues and sub-organization requests.  The institution’s primary mission 
will drive overall research, development, and acquisition; without adjustment to this mission, the 
institution will remain reactive and always (at least) one step behind changes in the environment.  
As a result, equipment designed for ‘standard’ missions and purposes will stall tactical 
adaptability when tactical organizations are involved in ‘non-standard’ missions. 
6.3.2 Funds 
The funding that U.S. Army units receive in cash and in kind (in equipment, rations, services, 
etc.) through the Congressional appropriations process is vast.  Specified funds are budgeted and 
encumbered for operational needs such as weapons platforms and fuel.  More general funds exist 
for discretionary spending on SSR projects and unaddressed unit requirements.  Funds are 
available either through the normal Congressional budgetary process or through additional 
spending bills tailored to the needs of the institution. 
The flexibility granted to units in how discretionary funds are spent is partly the result of 
the complexity of operations and uncertainty inherent to the environment in Iraq.  A rapidly 
changing environment defies the best predictions of any set budget or list of forecasted spending 
requirements.  Within very general guidelines, commanders are free to spend money on projects 
and initiatives that will support changing mission requirements as the need arises.  Funds have 
been used to acquire indigenous support and shift alliances, to build schools, to address 
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unbudgeted needs, and to assist in the gathering of information.  Small units and individuals 
often use available funds to establish relationships with locals either through direct payment or 
by addressing individual or local community needs.  One soldier described how using even 
relatively small amounts of money or remunerations can reap rewards that would otherwise be 
unattainable:487
 
 
“You go and buy a pack of reds and two cokes for $20 and you find out where 
everything is at.  You find someone influential and give their daughter a beanie 
baby and their son a new soccer ball.  You treat their women with respect when 
you go into a house.  This is how information is gathered and relationships are 
established.”488
 
 
Although general, congressionally mandated funding is tailored to long-term projects and 
major weapons systems, the availability of unspecified funds builds in adaptability.  When 
commanders and soldiers have access to large supplies of funding, particularly in a chaotic and 
largely impoverished environment where unemployment is rampant, initiatives that either 
directly or indirectly enhance relationships also build trust and help the spread of invaluable 
information that is not readily available through normal collection means.  Furthermore, because 
                                                 
487 It is important to note that this can also have negative consequences insofar as gifts and rewards can 
undermine the role of men in the family as traditional providers or breadwinners.  A balance must be attained 
between using this tactic to gain information and trust and undermining familial relationships and roles. 
488 Soldier deployed on initial invasion (September 2002-August 2003) and Baghdad (January 2005-
January 2006), Personal Interview, 8 October 2008. 
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monies spent or appropriated can be tracked, the efficacy of particular enterprises can be 
measured.  Tactical units can address shortfalls in design and capacity by using funds for 
achieving goals by alternative and unplanned means. 
6.3.3 Intelligence 
Three problems that have plagued intelligence operations generally also beset operations during 
OIF: the type and nature of intelligence gathered was inadequate for the environment; 
classification and dissemination procedures limited the transfer of vital information and; the 
amount of intelligence gathered and shared, whether appropriate or not, was overwhelming.489
 The intelligence apparatus that the U.S. Army took into OIF was derived from a national 
collection and processing system designed to counter threats from large state-based forces, 
principally those emanating from the former Soviet Union and its partner states.  A perennial 
focus on state-based adversaries circumscribed the adaptive capacity of the overall U.S. 
intelligence architecture during OIF: it was optimally constructed to detect indicators not 
necessarily relevant during SSR or simultaneous full spectrum operations.  Instead, “after four 
decades of primary focus on a fixed enemy, our intelligence capabilities became singularly 
optimized to peer at ICBM fields, observe submarine fleet anchorages, scan bomber-packed 
airfields, monitor Warsaw Pact tank divisions, and—with a network of spies—look deep inside 
  
Each restricted the easy flow of accurate information to where it is required in the decentralized 
operations prevalent in Iraq: tactical level units engaged in planning, on patrol, or in contact. 
                                                 
489 See, Hughes-Wilson, John, Military Intelligence Blunders, Carroll and Graf, New York, 1999, pp. 344-
45. 
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the Soviet governmental and military bureaucracies.”490  Additionally, “institutional momentum 
and past successes kept investments steady or growing in high-technology systems, and one can 
surmise that satellites and other overhead collectors continue to receive robust resourcing.”491
The trend in intelligence spending indicates a desire for investing in more and more 
sensitive equipment capable of detecting corporeal changes in the environment indicative of 
movement, signals emissions, and weapons deployment.  But this equipment is less than optimal 
for trying to discern enemy intent or for separating friend from foe in a largely anonymous urban 
environment devoid of identifiable tactical vehicles, electronic battlefield signatures, or advanced 
weapons platforms.  Apparently, the same full spectrum capability assumed of combat-ready 
forces infused with advanced technologies was imputed to national and U.S. Army intelligence 
systems.  Operations in OIF gave the lie to these assumptions.  An attempt to translate 
technological capabilities designed for collecting on state-based forces to a decidedly mobile yet 
technology bereft insurgency revealed significant weaknesses in national and U.S. Army 
collection capabilities. 
 
 This assumed intelligence capability pervaded U.S. Army doctrine, tactical training, and 
operational planning.  U.S. Army units came to depend on an enhanced intelligence capability 
that only significantly aided in the conduct of a narrow range of combat operations and was less 
than useful for informing SSR and simultaneous full spectrum operations.  One of the key tenets 
of U.S. Army tactical doctrine is that units will be provided with near perfect, full spectrum, 
battlefield intelligence  This provision allows commanders to act in a ‘time and place of their 
choosing’ and to ‘decisively shape operations and engagements.’  Although largely considered a 
                                                 
490 Barno, David, “Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency,” Parameters, Summer 2006, p. 21. 
491 Ibid, p. 22. 
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‘future’ capability throughout the late 20th Century, the assumption of near certainty seeped into 
current doctrine through transformational osmosis.492
Nonetheless, tactical doctrine was (and is) infused with manifold examples of capabilities 
derived from intelligence that was difficult if not impossible to obtain in Iraq in a timely fashion.  
Thus, operations, reliant upon capabilities premised on non-existent or poorly formed 
intelligence, are much more difficult to plan and execute than doctrine would lead a practitioner 
to believe.  Even with the employment of human ‘sensors,’ the intelligence picture was murky: 
human operators untrained in the nuances of intelligence collection in a complex environment 
did not make up for a dearth of requisite intelligence.
  What was ignored was the fact that near 
certainty would have been impossible even in conventional combat operations and sheer fantasy 
in the simultaneous full spectrum operations occurring in Iraq. 
493
                                                 
492 McMaster, H.R., “Crack in the Foundation: Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of 
Dominant Knowledge in Future War,” Op Cit, p. 55. 
  The use of human sensors to inform the 
overall intelligence picture did not yield the battlefield or informational dominance predicted by 
493 The relationship between soldiers and intelligence collection systems is confusing.  On the one hand, 
soldiers are supposed to be ordained with extensive capabilities because of a purportedly pervasive intelligence 
collection capacity.  This implies that soldiers will be trained assuming that correct and ample intelligence will be 
available from other, external intelligence sources.  On the other hand, if the technological intelligence system is 
incapable of gathering appropriate types of information then soldiers are expected to fill the gap in collection 
requirements.  This assumes that soldiers are capable of gathering the intelligence that is supposed to be collected by 
other systems.  In either case, given a complex and unfamiliar environment, neither the technological systems nor 
the common soldier is appropriately resourced, designed, or trained (respectively) to collect intelligence outside of 
the abilities of machines or beyond that which is trained.  Thus, the system is limited and the built-in backups do not 
exist. 
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tactical doctrine: the intelligence picture in Iraq was inadequate for shaping operations out of 
contact or for providing any sort of ‘dominance.’  To remedy this problem, soldiers and small 
units made adaptations to the conduct of their operations and increased their contact with the 
environment and the enemy.  The failures of technology and passive sensors were made up for 
by the establishment of an integrated intelligence/information gathering network developed by 
soldiers and their personal relationships with local Iraqi populations.494
  An affinity for applying familiar yet inappropriate terms (like describing individuals as 
sensors) to new concepts or conditions is indicative of how disruptive complex environments can 
be to standing doctrine and perceptions.  The depiction of cars, trucks, and motorcycles as 
insurgent ‘platforms’ or the description of populations as ‘human terrain’ are both examples of 
the persistence of legacy thinking and occur because overall intelligence and operations systems 
(to include their associated lexicon) are slow to adapt to new circumstances and new 
environments.
 
495
                                                 
494 McMaster, H.R., “Crack in the Foundation: Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of 
Dominant Knowledge in Future War,” Op Cit, pp. 62-63. 
  The application of old terms to new conditions is a symptom of the persistence 
of legacy thinking and emblematic of an unwillingness or incapability to adapt to non-doctrinal 
environments. 
495 Barno argues that familiar terms are applied because the system is designed to detect what these terms 
symbolize.  ‘Platform’ is traditional term used for describing conventional threat weapons systems and vehicles but 
does not easily translate to insurgent equipment.  The term is misused because of the novelty of complex 
environments.  Intelligence sensors designed for state-based threats are set to collect on platforms, not common 
vehicles surrounded by other common vehicles.  For discussion see, Barno, David, “Challenges in Fighting a Global 
Insurgency,” Op Cit, p. 23. 
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The legacy of linear doctrinal thinking also pervaded the intelligence planning process.  
The traditional process assumes a relatively predictable doctrinal enemy and environment.  Thus, 
it is a poor framework for planning operations in a complex environment populated with 
itinerant, non-standard adversaries.  “The IPB [Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield] 
process, as presented in doctrine is in part, deficient.  It provides an optimum framework, as 
designed, for determining certain and limited futures.  However, it is a poor framework for 
uncertain environments where a range of futures or true ambiguity is experienced.  Step four of 
the IPB process directs intelligence analysts to determine enemy COA [Course(s) of Action] as 
well as choosing the most likely and most dangerous courses of action.  It is just not possible to 
determine enemy intentions in a range of futures or a truly ambiguous environment.”496  
Traditional IPB, designed for conventional battlefield planning is insufficient: “because the 
population is the key to success in a counterinsurgency, COIN IPB must start with the people 
and their issues.”497
 What makes a complex environment even more ambiguous for a force like the U.S. Army 
is its non-standard character.  The U.S. Army possesses a conventional set of tools, equipment, 
  Traditionally, IPB, by the nature of the term, does not incorporate people’s 
issues.  Overlaying a conventionally oriented battlefield preparation process onto a non-linear 
and complex SSR operation can cause myriad problems for planners.  An uncomplicated and 
sequenced concept of operations is just not possible in a complex environment.  
                                                 
496 Brown, Lawrence T., The Enemy We were Fighting was not what We had Predicted.  What is Wrong 
with IPB at the Dawn of the 21st Century?, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, p. 44. 
497 Mansoor, Peter R. and Mark S. Ulrich, “Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity 
Analysis,” Military Review, September-October, 2007, p. 46. 
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and doctrine (and thus training) predicated on the successful attainment of measurements derived 
from force-on-force combat information.  Each of these inputs contributes to cognitive patterns 
and product development routines that are relevant almost solely to a conventional conflict and 
might have zero applicability in an unconventional struggle.  As Schultz and Dew argue in their 
examination of the conventional IPB planning and analysis process, “composition, disposition, 
and strength are all quantitative measures that add up the personnel, units, weapons, and 
machines of modern conventional armies.”498  When presented with non-doctrinal adversaries, 
analysts have little recourse but to try to adapt conventional IPB to an unconventional 
environment.  This is a difficult task since the tools and procedures available assume a 
preponderance of quantitatively measurable indicators available in the environment.  
Unfortunately, quantitatively measurable indicators are few and far between in a complex, 
unconventional environment and might be of little value, because of the nature of the mission, 
even if they are obtainable.499
Conventional indicators are unlikely to manifest during a complex insurgency.  Thus, 
applying conventional standards and techniques makes little sense in alterative environments 
filled with unorthodox adversaries.  While the absence of alternative approaches to intelligence 
 
                                                 
498 Schultz, Richard H. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of 
Contemporary Combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 24. 
499 Other elements of conventional intelligence planning and gathering hamper adaptive approaches to the 
collection process.  For instance, the Handbook of Intelligence Analysis guides soldiers to develop an order-of-battle 
template that focuses on tactics, training, effectiveness, and logistics relevant to conventional and nuclear operations 
and includes instructions applicable to issues of biography, unit history, uniforms, and insignia.  Without guides for 
gathering and processing intelligence on non-doctrinal threats, intelligence analysts will utilize the skills that they 
have been taught.  Unfortunately, these skills may only be relevant to conventional warfare.  See, Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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planning and collection will force adaptation it will be costly in terms of the time needed to 
develop new methods, products, and cognitive skills.  In Iraq, this problem was compounded by 
a lack of analytical capability among soldiers used to interpreting an abundance of combat-
related data provided by advanced technological sensor systems.  But the deus ex machina they 
had planned for and counted on never arrived.  When presented with non-combat conditions and 
an environment where technological systems offered little functionality or value-added analytics, 
intelligence analysts found their analytical capacity wanting.  “Apparently, younger officers and 
enlisted personnel were unprepared for their assignments as intelligence specialists and 
possessed ‘very little to no analytical skills.’  A network that was supposed to link intelligence 
teams and convey time-sensitive information among them—as well as permit them to tap into an 
evolving database—worked so poorly that it was virtually non-existent.”500
In an ambiguous environment, an alternative method for divining enemy intent and 
predicting enemy movements is to track their actions and develop products based on behavioral 
and tactical trends.  During OIF, this was accomplished at the unit level and then correlated at 
the institutional level: 
 
 
“We tracked and briefed emerging enemy TTPs on a daily basis.”501
 
 
“On my second tour we carefully gathered AARs [After Action Reviews or 
Reports] from the section through the battalion level where these AARs were 
                                                 
500 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Op Cit, p. 322. 
501 Soldier deployed to Baghdad (March 2003-August 2003, November 2004-November 2005), Personal 
Interview, 1 July 2008. 
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correlated.  Multiple AARs were sent higher.  Some of them went to places like the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned and some of them went to the Schoolhouse at 
Fort Huachuca.”502
 
 
The complexity of the environment and the enemy in Iraq required significant and creative 
adaptations to standard intelligence planning and collection methods, particularly in the absence 
of the appropriate technological tools and analytical skills necessary for this type of environment.  
For instance, multiple measures were developed to interdict the use of IEDs: the development of 
actionable intelligence to predict IED emplacement; the employment of active combined-arms 
patrolling to look for suspicious activity; the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and sniper 
teams to monitor roads during times of likely emplacement; emplacing remote TV cameras 
(RTV) at known trouble areas and; using CA teams to work with local nationals.”503  
Additionally, units adapted to the inadequacies of supporting technologies. Commercial off-the-
shelf Technologies (COTs), such as digital cameras, were used to support Close Target 
Reconnaissance (CTR) and other operations.  UAV optics and satellite imagery were considered 
insufficient for providing the detailed images demanded by urban operations.  UAV optics were 
not “resolute enough and satellite imagery is not reliable enough.”504
                                                 
502 Ibid. 
  One soldier describes 
some of the difficulties inherent in relying on technical intelligence and information gathering 
capabilities: 
503 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry), Op Cit, p. 90. 
504 Ibid, p. 91. 
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“We had satellite imagery come across, which is nice.  You can see where you are 
going, who’s there, and what is involved.  But you come to rely on it and if the 
weather is bad then your only means of communications is down.  There are no 
photos, no FM [Frequency Modulation] communications, or satellite 
communications.  You go from having everything to nothing.  Our technology can 
make you stumble.  I wouldn’t want to be away from it but it can slow you down a 
bit.”505
 
 
 Even when the appropriate intelligence is collected and analyzed, myriad sharing 
problems can affect whether or not the intelligence is distributed or pushed to the appropriate 
organizational levels in a timely fashion.  “The present classification system with its various 
compartments is an obstacle to the timely flow of information.  It must be reexamined with an 
eye on making it simpler and quicker to navigate.”506
                                                 
505 Soldier deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview, 23 
September 2008. 
  Most of these problems stem from the 
sensitivity of the type and nature of various collection assets.  Certain information is only 
transmitted along secure channels to appropriately cleared individuals.  Insufficiently cleared 
soldiers might not have access to information and intelligence reserved for personnel with Top 
Secret and Compartmentalized clearances.  The end result might be that time-sensitive and vital 
information is not disseminated, even when the information is of critical import to soldiers or 
units in contact.  This is unacceptable in a rapidly evolving environment where the speed of 
506 Cole, Myke, “From the Military: Applying 4GW Theory to the Intelligence Community,” http://www.d-
n-i.net, Accessed 18 October 2008. 
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intelligence dissemination might be more important than how well the intelligence is analyzed.  
Applying this intelligence cannot wait on a thorough examination by intelligence professionals.  
Instead, the demands of rapidly evolving situations and operations require that some analysis is 
conducted by the end user, regardless of training or occupational specialty.  As Knights and 
White argue, “the trend in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq is towards increasingly focused 
and intelligence-led activity.”507
 
  This activity requires the collection and spread of information 
by untraditional means and through unconventional sources regardless of traditional security 
constraints: 
 “We have made every soldier an intel asset.  He is down there doing his own 
IPB.  You have eleven-bravos [11B MOS—Infantry] who are self-teaching 
because of the information that they have available to them now.  They 
understand the import of that information.  They are becoming mini-intel non-
commissioned officers down there doing their own IPB.  But it is always stifled by 
those folks that want to have more security requirements…and don’t want to 
provide security clearances to all levels and all folks…I think that we need to get 
past that real quick.”508
 
 
Some adjustments to this system have been made according to tactical needs in Iraq.  
Adaptations to the collection and dissemination systems have been made so that information is 
                                                 
507 Knights, Michael and Jeffrey White, “Iraqi Resistance Proves Resilient,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 
November 2003, p. 24. 
508 General Chiarelli, Peter, Telephone Interview, 27 October 2008. 
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not necessarily analyzed prior to its dissemination.  Instead, intelligence is analyzed in parallel 
with ongoing operations so that if decisions must be made on the ground, the soldiers or officers 
charged with this decision making will be appropriately resourced: 
 
“We are pushing HUMINT down a lot further than we ever have before.  That’s 
an area where we are starting to catch up.  I think that we understand the 
importance of low-tech solutions.  I think we also understand that there are high-
tech solutions that we just don’t need to keep at the national, strategic, or 
operational levels—we need to get them down to the individual soldier.”509
  
 
The type of intelligence required by operations in Iraq is expansive and far outside the 
realm of traditional, conventional needs.  “When intelligence officers find themselves immersed 
in gathering information for actionable intelligence in a ‘small war,’ they become amateur 
sociologists, cultural and negotiation experts, and a host of other things.”510
                                                 
509 Ibid. 
  The type of 
intelligence needed reflects the type of operation(s) being conducted.  In simultaneous full 
spectrum operations, multiple channels of intelligence are required.  Increasing the available 
types of intelligence requires a corresponding increase in the expertise of the end user.  Given the 
narrow and specialized training afforded most junior leaders and soldiers in the U.S. Army, this 
is unlikely to be the case.  What is likely is that vast amounts of intelligence will be shared with 
users who have little capacity for interpreting and acting on the information provided. 
510 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Op Cit, p. 321. 
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This problem is confused further by the ubiquity of communications equipment and data-
sharing devices on the battlefield in Iraq.  While intelligence is developed at an arithmetic rate, 
sharing (and associated modifications to the information shared) is conducted at an exponential 
pace.  Each individual who receives intelligence has the opportunity to inject alterations based on 
current information and individual interpretation prior to horizontally and vertically 
retransmitting the data.  The volume of intelligence and raw information being shared can 
overwhelm decision makers involved in a fast-paced tactical mission.  Additionally, if the 
intelligence being spread is tainted it will only be further corrupted as it is rapidly shared across 
individuals and units.  Like a tactical game of telephone, both bad and good intelligence can be 
disrupted or attenuated the further away it travels from its source.  Although this problem can be 
mitigated by sending intelligence through digital transmissions and text, much time-sensitive 
information is shared via voice or in person once it is received from an external source. 
Intelligence sharing is widely viewed as a palliative simplifier in a complex environment.  
But the exponential transmission of intelligence can sometimes obfuscate an already confused 
situation.  Although an assortment of tactical adaptations were made to how intelligence is 
gathered, analyzed, processed, and transmitted in Iraq, various problems continue to challenge 
the largely conventional intelligence cycle and sharing process.  Intelligence operations in OIF 
are still dominated by legacy planning and collection tools, systems, and technologies developed 
during the Cold War.  Because operations are driven by intelligence, particularly in a complex 
environment, organizational adaptation suffers from an architecture designed for a uni-
dimensional adversary operating in a linear environment despite efforts to circumnavigate these 
structural limitations. 
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6.3.4 Material & Technical Resources Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
• Under normal circumstances, equipment is budgeted for and procured to assist units and 
individuals in completing missions that support strategy.  The U.S. Army’s acquisition 
system is generally slow but changes to fielding initiatives have reduced the time 
required to acquire systems and equipment as the need arises.  Static equipment stocks 
can reduce the pace of adaptation when the equipment provided is inappropriate for the 
mission assigned. 
• Readily available specified funds assist the institution and sub-organizations in meeting 
budgeted needs.  Readily available general funds allow units to adapt to circumstances 
not projected in budgets.  General funds can afford units the opportunity to shape 
operations to better fit overall mission objectives. 
• An intelligence architecture designed for state-based enemies but applied in non-standard 
environments against unconventional adversaries leads to collection, analysis, and 
dissemination problems in doctrine, training, and operations.  Enhanced communications 
networks can be a double-edged sword:  the normal dissemination and sharing system 
can be bypassed thus increasing the flow of intelligence to end users; spontaneous and 
unchecked dissemination chains can also enable the sharing of too much intelligence or 
corrupted information.  The burden is on the end user (who might or might not be 
appropriately trained) to interpret, potentially, volumes and varied types of intelligence.  
The potential for adaptation through intelligence sharing is enormous but a corresponding 
increase in generalized operational and intelligence training is required for junior leaders 
and soldiers. 
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6.4 EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE 
6.4.1 Consultation 
Consultation with national and local police and military forces and informal citizen’s 
associations (tribes, paramilitary organizations, Sons of Iraq, etc.) enabled the U.S. Army to 
gather information and make adjustments that would not normally have occurred.  The local 
knowledge, language skills, familiarity with the environment, and long-standing relationships 
with the population that these forces maintained assisted the U.S. Army in altering perceptions of 
the organization’s role in Iraqi social and security affairs.  Consultation, for the most part, 
enhanced community knowledge and contributed to putting a localized face on U.S. Army 
operations. 
One of the most significant contributions of consultation with formal and informal 
organizations in Iraq was the intimate information that these organizations provided.  Most 
critical was the intelligence gathered and shared by local forces during and after the conduct of 
day-to-day operations.  The Iraqi National Guard (ING) and the Iraqi National Police (INP) in 
particular were instrumental in gathering information formally and informally (out of uniform) 
and then sharing it with U.S. Army units.  “The thing that made them [Iraqi National Police] 
more effective than anything else, though, was their ability to collect intelligence, their ability to 
be tied into the local community and to get information that others could not.”511
                                                 
511 Malkasian, Carter, “Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare: A Discussion by Senior Military Scholars,” 
The National Press Club, Washington DC, 22 July 2008. 
  Joint patrols 
with these forces enabled greater contact with the community and the establishment of the 
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mutual trust and understanding demanded by successful SSR operations.  Consulting with these 
forces greatly enhanced the knowledge base of the U.S. Army and the adaptability of small units 
that were assigned to work in tandem with these forces.512
6.4.2 Direct Action 
 
Direct action can be summed up as those actions taken either in consultation with the U.S. Army 
or independently to support or supplement the U.S. Army’s overall mission in Iraq.  Direct action 
missions involve intimate contact with the environment or the enemy by individuals and units of 
forces external to the U.S. Army.  Many of these duties were assumed by coalition forces, the 
Iraqi National Police (INP), the Iraqi National Guard (ING), and various local citizens’ 
movements supportive of the U.S. Army’s mission. 
Entities engaged in direct action enabled adaptation by sharing information about 
operational mission success and failure.  By completing their missions with differing levels of 
resources, tactics, and capabilities (and success), external units also added complexity to the 
environment and decreased the adaptive capacity of competing organizations (i.e. the 
insurgency).  Through external unit engagement with the environment and information sharing, 
U.S. Army units gained operational knowledge from a different perspective without a significant 
expenditure.  U.S. Army units were able to test new TTPs, probe and sense the environment 
                                                 
512 It is worth mentioning here that this process is routinely interrupted by the movement of units within and 
out of the theater of operations.  Personal relationships are the sine qua non of effective consultation at all levels.  
When units and particular individuals redeploy or are assigned to other Areas of Responsibility (AOR), established 
personal relationships and trust networks are weakened if not broken entirely.  This problem applies to local 
nationals as well as INP and ING units and personnel. 
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vicariously, and ultimately learn through an alternative lens.  The addition of personnel, 
equipment, and cognitive capacity by other actors contributing through direct action expanded 
the range of adaptation beyond what was indigenously possible. 
6.4.3 Cooperation 
Cooperation is intrinsically tied to consultation and direct action because it blends elements of 
both.  U.S. Army units, particularly at the tactical level, relied on cooperation with indigenous 
partners to train ING and INP forces and for conducting sensitive raids and other tactical actions.  
Additionally, intelligence was developed and shared through cooperative efforts and security was 
established by surrogate forces liaising with U.S. Army units.  Adaptation does not always have 
to be competitive: it is many times collaborative and cooperative.  Working with tribes and local 
familial organizations increased the ambient security provided to the local population while 
reducing the need for committing and exposing large numbers of U.S. Army units in hostile 
areas.  This type of cooperation has elicited positive results in the past in Iraq:  “relying on tribes 
to provide security is not a new phenomenon for Iraq.  The British did so in the 1920s; later 
Saddam Hussein became a master of using them to ensure the continuity of his rule, particularly 
once the formal Iraqi state and the Ba’ath Party withered in the 1980s and 1990s.”513
One of the most significant events in OIF was the result of cooperation between 
individual U.S. Army (and other branches) units and key leaders throughout Iraq, particularly in 
 
                                                 
513 Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, Volume 50, Number 2, April 2008, p. 67. 
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al Anbar Province.514  “The key to the turnaround on the western front was a strategy of 
partnership between local leaders and U.S. officers.  Insurgencies grow from the bottom up; they 
must be defeated by turning the population against the rebels village by village, city by city.  No 
general, no matter how brilliant, can accomplish this by maneuvering his army.  Instead, the 
army and the police must spread out and remain among the population.”515  Individual units 
leveraged local organizations and individuals for information used to specifically target rebel and 
insurgent actors.  “The locals knew who the extremists were; the Americans brought the 
hammer.  After the tribes, now aligned with the Americans, had been successful in killing some 
Qaeda members, the bulk of the Sunni population joined with them.”516
6.4.4 External Assistance Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
  Cooperative efforts in 
one area fuelled cooperation in other areas.  Knowledge of how to plan and conduct operations 
with high regard to the local environment and threat organization actors increased dramatically 
through cooperation with local forces and tribes. 
• Consultation with local actors and forces enhanced intelligence gathering operations and 
expanded the base of tactical unit knowledge.  Adaptability grew as consultation 
                                                 
514 Cooperation developed out of local dissatisfaction with the methods and actions of foreign fighters.  
Bing West describes the feelings of local tribes in Al Anbar:  “within the tribes, bands of warriors were chafing to 
take revenge after two years of seeing their tribesmen killed, their women ‘married,’ and their businesses shaken 
down for ‘protection.’”  Acting on this knowledge allowed for U.S. forces to develop relationships with tribal 
leaders at an opportune moment.  See, West, Bing, The Strongest Tribe, Random House, New York, 2008, p. 54. 
515 West, Bing, “In Victory’s Direction”, National Review, 15 September 2008, p. 52. 
516 Ibid. 
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increased and previously unattainable information was exploited to operational 
advantage. 
• Alternative means of probing, sensing, and engaging the environment through external 
personnel with differing tactics and equipment elicited different enemy responses and 
environmental cues observable by U.S. Army units.  Thus, the range of targeted 
adaptations expanded beyond the innate capabilities of individual organizations. 
• Cooperation with local leaders and forces increased the array of legitimate operations 
conducted by U.S. Army units.  Cooperation revealed intelligence and TTPs that 
shortened the adaptive timeline.  Time-sensitive information regarding enemy tactics, 
identities, and locations permitted proactive adjustments to planning and execution 
cycles. 
6.5 CRITICAL GROUP PROCESSES 
6.5.1 Application of Skills & Knowledge 
U.S. Army unit training prior to OIF was almost solely designed for combat operations.  
Therefore, individuals and units were predisposed for applying skills and knowledge related to 
conducting combat missions.  Even after entering the SSR phases of OIF, many U.S. Army units 
continued to develop combat related skills and knowledge.  SSR operations (at least initially) 
were considered a distraction from regular, conventional training and preparation.  Some units, 
upon return to home station, reacted by incorporating the standard with the unconventional: 
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 “When we returned we went back to our basics.  We trained FM 7-8, did a lot of 
role playing, convoy live fires; MOUT, and IEDs were incorporated.  Even 
though we stuck to our basics, our grassroots, we continued to move forward.”517
 
 
Some failed to make this transition even though the difficulties of applying legacy skills to a new 
environment were recognized: 
 
“Our first train-up was purely HIC.  We got back after doing that and 
transitioned from HIC to SOSO.  Those were still part of our METL but we didn’t 
focus a lot of effort on those, we were more about killing bad guys.”518
 
 
Confusion about what was trained and what was required mounted: 
 
“You were in a reactive mode just long enough to realize that this is a very, very 
fluid environment.  You had to have very, very fluid tactics.  I don’t know if we 
ever said the word doctrine while we were over there because it just didn’t 
apply.”519
 
 
                                                 
517 Soldier deployed on initial invasion and to Samawah, Personal Interview, 18 September 2008. 
518 Soldier Deployed on initial invasion (September 2002-Ausut 2003) and Baghdad (January 2005-January 
2006), Personal Interview, 8 October 2008. 
519 Soldier deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
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 Applying many of the kinetic skills and conventional knowledge gleaned from decades of 
combat training and experience was difficult in OIF (because of the nature of the environment 
and associated operations) and often times proved counterproductive on a variety of fronts.  
“Units must rely on the minimum force needed to subdue insurgents.  In fact, in COIN, ‘the more 
force you use, the less effective you are.’  In a COIN environment, the use of fires can affect 
intelligence collection adversely, and intelligence is the lifeblood of COIN.  When we capture an 
insurgent, we can exploit his knowledge of the terrorist network; when we kill an insurgent, his 
knowledge of the terrorist network dies with him.”520  The skills and knowledge relevant to 
combat depended on standard task performance which emphasized reflexive and practiced 
behaviors.  Deliberate decision-making was subordinated to standard, approved responses and 
trained patterns of conduct supported by advanced weaponry and technological aides.  
Technology and routine were meant to replace individual initiative and decision-making: the 
battlefield was supposed to be programmatic and predictable.  But in a fluid unconventional 
environment, predictability is unlikely attainable.  As David Harper argues, “counterinsurgency 
is not a technological task.  It is a face-to-face, hand-to-hand, street-to-street process of gaining 
trust and building consensus while providing security.  Technology allows us only to find and 
kill insurgents.  Low-tech interaction between Soldiers and civilians allows us to end the 
insurgency itself.”521
                                                 
520 Nagl, John A. and Paul L. Yingling, “The FA in the Long War: A New Mission in COIN,” Field 
Artillery Magazine, July-August 2006, p. 34. 
 
521 Harper, David, “Targeting the American Will and Other Challenges for 4th-Generation Leadership,” 
Military Review, March-April, 2007, p. 101. 
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 Reacting to a simultaneous full spectrum environment required the development of skills 
and abilities not germane to combat training and experience.  This occurred slowly in Iraq 
because the institutional Army failed to react to environmental stimuli countering long-standing 
beliefs and conceptions regarding modern combat operations.  The development of new methods 
of collecting and sharing information and improving unconventional knowledge-bases 
contributed to enhanced adaptive abilities.  Gompert argues that “these abilities depend on a self-
aware blending of experience-based intuition and information-based reasoning.  They can be 
utilized effectively by employing what is known as rapid-adaptive decisionmaking techniques, 
in which intuition provides initial direction, creating time and access to information, expanding 
the opportunity to reason and to check and correct intuition, and so on—all done at speeds 
required by fast-breaking circumstances.”522
6.5.2 Task Performance Competency 
  In spite of institutional resistance to the realities of 
Iraq’s operational environment, individuals and small units developed knowledge and skill bases 
that defied doctrine and conventional thought.  Necessity drove adaptations that helped units 
overcome the limitations of their narrow knowledge, skill, and training foundations. 
Enhancing task performance competency requires the timely inculcation of knowledge and skills 
gained through experience into training and execution.  In order to ensure that knowledge and 
skills are translated into tasks supporting the overall mission, organizations must develop 
evaluative metrics that measure task output.  In a complex environment with non-standard 
                                                 
522 Gompert, David C., Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN), RAND, Santa 
Monica, 2007, p. 37. 
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missions and tasks, establishing competency or relating this competency to varied mission sets is 
difficult to accomplish: no previously determined set of measurements will accurately capture 
task performance competency.  Utilizing standard, dichotomous sets of measurements 
(Success/Failure, Yes/No) would not work in Iraq; U.S. Army units instead needed a set of 
scaled measurements that could only be developed by information gathering and processing 
systems completely foreign to the conduct of and assessment of standard combat operations.  
The pervasive use of standard, conventional combat measurements of task performance 
competency during OIF highlighted the disconnect between these measurements and what was 
actually relevant for assessing effectiveness against insurgent forces in a simultaneous full 
spectrum environment.  As body counts and other combat-relevant measurements were being 
tallied, the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency went unmeasured.  Using standard 
measurements also ensured that subordinate units and organizations performed tasks that 
enhanced their combat performance metrics even if these tasks were somewhat or wholly 
irrelevant for the assigned mission. 
The confusion between tasks performed and the mission at hand cascaded from the 
highest to the lowest levels in the U.S. Army even after years of conducting OOTW in Iraq.  
“General Casey’s statements and actions suggest that he believed U.S. units were present in 
country not to end the insurgency or al Qaeda’s involvement in it, but rather to train the Iraqis to 
fight the insurgents themselves.  Unit commanders at the brigade level and below repeatedly 
state that their goal was training the Iraqis to conduct a Counterinsurgency.  Few stated that their 
mission was defeating the insurgency, securing the population, or ending sectarian violence.  
Nevertheless, most operational summaries relate the number of insurgents killed and captured, 
and the number of weapons seized.  These patterns suggest that subordinate officers believed that 
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higher commands assess them based upon these raiding metrics, despite the apparent focus on 
training Iraqi Security Forces.”523
Establishing measures of effectiveness (MOE) for various non-combat tasks suffered 
from the habitual use of quantitative indicators developed for rating operations in a combat 
environment.  MOE using qualitative indicators simply did not exist in sufficient levels to assist 
in the assessment of task performance competency during SSR operations in Iraq.  As Jim Baker 
asserts, “staff officers at various headquarters and developmental agencies can generate reams of 
quantitative measures.”
 
524  But quantitative measures were not very useful for measuring task 
performance when organizations assumed the missions of providing population security or 
reducing the effectiveness of the insurgency:  “quantitative data may not be sufficient to judge 
the degree and intensity of popular feeling, or more importantly, the way that these feelings are 
distributed throughout geographic or demographic strata.”525
Inappropriately rating the effectiveness of either the insurgency or the U.S. Army in 
achieving organizational goals was not limited to approaches within defense circles.  The use of 
quantitative measures suffused analysis conducted within and outside of the U.S. Army.  “There 
was general agreement that measures of the insurgency (including the effectiveness of 
countermeasures) were simply unavailable.  Media-created measures, including the number of 
U.S. casualties (which had reached 2,000) and Iraqi civilian casualties (then estimated at 26,000) 
 
                                                 
523 Kagan, Kimberly, “From ‘New Way Forward’ to New Commander,” The Institute for the Study of War 
and the Weekly Standard, 10 January 2007—10 February 2007, p. 14. 
524 Baker, Jim, “Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies,” Parameters, Winter 2006-07, p. 42. 
525 Ibid. 
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were of dubious value in helping the United States assess the state of the insurgency.  Ironically, 
however, they provided the insurgents with measures.”526
New, non-standard missions required the development of new, non-standard tasks.  
Typically, these tasks were developed at the unit level as individual soldiers charged with 
executing new missions struggled with ways to translate action into organizational objectives and 
vice versa.  But without an effective and relevant set of MOE to measure the end result of tasks 
performed in support of operational missions, competency was difficult to derive.  Establishing 
success in pursuit of intent or a desired end-state necessitates developing alternative 
measurement methodologies.  “A systemic methodology for reviewing organizational metrics is 
necessary within operational headquarters.  Military organizations already have various forms of 
this type of review, but the review focuses on quantitative performance in mechanistic processes 
(the science of warfare).  Endless meetings to force accountability and transparency in readiness 
rates and personnel status as well as logistics flows permeate the culture.  What does not 
commonly exist however is the same mentality for the operation processes (the art of warfare).  
All headquarters must assess their effectiveness in achieving their intended vision in order to link 
the actions of its departments to its vision.”
 
527
One effective adaptation to the difficulties of developing MOE for simultaneous full 
spectrum operations was to relax controls on training.  This effectively allowed small units to 
work on developing flexible tasks and enhancing individual decision making; if the larger 
organization was incapable of producing qualitative MOE then the responsibility for measuring 
 
                                                 
526 Schwartz, Alan, Scenarios for the Insurgency in Iraq, U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report #174, 
October 2006, p. 2. 
527 Lopez, Rafael, On Learning: Metrics Based Systems for Countering Asymmetric Threats, Op Cit, p. 59. 
 261 
competency and effectiveness would fall on small unit practitioners.  Junior leaders responsible 
for developing and conducting tasks in support of organizational and institutional goals had to 
develop training and localized MOE to assist in the conduct and assessment of mission 
success:528
 
 
“We conducted a de-centralized training approach with very little collective 
training above the platoon level.  Our focus was on squad leader and platoon 
level planning.  We also focused on leaders’ cognitive abilities and their ability to 
deal with rapidly changing situations and changes within the spectrum of 
conflict.”529
 
 
Individual and small unit responsiveness was substituted for a lack of institutionalized qualitative 
MOE; effectiveness and competency were rated by decision makers while knowledge, skills, and 
innovative TTPs were inculcated into training by small units:  
 
                                                 
528 This approach is argued in the 1/25 SBCT Initial Impressions Report: “Commanders and leaders should 
utilize innovative approaches in the development of flexible TTPs that instill instinctive leadership down o the 
platoon level.  This agile mind set can help bridge some of the doctrinal gaps when conducting operations in a COIN 
environment.”  Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. 1. 
529 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (Spring-Summer 2005) and Al Anbar Province (Fall 2005-Spring 2006), 
Personal Interview, 1 July 2008. 
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“Our TTPs were constantly adjusted depending on the threat.  Existing TTPs 
were effective in some locations, i.e. Northern Iraq, and ineffective in others, i.e. 
al Anbar.  This was almost entirely due to the nature of the threat.”530
 
 
“We would go from high-intensity to low-intensity based on insurgent activity.  
Increases in foreign fighters would cause us to go more high-intensity.  Once you 
cleaned those areas out you would transition back to a low-intensity focus on the 
insurgency.”531
 
 
 Bypassing normal training strictures and allowing junior leaders to develop training and 
assessment programs enabled the development of non-standard tasks and evaluation methods at 
the small unit level.  As long as clear intent was provided, small units could rapidly adapt task 
performance to mission accomplishment.  Assessing effectiveness could then occur at the small 
unit level.  Failure or success, and all variants in between, was all too obvious to small units 
during the conduct of operations.  Various inputs (measured during and after task 
accomplishment) were adjusted to increase competency following this assessment.  Although the 
development of comprehensive qualitative MOE for non-standard and unconventional missions 
would greatly assist the institution in evaluating overall task performance competency in 
simultaneous full spectrum operations, allowing small units familiar with conducting 
decentralized operations (because of their intimacy with the environment they have an inherent 
                                                 
530 Ibid. 
531 Soldier deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview, 23 
September 2008. 
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ability to determine their effectiveness and competency) to adjust training with knowledge and 
experience was an effective short-term adaptation. 
6.5.3 Command, Control, and Communications 
Standard and conventional Command, Control, and Communications (C3) significantly 
changed during OIF to reflect the necessity of decentralized operations and devolved decision-
making authority.  Normal command and control procedures and mechanisms were modified to 
echo the environment of Iraq where small unit operations, both friendly and enemy, dominated 
the landscape.  To properly engage this environment, “Commanders employed mission 
command, in which they provided clear intent and empowered subordinates to act on these 
opportunities within this intent.  Brigade and battalions allocated resources and conducted 
concurrent planning in support of subordinate operations.”532
Although the brigade was and is the predominant organizational form for operations in 
Iraq, rarely was an entire brigade involved in any given operation during SSR phases.  Most 
operations in OIF were handled by companies, platoons, or squads resourced and supported by 
battalion and brigade assets.  One brigade staff officer commented on the planning and conduct 
of operations in Iraq: 
 
 
“We didn’t do brigade or battalion operations.  The information we put together 
was based on how the Army works in Iraq.  It was for the battalion but was 
                                                 
532 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. 27. 
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drilled down to the point where the brigade was breaking it down for company if 
not platoon level operations.  The operations we conducted were based on the 
targeting process and were executed by a company or a platoon.”533
 
 
Despite a penchant for centralized training that begins with individual skills and ends (typically) 
with brigade-wide exercises, missions in Iraq required the nimbleness of small units being 
resourced by larger, parent units.  For most tasks an entire company, let alone a battalion or 
brigade, was too large for the effective conduct of a mission.  Stealth and speed were priority 
skills; mass and overall firepower were not decisive factors. 
 U.S. Army units altered command and control relationships with innovative approaches 
to information sharing that enhanced the awareness of individual units and empowered junior 
decision-makers.  The normal chain of command, although still in operation, became more 
collaborative as dictated by the pace and nature of operations in OIF.  Collaboration between 
small units and parent units (through the company and up to national level resources, depending 
on the mission) was supported by an extensive information sharing architecture.  Commanders, 
particularly during the combat phase but also in later phases were able to use the Army Battle 
Command System (ABCS) to track their own forces, template threat forces, and communicate 
information and visual intelligence rapidly.534
                                                 
533 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
 
534 ABCS consists of a variety of subordinate C3 systems including: Maneuver and Control System (MCS), 
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 
(FBCB2), All Source Analysis System (ASAS), Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3), and Air and 
Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS).  See discussion of ABCS in Fontenot, Op Cit, p. 394. 
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Collaboration among soldiers, both vertically and horizontally across unit boundaries and 
echelons of command, spontaneously erupted along inter-netted communications lines.  Soldiers 
took advantage of these collaborative tools to share information and obviate many unnecessary 
formal RFIs.  The RFI system followed normal command and control procedures and in some 
cases took days to fulfill.  But the pace of operations and the presence of varied threat 
organizations required the near instantaneous sharing or information as well as TTPs.  “Lower 
level leaders must be empowered to develop and implement TTPs that are decentralized, flexible 
and tailored to the battle space in the ever changing environment associated with stability 
operations in urban terrain.”535
Borne out of the necessity of operations in OIF and in support of emerging collaborative 
efforts by individuals and small units, the U.S. Army developed software named ‘Green Force 
Tracker’ that allows “soldiers around the world to communicate with each other using instant 
messages and Web-conferences, capture and transmit screenshots, and edit documents 
together.”
  Many of these efforts resulted in information sharing that was, 
largely, uncontrollable but nonetheless contributed to operational success and enhanced unit 
planning capabilities. 
536  “Green Force Tracker is an Army adaptation of IBM’s Lotus Same-time 
commercial instant-messaging software.”537
                                                 
535 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. viii. 
  Collaborative tools enable individuals and small 
units too pool knowledge and experience across unit lines at a pace that would be impossible if 
536 Osborn, Kris, “Army Fields New Instant-Messaging Software Program,” Army Times, 17 November 
2008, p. 22. 
537 Ibid. 
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normal command and control procedures were followed. Relaxing command and control 
procedures to better reflect operational requirements enhanced both formal and informal 
information sharing.  In doing so, parent units were able to enhance the capabilities and 
adaptability of subordinate units.  “Responsiveness was greatly enhanced at lower echelons by 
employing mission command, enabling battalions and company commanders to increase the 
tempo of operations to a level where the enemy is forced to react to friendly actions and cannot 
gain the initiative.”538
6.5.4 Cognition and Behavior 
 
Cognition and behavior are shaped by training, experience, and culture.539  In OIF, individual 
cognition and behavior, formed by preparation for kinetic engagements, limited the range of 
responses and adaptations that units were capable of making.  “Our own regulations, 
bureaucratic processes, staff relationships, and culture complicate the ability of our soldiers and 
leaders to achieve synchronized nonlethal effects across the battlespace.  Our traditional training 
model, still shuddering from the echo of our Cold War mentality, has infused our organization to 
think only in kinetic terms.”540
                                                 
538 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. 28. 
 
539 Cognition and behavior are mutually reinforcing.  Cognition shapes behavior and behavior reinforces 
cognition. 
540 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: the Requirement for Full-Spectrum 
Operations,” Op Cit. 
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Individuals and units tend to think and respond in terms related to their training.  Being 
immersed in concepts, terms, and behaviors inculcated through conventional training ensured 
that, in the face of an alternative environment, units would be slow to change.  Conventional 
training emphasized rote responses to set-piece environments—tasks to standard;541
Simultaneous and decentralized full spectrum operations in Iraq required units to adapt to 
the environment and the enemy quickly.  This necessitated obtaining clear guidance from higher 
headquarters regarding the desired end-state and at a minimum, some conceptualization as to 
how to achieve this end-state.  Without the appropriate training in matching standard tasks with 
unorthodox missions, individual units struggled with achieving the objectives assigned by higher 
commands.  Compounding this problem was the difficulty that higher commands had with 
developing the appropriate missions in the first place.  The range of tasks required for SSR 
operations, most of which were untrained, left commanders with the difficult job of developing 
 a shifting 
environment required the development of undiscovered tasks that correspondingly, were never 
trained.  Training that is focused narrowly on the accomplishment of tasks instead of end-states 
or commander’s intent truncates individual and unit abilities to perceive and adjust to changing 
environmental stimuli.  Thus, OIFs evolution into a simultaneous full spectrum operation 
resulted in a cognitive adaptation deficit with units struggling to adapt conventional tasks to non-
standard but desired end-states. 
                                                 
541 An interesting anecdote captures this mentality even in headquarters units: “The sectarian conflict 
between Shia and Sunnis goes back 1500 years, and the folks at the US Embassy in Baghdad believe it can be 
solved in 2 years with power point presentations detached from the complex dynamics defining the conflict that 
don’t readily make for neatly delineated line-charts.”  al-Waeli, Kadhim H., Iraq: Cultural/Political and Media 
Observations, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Camp Victory Baghdad, 9 November 2007, p. 3. 
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clearly stated missions that could be conducted by units bereft of an appropriate training 
regimen.  As a result, when the environment changed or the war-gamed plan dissolved, many 
units had a difficult time reacting appropriately.  Without a clear mission that could be supported 
by conventional tasks, units that ran into environmental challenges either had to await further 
guidance or had to invent skills extemporaneously.  Clear guidance and preparation based on this 
guidance, however non-doctrinal the supporting tasks might have been, were the sine qua non of 
achieving the desired end-state for missions in OIF.  “In order to develop self-synchronizing 
units, there are certain critical components that the relevant units, or systems must possess.  The 
first is the endstate or goal that the unit is trying to achieve.  Whether the word is endstate or 
effect or aim at this point is not very important.  What is important is for that unit to know what 
it is trying to achieve.  It must clearly understand its purpose.”542
Enabling greater organizational adaptation requires that inputs to individual and unit 
cognition and behavior change.
 
543
                                                 
542 Hales, Samuel E., COIN Modeling: an MDMP Technique for Planning Counter-Insurgency Campaigns, 
School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 May 2005, p. 20. 
  Experience in OIF and to a lesser degree OEF and 
corresponding changes in the culture of the U.S. Army based on this experience have enabled a 
degree of change across the institutional Army.  Complex environments, like those found in each 
of these operations, place units in the position of having to self-organize based on a set of rules, 
543 In other words, “leaders must create a climate that fosters adaptability.”  See, Dorsey, David, et al, 
Adaptability and Adaptive Performance: Current Findings and Future Directions for Building Adaptive Forces, 
Personnel Decisions Research Institutes, Inc., Hampton, VA, 15 July 2006, p. 8. 
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leadership, mission and organization.544
6.5.5 Critical Group Processes Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
  Training that forces individuals and units to adapt to the 
commander’s intent or desired end-state is required to revolutionize cognition and behavior. 
• Interaction with the environment and the enemy in simultaneous full spectrum operations 
forced small units to expand skill and knowledge sets (through innovative training and 
information sharing) beyond those trained prior to OIF and in spite of initial institutional 
resistance to change. 
• Relaxing controls on training and shifting the focus of operational preparation to small 
units allowed junior leaders to localize MOE based upon experience, trial, error, and 
success.  Inputs to competency were adjusted as familiarity with decentralized maneuvers 
in simultaneous full spectrum operations increased. 
• Collaboration among soldiers across unit boundaries, both vertically and horizontally, 
bypassed normal C2 chains and the formal RFI process.  These informal adaptations for 
rapidly evolving operations spurred formal adjustments to how information is shared 
among individuals and units. 
• Cognition and behavioral adaptations at the small unit level, through contact with the 
environment and the enemy, drove institutional cultural changes that in turn altered 
perceptions of the role of individuals and units in support of non-standard missions. 
                                                 
544 Karmer, Eric-Hans, Organizing Doubt: Grounded Theory, Army Units and Dealing with Dynamic 
Complexity, Copenhagen Business School Press, 2007. 
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6.6 LEARNING 
6.6.1 Knowledge Collection 
Knowledge collection has always been a priority for U.S. Army units but the process was 
significantly enhanced during OIF through the emplacement of personnel from CALL in tactical 
units, through individual unit initiatives to collect knowledge in easily transferrable forms, and 
by communications capabilities allowing for the easy storage and transfer of information 
between individuals and units.  AARs (consisting of a review of what was to be accomplished as 
well as the strengths and weaknesses presented during any unit action) were used extensively to 
gather information following the completion of a mission during OIF.545  In addition to 
commonly employed AARs unit leaders also conducted patrol debriefs (many times with the 
assistance of staff personnel (typically a representative of the unit S2 section (intelligence) or by 
company-level Field Artillery personnel))546
 
 to collect and correlate lessons learned regarding 
enemy activity and friendly reactions to this activity: 
“Executive summaries and lessons learned were recorded after every operation, 
no matter how small.  This information was stored and shared through a portal 
                                                 
545 AARs are also used extensively in training as a way to recapitulate events and capture success and 
failure. 
546 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry), Op Cit, p. 78. 
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system available to all units within our task force and also those at home station 
preparing to deploy to relieve us.”547
 
 
 “We had an S2 representative attached to our Combat Outpost.  We would give 
all our information to this guy and it would be filtered back up through the 
company to the battalion.  The battalion would receive information from all of the 
COPs.  The battalion would do the analysis.”548
 
 
The liberal use of debriefings was only hampered by the unavailability of personnel to officially 
capture lessons from sub-unit missions or by the preponderance of other mission requirements.  
“Battalion S-2 sections were not able to debrief all patrols due to the sheer number of patrols, 
additional taskings (such as supporting detainee operations) and the limited number of personnel 
available in the S-2 shop.  S-2 sections did, however, make a considerable effort to debrief all 
patrols that had significant contact with direct force and IEDs in order to effectively derive as 
much information as possible.  Patrols were usually debriefed at the company level by the Fire 
Support Team (FIST), who then forwarded significant or relevant information up to the battalion 
                                                 
547 Soldier deployed to Mosul (Spring-Summer 2005) and al Anbar Province (Fall 2005-Spring 2006), 
Personal Interview, 1 July 2008. 
548 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
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S-2.  The Company FSOs used a standard debriefing format, but time-sensitive and actionable 
information was sent either by FBCB2 or FM during the patrol.”549
Officially, reams of post-action information were collected and recorded by CALL and 
by unit representatives and were distributed widely through various channels (discussed below).  
But knowledge collection was not limited to what was captured through official sanction; many 
informal methods were employed for information gathering and tacit knowledge collection was 
enhanced by frequent interaction among soldiers on routine missions.  Informal knowledge 
collection and internalization not only enabled individual soldiers and units to retrieve valuable 
information when needed but also affected individual and unit capacity for knowledge 
application and task performance adaptation: 
 
 
 “Informal lessons were more important than formal.  You get the structured 
broad overview from the formal.  Right seat ride and broad spectrum ‘this is what 
is going on.’  When you walk a particular area and get to talking, that is when 
you start getting the informal perspective.  Questions can be asked and you can 
talk things out.”550
 
 
Informal knowledge collection also aided in the development of a capacity for learning: 
 
                                                 
549 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 1 (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry), Op Cit, pp. 56-57. 
550 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi (November 
2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
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 “Now will they learn exactly?  No, because Samarra is not the exact same thing 
as Mosul.  And so you can’t bring the lessons over from here to there.  But what 
they started developing is capacity.  He or she could go from Samarra to Mosul 
and say, it is not the same here, but you know what, I can figure this out.”551
 
 
And for unlearning when and where appropriate: 
 
 “You had to be careful of what you learned.  If a guy was digging he may be 
emplacing an IED or he may be looking for water if the pump house wasn’t 
working.  We fixed the pump house so that the number of people digging for water 
decreased.”552
 
 
 The bulk of information available regarding lessons learned in Iraq has been formally 
collected and is available in either printed or graphic form to be used by deploying and deployed 
units to inform planning and operations.  These lessons can be used to build training scenarios, to 
inform the professional military education system, and to help build or reform doctrine.  More 
importantly, the lessons that have been internalized as tacit knowledge (developed through actual 
experience and the informal sharing of lessons by a particular individual or unit in contact with 
the environment and the enemy) are what is used to give context to any formal collected 
knowledge:  formal or explicit knowledge is tempered by the level of acquired tacit knowledge 
                                                 
551 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wong, Leonard, Personal Interview, 6 November 2008. 
552 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi (November 
2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
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of the end-user.  Although it is difficult if not impossible to capture tacit knowledge, it is 
invaluable to the knowledge collection, storage, and retrieval process.  Without a body of tacit 
knowledge to inform and support explicit knowledge, the lessons captured by debriefs and AARs 
would be of far less value.  Informal knowledge collection enables individuals to rapidly 
incorporate formal knowledge into a corpus of information allowing for comprehensive and 
subjective understanding.  Repeat exposure to this knowledge, when incorporated with tacit 
knowledge gained, enhances collective knowledge retention. 
By laboriously capturing lessons learned through a formal process and by encouraging 
informal exchanges of information among units and individuals, the U.S. Army comprehensively 
added to the knowledge collection process and thus enabled greater knowledge retention through 
iterative deployments to the theater. 
6.6.2 Knowledge Transfer 
The transfer of mission-useful knowledge was significantly slowed during the initial phases of 
OIF but increased as units and individuals reacted to realities on the ground.  A preliminary 
focus on combat operations, or derivatives thereof, ensured that explicit knowledge transfer was 
infused with lessons related almost solely to combat activity.  Of course, informal and tacit 
knowledge transfer and collection, respectively, reflected knowledge gleaned from adaptations 
made to adjust to a simultaneous full spectrum environment but without an official complement 
of explicit knowledge transfer, these lessons would achieve something less than full impact.  
Formal systems for knowledge transfer among units and individuals were not fully developed 
until after conditions deteriorated in Iraq.  Not until later in the campaign was full spectrum 
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knowledge collected and transferred in a timely fashion and in accordance with operational 
requirements and needs. 
 Units moving in and out of Iraq on a fairly regular basis caused uneven and imperfect 
transfers of knowledge.  On the one hand, deployment and redeployment necessitated that 
incoming and outgoing units share information both formally and informally, however 
incompletely this was accomplished.  But units leaving Iraq departed with a significant store of 
tacit knowledge gained from experience and interaction with the local population.  This 
information could not be easily passed through either formal or informal channels and the 
process of units relieving one another had a deleterious and abrupt effect on the collective body 
of knowledge captured by any particular unit.  “Instead of staying in country until the job is 
done, commanders and entire units sever relations with a contested population and essentially 
force fresh arrivals to learn anew.”553  Hashim describes the troop-rotation process as ‘insidious’ 
and argues that this policy allows little time for the development and institutionalization of area 
specific knowledge.  Worse yet, “The unit might, for example, be unable to transfer that 
institutionalized knowledge to the one taking over from it.  There may simply be no mechanism 
for doing so, or, as is often the case, the unit’s knowledge may be limited to a very small group 
of harried and harassed officers who simply do not have the time to pass information to their 
successors, or are not tasked effectively to do so.”554
                                                 
553 Vrooman, Stephen A., A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept: The Galula Compass, School of 
Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 May, 2005, 
p. 46. 
 
554 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Op Cit, p. 338. 
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Although replacing the knowledge lost through the departure of a unit from the theater 
was impossible, over time individual units and the institution developed methods for transferring 
large volumes of lessons and knowledge acquired to be incorporated either in training, education, 
or on future deployments: 
 
“During both tours, lessons learned were incorporated into future operations.  
This was a priority in the force protection realm.  As for formal lessons learned, I 
can tell you that when I went back to the Schoolhouse for the MICCC [Military 
Intelligence Captain’s Career Course] they were all about incorporating TTPs 
into the curriculum.  As one of the few combat vets in the class at that point, I 
often found myself on the podium relaying my experiences from the war.”555
 
 
“That is why we have the Center for Army Lessons Learned, that’s why they have 
embedded lessons learned analysts deployed in each of the divisions, that’s why 
we conduct routine VTC linkages with those that have deployed and those that are 
getting ready to deploy.  The institution listens in on that and then makes those 
program of instruction [POI] adjustments that are necessary given that which we 
are hearing from the field.”556
 
 
                                                 
555 Soldier deployed to Baghdad (March 2003-August 2003, November 2004-November 2005), Personal 
Interview, 1 July 2008. 
556 General (Ret.) Wallace, William, Personal Interview, 21 November 2008. 
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Knowledge was also transferred in theater formally and informally through various means and to 
address a number of shortfalls in unit SOPs, doctrine, and typical collection and sharing practices 
that inhibited the free-flow of information:   
 
“When you are talking about any COE, the best lessons learned don’t come from 
an AAR, and INSTUM, or an OPSUM.  I truly believe that they come from 
soldiers talking to other soldiers; everybody telling war stories…bring this, don’t 
bring that…use 550 cord or don’t.  They are informal but they help in the formal 
adaptation process as a unit…Functionality overrides everything, particularly 
uniformity.”557
 
 
“Everybody was allowed to talk back and forth and information thus got out.  
This was unlike a formal brief where nobody wants to talk and nobody wants to 
raise their hand and the only outcome is an hour or two wasted from everyone’s 
life.  I think that the Army is going to a more informal system and I think that it is 
better.  The young gunner sees a lot that perhaps a senior guy doesn’t see.  That 
can be brought to the table and everybody can learn from it.  The informal way is 
probably the best way to go.”558
 
 
                                                 
557 Soldier deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
558 Soldier deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal 
Interview, 23 September 2008. 
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Informal methods had the effect of enabling the transfer of information on an as needed 
basis: 
“If you asked a chat room for a response, you would get 10 replies that you could 
choose from almost instantly.  If you sent an official RFI, you could forget it; you 
had to wait for 3 days to get a response and by that time it was irrelevant.”559
 
 
“If you are doing things informally, you have to apply a sanity check but I would 
rather be making the sanity check, as a leader, than having someone else do it for 
me.  People would reply on MIRC from across the country.  It was a lot better 
than the formalized version.  At the brigade, you are just pulling from your 
battalions and you are pushing up to higher.  Higher is just summarizing the 
whole country across a set of indicators or questions that they deemed important.  
I don’t think that I ever read a Corps INTSUM because it was one hand over the 
world crap that I couldn’t use to give to battalions.”560
 
 
In addition to informal methods developed in theater among soldiers, other knowledge 
transfer databases and websites were established upon the return to garrison.  Younger officers 
familiar with the collaborative potential of the internet established a number of helpful websites 
like Companycommand.com and PlatoonLeader.org for returning and deploying junior officers.  
“The explosive growth of social networking and online collaboration tools have produced a 
groundswell of activity among the Army’s younger officers, many of whom grew up with the 
                                                 
559 Soldier deployed to Mosul (November 2004- October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
560 Ibid. 
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Internet.  Communities of practice are rapidly spreading knowledge across the Army in ways 
never before possible.  These sites were launched without the Army’s financial support.  These 
were absorbed into the Army.mil network as part of BCKS [Battle Command Knowledge 
System].”561
Formally, U.S. Army units, sometimes independently and sometimes with institutional 
support or direction established websites to enable knowledge transfer within and among units.  
CavNet was launched by then MG Peter Chiarelli on the Secret IP Router Network (SIPRnet)
 
562 
and “the LANCERSNET website forum was developed by the brigade to share lessons learned 
across the AOR.  The site’s proponent was the brigade S-3, and was maintained by the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Liaison Officer (LNO) attached to the brigade throughout the 
operational deployment.”563
 As the process of knowledge transfer matured over time, it was enhanced by increasing 
levels of individual experience and tacit knowledge retention.  Cataldo argues that the greater the 
levels of task and group experience an individual or group of individuals has, the greater their 
levels of information sharing.
  Formal methods of knowledge transfer were important for the 
transfer of large volumes of required information and knowledge on a continuous basis. 
564
                                                 
561 FCW Staff, Army Lessons Learned: Junior Officers Sharing Battlefield Experiences in Near-Real Time 
Adapt Faster than the Army’s Top Military Leaders, 15 July 2006, 
  Information sharing and knowledge transfer is enhanced by an 
http://www.fcw.com/print/12_25/news/95271-
1.html, accessed on 3 July 2008. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker 
Brigade Combat Team 2 (1st Brigade, 25th Infantry) (Draft), Op Cit, p. 3. 
564 Cataldo, Marcelo, et al., “The Effect of Personnel Selection Schemes on Knowledge Transfer”, Working 
Paper, CASOS, Undated, p. 49. 
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organization’s structure and the level of connectivity within this structure.  Cataldo also argues 
that organizational structure has “a strong effect on the amount of total knowledge transferred 
with and without turnover, with the fully-connected structure as the most beneficial for 
knowledge transfer, while the hierarchical structure was the most restrictive.”565
  Flattening unit hierarchy happened both formally and informally during OIF in response 
to the need to accelerate methods of knowledge transfer.  Chiarelli and Smith argue that the U.S. 
Army can further flatten organizational structures by “doing more to enable unconstrained 
horizontal integration and rapid knowledge transfer.  Sometimes the most critical information on 
the battlefield doesn’t come from the chain of command, but from external sources.  We must 
enable those most in need of that information to access it without the filters a chain of command 
traditionally imposes.”
  Although 
hierarchical organizations (like the U.S. Army) would normally be restricted by design 
constraints in the amount of potential knowledge transferred (even during periods of little 
personnel turnover), advances in communicative capacity and the enhancement of formal and 
informal knowledge transfer dulled the effect normally caused by a hierarchical design.  Aided 
by increased tacit knowledge among individual officers and soldiers, as OIF deployments 
progressed, and by the development of various transfer mechanisms, the U.S. Army was able to 
overcome many organizational constraints and inhibitors to the successful and timely transfer of 
knowledge.    
566
                                                 
565 Ibid. 
  Continued experiments with knowledge transfer mechanisms and 
individual unit and soldier adaption with the tools available for increased information sharing 
566 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Stephen M. Smith, “Learning from Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of 
Preparing for a Dangerous Future,” Military Review, September-October 2007, p. 7. 
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will ensure increased organizational flattening via advanced levels of organizational knowledge 
transfer.  
6.6.3 Knowledge Integration 
The knowledge collected and transferred by the U.S. Army during OIF has been integrated into 
doctrine, education, and training and has been internalized as tacit knowledge by OIF 
participants.  The process of knowledge integration by units and individuals has improved 
throughout the OIF campaign as more and more units have trained for and deployed to theater.  
Cragin argues that an organization’s absorptive capacity for knowledge is derived from the 
amount and type of knowledge and capability that an organization possesses as it seeks to 
integrate new knowledge.567
 
  Certainly, the initially combat-centric U.S. Army has increased its 
absorptive capacity of alternative types of knowledge by engaging in simultaneous full spectrum 
operations in Iraq.  Experience and subsequent adaptations have led to a greater capacity for 
integration and modifications of key inputs like doctrine and policy: 
 “The Army has done a very good job in my eyes of creating doctrine that 
appreciates the strategic situation that it finds itself in.  I am pointing to FM 3-0 
Operations, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, and FM 3-07 Stability Operations.  The 
Army has done a remarkable job in adapting its training for the wars in which it 
                                                 
567 Cragin, Kim, et al., “Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New 
Technologies,” RAND, Santa Monica, 2007, p. 16. 
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commonly finds itself in particular the combat training centers have completely 
revamped how they do business.”568
 
 
“Once upon a time we thought that we could do combat operations and then we 
would follow that with what we used to call operations other than war.  What we 
have come to realize in this current operational context, and perhaps it has 
always been that way but we weren’t focused on it, is that war is war and that 
stability operations have an equivalent place in the execution of operations 
because the fact of the matter is, in my judgment, that major combat operations 
provide…they set the conditions for that which follows and what follows is the 
creation of sufficient stability in order for other elements of national power to be 
applied to the problem.”569
 
 
The U.S. Army also integrated knowledge derived from experience in OIF into individual and 
unit training upon entry into the Army: 
 
“So, if you were to look at basic training back in the early part of this century, 
about 2000, 2001, the amount of field training that a soldier got was something 
on the order of 7-10 days.  Today, they do three field training exercises and 
frequently, movement to the field is a training exercise in itself, where they have 
to actually do a tactical movement to a training site and en route to that training 
                                                 
568 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Nagl, John, Telephone Interview, 14 September 2008. 
569 Ibid. 
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site they might have to react to cultural circumstances that are presented to them, 
react to IEDs and provide security and that sort of thing.  Importantly, in virtually 
every one of our training bases, we have Forward Operating Bases that are 
designed to give the soldier at least the context of what the physical environment 
might be that he is going to be presented with when he goes down range.”570
 
 
And into instructor training: 
 
“The Army itself got smart and filtered lessons down so that everyone would 
know what was happening on the battlefield.  All of the evaluators had to have 
been deployed to Iraq.  The only jobs that we could get on returning from Iraq 
was training and evaluation, JRTC or NTC, teaching, drill sergeant, or 
ROTC.”571
 
 
And at the training centers: 
 
 “In 2006, JRTC had FOBs set up.  When we went through, the cantonment area 
was set up as a FOB and when you left you went to a patrol base and you 
operated out of a patrol base.”572
                                                 
570 Ibid. 
 
571 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interrview, 21 June 2008. 
572 Soldier Deployed to Baghdad (March 2004-March 2005), Personal Interview, 22 September 2008. 
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“They turned Hohenfelz into Iraq…the Army was trying to transfer the knowledge 
that we acquired while we were deployed…all of our scenarios were drived by 
people that just got back from Iraq.”573
 
 
This had significant structural implications: 
 
 “Our present cycle of deploy/reset/deploy is ideal for real inculcation of lessons 
learned.  We’ve skipped ahead dramatically this decade in terms of training and 
organization.  The modular TO&Es [Table of Organization and Equipment] and 
our COIN doctrine would both been studied to death absent this conflict.”574
 
 
 One noteworthy problem the U.S. Army and individual units stumbled upon when trying 
to integrate knowledge was that it resisted translation into circumstances foreign to its genesis.  
Much of the knowledge gathered during OIF was localized, temporal, or only pertained to 
specific unit types: 
 
“Very few SOPs or TTPs would work for the brigade.  They would probably work 
at the company level or below.”575
                                                 
573 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interrview, 21 June 2008. 
 
574 Major General Bolger, Dan, E-mail Interview, 13 September 2008. 
575 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
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The process of ‘lateral transmission’576
 
 of unit lessons was dealt with in one of three ways: 1) 
robust analysis for generalization was conducted by CALL or another supporting organization 
for institution-wide lesson sharing and integration; 2) localized or unit specific knowledge was 
characterized as such and was not integrated widely but on an as-needed basis or when then the 
knowledge was applicable to the environmental conditions at hand or; 3) individual leaders 
digested broader lessons and made individual decisions as to whether and how to integrate 
knowledge into training and operations.  For instance: 
“TTPs were much different the second time.  We walked down the road in front of 
tanks to clear IEDs—that didn’t work out very well.  We started using dismounted 
patrols and UAVs together.  We got much more accomplished dismounted than 
we did driving down the road.”577
 
 
“I think that it is human nature to take what did work and try to use it in the next 
scenario.  What you need to take into a situation is that you need to adapt very 
quickly.  You start coming up with contingencies and that helps the adaptation 
                                                 
576 Huba Wass de Czege argues that “complexity and novelty conspire to make lessons learned in one 
mission potentially non-transferrable to the next.”  See Wass de Czege, Huba, “Rethinking IO: Complex Operations 
in the Information Age,” Military Review, November-December 2008, p. 17. 
577 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
 286 
process.  You need to think of what they are going to do next and try to head it off.  
That is what we were supposed to do.”578
 
 
“We were a kinetic Army who understood how to destroy the enemy.  Today, we 
have made tremendous progress in our understanding of counterinsurgency, and 
we have truly built capacity around brigade combat teams who can be task 
organized to do almost anything.”579
 
 
The institutional Army lagged far behind in adaptation speed when compared to small 
units and individuals.  The standard method for the institutional integration of knowledge 
requires in-depth (and time consuming) analysis for the broad applicability of lessons which are 
either shared through publication, are reflected in changes in doctrine, or are incorporated into 
lessons in the professional military education system.  At the lower unit levels, knowledge 
integration and adaptation naturally occurred much faster.  Small unit leaders could make 
adjustments based upon local knowledge without consideration of whether this knowledge 
translated into broader lessons and without conducting lengthy in-depth analysis.  With the 
availability of data sharing tools, small unit leaders transmitted knowledge and conveyed the 
operational nuances necessary for interpreting and employing this knowledge.  Integrating 
explicit knowledge created by similar units at similar echelons requires far fewer interactions 
than developing and integrating requisite tacit knowledge for the same mission or operation.580
                                                 
578 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
  
579 Lieutenant Colonel Crider, James, E-mail Interview, 22 September 2008. 
580 See discussion of tacit knowledge in Cragin, et al, Op Cit. 
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Any formal or informal method for integrating explicit knowledge and then translating it into 
tacit knowledge through application significantly decreased the time required to make 
adaptations.  Immediate or timely knowledge integration at the small unit level and the 
subsequent reintegration of this knowledge by the institution enabled comprehensive assimilation 
throughout the theater.  The institution and its sub-components created a supplementary and 
overlapping integration techniques ensuring cyclical knowledge integration across the force. 
6.6.4 Learning Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
• Formal and informal methods of knowledge collection enabled adaptation through robust 
collection and application in the building of tacit knowledge.  Collective knowledge 
retention is abetted by formal and informal collection through iterative exposure to the 
environment and methods employed to reinforce collection and retention procedures. 
• The cycling of units in and out of as well as across the Iraqi theater of operations 
necessitated but also disrupted knowledge transfer.  Individuals and units formally and 
informally established methods for transferring knowledge on an immediate, requested, 
and as-needed basis.  Information sharing tools enhanced this process and flattened 
organization structures that would normally retard the timely transfer of knowledge. 
• Knowledge collected and transferred was integrated into doctrine, education, and training 
and has been internalized as tacit knowledge through experience.  Problems of lateral 
transmission of knowledge were overcome by small unit interpretation and individual 
decision making.  The normal pattern of integration adapted to include supplementary 
individual, unit, and institutional initiatives. 
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6.7 CONCLUSION:  THE BROADER EFFECTS OF ADAPTATION 
Most if not all institutional adaptations made during the course of events in OIF were driven or 
inspired by adaptations (both successful and unsuccessful) made at the small unit level in 
reaction to organizational design and changing environmental stimuli in the pursuit of mission 
success.  The dearth of policy, guidance, education, and training for simultaneous full spectrum 
operations necessitated rapid and continuous changes by individual decision makers and units in 
contact with the environment.  Lessons learned became lessons applied:  units grappled with 
adjusting inputs (across the range of inputs described and discussed in this chapter) and outputs 
to match tactical action with strategic intent while the institution, albeit slowly at first, adjusted 
resources, policy, doctrine, and strategy to better match and augment successes at the sub-unit 
level.  
In total, the U.S. Army developed (at the unit and institutional levels) and maintains a 
massive organizational capacity for self-evaluation and adaptation.  The communications, 
training, and education architectures, even if not intentionally designed for this purpose, allow 
for manifold adaptive efforts across the force.  Merging resources with formal and informal 
methods of adaptation within and across units enabled significant adjustments to be made in 
response to changing environmental cues.  Integrating vast flows of information from disparate 
sources at the institutional level combined with experimentation and innovative decision making 
at the unit level led to the creation of an adaptive learning apparatus where inputs, outputs, and 
learning were adjusted either incrementally or inclusively depending on the nature and general 
relevance of the adaptation(s) made.  Although initial adaptive efforts were not integrated into 
the core structures of the U.S. Army (culture, doctrine, training, intelligence, etc.) at first, 
individual and small unit successes were incorporated (over time) into the total force through 
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organizational osmosis, leadership, and through bottom-up adjustments.  For any substantive 
adaptations to take hold, mutually reinforcing adaptation had to occur at many levels: 
 
“Unless the larger institution adapts, what you will have is individual units 
finding individual solutions; some of which might be right and some of which 
might be wrong but none of which gets transferred.  And so you end up learning 
the same lessons over, and over again.”581
 
 
Gehler argues likewise:  “Individual learning can be present and understood by the 
organization’s members, but institutional learning does not occur unless the institution accepts, 
integrates, and disseminates this individual learning, and it becomes widely accepted.”582
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, contains a laundry list of adaptations that serve as 
a record of changes made across the force during OIF: 
 
• Forces that learn COIN effectively have generally—developed COIN doctrine and 
practices locally; 
• Established local training centers during COIN operations; 
• Regularly challenged their assumptions, both formally and informally; 
• Learned about the broader world outside the military and requested outside assistance in 
understanding foreign political, cultural, social and other situations beyond their 
experience; 
                                                 
581 Colonel (Ret.) Mansoor, Peter, Telephone Interview, 12 September 2008. 
582 Gehler, Christopher P., Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and Innovative Leaders 
for Today and Tomorrow, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, August 2005, p. 5. 
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• Promoted suggestions from the field; 
• Fostered open communications between senior officers and their subordinates; 
• Established rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned; 
• Coordinated closely with governmental and nongovernmental partners at all command 
levels; 
• Proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people in the conflict 
zone.583
 
 
“These are not always practices for an organization to establish.  Adopting them is particularly 
challenging for a military engaged in a conflict.  However, these traits are essential for any 
military confronting an enemy who does not fight using conventional tactics and who adapts 
while waging irregular warfare.”584  The explicit acknowledgement in this manual that “learning 
organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not”585
Although the development of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and the subsequent 
publication of FM 3-07, Stability Operations (establishing a unique and comprehensive set of 
 is evidence that the 
institution not only received but integrated organizational adaptations and in a sense achieved a 
level of self-awareness missing prior to the commencement of OIF. 
                                                 
583 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 
p. x. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Ibid. 
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tasks for stability operations),586
                                                 
586 Establish Civil Security: Enforce Cessation of Hostilities, Peace Agreements, and Other Arrangements; 
Determine Disposition and Constitution of National Armed and Intelligence Services; Conduct Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration; conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, and Freedom of Movement; 
Support Idenfitication; Protect Key Personnel and Facilities; Clear Explosive and CBRN Hazards.  Establish Civil 
Control: Establish Public Order and Safety; Establish Interim Criminal Justice System; Support Law Enforcement 
and Police Reform; Support Judicial Reform; Support Property Dispute Resolution Processes; Support Justice 
system Reform; Support Corrections Reform; Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals; Support Public Outreach 
and Community Rebuilding Programs.  Restore Essential Services: Provide Essential Civil Services; Tasks Related 
to Civilian Dislocation (Assist Dislocated Civilians, Support Assistance to Dislocated Civilians, Support Security to 
Dislocated Civilians Camps); Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs; Support Nonfood 
Relief Programs; Support Humanitarian Demining; Support Human Rights Initiatives; Support Public Health 
Programs; Support Education Programs.  Support to Governance: Support Transitional Administrations; Supportt 
Development of Local Governance; Support Anticorruption Initiatives; Support Elections.  Support to Economic 
and Infrastructure Development: Support Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation; Support Monetary 
Institutions and Programs; Support National Treasury Operations; Support Public Sector Investment Programs; 
Support Private Sector Development; Protect Natural Resources and Environment; Support Agricultural 
Development Programs; Restore Transportation Infrastructure; Restore Telecommunications Infrastructure; Support 
General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs.  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, 
Stability Operations, Washington DC, October 2008, p. 3-2—3-19. 
 demonstrate an institutional recognition of past and current 
difficulties encountered in Iraq and the enormous strides taken to adapt to these difficulties, other 
doctrine and institutional structures have yet to significantly change.  Doctrine, perhaps by 
design and certainly abetted by organizational structure, has a way of insulating itself from 
significant change.  In tandem with a change-resistant structure, dogmatic prescriptions in 
doctrine can significantly buffer any attempts at reform or the development of alternative 
strategies.  “Today’s military change process produces a sub-optimal strategy, because feedback 
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within the system becomes distorted by the restrictions that doctrine and structure place on the 
strategy.”587  Furthermore, “the Army’s structure is as ageless as its doctrine.  Even though the 
Army leadership acknowledges that the threat environment is changing, it has yet to shift focus 
toward alternative organizational structures.”588
Despite an apparent recognition that operations in Iraq required adapting the institutional 
mindset and approach to conflict, Wass de Czege argues that this has not necessarily happened:  
“no one in authority has yet directed changes in doctrine and general practice based on the 
missions that prevail today.  Doctrine still centers on missions with unambiguous and unitary 
objectives.  Such missions involve distinct and hierarchical adversaries and allies within clear 
contextual boundaries.  They present problems one can solve using a linear logic.  Most missions 
from Grenada to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have required the pursuit of multiple parallel 
and sequential objectives involving shadowy and non-hierarchical adversaries.  They have 
involved local informal alliances with varied partners within uncertain contextual boundaries that 
contain problems exhibiting complex, non-linear and interactive causal chains possessing no 
clear solution.”
 
589
Another persistent problem plaguing new doctrine as well as old is an inability to tie 
adaptive responses to an actual and measurable effect on the adversary or the environment.  
“Currently, the Army does not have a doctrinal method to evaluate the effectiveness of its actions 
along a particular line of operation.  By using measures of effectiveness as a tool that links the 
 
                                                 
587 Alden, James G., “Eyes Wide Shut: Rigid Doctrine and a Legacy Structure Make the Army Slow to 
Adapt,” Armed Forces Journal, March 2007. 
588 Ibid. 
589 Wass de Czege, Op Cit, p. 17. 
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logical lines of operations to the operational objectives and eventually the strategic end state, 
commanders can develop the measurement technique necessary to evaluate the success of their 
counterinsurgency operations.”590  Also, “despite the vast use of the term, the United States 
Army has not defined measures of effectiveness in its doctrine.”591  Regardless of the many 
significant adaptations made by units and the institution as a whole throughout the course of OIF, 
fully incorporating these changes by establishing MOE and by realigning the planning process to 
incorporate many separate objectives, although manifestly necessary, will take time.  There is no 
question as to whether elements of the core attributes of the institution will remain intact, they 
will, and they will likely self-resist future efforts to incorporate adaptations made in Iraq.592
Successful unit level adaptations in Iraq not only led to doctrinal changes, however 
flawed, they also led to fundamental changes in strategy that fully echoed innovation within the 
theater.  The main elements of the 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) reflected 
progressive tactical adaptations, particularly along the security and economic fronts.  The NSVI 
established three tracks for success in Iraq that mimicked achievements made my tactical units in 
various pockets of Iraq: Political (Isolate, Engage, Build); Security (Clear, Hold, Build) and; 
  The 
question is whether or not the persistence of these core elements will dampen the adaptive 
architecture borne out of the mismatch and struggle between the legacy and the necessities of the 
mission in Iraq and likely future operations (discussed in Chapter 8). 
                                                 
590 Jones, Douglas D., Understanding Measures of Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency Operations, School 
of Advanced Military Studies, Op Cit, p. 24. 
591 Ibid, p. 26. 
592 To be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
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Economic (Restore, Reform, Build). 593  Critiques of the NSVI highlight the bottom-up character 
of the strategy.  While capturing successful adaptations on the ground and elevating them into a 
broader strategic platform, the NSVI failed to address larger and important matters that would 
reinforce the adaptive process by providing the guidance needed to further translate tactical 
success into the achievement of national goals.  The limited nature of the NSVI betrayed its 
origins:  successful unit level adaptations in Iraq.  “The NSVI is an improvement over previous 
planning efforts.  However, the NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they 
do not fully address all the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy.  On one 
hand, the strategy’s purpose and scope is clear because it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a 
vital national interest and central front in the war on terror…on the other hand, the strategy falls 
short in three key areas.  First, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. 
involvement in Iraq, including the costs of maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi 
government capacity at the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical infrastructure.  
Second, it only partially identifies which U.S. agencies implement key aspects of the strategy or 
resolve conflicts among the many implementing agencies.”594
                                                 
593 National Security Council, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” November 2005, p. 7. 
  Even the development of the 
‘New Way Forward’ in 2007 (Let the Iraqis lead; Help Iraqis protect the population; Isolate 
extremists; Create space for political progress; Diversity political and economic efforts and; 
594 GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, 
GAO, July 2006, p. 1. 
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Situate the strategy in a regional approach)595
 At the institutional level, the U.S. Army made significant changes to how individuals 
were educated and how units were trained for operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  These 
changes were made by incorporating myriad lessons from and successful adaptations in Iraq and 
by staffing key training and education centers with veterans of the conflict and with language 
trained role players.  The NTC completely revamped its exercise training to reflect the 
exigencies of fighting an insurgency and a 60-day training program for advisors was set up at 
Fort Riley, KS.
 did not significantly expand strategy beyond 
innovations that were made within units and by senior leadership in Iraq. 
 596  Other Maneuver Combat Training Centers (MCTCs) adjusted their training 
by adding villages, urban areas, and Arab and Farsi speakers acting as role players.597
 
  In 
addition to training, experience and the development of stores of tacit knowledge further edified 
a highly educated force: 
 “In Iraq, the force is an educated force.  It has been educated by 2 or 3 tours.  
Experience has educated the force in Iraq.”598
 
 
                                                 
595 The White House, Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq, The White House, 10 January 2007, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/2000110-3.html. 
596 Vandergriff, Donald E. Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing 
Face of War, Op Cit. 
597 Hairgrove, Thomas B., Transitions in Full Spectrum Operations: the Effects of Ethos, School of 
Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 March 
2007. 
598 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Crane, Conrad C., Personal Interview, 5 November 2008. 
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By capturing successful adaptations and incorporating them into the force through education, 
training, doctrine, and experience, iteratively, the U.S. Army created a semi-permanent 
institutional architecture for integrating the process of adaptation. 
Objections to doctrinal and strategic change notwithstanding, adaptation during OIF, 
particularly at the tactical unit level, proceeded despite a significant historical, doctrinal, and 
politically supported institutional preference for maintaining and executing only the combat 
bands of the spectrum of conflict.  To wit, “planners structured U.S. forces for the invasion, 
which was much easier than anticipated, not for the subsequent occupation, which was much 
harder.”599
 
  The inappropriateness of the U.S. Army’s structure had two significant but 
diametrically opposed effects: a reduced capacity for conducting simultaneous full spectrum 
operations that significantly slowed the adaptive effort and; a concurrent need for an accelerated 
process of adaptation.  The prevalent faith in the panacea of technology and advanced machinery 
combined with a bizarre belief that combat effectiveness translated into full spectrum 
effectiveness could not diminish the fact that warfare is a fundamentally human enterprise that is 
engaged in by competitive and adaptive human beings: 
“Warfare is a human endeavor.  Because it involves people, there are enduring 
qualities about war that will not change.  There will always be fog and friction.  
People get tired and make mistakes.  And, you have to fight a living, breathing, 
thinking human being.  So, as he adapts, you adapt.”600
                                                 
599 Pirnie, Bruce R. and Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND, Santa Monica, 
CA, 2008, p. 47. 
 
600 Colonel (Ret.) Mansoor, Peter, Telephone Interview, 12 September 2008. 
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Adaptation in simultaneous full spectrum conflict was recognized for what it was and is:  a 
continuous and cyclical process of modifying inputs and outputs to achieve organizational 
missions, goals, and objectives in the face of a rapidly changing environment.  As Alden argues, 
“change must not be seen as leading to a particular end-state but as a constant process focused 
exclusively on the threat environment.”601
 Secretary of Defense Gates sums up the adaptive struggle the U.S. Army commenced in 
OIF:  “In Iraq, an army that was basically a smaller version of the United States’ Cold War force 
over time became an effective instrument of counterinsurgency.  For every heroic and 
resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional 
shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome.”
 
 602  The bottom-up creation of an adaptive 
architecture will have to be maintained well into the future so to ensure that contrasts between 
mission, structure, and the ideal organizational form are not so stark as to require such a massive 
adaptive response.  “There have to be institutional changes so that the next set of colonels, 
captains, and sergeants will not have to be quite so heroic or quite so resourceful.”603
                                                 
601 Alden, James G., “Eyes Wide Shut: Rigid Doctrine and a Legacy Structure Make the Army Slow to 
Adapt,” Op Cit. 
 
602 Gates, Robert M., “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign 
Affairs, Volume 88, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2009. 
603 Ibid. 
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7.0  REACTIVE SEQUENCE:  INSURGENT ADAPTATION604
“There are several factors which will determine how much influence the group exercises over 
the individual through group pressures and norms.  One factor is the size of the group.  The 
smaller the group, the more effectively control is exerted over an individual.  Other things 
being equal, the control exercised by the group is in inverse proportion to its size.”
 
605
 
 
Modern insurgencies, like the one that formed in Iraq in particular, are decidedly different than 
their 20th
                                                 
604 This section details insurgent organization activity in the past tense because the insurgency in Iraq has 
changed significantly in the last few years. Many of the organizations analyzed in this study no longer exist, have 
disbanded, have been integrated into the political process or into the counterinsurgency, or have re-formed into other 
entities because of changes in the conflict and changes in organizational goals.  This does not imply that elements of 
the insurgency no longer exist but instead that the bulk of insurgent activity has dissipated.  Accordingly, and 
although the analysis still obtains, the organizational dimensions analyzed herein should not be documented or read 
in the present tense. 
 Century counterparts in funding, composition, lethality, flexibility, and structure.  The 
Iraqi insurgency (evaluated, at the tactical level, as a general composite of Iraq’s insurgent 
605 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in 
Insurgencies, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-104, September 1966, p. 94.  This lesson, learned early in 
the Vietnam War, is still applicable today.  Group size and cohesion, particularly in respect to the control of 
individuals and the achievement of organizational goals, are inversely related. 
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networks for this study) was a sizable network composed of some large but many smaller, 
manifold sub-networks and associated organizations.  The insurgency’s constituencies were 
reduced or expanded by organizational goals and these goals were, in turn, truncated or expanded 
by their constituencies.  Such is the duality-laced nature of decentralized networks:  they are at 
once parsimonious and efficient but they lack ultimate coherence; their emergence is ephemeral 
yet their ties are durable; they have less direct effect than a large, centralized organization but 
can saturate an environment in simultaneity; they are ubiquitous but unobvious; their strengths 
are their weaknesses and their weaknesses are their strengths. 
Kilcullen argues that the transnational character of modern insurgencies is also new.  
“Classical-era insurgents copied each other.  But each movement operated in its own country, 
emulation typically happened after the event, and direct cooperation between movements was 
rare…by contrast, in the field today we see real-time cooperation and cross-pollination between 
insurgents in many countries.”606
 
  The form of insurgency that emerged in Iraq is unique (but not 
inimitable) in that it appears to be a blend of three types of insurgent forms identified by 
Gompert and Gordon:  
• Local: self-contained in cause, conduct, scope and usually (although not necessarily) 
effect.  An example is the insurgency in the Philippines (1900); 
• Local-International: receives outside support but is fought on a local scale (Vietnam); 
• Global-Local: a local insurgency receives international support and becomes part of a 
wider struggle (International Communism).607
                                                 
606 Kilcullen, David, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Small Wars Journal, 2006, p. 4. 
 
607 Gompert, David C. and John Gordon IV, Op Cit, pp. 25-28. 
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The Iraqi insurgency was at once local (as represented by various Sunni and Shia groups 
composed mostly of tribes and families indigenous to Iraq and nationalist in character), local-
international (received outside support from other organizations and states in the form of 
funding, tactics, equipment, etc.), and global-local (attracted individuals and support from al 
Qaeda and like-minded organizations involved in an international jihad-based struggle).  The 
complexity of the Iraqi insurgency and the environment that spawned and hosted this insurgency 
had no 20th Century peer.  The difficulties associated with countering the insurgency in Iraq also 
had no operational peer and cannot be overestimated: “A mutating and ideologically driven 
global insurgency engendered by a stateless, adaptive, complex, and polycephalous host, 
moreover, is even more challenging than traditional insurgencies.”608  The effect of the insurgent 
struggle was a collapse of the traditional boundaries between the levels of war.  Strategy, 
operations, and tactics were compounded into a confusing quantum amalgam of action and 
reaction that masked normal operational cues and defied traditional planning and execution 
boundaries.609
Coalition action and inaction in early 2003 (if not the invasion decision itself) helped 
create the environment for the emergence and expansion of a complex insurgency.  A complete 
and compelled breakdown of the Iraqi state security apparatus enhanced the likelihood and 
 
                                                 
608 Cassidy, Robert M., Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, Stanford Security Studies, 
Stanford, 2008, p. 3. 
609 Harper contends that “In the current operating environment…the strategic level or war has come to 
dominate the tactical and operational levels as the three…have collapsed into one another.”  Harper, David, Op Cit, 
p. 96. 
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success of any possible and potential insurgency.  “When states cannot control their borders or 
exercise control over isolated parts of the country, insurgents often flourish.”610  The breakdown 
of state security also freed for action many informal security providers, like Iraq’s tribes, who 
were for years after Operation DESERT STORM empowered by Saddam Hussein to provide 
stability and security in local jurisdictions.  As Long argues, “In general, the weaker the state, the 
more autonomy is given to tribes to provide what the state cannot.”611
 Although the emergence (or reemergence) of Iraq’s tribes, foreign fighters, criminal 
organizations, and the fusion of insurgent forms and the networked nature of the insurgency in 
Iraq increased the complexity of the conflict dramatically and complicated counterinsurgent 
efforts,
  The power of the tribes 
was inversely related to the power of the state and thus, by default, Iraq’s tribes inherited 
substantial power and influence after the 2003 invasion and dissolution of Iraq’s security 
services.  When combined with a disaffected population, a cadre of well trained and financed 
foreign fighters, and substantial organized criminal organizations, Iraq’s tribes helped form an 
informal security juggernaut that contributed as much to pockets of stability as it did to 
generalized chaos. 
612
                                                 
610 Byman, Daniel L., et al, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, RAND, Santa Monica, 
2001, p. 107. 
 this complexity also contributed to significant internecine conflict among the 
611 Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, Volume 50, Number 2, April 2008, p. 70. 
612 For example, “The Sunni part of the insurgency has become the equivalent of a distributed network: a 
group of affiliated and unaffiliated moves with well-organized cells.  It is extremely difficult to attack and defeat 
because it does not have unitary or cohesive structure or a rigid hierarchy within the larger movements.  The larger 
movements seem to have leadership, planning, financing, and arming cadres kept carefully separate from most 
operational cells in the field.”  Cordesman, Anthony H., The Iraq War and Lessons for Counterinsurgency, CSIS, 16 
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insurgents and a dearth of coherent and unifying strategic goals to direct the insurgency and to 
compel its acceptance by the Iraqi population.  As Kilcullen notes, the Iraqi insurgency did not 
establish any form of a counter-government.613  Metz and Millen contend that the Iraqi 
insurgency had an inchoate ideology, lacked a “positive dimension” and had no clear 
leadership.614 According to Paul Smith, the Iraqi insurgency was a tangible and unique 
agglomeration and manifestation of the darker forces of globalization.615
                                                                                                                                                             
March 2006, p. 9.  The Department of Defense had (and continues to have) difficulty defining the character and 
nature of recent insurgencies: “Despite the broader scope, the DOD’s doctrinal definition of insurgency retained 
traditional assumptions about command and intent, viewing an insurgent organization as operating under the 
command of an identifiable leadership and moving toward one overarching objective.”  See, Wright and Reese, Op 
Cit, p. 99. 
  “Contemporary 
insurgencies are less like a traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are 
more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market.  This circumstance is the result of 
globalization, the decline of overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of 
613 Kilcullen, David, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Small Wars Journal, 2006, p. 5. 
614 Metz, Steven and Raymond Millen, Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and Continuity, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2004, pp. 9-10. 
615 Smith argues that the benefits of globalization accrue to criminal and terrorist groups as well.  “Like 
international criminal groups, terrorists have benefited greatly from globalization and its attendant benefits, 
including mass communications, technology, and advanced financial services (which provide the critical covert 
financial support for terrorist operations).  The vast global arms market—including the ubiquitous black market—
provides key weapons for terrorist groups.  Porous borders and international migration also play a role in facilitating 
modern terrorism.”  Smith, Paul J., Op Cit, p. 83. 
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informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated 
with state weakness or failure.”616
While a divided strategy, absent leadership, and little coordination freed the insurgency 
and confused the counterinsurgency, these factors also militated against the harmonization of 
objectives and homogenization of intent needed for disparate groups to adapt towards and 
achieve organizational goals.  Although the issue is not entirely settled, it appears if the 
prognostication of Eisenstadt and White held true: “The insurgency’s lack of a unified 
leadership, broad-based institutions, or a clearly articulated vision for Iraq’s future could hinder 
formation of a unified political-military strategy, further limiting its popular appeal if these 
shortcomings prevent the attainment of key political and military objectives.”
 
617
Distinguishing between the component parts of the insurgency and typifying enduring 
organizational characteristics and dimensions, temporally, is confounded by the substantial 
organizational metamorphoses many groups engendered as they pursued organizational goals:  
small groups appeared and disappeared fleetingly, coalesced, or joined larger groups; large 
 The strengths of 
an uncoordinated and networked insurgency were also its weaknesses.  The insurgency’s 
objectives were too diffuse for the organization, in toto, to effectively adapt: inputs and outputs 
could not be synchronized to comprehensively achieve adaptation toward organizational goals 
and missions.  As the insurgency divided and as groups defected to the counterinsurgency, 
organizational adaptation suffered even further. 
                                                 
616 Metz, Steven, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,” 
Parameters, Winter 2007-08, p. 23. 
617 Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White, “Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency,” Policy Focus #50, 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2005, p. 33. 
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groups engaged in fighting, politics, or both depending on shifts in power and influence; some 
groups resembled criminal cartels as much as guerrilla cadres and; other groups joined the 
insurgency and then later defected and joined the counterinsurgency when alternative avenues to 
achieving organizational goals opened and when cooperation with other insurgent groups was no 
longer palatable.  Although some groups appear more political than classically insurgent in 
hindsight, due in large part to oscillating benignity and careful masquerading, and some even 
engaged in the political process in the early phases of OIF, it is certain that any benevolent 
countenance was founded on some history of violence, the threat of violence, the provisioning of 
unconventional forms of protection, and the distribution of otherwise unavailable goods and 
services.  Each of these inducements and coercions were complementary tools in common use by 
most major insurgent organizations struggling for power and relevance in post-invasion Iraq and 
each was wielded at the expense of the control and legitimacy of the Iraqi government.  To be 
clear, by definition618
                                                 
618 Insurgency is defined as: “An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing 
insurgent control.”  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2006. 
 any organized group participating or contributing to a politico-military 
struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying 
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control, contributed to the Iraqi 
insurgency.   Many organizations were guilty of this charge in the wake of the political and 
security vacuum created by the 2003 invasion.  Although this study does not specifically address 
the political machinations of larger insurgent groups and almost solely focuses on tactical 
organizational behavior, it does not deny the salience and fungibility of methods for accruing 
power and accomplishing organizational objectives.  Likewise, this study does not deny the 
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prominence and influence of larger, better resourced, and popularly supported organizations 
either directly or tangentially involved in the insurgent struggle.  Even when larger organizations 
were not directly involved in the insurgency either violently, criminally, or politically, they still 
wielded immeasurable influence, represented vast swaths of the Iraqi population, and 
enormously complicated the efforts of the Iraqi government and counterinsurgent forces. 
Until recently, as the security situation in Iraq improved and as the weight of political 
power increased, larger organizations and groups engaged in politics and violence 
interchangeably as part of the insurgency by substituting one for the other or by combining the 
two in order to achieve organizational goals.  But the capacity for wielding direct influence in 
both politics and violence was almost solely the province of larger organizations.  Smaller 
groups, while they could engage in violent and criminal behavior at the tactical level (and on the 
occasion strategically through the commission of a spectacular event or when attacks were 
massed athwart geography or at rapid intervals), did not possess the wherewithal, resources, or 
popular support to seriously engage in the political process or wield significant influence with 
other insurgent organizations, the Iraqi population, Coalition forces, the CPA, or the Iraqi 
government.  Organizations like JAM and the Badr Brigades explicitly (and deftly) shifted 
organizational emphasis from violence to politics and back as desired or as organizational 
requirements dictated.619
                                                 
619 Many large militias like JAM and the Badr Brigades and other organizations essentially operated as 
political parties with supporting militias.  For discussion, see, Dobbins, James, et al, Occupying Iraq: A History of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, RAND, Santa Monica, 2009. 
  From 2004 through August 2007, JAM engaged in uprisings and 
fighting in Baghdad, Karbala, Basra, Najaf, and elsewhere.  JAM also, variously, cooperated 
with Sunni groups, had direct relations with and was supported by Iran, operated a shadow 
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government, infiltrated the Iraqi police force, and provided security, protection, and resources to 
its followers, all to benefit the organization and at the expense of the legitimacy of the CPA and 
the Iraqi government.  But JAM also took part in legitimate politicking, the Iraqi national 
elections, and ran candidates for a variety of other offices.  The Badr Brigades (also known as 
the Badr Division/Corps) maintained an informal security force then enlisted in the INP and ING 
and participated in national elections.  But, like JAM, this group wielded significant political 
power and engaged in fights against insurgent organizations with or absent the consent of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and later, the Iraqi government.  Former Baathist regime 
elements (FRE), in particular the Fedayeen Saddam and former members of the Iraqi military 
and intelligence services, were steadfastly nationalist and stood opposed to the CPA and the new 
Iraqi government.  Naturally, the FRE supported and directly contributed to the insurgency with 
violence but were ultimately interested in regaining political power and influence.  Famously, the 
Sunni Tribes made the transition from being active insurgents aligned with al Qaeda to being a 
significant part of the counterinsurgency.  Each of these groups was further supported by or was 
aligned with a variety of other large organizations contributing to the insurgent fight against the 
coalition and the Iraqi government either directly, through violence and criminal enterprise, or 
more indirectly with tacit support.  These organizations included:620
 
 
• Tandhim al-Qa-ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al Qaeda’s organization in Mesopotamia 
purportedly formed by Zarqawi); 
• Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna (Partisans of the Sunna Army); 
• Al Jaysh al-Islami fil-‘Iraq (the Islamic Army in Iraq); 
                                                 
620 International Crisis Group, Op Cit, pp. 1-3. 
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• Al-Jamga al-Islamiya lil-Muqawama al’Iraqiya (the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance 
or JAMI). 
 
Other groups included:621
• Jaysh al-Rashidin (First Four Caliphs Army); 
 
• Jaysh al-Ta’ifa al-Mansoura (Victorious Group’s Army); 
• Jaysh al-Mujahidin (Mujahidin’s Army); 
• Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya fil-‘Iraq (Islamic Resistance Movement in Iraq in 
conjunction with the 1920 Revolution Brigades); 
• Jaysh Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army). 
 
 A final grouping included:622
• ‘Asa’ib Ahl al’Iraq (Clans of the People of Iraq); 
 
• Saraya Al Ghadhab Al-Islami (Islamic Anger Brigades); 
• Saraya Usud Al-Tawhid (Lions of Unification Brigades); 
• Saraya Suyuf al-Haqq (Swords of Justice Brigades). 
 
Although these groups (and the people that supported them or were represented by them) 
modified their behavior and allegiances over time in an attempt to achieve organizational goals, 
each, by circumstance or by design, and some much more violently than others, contributed to 
the insurgency by weakening the control and legitimacy of the Iraqi government.  The range of 
                                                 
621 Ibid. 
622 Ibid. 
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goals and perceptions for all of the competing and affected groups in Iraq was staggering.  The 
only unifying goal of all of these groups was their desire to effect the removal of coalition forces 
from Iraq.  Beyond that, many groups, even ones sharing common sectarian, religious, and 
political interests, came into conflict.  Parallel or cross-organizational objectives became points 
of contention within the insurgency, led to intra-organizational competition for resources, and 
established cleavages that were taken advantage of by the counterinsurgency.623  Al Qaeda’s 
ambition was not necessarily focused on Iraq but was more regional (even global) and dogmatic: 
to establish the truth; get rid of evil; establish an Islamic Nation by preparing an Islamic cadre 
through training and participation in fighting operations and; backing, supporting, and 
coordinating Jihad movements worldwide.624  Sunni and Shia groups were by and large focused 
on provincial and national objectives.  Many tribes and families were concerned with provincial 
and local concerns.  By confounding the counterinsurgency to achieve their limited objectives, 
the insurgents “hoped to make Iraq ungovernable, delay rebuilding of critical infrastructure, and 
prevent the emergence of democratic government.  They calculated quite reasonably that most 
Iraqis would blame the United States for the abysmal living conditions into which they had sunk.  
However, in pursuing this strategy, they were the ones denying their own people better times.”625
                                                 
623 Long discusses the complications of the relationship among tribes, the state, and an external power that 
further confused an already diverse insurgent network.  See Long, Austin, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival, 
Volume 50, Number 2, April 2008, p. 72. 
  
As one soldier notes: 
624 Combating Terrorism Center, Harmony Document AFGP-2002-000080, CTC, West Point, New York, 
2002. 
625 Mockaitis, Thomas R., “The Iraq War: Learning From the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning 
for the Future,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 2007, p. 33. 
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“Strategically they do a good job with the internet and getting their twisted 
version of the truth out.  However, if all politics are indeed local then what I saw 
was basically an insurgency that based its hopes on the fear of the people as 
opposed to real hope for a meaningful future.  Handwritten notes with a bullet, 
decapitation and basic assassination all remained as central to their struggle for 
control of the people as it did in 2004.”626
 
 
Initially, (through 2003) as in the latter stages (late 2007 onwards) of the conflict, the insurgency 
lacked any clear and unifying organizational objectives.627  All that American commanders could 
see and discern were “vague political and religious statements.”628  The initial phases of the 
insurgency were not recognized and in fact denied as an insurgency or guerrilla war.629
                                                 
626 Lieutenant Colonel Crider, James, Email Interview, 22 September 2008. 
  Without 
a clearly articulated and achievable organizational strategy or goal, it is impossible for a 
centralized and highly controlled organization to adapt inputs and outputs towards a coherent 
objective.  Certainly, this is true for decentralized and networked organizations as well.  Both the 
627 From 2004 through most of 2007, the many networks in the insurgency were largely united by the 
common goal of dispensing with counterinsurgency forces, “As the insurgency became larger and more lethal, it 
also diversified.  While the opposition had begun as a loose association of ex-Baathists operating more or less 
independently, by the spring of 2004, it had become a multifaceted and cohesive network.”  Wright and Reese, Op 
Cit., p. 102. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Hammes, Thomas X., The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 2006, pp. 173-
174. 
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insurgency and the counterinsurgency suffered from the insurgency’s lack of persistent and 
defined organizational objectives.630
A significant result of the insurgency’s confused organizational objectives, whether 
intentional or merely by chance, was the generalized chaos and lawlessness that accompanied a 
worsening of the security environment.  In combination with a weakened state security 
apparatus, this contributed to increased dissatisfaction among the Iraqi populace, expanded the 
pool of the insurgency, and diminished the legitimacy of counterinsurgent forces.  “Something I 
think Americans do not focus on, but for many ordinary Iraqis, the central security issue has 
nothing to do with politics; it has to do with ordinary crime, particularly kidnapping, theft and a 
general rise in organized crime attendant on the general weakness of the security system and the 
police.”
 
631  As state authority collapsed and was “being replaced by localism”632
                                                 
630 Arguably, if the insurgency, because of its networked form, would have had a clearer set of strategic 
goals, it would have realized even more intra-organizational friction and division than it did experience.  As 
Eisenstadt and White argue, “The insurgency’s lack of a clearly articulated vision for Iraq’s future has prevented 
potentially profound differences in its ranks from disrupting its activities.”  Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White, 
Op Cit, p. 33.  This difficulty was realized later in the conflict as different insurgent organizations sought an 
endgame that brought their contrasting visions into relief and exacerbated already simmering tensions.  At least part 
of the insurgency’s strategy was to create chaos but, because this is a negative goal, this did not foment cooperation.  
McMaster, H. R., Charlie Rose Interview with H. R. McMaster, 
 the insurgency 
sought a tangential objective to enhance its general viability and to manipulate the 
http://www.charlierose.com/shows/2008/05/30/1/a-
conversation-with-col-h-r-mcmaster, 2008. 
631 Slocombe, Walter B., Current Operations and the Political Transition in Iraq, Testimony before the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 17 March 2005, p. 18. 
632 Larrabe, F. Stephen, The Middle East: The Changing Strategic Environment, RAND, Santa Monica, 
CA, 2006, p. 6. 
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environment633 to its favor.  “Empowered by the Internet and bad intentions, the creation of 
mayhem and bad publicity for the Coalition is not a by-product of enemy action but its 
objective.”634  This objective allowed the insurgents to essentially control large portions of Iraq’s 
cities and created the impression that the insurgency was indeed in charge everywhere.  “Since 
cities, particularly capitals, are centers of communication, administration, wealth, and power, 
they tend to control whole nations.  Political control of one major city may be sufficient to 
establish a convincing claim to control of the country.”635
 The insurgency’s decentralization, notable lack of coordination, and use of dispersed 
small-unit attacks sowed confusion within the counterinsurgency: “We’re seeing a cellular 
organization of six to eight people, armed with RPGs, machine guns, et cetera, attacking us at, 
sometimes, times and places of their choosing, and other times we attack them at times and 
places of our choosing.  They are receiving financial help from probably regional-level leaders.  
And I think describing it as guerrilla tactics being employed against us is, you know, a proper 
thing to describe in strictly military terms.”
 
636
                                                 
633 Kostakos and Kostakos argue that criminal and terrorist organizations a balance with their external 
environment by influencing this environment.  See, Kostakos, Panos and Vassillis Kostakos, Criminal Group 
Behavior and Operational Environments, ECPR Standing Group on Organized Crime Newsletter, Volume 5, Issue 
2, May 2006, p. 6. 
  Initially, the counterinsurgency believed that the 
insurgents were being led or directed by FREs in a military style campaign.  Correspondingly, 
634 Collins, Joseph J., “The Perils of Planning: Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq,” The Interagency and 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, Eds. Joseph R. Cerami and 
Jay W. Boggs, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 2007, p. 104.  
635 Defense Research Corporation, “Urban Insurgency Cases,” Santa Barbara, CA, 14 March 1968, p. 8. 
636 Abizaid, John, Situation Report, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript, 16 July 2003. 
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the tactics employed by the counterinsurgency did not indicate an appreciation of the complexity 
of the insurgency it faced.  Although the capture and execution and killing of Saddam Hussein 
and his sons, respectively, might have been perceived as the beginning of the end but it was 
really the end of the beginning.  Upon the Husseins’ deaths, the United States government could 
no longer sensibly claim that resistance was being directed by the former regime members or 
other associated dead-enders.  In corollary, the insurgency could no longer be accused of 
supporting the former regime.637  In hindsight, these deaths should have cured the United States 
of its illusions regarding the insurgency.  Furthermore, “Having shattered the unifying state 
structure of Iraq, it was perhaps unsurprising that coalition forces should face a number of very 
different enemies with diverse aims, aspirations, and tactics.”638
As stated at the beginning of the previous chapter, an ideal organizational form is 
perfectly suited to accomplishing organizational goals and missions in any environment and 
against any competitor.  The ideal organization is also perfectly situated to take advantage of any 
opportunities presented by changing environmental stimuli or organizational defects (in training, 
execution, learning, etc.) revealed by a competitor.  But each degree that an organization is 
separated from the ideal type necessitates adaptation for the achievement of organizational goals 
and missions: an adjustment of inputs, outputs, or both.  Because an organization is unlikely to 
be ideal for any given environment or against any particular competitor it must therefore 
maintain a capacity for adaptation if it is to remain a going concern. 
 
                                                 
637 Cockburn, Patrick, The Occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq, Verso, New York, 2007, p. 105. 
638 Finlan, Alstair, “Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Iraq,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, Volume 16, Number 1, 2005, p. 10. 
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For the Iraqi insurgency, rapid adaptation occurred across the organization but was tied to 
the organizational goals of disparate participating groups.  Without an overarching trans-
organizational objective, the insurgency strayed far away from the ideal organizational form and 
could not coherently adapt inputs and outputs in concert.  A lack of coordination gave the 
insurgency its strength when combating and competing against the counterinsurgency but also 
proved to be a great weakness.  If sowing chaos and disrupting the realization of 
counterinsurgent objectives was its only goal, the insurgency in Iraq would have neared an ideal 
organizational form.  But, these were not the only objectives of the insurgency.  Even the 
unifying ambition of ridding Iraq of Coalition forces could not temper other competing 
organizational goals.  As a result, the insurgency could not adapt inputs and outputs articulately 
and the network failed to achieve enduring organizational success.  
 This chapter will examine the input and output components that comprised the 
insurgency’s adaptive process and will outline modifications made throughout the course of the 
conflict in Iraq.  Factors inhibiting and enabling organizational adaptation will be highlighted 
and used to demonstrate how tactical-level organizational adaptation occurred but failed to 
translate into overall organizational success. 
7.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
7.1.1 Goals and rewards 
Depending on their role in the insurgency, each participant and sub-organization had different 
goals and sought different rewards.  Each set of goals and rewards initially fueled and later 
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undermined the insurgency as it first waxed and then waned in power.  Elements of the 
insurgency were variously motivated to take anti-Coalition actions early on while later they 
supported anti-insurgent operations.  Some Iraqis were involved in the insurgency (and afterward 
the counterinsurgency) out of basic economic necessity639 while others joined in order to 
“prevent the establishment of a state dominated by Shiites and secular Kurds.”640
Regardless of the rewards sought, the principal unifying goal (indeed their strength)
  Some 
insurgent groups were criminal-commercial in nature and others were ideologically driven.  As a 
result of these various motivations, the reward system was different for each group: nationalist 
pride; ideological, spiritual, and religious recompense and; money were all fundamental yet 
distinct motivators. 
641 of 
most if not all individual insurgents and insurgent groups was driving Coalition forces from Iraq.  
In fact, the insurgency’s manifold organizations held few principal goals in common other than a 
desire to remove U.S. and Coalition forces from the country—until late in the conflict, little 
thought was given to the likely aftermath of a successful insurgency.  Initial goals were more 
nihilistic than positive and included ensuring that the Iraqi government could not function.642
                                                 
639 Paley, Amit R., “Iraqis Joining Insurgency Less for Cause than Cash,” Washington Post Foreign 
Service, 20 November 2007. 
  
Generally, the insurgency in Iraq sought to “create a crisis between the Iraqi government and the 
Iraqi people in the hopes that outside support for the government will wane, forcing the 
640 Steinberg, Guido, The Iraqi Insurgency: Actors, Strategies, and Structures, SWP Research Paper, 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006, p. 14. 
641 Hammes, Thomas X., The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, pp. 183-184. 
642 Hammes, Thomas X., “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” Military Review, July-August 2006. 
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withdrawal of foreign forces.”643
As an organizational goal, creating a crisis instead of a political road-map or alternative 
form of governance not only required little support from the people of Iraq but also demanded 
little if any real coordination among various insurgent organizations.
  The underlying differences in goals and rewards systems and 
the strange bedfellows that the confluence of these systems engendered made the insurgency 
magnificently complex but also contributed to its eventual loss of influence and subsequent 
operational collapse. 
644
                                                 
643 Rabasa, Angel, et al, Beyond al-Qaeda Part 2: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe, RAND, Santa 
Monica, 2006, p. 52. 
  Creating chaos demands 
very little planning.  Indeed, the less planning and coordination conducted, the more likely the 
appearance or manifestation of turmoil and pervasion of anarchy.  Lacking a positive or value-
added agenda freed the insurgency to conduct activities that were anything but productive or 
beneficial to the future of Iraq, its governance, or its citizens:  “insurgent actions are destructive 
and psychological, while those of the government are basically constructive and administrative.  
644 Hoffman, Frank G., “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?,” Parameters, Summer 2007, p. 81.  Andrade 
argues that the insurgency in Iraq distinguished itself from previous insurgent templates, “In Iraq, the situation is 
different in that the guerrillas have not made a concerted effort to mobilize the people.  A large part of the Sunni 
population seems to support the insurgency, but the guerrillas are not forming local shadow governments or 
attempting to establish their own political and economic programs.”  Andrade, Dale, “Three Lessons from 
Vietnam,” Washington Post, 29 December 2005.  Additionally, “Almost none [of the insurgent groups] have 
articulated a vision of a free post-U.S. Iraq.  The insurgency is not a monolithic or united movement directed by a 
leadership with a unitary and disciplined ideological vision.”  Hashim, Ahmed, “Terrorism and Complex Warfare in 
Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume II, Issue 12, June 2004, p. 2.  This can be partly explained 
by some popular motivations based on regional and religious factors not wholly related to governance. 
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The insurgent does not have to administer conventional government, while the government’s 
main concern is more effective government.”645  Although creating a crisis might have been an 
explicit or intentional goal of al Qaeda, affiliated groups, and for organized criminals, it likely 
was only a secondary or tertiary effect of other groups’ operations as they tried to achieve more 
limited and tangible objectives.  For instance, while insurgent organizations disrupted 
communications, services, transportation, and energy distribution at will to create chaos for the 
population and the counterinsurgency,646 this also set the conditions for rampant criminal 
activities submerged and hidden beneath waves of disorder.  Coincidentally, criminal activities 
created even more chaos and thus multiplied the effect of the initial insurgent action.  Although 
insurgents worked to achieve operational goals in a premeditated fashion,647
Crime rose dramatically after the 2003 invasion.  As the conflict became an 
insurgent/counterinsurgent struggle and as Iraq was brimming with chaos, the rewards accruing 
to criminals increased dramatically.  Criminals, organized and otherwise, were able to take 
advantage of chaotic conditions as the country began to rebuild itself and as foreign and 
Coalition money poured into governmental and business coffers through governmental aid and 
 the effect of 
achieving these goals created a convenient environment for various ideological and criminal 
enterprisers and the architecture for an alternative reward system consisting of power, influence, 
and money. 
                                                 
645 Darling, Roger, “A New Conceptual Scheme for Analyzing Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, 
February 1974, pp. 57-58. 
646 Hoffman, Frank G., “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?,” Parameters, Summer 2007, p. 83. 
647 Mansoor, Peter R. and Mark S. Ulrich, “Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity 
Analysis,” Military Review, September-October, 2007, p. 48. 
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contracts.  Criminals contributed to and fed off of the insurgency even though their objectives 
and motivations were significantly different than those of the definitional insurgent.  “According 
to American estimates, some 80% of all violent attacks in the country have crime as their 
underlying motive…While this is likely too high an estimate, it highlights the fact that parties 
involved in a civil war or conflicts resembling civil wars often resort to criminal activity as a 
source of money.”648  Even if these numbers are halved, criminal organizations in Iraq created 
substantial instability, sowed fear and loathing into the Iraqi population, and exacerbated the 
effect of the ideologically and politically motivated arms of the insurgency.  The reward for their 
activities was money, the settling of scores against competitors, and the expansion of an illicit 
market that they largely controlled through legitimate and illegitimate ‘commercial’ activities.  
Commercial insurgents, part of the overall criminal enterprise system in Iraq, aimed “for little 
more than to acquire material resources through the seizure and control of political power.”649
Crime also supplemented or supplanted normal economic activity that was seriously 
disrupted by the invasion and the breakdown of state security.
  
Politically enabled street crime, devoid of any ideological or organizational restrictions and 
accelerated by a ubiquitous insurgency, generated rewards that furthered the ambitions of the 
criminally motivated elements of the insurgency. 
650
                                                 
648 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 25. 
  Criminal activity fused with 
insurgent activity as the funds from the former were used to pay for the actions of the latter.  
Initially, foreign and local insurgent organizations that hired out or contracted for attacks on the 
649 Todd, Lin, Iraq Tribal Study—Al-Anbar Governorate, Global Resources Group, 18 June 2006, p. 6-5. 
650 “Unemployment skyrocketed after the invasion, reaching 67 percent, due in large measure to deliberate 
U.S. policy.”  Mockaitis, Thomas R., Op Cit, p. 39. 
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coalition were paid very little.  Simple assaults on Coalition convoys, sniper attacks on outposts, 
and mortar attacks received scant financial reward.  Although initial payments were relatively 
small, as the insurgency grew in strength and sophistication (and as insurgent work became more 
dangerous and complex), remuneration for insurgent work increased significantly.  Insurgents 
could expect to receive between “$500 and $2,000 for each operation undertaken—between 
$10,000 and $20,000 for downed helicopters or airplanes.651  Lacquer argues that “There is a 
negative correlation between guerrilla warfare and the degree of economic development.”652
Unlike the affected population and criminal groups, AQI and AQI affiliated organizations 
had manifold goals almost exclusively regional or internationalist in character: to contextualize 
local conflicts as part of a broader struggle against ‘apostasy’ and ‘the infidel’;
  
Rampant unemployment, negative economic development, and a scarcity of hard currency 
helped link crime, the insurgency, and the local population in pursuit of their goals, however 
divergent.   
653 to establish a 
pan-Islamic Caliphate;654
                                                 
651 Novikov, Gene, “Unmaksing the Iraqi Insurgency,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume 
II, Issue 12, 17 June 2004, p. 6. 
 to overthrow ‘non-Islamic’ regimes; to expel Westerners from Muslim 
countries; to compel U.S. force withdrawal from bases in the Middle East, to build a following 
652 Lacquer, Walter, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Case Study, Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick, NJ, 1998, p. 395. 
653 Rabasa, Angel, et al, Beyond al-Qaeda Part 1: The Global Jihadist Movement, RAND, Santa Monica, 
2006, p. xvii. 
654 Rosenau, William, Waging the ‘War of Ideas,’ RAND, Santa Monica, 2006, p. 1136. 
 319 
based on action not strategy and; to bring about the complete collapse of the Iraqi state.655  For 
the extreme arm of a relatively extremist al Qaeda, represented by the Abu Musab al Zarqawi 
network, Iraq was treated merely as a potential base for supporting al Qaeda’s operations 
abroad.656  Zarqawi specifically sought to divide Sunni and Shi’a by first igniting a civil war in 
Iraq that could be exported to the greater Middle East and eventually to the entire Muslim 
world.657  Al Qaeda’s methods in securing these various goals distinguished them from their 
more nationalist allies: “While the national Islamists are essentially fighting a classic guerrilla 
war with only a few isolated acts of terror to their name, the Jihadists use terrorist attacks to 
specifically try to provoke a sectarian civil war.”658
Cooperation among various insurgent groups was critical for realizing the insurgency’s 
one unifying goal: the removal of Coalition forces from Iraq.  The Sunni elements of the 
insurgency, by far the largest component of this force, were critical to achieving this goal.  For 
their part, the Sunni insurgency was principally concerned with securing a greater role for the 
 Eventually, AQI’s ideology and 
internationalist goals, which were largely inseparable and reflected an almost complete disregard 
for the Iraqi population and Iraqi elements of the insurgency, led to the disentanglement of pan-
insurgent goals and an operational schism that precipitated the decline of the insurgency. 
                                                 
655 See, Jenkins, Brian Michael, “The Jihadists Operational Code,” Three Years After: Next Steps in the 
War on Terror, Ed. David Aaron, RAND, Santa Monica, 2005, p. 4, Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 15, and 
Krepinevich, Andrew, The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare, CBSA, 2 June 2004, p. 2. 
656 Vandergriff, Donald E., Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing 
Face of War, Center for Defense Information, Washington DC, 2006. 
657 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 182. 
658 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit. 
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Sunni population in the postwar Iraqi political order.  This could be accomplished either by 
banding with the other insurgent organizations to compel a withdrawal of Coalition forces (who 
set and enforced the conditions for a Shi’a majority in the new Iraqi government) or by working 
with Coalition and government forces directly.  Initially, the Sunni insurgency opted to cooperate 
with AQI and other like minded insurgent groups to force withdrawal.  But by mid-2004, 
significant political divisions emerged splintering the insurgency between legal Sunni groups 
(working through political channels) and Sunni insurgent groups (directly fighting against the 
counterinsurgency).  Both of these Sunni groups were further divided from the likeminded 
Ba’thist, nationalist, tribal, and foreign organizations.  Partitions abounded and allegiances 
changed over time in Iraq.  “Whilst sectarian self-identifications have had some salience in the 
past, other forms of self-description have often been as strong if not more so: the tribe, clan, city 
quarter, guild, class, nation-state and transborder ethonationalist groupings have all been strong 
claimants on loyalty in the past…none of these factors is immutable.”659  Accordingly, divisions 
erupted over differing agendas, modus operandi, and long-term organizational goals.660
                                                 
659 Herring, Eric and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2006, p. 148.  Herring and Rangwala discuss, at length, divisions and alliances 
in Iraq prior to and during the occupation. 
  As 
Steinberg argues, “The insurgents agree on who and what they are fighting against, but they 
don’t always concur on what they are fighting for. They are primarily concerned with securing a 
660 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 208. 
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greater role for the Sunni population in a new political order for Iraq, notwithstanding the lack of 
clarity about what that order would look like.”661
Discord among insurgent factions only deepened further as foreign elements of the 
insurgency (particularly AQI) became ever more radical as the conflict progressed.  Al Qaeda’s 
savagery and the realization that AQI was as much an occupying force as the Coalition 
exacerbated the insurgent rift.
 
 662  Recognizing an opportunity to achieve organizational political 
and social goals by shifting allegiances, the Sunni insurgency turned on their former insurgent 
allies.  The 40 or so tribal chieftains that led the Sunni rebellion against the insurgency (calling 
themselves the Anbar Awakening) did so for two principal reasons: monetary, material, political, 
and physical support from the Coalition and; al Qaeda’s “growing encroachment on their 
traditional pursuits of banditry and smuggling.”663  In 2008, “nearly 100,000 Iraqis, many of 
them former insurgents” were on the American payroll.664  Former Sunni insurgents work at 
police stations and labor as ‘loosely supervised gunmen’ supporting the Awakening Councils in 
Sunni dominated tribal areas.665
                                                 
661 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 14. 
 
662 Jones, James L., The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, Independent 
Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 6 September 2007, p. 127.  Part of this savagery included indiscriminate 
murder, extremist tactics, and suicide bombings leading to the death of thousands of Iraqi civilians.  See Burns, John 
F. and Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,” New York Times Late Edition, 11 
June 2007. 
663 Blanche, Ed, “Splintering Iraq’s Insurgency,” The Middle East, June 2007. 
664 Filkins, Dexter, “U.S. Hands Back a Quieter Anbar,” New York Times, 2 September 2008. 
665 Ibid. 
 322 
The ability to achieve organizational goals and rewards varied inversely as the 
insurgency’s strength ebbed and flowed.  Byman argues that “It is particularly important to 
recognize the many dimensions of a successful insurgency.  Most analyses focus on size, 
resources, and outside support, and some also address the issue of popularity of the insurgents’ 
cause.  Equally important, and at times, more so, are issues regarding identity and group 
competition: the political identity that is most salient for the group among the myriad challengers 
that will prevail is not preordained.”666
7.1.2 Information 
  The competition among groups for resources, rewards, 
and for the achievement of organizational goals does not preordain allegiance either.  When 
economic, political, and nationalist fortunes shifted all that remained were the ideological goals 
of foreign fighters and some of their local supporters; the glue holding these organizations 
together dissolved.  Competition for the achievement of organizational goals rather quickly 
replaced solidarity in the reward structure of the insurgency.   
Controlling the information environment during a complex insurgency is of paramount 
importance to competing organizations.  This is particularly true for organizations that operate 
tactically but have strategic ambitions.  Information not only instructs and educates it also shapes 
perceptions.  Most importantly for a networked organization, effective information gathering and 
dissemination creates the appearance of solidarity, expands the influence of the organization, 
advertises the organization’s activities, and helps improve internal organizational processes.  The 
                                                 
666 Byman, Daniel, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, RAND, Santa Monica, 2007, p. 30. 
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insurgency in Iraq effectively used information to portray itself strategically, to coordinate 
operations, and to influence audiences that could either inhibit or augment tactical actions. 
Influencing and at times controlling the information environment in Iraq required 
committed resources.  Many of the larger insurgent organizations “established dedicated 
information offices which in essence function as ‘online press agencies’ issuing communiqués, 
developing and posting new content for their websites (often several times a day) and generally 
updating and regularly replenishing news and other features.”667  The information or propaganda 
that these offices generated could be used to strengthen resolve among dedicated organization 
members, influence potential constituents or the public, and internally to “enhance cohesion and 
morale.”668  The insurgency also used information and propaganda to challenge the 
counterinsurgent agenda.  “A large number of insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq proved to be 
adept at using all types of media to further their cause and to discredit the Coalition and the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF).”669
For the insurgency, the spoken word was perhaps the most important method of 
channeling information.  The oral transference of information was for all intents and purposes 
undetectable and almost impossible to interdict by the counterinsurgency.  And, it was incredibly 
effective for transmitting information through a population that had literacy rates lower than 60 
 
                                                 
667 Hoffman, Bruce, “The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists,” Testimony Presented to the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 4 May 2006, P. 14. 
668 Ibid., p. 3. 
669 Wright, Donald P. and Timothy R. Reese, Op Cit, p. 104. 
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percent overall and even lower in rural areas.670  The fact that Iraq’s official language is Arabic 
enabled AQI and other associated foreign and indigenous insurgent groups to communicate in a 
language unfamiliar to the counterinsurgency but almost entirely familiar to the local 
population.671
To reach broader populations and audiences and to enhance coordination among the 
insurgency, information technology (IT) was used in low cost and innovative ways.  To attract 
supporters, “videos of exploding U.S. vehicles and dead Americans” were distributed via the 
internet.
   
672  The insurgency used the internet “to provide would-be recruits with directions on 
how to make their way into Iraq via Syria.  For example, two websites, Jihadweb and Al-
Firdaws, have presented detailed instructions.”673
                                                 
670 “Iraq’s adult literacy rate is now one of the lowest in all Arab countries; UNESCO estimates literacy 
rates to be less than 60 percent, or 6 million illiterate Iraqi adults.  Rural residents and women have been hit hardest; 
only 37 percent of rural women can read, and 30 percent of Iraqi girls of high school age are enrolled in school 
compared with 42 percent of boys.”  USAID, “Assistance for Iraq,” accessed 19 October 2009, available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/education.html. 
  IT was also used to build a command, control, 
and information structure that usually does not exist in a networked or non-hierarchical 
671 Although Arabic is Iraq’s official language, Kurdish is widely used in the Kurdish regions of Northern 
Iraq.  Al Qaeda recognized this fact early on, “We believe that jihad in Iraq will be easier for Al-Qaida than in 
Afghanistan in view of the factor of language, which was an obstacle in Afghanistan, and the factor of the people’s 
similar features.”  Al-Siba’l, Hani, “Terrorism: Jihadist Website Describes Jihadist Movements in Iraq,” FBIS 
Report in Arabic 14 March 2004. 
672 Wilson, Clay, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and 
Countermeasures, CRS Report for Congress, 25 September 2006, p. 2. 
673 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 167. 
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organization: “The structure of terrorist and insurgent groups facilitate this transfer of 
information amongst themselves. Lacking the traditional bureaucracy of modern militaries, 
information flows rapidly and efficiently between participating subunits.  Indeed, Al Qaeda’s 
organization has gone virtual as many of their former activities are conducted solely on line: 
spreading propaganda, recruiting new Jihadists, fundraising, indoctrination and psychological 
warfare.  They even have the ability to fabricate and disseminate their own professionally 
produced and mass marketed CD-Roms and DVDs.”674  Information was gathered at the tactical 
level and broadcast for strategic purposes.675  The insurgency was flush with technically adept 
individuals that established and maintained elaborate websites used for broadcasting propaganda 
against Coalition forces and their efforts.676  “Insurgents often had a cameraman at the site of a 
car bombing, and within minutes of the explosion, the images appeared on the Internet without 
having to be vetted in any approval process and with little regard to for the distinction between 
news and propaganda.”677
                                                 
674 Methods for sharing information that took advantage of the networked structure of terrorist 
organizations was imported into Iraq principally by Al Qaeda and was adopted by other organizations participating 
in the insurgency.  See, Karzai, Hekmat and Paul T. Mitchell, Networked Power: Insurgents Versus ‘Big Army’, 
IDSS Commentaries, 27 January 2006, p. 2 
 
675 See, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Violent Islamist 
Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat, Majority and Minority Staff Report, 9 May 2008, pp. 
7-10. 
676 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 167. 
677 Wright, Donald P. and Timothy R. Reese, Op Cit, p. 288. 
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Insurgent use of IT and the internet for strategic purposes did not always achieve the 
insurgents’ desired intent and many times had consequences far beyond the control of insurgent 
factions.  For instance, operational videos, plans, and guidebooks, when captured, proved a 
treasure trove to counterinsurgent analysts.  Additionally, hostage videos and hostage beheading 
videos broadcast to cause fear and rally support for the insurgency among sympathetic audiences 
often created revulsion and horrified viewers who had little previous exposure to the actions of 
the insurgency beyond what they read in newspapers, magazines, or on the internet.  
Strategically, videos capturing the slaughter of Iraqi civilians and the beheading of foreign 
contractors and military personnel demonstrated the savagery of the more radical elements of the 
insurgency and allowed foreign politicians and military leaders to engender greater resolve by 
painting the entire insurgency with one large brush.  These videos created graphic images that 
negatively supplemented and informed international audiences’ impressions of the insurgents’ 
struggle. 
 Perhaps most vexing for the U.S. Army and other counterinsurgent forces was the 
insurgency’s ability to use low-level and ubiquitous technologies to supplement and coordinate 
mass social networks among the Iraqi population: 
 
“We were in an area that was very rural and poor.  They didn’t have any money, 
food and water was scarce, and yet they had what would be the equivalent of the 
iPhone here.  They were taking video and calling from one sheepherder to the 
next to let each other know that we just came by a position.  I was surprised that 
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when we found a cell phone and you looked at it, they had better video than you 
or I have on our phones.”678
 
 
This was also done within branches of the government, “Many terrorist groups maintain 
networks of individuals to feed information back into the organization.  These groups frequently 
develop sources within the government and security agencies that oppose them, either by 
infiltrating them or by recruiting operatives who are already members of those agencies.”679
The creation of feedback loops provided insurgent organizations with critical operational 
information, facilitated organizational control over operations, and enabled directed clandestine 
and overt information gathering to be used against the Coalition or for internal purposes.  
Insurgent control and/or influence over the information environment was abetted by IT but relied 
mostly on unsophisticated networks consisting of personal contacts, well placed sources, and the 
ability to gather and spread information at low cost.  Facility with information flows and largely 
unfettered access to information gathering and dissemination technologies allowed the 
insurgency to adapt at the tactical and strategic levels rapidly and simultaneously and further 
improved the capacity for training, intelligence operations, and inter-organizational cooperation. 
 
                                                 
678 Soldier deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview, 23 
September 2008. 
679 Jackson, Brian A., et al, Op Cit, p. 22. 
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7.1.3 Training 
Initially, the level of training and tactical acumen within and across the insurgency varied wildly.  
Former Iraqi military, police, and intelligence operators and the quasi-professional elements of 
foreign groups had experience and diverse levels of combat, paramilitary, or terrorist tactics 
training.  Many members of the general population, the tribes, and even some of the militias had 
some degree of familiarity with small arms and other light weapons but little if any real training 
on their use in an operational sense or in coordination with other weapons and operators: 
 
“We have smart, tough, adaptable enemies.  But they are not supermen.  They are 
generally poor shots, lack meaningful combat training, and work in atomized, ill-
coordinated cells and teams.”680
 
 
Although Iraq would turn into a large, experiential training ground for thousands of insurgents 
and terrorists, coordinated training never reached a level of standardization, even with the help of 
outside agencies and state-sponsored groups that allowed the insurgency to be completely 
tactically effective and entirely coordinated during operations.  But this was not all bad.  While 
standardization would have enabled greater efficiency across the insurgency and a streamlining 
of organizational input and output modifications, standardization would have also created some 
level of replication and predictability, a sure danger to an insurgent force. 
Instead of becoming predictable and following a standardized template, the insurgency, 
by trying to achieve tactical effectiveness, became unpredictable.  Some insurgent organizations 
                                                 
680 Major General Bolger, Dan, Email Interview, 13 September 2008. 
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displayed evolved competency and were capable of mounting complex baited ambushes 
incorporating a wide variety of tactics and weapons in well timed and sequenced attacks.  Other 
insurgent organizations mounted haphazard and unintentionally (and on occasion, intentionally) 
suicidal mass attacks on Coalition forces with disastrous results.  The net effect of variable 
competence and tactical inefficiency was a significant, continual, and uneven adaptation across 
the insurgency that kept the U.S. Army almost perpetually off balance.  Unpredictability and 
heterogeneous capabilities were as much unintentional strengths as they were structural 
weaknesses.  Failure invited change as much as success summoned replication: both taught 
valuable lessons and both engendered confusion among counterinsurgent forces. 
Training an insurgent is not a high cost or laborious endeavor.  Technically, most 
insurgent attacks are fairly simple to rehearse and execute and the weapons used do not require a 
great degree of knowledge or sophistication to employ.  Insurgent attacks in Iraq, which reflect 
imported knowledge gleaned from planning and executing terrorist and standardized military 
operations, are crude when compared to the complex operations conducted by modern militaries.  
Even the feared and deadly and multiform IED attack is relatively simple to construct and 
employ.  “Most terrorist acts are committed with fire, a knife, dynamite or other explosives, or 
with personal automatic weapons.  The majority of these are at the ‘low-tech’ levels.  The change 
in this respect, and a strong recent concern, is increasing sophistication with remote detonation 
methods.  These are disturbingly easy to arrange and can give new life to a deadly old standard, 
the vehicle bomb.”681
                                                 
681 Harmon, Christopher C., “What History Suggests about Terrorism and its Future,” The Past as Prologue: 
The Importance of History to the Military Profession, Eds. Murray, Williamson and Richard Hart Sinnreich, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 241. 
  Another favorite tactic of the insurgency was the suicide attack, which 
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was nearly as deadly as the IED and even more difficult to detect and defend against.  “Suicide 
bombings are cost effective, have a small logistical tail, do not require strenuous training and are 
not easy to combat.”682  Suicide attacks were largely the province of foreign fighters and mostly 
relied on recruits with few discernable skills to contribute to the insurgency.683
Although initially insurgent groups were disorganized and had limited aims and little 
need for specialization,  “This situation began to change in 2004, most likely because of the 
growing role of former military personnel in providing training, specialized skills and manpower 
to insurgent groups.”
 
684  Instilling basic combat knowledge throughout the insurgency enabled 
individuals and organizations to be much more adaptive.  Since the insurgency only rarely 
employed truly complex attacks with a large number of forces and weapons systems, simple 
training sufficed for operational effectiveness and for instilling enough baseline knowledge to 
allow for group level adaptation.  “A terrorist group has much to gain by building or acquiring 
new operational capabilities and tactics.  The more tactics a group has in its repertoire—from 
bombings to firearms attacks to kidnappings to unconventional weapons—the greater its 
flexibility and operations freedom.”685
To supplement higher order planning and attacks, insurgent organizations looked to 
published military manuals and successful innovations by other insurgent groups for knowledge 
 
                                                 
682 Hashim, Ahmed S. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 181. 
683 This changed (and is discussed later) when Al Qaeda enlisted Iraqi women to conduct 
martyrdom/revenge missions in response to male relatives killed during the conflict. 
684 Hashim, Ahmed S., Ibid., p. 183. 
685 Jackson, Brian A., et al, Op Cit, p. 18. 
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and inspiration.  Insurgents had access to volumes of army training manuals (foreign and 
domestic) and terrorist handbooks and actively sought lessons from other insurgent groups (i.e., 
Hezbollah and Palestinian organizations) contributing resources to the conflict in Iraq.686  
Foreign fighters also provided manuals and training expertise in the form of encyclopedic 
collections produced by al Qaeda:  “Basic training materials are contained in Al-Qaeda’s 7,000-
page multi-volume, Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, a collection of techniques culled from 
American and British special force’s manuals combined with lessons learned from jihadist 
operations in Kashmir, Bosnia, Mindanao and Chechnya.  These teaching materials are 
supplemented with other specialty training manuals, for example, the Declaration of Jihad 
against the Country’s Tyrants, Military Series, with lessons ranging from communication, 
transportation of weapons and their procurement, is used exclusively for advanced terrorist 
training.”687
The insurgency also took advantage of experts and skilled trainers when possible.  
Professional training is directly related to an organization’s ability to freely meet and move about 
in its local environment.  To be fully effective, training of this sort requires its participants to 
actually engage in the behavior that they are being taught.
  Training freed from bureaucratic controls and the exactitude necessitated by 
organizational standards could proceed at any level and draw from any source in its conduct. 
688
                                                 
686 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 163. 
  Training sessions were held when 
687 Hanratty, Martin E., Can the United States Defeat Radical Islam?, School of Advanced Military Studies 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 May 2008, p. 22. 
688 Much of the training that insurgents and insurgent organizations received, particularly contracted 
individuals and localized organizations, occurred on the job. 
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the group was together and incorporated lessons from each member’s experiences and were 
conducted by veteran members of the organization.689  Generally, this rarely occurred in areas 
outside of direct insurgent control and was highly circumscribed even in areas where the 
insurgency held sway.  Large and open or even clandestine gatherings were discouraged to 
protect the operational security of the organization or group and the safety of its members.  Thus, 
the most advanced and time consuming insurgent training came from experienced internal and 
external groups and state-sponsored organizations capable of minimizing training horizons and 
collapsing important lessons into a shortened but intense regimen.690
In at least one case, a state (Iran) directly, if mostly covertly, contributed to the training 
of the insurgency.  Iranian sponsored training occurred inside Iran and in areas where Iranian-
backed militants were in power (chiefly in Lebanon).  “Iraqi militants captured by the United 
States describe a complex Iranian program equipped to illicitly move, train, and arm Iraqis.  
Classes range from basic weapons courses and paramilitary training to courses designed to create 
  Expert cadres developed 
spontaneously or were sought out much like the Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) used by U.S. 
forces. 
                                                 
689 Chehab, Zaki, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East, Nation 
Books, 2006. 
690 Advanced professional training (recruits went through a 15 day boot camp to test physical and 
psychological commitment to al Qaeda; a 45 day period of basic military training consisting of map reading, 
trenching, celestial navigation, and weapons training and if selected; a 45 day guerrilla warfare school that trained 
hijacking, espionage, and assassination) used to occur at al Qaeda training bases in Afghanistan until these bases 
were destroyed or significantly compromised by the 2001 U.S.-led invasion.  As a result, “training has become local 
and less professional” in Afghanistan.  See, Hanratty, Martin E., Op Cit, pp. 22-23.  The same conditions prevailed 
in Iraq; open training camps do not exist or do not exist for long in one location.   
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Iraqi master-trainers that can continue military education and training inside Iraq.  Iran employs 
Lebanese Hizballah agents as trainers inside Iran and sponsors Iraqi militants’ travel to train 
Hizballah in Lebanon.”691  Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the 
Qods Force to train Iraqi militants within the sanctuary of Iranian borders.692  The professional 
training and material support provided by Iran was exported to Iraq via a trained cadre of 
insurgents and in the form of infiltrated experts hidden among the supportive populations. “Iran 
has imported numerous Lebanese Hezbollah trainers and advisors into Iraq; the Iranian Qods 
Force directly oversees Iranian efforts in Iraq, and cell leaders in Iraq, including Iraqis and 
Lebanese Hezbollah operatives, report directly and indirectly to Qods Force commanders in 
Tehran; Iran supports Ansar al Sunnah, a Sunni terrorist group with close links to al Qaeda, with 
training camps inside Iran and further assists the group with operations in Iraq.”693
 The insurgency adapted to circumstance by conducting discrete training supported by 
multiple hosts, suffusing training with valuable lessons learned through trial and error, and by 
borrowing and incorporating lessons from other organizations and sources both internal and 
external to the conflict in Iraq.  Although the insurgency was largely incapable of conducting 
sustained training and exercises it compensated for this deficiency by deliberately modifying 
critical inputs to expand organizational competency and generously allowed for wide-ranging 
 
                                                 
691 Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and ‘Other Means’, Combating 
Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 13 October 2008, p. 84. 
692 JAM and Special Group Criminals (SGC) specifically received training in Iran.  Ibid.  See also 
Cochrane, Marisa, “Special Groups Regenerate,” The Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard, 
Summer 2007—Summer 2008, p. 7. 
693 Kagan, Kimberly, “Iran’s Proxy War Against the United States and the Iraqi Government,” The Institute 
for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard, May 2006—August 20 2007, p. 2. 
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experimentation throughout the broader organization.  Furthermore, the insurgency purposefully 
manipulated its networked structure for training and learning.  Networking not only benefited the 
insurgency’s operations by taking advantage of stealth and speed, it also benefited its training 
and preparation by placing a premium on learning, innovation, and information sharing. 
By chance and design and through success and failure the insurgency developed and 
trained engagement techniques that took advantage of its networked structure and reduced the 
technological advantages enjoyed by the Coalition.  “Given their weaknesses, ranging from lack 
of advanced weapons to inferior or nonexistent training, they know that they have to develop and 
use tactics that function well below the threshold of the utility of Coalition tactics and weapons 
systems.”694  The insurgency trained to conduct swarming attacks followed by the quick 
disengagement and dispersal of forces.  Additionally, the insurgency developed, synthesized, and 
trained methods for causing the most confusion and damage possible through the least detectable 
means.  Multiple remote IED attacks against soft targets, assassinations, and suicide bombings 
displaying varying degrees of competence all took advantage of the strengths of the insurgency 
while simultaneously defeating the technological superiority of the Coalition.  Training and 
employing networked attacks allowed for complexity, dispersal, adaptation (both 
extemporaneous and deliberate), and unpredictability.695
                                                 
694 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 180.  See also, Munck, Ronaldo and Purnaka L. de Silva, Op Cit, p. 1. 
 
695 For discussion see, Hoehn, Andrew R., et al, A New Division of Labor: Meeting America’s Security 
Challenges Beyond Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. 15. 
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7.1.4 Constraints 
Barriers to entry in the current international security environment are few and the ability of illicit 
groups and individuals to operate across and within borders has expanded.  Unlike the 
conventional and state-based enemies that dominated the 20th Century (and previous) security 
landscape, new adversaries are considerably more adaptive and capable of adjusting to 
environmental changes.  “The new threat paradigm, in contrast, is generally nongovernmental (or 
a failed state), nonconventional, dynamic or random and nonlinear in its emergence, with no 
constraints or rules of engagement.  It has no known doctrine, is almost impossible to predict in 
advance, and is supported by an unlimited 5th column of criminals, terrorists, drug traffickers, 
drug addicts, and corrupt individuals.”696  The environment hosting these threat organizations 
and the number of enablers available to facilitate their operations has expanded exponentially.  
“In this new technological environment, small groups could travel, communicate, finance, and 
trade globally without state support.  Translated into military terms, this allowed small groups to 
finance, plan, supply, and coordinate attacks globally with little regard for borders, laws, and 
government.”697
Despite an expanded capacity for movement and communication and a relaxation of 
traditional state-based controls on organizational activity, illicit organizations, particularly 
networked organizations operating in a failing or failed state, still share a number of constraints 
 
                                                 
696 Steele, Robert D., The New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of 
Nontraditional Threats, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 2002, p. v. 
697 Robb, John, Brave New War: the Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, John Wiley & 
Sons, 2007, p. 30. 
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linked to the population(s) they operate among.  For instance, these organizations (particularly an 
insurgency) must: remain more often than not hidden from licit organizations and forces;698
Generating and retaining active and passive support for the insurgency and its operations 
was of principal concern.  This required developing and taking advantage of vast social networks 
across wide and varied constituencies within and near Iraqi borders.  Sanctuaries and safe 
havens, either cross-border or local, could “prolong an insurrection indefinitely”
 have 
some sanctuary for operational planning and the housing of materiel; attract personnel (both 
skilled and unskilled) to conduct protracted (and expanded) operations and; develop an 
indigenous intelligence network to supplant the absence of a robust gathering and analytical 
capacity common to hierarchical military organizations. 
699  or could dry 
up as support shifted or waned.700  For example, “AQI uses suburbs, close villages, and villages 
out in the belts as support zones for operations in the city.  These areas are home to safe houses, 
more elaborate insurgent complexes, weapons caches, weapons assembly sites, and areas where 
AQI can simply escape security operations.”701
                                                 
698 How hidden or covert individuals and organizations must remain depends on the environment where 
they are operating. 
  Thus, those providing asylum had to be 
protected from undue harm.  This was progressively difficult to accomplish as the 
699 Tierney, John J., Op Cit, p. 261. 
700 Kagan argues that “Insurgents rely on particular locations in order to move and meet freely to plan 
operations, transport goods, and store them.  Insurgents assemble car bombs and other explosive devices in ‘safe’ 
areas.”  Kagan, Kimberly, “From ‘New Way Forward’ to New Commander,” The Institute for the Study of War and 
the Weekly Standard, January 10, 2007—February 10, 2007, p. 4. 
701 Hamilton, Eric, “The Fight for Mosul,” The Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard, 
March 2003-March 2008. 
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counterinsurgency increasingly operated within the population and thus forced the insurgency to 
commit acts resulting in collateral civilian casualties.  As the conflict proceeded, “Coalition 
forces continued to attract the majority of attacks, while the Iraqi security forces and civilians 
continued to suffer the majority of casualties.”702
Attracting local support for recruitment drives was also important as the bulk of insurgent 
fighters were drawn from the Iraqi population.  Recruitment required taking advantage of the 
same social networks that enabled and shielded insurgent operations.  Personal contact and 
familiarity were considerable and necessary recruitment facilitators.  Although the internet 
proved invaluable for insurgent knowledge transfer and propaganda purposes, it was not a 
significant recruitment enabler: recruits rarely mentioned the internet as a recruitment tool (few 
had ready or reliable internet access) and instead were recruited through social, religious, and 
familial networks inside and outside of Iraq.  In fact, many recruiters had to leave Iraq to attract 
recruits through more traditional methods.
  
703  Compounding these difficulties were bureaucratic 
inhibitors emplaced by AQI on the passage of insurgents through Iraq’s borders.  As Fishman 
documents, AQI was highly bureaucratized, required insurgents to sign entrance contracts, and 
insisted that some exiting fighters “sign contracts demanding they not join other Jihadi 
groups.”704
                                                 
702 Report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, September 2007, p. 20. 
   
703 For discussion see, Watts, Clinton, Op Cit.  Fishman argues that “Foreign fighters who ended up in Iraq 
appear overwhelmingly to have joined the Jihad through local Jihadi sympathizers (33.5%) and personal social 
networks.”  See, Combating Terrorism Center, Bombers, Bank Accounts & Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road in and out 
of Iraq, Ed. Fishman, Brian, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 2008, pp. 7-8. 
704 Combating Terrorism Center, Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road in and out of 
Iraq, Ed. Fishman, Brian, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 2008, pp. 7-8. 
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Local support was critical for providing information and analysis infused with a thorough 
understanding of the host environment.  A networked insurgency does not have an inherent 
capacity for higher order intelligence collection and analysis and must supplement the 
capabilities of its operators in this endeavor.  The population acted as the eyes and ears of the 
insurgency and provided a level of analysis impossible to obtain without detailed knowledge of 
local personalities and conditions.  When support for the insurgency faded and when indigenous 
Iraqi organizations shifted allegiances, what remained of the insurgency lacked any meaningful 
capacity for supporting durable long-term initiatives or for developing a comprehensive picture 
of the operational environment.  Moreover, population support tends to be a zero-sum game: any 
loss by the insurgency (either passive or active) was necessarily a gain for counterinsurgent 
forces. 
Like any networked organization operating across jurisdictions and international 
boundaries, host sustenance and support can mean the difference between operational success 
and failure.  Currying, retaining, and cultivating local favor is vital.  Despite enhanced capacities 
afforded by technological advances and conditions favorable to networked operations, including 
but not limited to the complete collapse of formal state and local security in Iraq, the 
insurgency’s fate was inextricably tied to the local population.  Maintaining population support 
was a significant constraint that limited the insurgency’s ability to act with impunity and without 
due concern for prevailing local sentiment.  “It is generally assumed that the insurgency has a 
core of combatants, with a significantly larger pool of active and passive supporters.”705
                                                 
705 Bowman, Steve, Op Cit, p. 8. 
  
Organizational behavior, whether or not it took into account local attitudes, was constrained by 
them.  Restraint was necessary for success and organizational targets had to be chosen wisely.  In 
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this respect, the insurgency failed miserably as the conflict in Iraq wore on.706
7.1.5 Organizational Context Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
  Exposition, 
blindness, and an inability to expand the organization were all side effects of failing to heed 
organizational limitations and constraints. 
• The more complex the insurgency and the more convoluted its composition and 
supporting constituencies, the more likely competing organizations will experience 
friction as they try to accomplish their goals and achieve rewards.  An overarching, trans-
organizational goal does not suppress other diverging organizational goals.  Although the 
complexity of the insurgency confounded counterinsurgent efforts, created a massive de 
facto resource and personnel pool for affiliated organizations, and enhanced the 
insurgency’s capacity for operations, it also diminished the organization’s ability to 
positively adapt inputs and outputs toward coherent and common goal achievement. 
• Dedicated resources (information offices, spoken word recordings, print materials, 
internet broadcasts and databases, digital photography, etc.) and entrenched feedback 
loops populated by well-placed sources and local populations enhanced the insurgency’s 
capacity for influencing the information environment.  Ubiquitous, low cost, and 
replaceable technologies operating on state or Coalition run transmission systems allowed 
insurgent organizations to rapidly respond to and counter the efforts of the Coalition. 
                                                 
706 See Appendix B.  In general, and whether intentional or not, the insurgency killed more and more Iraqi 
civilians as the conflict evolved. 
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• Uneven skill sets among insurgent organizations and members led to operational failures 
and “Combat Darwinism”707
• The insurgency faced few constraints on organizational behavior other than the need to 
maintain population support; active if possible and passive if not.  Population support 
facilitated and concealed operations, drove local recruitment, and helped maintain 
influence if not control over the information environment.  Acting with impunity or a 
lack of sufficient respect for this constraint imposed significant organizational costs.  
 but also led to vast organizational experimentation.  
Coincidentally, insurgent experimentation and wily tactical innovations (intentional and 
unintentional) kept counterinsurgent forces off-balance.  Training occurred on the job, 
utilized the experiences of organization members, was supported by external groups and 
state-sponsored professionals, and focused in the main on low-tech and simple but 
coordinated tactics.  Varied but broadly implemented low-level training exercises and 
rehearsals (many recorded for educational purposes) ensured that the insurgency adapted 
comprehensively to individual successes and failures. 
                                                 
707 Term coined by Ahmed Hashim.  See, Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2006, p. 159. 
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7.2 GROUP DESIGN & CULTURE 
7.2.1 Composition 
What made the insurgency in Iraq truly unique was its immensely diverse, decentralized hybrid-
networked character.  “Networks can vary in size, shape, membership, cohesion, and purpose.  
They can be large or small, local or global, cohesive or diffuse, centrally directed or highly 
decentralized, purposeful or directionless.  A network can be narrowly focused on one goal or 
broadly oriented toward many goals, and its membership can be exclusive or encompassing.  
Networks are at once pervasive and intangible, everywhere and nowhere.”708
 
  Two veterans of 
the Iraqi conflict concur: 
“Things didn’t always apply across the board…different enemy cells were doing 
different things…There was no standard, we pretty much had to be ready for 
everything.”709
 
 
“You don’t necessarily have a homogeneous enemy and it evolves at different 
times and places throughout the country.”710
 
 
                                                 
708 Williams, Phil, “The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks,” Current History, April 1998, p. 155. 
709 Soldier Deployed to Baghdad (Early 2003; 2006-2007), Personal Interview, 18 September 2008. 
710 Major General Perkins, David, Telephone Interview, 21 September 2008. 
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Heterogeneity and decentralization ensured that insurgent organizations would not have to bend 
to missions but instead would form or cooperate with one another based on shared requirements, 
interests, and goals, particularly when operations called for specialized functions and 
capabilities.  Decentralization was reinforced by localism and manifested in the rejection of 
defined leadership, a dearth of cross-organizational cohesiveness, and eventually, unsuccessful 
efforts to constructively reconcile disparate organizational goals.  “The most important structural 
characteristic of the Iraqi insurgency is its high degree of decentralization.  This is particularly 
apparent in the lack of identifiable leaders.  The individual groups typically operate on a local, 
and only occasionally on a regional basis.”711  Absent an intrinsic center of gravity and a 
hierarchical command structure, the insurgency defied comparison with its more conventional 
predecessors.712
At times and across differing organizations, the insurgency exhibited hierarchical traits 
(particularly those composed of former regime elements), networked traits (tribal and localized 
insurgent groups), or elements of both organizational types (Fedayeen Saddam).
 
713
                                                 
711 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 18. 
 The 
insurgency essentially was a loose arrangement of peripheral organizations acting initially in 
goal-oriented concert but with varying levels of intensity and ambition.  The discovery, 
infiltration, or disbandment of any particular peripheral unit had no major effect on the rest of the 
712 Ibid, p. 6.  Creveld argues that, “Insurgent organizations rarely have a clear center of gravity—a single 
group of people, installation, or location around which everything revolves and whose elimination or occupation 
would lead to their collapse.”  Creveld, Martin van, The Culture of War, Ballantine Books, NY, 2008, p. 299. 
713 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 155. 
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network.  Parts of an organizational periphery could “be cut off from the network or replaced by 
recruitment of new members.”714   No single organization within the insurgency was supreme 
and none had firm or durable control over other significant parts of the network.  “It is possible 
to depict the insurgent network as a constellation of groups that cooperated but also shifted 
positions and loyalties as their motivations and actions changed.”715
The insurgency’s composition was initially based on one shared goal: compelling the 
withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq.  Circumstance more so than design impelled 
organizational form although the former was shaped by the actions of the insurgency’s chief 
competitors over time: “Counterterrorist actions by the United States and its allies are 
responsible, at least in part, for al-Qaeda’s increased reliance on loose networks of operatives to 
conduct operations.  Arrests of senior leaders and the loss of its Afghan haven have forced the 
group not only to turn to other established terrorist affiliates to conduct attacks but also to 
operate in a more decentralized, cellular fashion.”
 
716
                                                 
714 Lemieux, Vincent, Criminal Networks, Research and Evaluation Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, Ottawa, Canada, March 2003, p. 14. 
  Individual members and organizations 
were not deployed based on timelines; organizational activities were neither dictated nor 
circumscribed according to a set of detached institutional goals.  Objectives and goals helped 
direct but were not determinative of form and function or the varying levels of cooperation that 
emerged between and among groups and individuals.  Thus, the operational behavior and nature 
of the insurgency was as multiform as its composition.  “In reality the form of insurgency—
715 Wright and Reese, Op Cit., p. 102. 
716 Rabasa, Angel, et al, Beyond al-Qaeda Part 1: The Global Jihadist Movement, RAND, Santa Monica, 
2006, p. 40. 
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terrorism, guerrilla, mass-protest, or any combination of these—is mainly determined by 
objective conditions rather than by strategic conceptions of the insurgents.  The most important 
factor is capability.  Usually, the insurgents utilize every possible mode of struggle that can 
advance their cause.”717
 The insurgency’s compositional heterogeneity was reflected in its organization and in the 
breadth of its participating groups.  “There are a remarkable number of insurgent organizations.  
They vary widely in levels of skill, functional specialization, professionalism, number of 
personnel, modus operandi, targeting and longevity.”
  
718  Most of these groups, to varying 
degrees, were supported by or had linkages to a number of larger organizations (although control 
or coordination was not implied by this relationship or its structure).719
                                                 
717 Merari, Ariel, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 5, 
Number 3, Winter 1993, p. 248. 
  Larger organizations 
were divided into a series of supporting or linked brigades although the relationships and 
command structures differed in each (if they existed at all).  Depending on organizational 
requirements and operational necessities, some larger groups took the opportunity to plan and 
coordinate interests and on occasion to cooperate with one another.  “In winter 2005/2006, the 
Jihadists attempted to create larger organizations through a process of consolidation.  In some 
cases, the mergers were genuine, while others were simply media stunts.  What lies behind these 
efforts is not entirely clear, but it is probably related to the emergence of the two competing 
718 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 170. 
719 Listed previously in this chapter. 
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camps.”720  In September of 2007, Ansar al-Sunna and the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) 
held joint planning sessions; in November 2007, the Mujahideen Army claimed joint 
responsibility for an attack with ‘Islamic State’ fighters.721  Guido claims that by late 2006 there 
was a consolidation effort launched by the national Islamist and Jihadist camps in Iraq.722  The 
composition and relationships that comprised the insurgency, even at the highest organizational 
levels, changed according to opportunity and need. For example, as AQI’s power further waned 
in 2007 it formed formal organizational partnerships and alliances with several other insurgent 
organizations and drew still others “into its orbit.”723
   AQI, at one end of the organizational spectrum, had a very structured organization 
consisting of: a commanding officer, an information officer, an intelligence officer, political 
committee, executive officer (with a martyrdom coordinator for regional or city groups), an 
Islamic law committee, a finance officer, and a logistics officer.
  Coordination of this sort represented a tacit 
acknowledgement that not even a central and endowed insurgent organization (like AQI) could 
dominate or control the direction of an insurgency with such a varied and differently ambitious 
membership.  When necessity and objective conditions dictated, organizations would cooperate 
with one another to the extent that was possible and when potential benefits could be realized. 
724
                                                 
720 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 17. 
  AQI also maintained tightly 
organized tactical units but devolved control of operations to local amir.  “Each amir selects 
721 Marsh, Bill, “The Ever-Mutating Iraq Insurgency,” The New York Times, 7 January 2007. 
722 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 17. 
723 Marsh, Bill, Op Cit. 
724 Nance, Malcolm W., The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency, 2007, 
p. 281. 
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deputies to conduct recruiting and personnel placement in the combat cells, initial and advanced 
combat training, and provides for the logistics.  Al Qaeda combat cells operate in groups no 
bigger than ten to twenty men and, like all insurgent groups, meet or communicate only with 
trusted men who they know personally or have been vouched for by the organization.”725 AQI 
supported its tactical organizations with an intricate and fairly comprehensive logistical network 
partially established prior to the Coalition invasion.726  “Al Qaeda had a sophisticated covert 
organization of safehouses and its own personnel links established immediately before the 
invasion by Zarqawi who worked in league with the Saddam Fedayeen, the Iraqi Intelligence 
Service, and Ansar al-Islam.”727  To maintain loyalty and cohesiveness throughout the 
organization without micromanaging and compromising atomized operations at the tactical level, 
AQI (like other elements and affiliates of al Qaeda) recruited and promoted and operated based 
on family, friendship, and nationality ties.  Its flat, cellular structure allowed echeloning and 
communication without reducing operational freedom or excessively breaching operational 
security.728
 At the other end of the organizational spectrum from AQI were the organizations and 
individuals participating in the insurgency on an ad hoc, skill set, or contractual basis.  Because 
the bulk of insurgent activity was taken up by thousands of part-time insurgents performing 
 
                                                 
725 Nance, Malcolm W., Op Cit, p. 283. 
726 “Al-Aq’ida’s allies began moving into Iraq even before U.S. forces entered the country in early 2003.  
After fleeing Afghanistan and traversing Iran, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi slipped into Northern Iraq some time in 
2002.”  Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa-ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, 
Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 2008, p. 4. 
727 Nance, Malcolm W., Op Cit, p. 284. 
728 Hanratty, Martin E., Op Cit, p. 24. 
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functions that supported the aims of more permanent insurgent groups, their participation in the 
insurgency was generally ephemeral.729  Participants came from near and abroad.  An 
uncoordinated and essentially volunteer cadre of foreign fighters helped filled the ranks of the 
insurgency throughout the conflict.  As Byman and Pollock argue, “Terrorists often find a home 
in states in civil war.”730  Attracted by the cause and by the chance of gaining operational 
experience, individuals from the Eurasian and African continents traveled great distances to 
participate in the Iraqi insurgency.  Regionally, many individuals with direct or even distant 
relations to Iraq’s Sunni tribes helped expand the rolls of the insurgency.731  The utility of these 
volunteers varied.  Those foreign insurgents that were directed to Iraq by other non-state actors 
or groups tended to be of a better caliber and more capable than their unsponsored 
counterparts.732  Conversely, foreign fighters with little military or guerrilla training many times 
ended up being commissioned for suicide bombings.733
                                                 
729 Robb estimated that, for planning purposes, on any given day the Coalition could face an active 
insurgency of over 150,000 members.  Robb, John, How Big is the Iraqi Insurgency?,” 14 October 2005, available at 
   
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/How%20Big%20is%20Iraq%Insurgency.pdf, accessed on 1 
July 2008. 
730 Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart, Brookings, Washington DC, 2007, p. 3. 
731 Al-Siba’l, Hani, Op Cit. 
732 Hashim, Ahmed, “Foreign Involvement in the Iraqi Insurgency,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism 
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  Although there were many foreign fighters present in the insurgency, native Iraqis and 
Iraqi tribal members provided the bulk of insurgent personnel.734  As for the locals drawn into 
the insurgency, “Most of the time they [insurgents] lead normal lives, going about their business 
as usual.  On occasion, though, they engage in active hostilities and then disengage as the 
enemy’s movements and other circumstances may dictate.”735 Iraq’s tribes and militias 
contributed vast amounts of personnel and resources to the insurgency.  Tribes consist of “nested 
(vice hierarchically organized) kinship groups.  There are thousands of clans, hundreds of tribes, 
and about two dozen tribal confederations in Iraq today, each with its own sheikh.”736  Militias 
directly resisted the counterinsurgency but were most damaging when they weakened 
“government influence by providing unofficial (and effective) security in localized areas using 
illegal methods.”737
Heterogeneous functional needs contributed as much to the composition of the 
insurgency as circumstance and organizational ambitions and necessitated unique competency 
and leadership skills. Even in smaller organizations with limited capabilities, coordinating a 
diverse membership with varied functional capacities requires skilled leadership and 
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organizational legerdemain.738  “Whatever the scope of the insurgency, the effective use of 
people will depend on the skill of insurgent leaders in identifying, integrating, and coordinating 
the different tasks and roles essential for success in combat operations, training, logistics, 
communications, transportation, and the medical, financial, informational, diplomatic, and 
supervisory areas.  The complexity of the organizations designed to perform these functions 
reflects insurgent strategies.”739
The scope of the insurgency and each organization’s predilections were signaled by the 
types of targets each organization chose and their rationale for doing so:  “Insurgent groups have 
attacked and damaged or destroyed power stations, liquid natural-gas plants and oil installations.  
It should be noted, however, that three types of groups have attacked such critical infrastructure: 
looters, who may want something of value to use or sell; organized criminals, who wish to resell 
useable equipment; and politically inspired insurgents, whose attacks keep the occupation 
authorities from translating their promise of reconstruction into reality.”
 
740
                                                 
738 For instance, a simple but typical IED cell can “consist of six to eight people, including a financier, 
bomb maker, emplacer, triggerman, spotter, and often a cameraman.”  Wilson, Clay, Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures, CRS report for Congress, 25 September 2006, p. 2. 
  Conflicting insurgent 
aims and functional rationales converged despite any significant levels of coordination among 
groups.  Discerning the motivation for an attack or the responsible party merely by identifying 
the target was nearly impossible.   
739 O’Neill, Bard E., Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Brassey’s Inc.., 
Washington, DC, 1990, p. 91. 
740 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, pp. 197-198. 
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The insurgency’s composition at times depended on the capacity or will of a member 
organization to take on certain functions.  This made for strange partnering.  The nexus between 
AQI, other elements of the insurgency, and various criminal organizations was premised on the 
latter’s organizational capability even when its adoption came at the cost of broader 
organizational unity.  “Human smuggling often takes place on the same trails as livestock 
smuggling.  There is ample evidence that AQI uses criminal smugglers, who they do not fully 
trust, to cross the border.  AQIs effort to monopolize smuggling networks, which impeded Sunni 
tribal leaders from much of their traditional livelihood, was an important element convincing 
Iraqi tribes to cooperate with US forces.”741  Organized crime in Iraq was a means for the 
accumulation of resources; it helped sustain and precipitate conflict and contributed to alternative 
modes of governance.742  Criminal elements were also used for extortion, theft, and kidnapping 
for ransom.743
                                                 
741 CTC, Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road in and out of Iraq, Ed. Fishman, Brian, 
Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 2008, p. 7-8. 
  Conversely, elements of organized crime in Iraq established symbiotic 
relationships with insurgent organizations in order to better take advantage of the economic side 
effects of mass disorder.  Membership in both types of organizations increased.  “The 
development of linkages between insurgent/terrorist groups and criminal gangs becomes much 
smoother if individuals are members of both organizations and if the politics-driven 
insurgency/terrorist groups engage in economic criminal activity as a matter either of strategic 
742 For extensive discussion and analysis of organized crime in Iraq see, Williams, Phil, Criminals, Militias, 
and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 
2009, pp. 255-259. 
743 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 169. 
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policy (to ensure that the state cannot restore normal economic activity) or of replenishing their 
coffers.”744
 A variously composed complex insurgency, like that in Iraq, possessed the manifold 
strengths afforded a networked organization but suffered from the limitations associated with 
decentralization, namely clashing, competing organizational objectives.  “Disunity, in particular, 
is often the natural by-product of insurgencies waged by groups with segmented structures.”
 
745  
Disunity manifested structurally and culturally and was difficult to avoid given the varied 
composition of the insurgency and the breadth of contrasting organizational goals.  Cooperation 
was as likely as friction and as the insurgency wore on and as organizations took diverging paths 
towards their goals.  AQI and its affiliates were dominated by foreign fighters whom many Iraqis 
resented, particularly as AQI’s enhanced violence became more indiscriminate.746  And, even 
though AQI and indigenous groups did share the goal of compelling a Coalition withdrawal, 
many formerly affiliated groups parted ways as they found better methods for achieving their 
goals.  “Groups like Anbar Revenge Brigade have come to the conclusion that the best way to 
reduce the coalition troop presence in their home regions is to flush out al-Qaeda elements in 
their cities.  Iraqi Sunni tribal and religious leaders have been victims of al-Qaeda attacks, further 
turning key tribes in al-Anbar against al-Qaeda elements.”747
                                                 
744 Ibid. 
 
745 O’Neill, Bard E., Op Cit, p. 61. 
746 Marsh, Bill, Op Cit. 
747 Khalil, Kydia, “Anbar Revenge Brigade Makes Progress in the Fight Against al-Qaeda,” Terrorism 
Focus, Volume III, Issue 12, 28 March 2006, pp. 1-2. 
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  The insurgency’s diverse composition and networked structure endowed incalculable 
resources to various participating groups.  Enhanced information sharing, the availability of key 
individual and organizational skills, and the power of numbers absent central direction all 
contributed to the adaptive capacity of the insurgency.  But while a diverse composition provides 
a bounty of skills and resources it also presents the challenge of reconciling diverse objectives 
and goals.  “Rival groups may have a deleterious impact on an insurgent movement, the 
government, or both.  Where more than one disadvantaged group is incorporated into insurgent 
ranks, the size and capability of the movement may increase.  Sometimes, however, it creates 
problems with respect to cohesion.”748
7.2.2 Norms 
  When organizational differences could not be overcome 
(as was the case with the Iraqi insurgency from at least late 2006 onwards) and different groups 
sought different means to achieve assorted organizational ends, the insurgency’s compositional 
diversity transformed from an asset into a liability.  As a result of this fracture, the adaptive 
capacity of the insurgency plummeted and various formerly cooperating organizations turned 
into fierce competitors. 
Organizational norms differed significantly in Iraq because so many distinct types of 
organizations comprised the insurgency.  Norms prohibiting suicide bombing, acts of terrorism, 
or other more taboo methods of attack were accepted by many Iraqis and Iraqi insurgent 
organizations but were embraced by foreign organizations, particularly those affiliated with al 
                                                 
748 O’Neill, Bard E., Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Brassey’s Inc., 
Washington, DC, 1990, pp. 60-61. 
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Qaeda and especially those affiliated with Abu Musab al Zarqawi.  Like other variable 
organizational attributes examined in this study, differing sets of norms led to inconsistent trans-
organizational behaviors.  The eventual dissolution of the broader insurgency and tectonic shifts 
in popular support for different organizations could at least be partially attributed to the 
capricious organizational norms exhibited by a number of insurgent organizations in Iraq. 
Different sets of norms led each insurgent organization to set different standards of 
conduct for their members.  Standards of conduct were increasingly important for retaining local 
support as the conflict in Iraq progressed and general support for the insurgency waned.  Local 
Iraqi populations enabled most if not all insurgent organizations and bore the brunt of insurgent 
activity; their support was critical to any insurgent organization’s success, especially in the long-
term.  Although violence in Iraq was endemic and the insurgency went out of its way to highlight 
the fact that the government could not provide security, the insurgency had to balance its 
barbarity against losses of popular support.749  Norms shaped organizational behavior which in 
turn had either a positive or negative effect on the attitude of the local population.  Thus, where 
norms were more conventional and tempered, organizational behavior was subdued and popular 
support was retained.  Where norms were unconventional and flexible, organizational behavior 
was unencumbered and popular support was lost.  Even amongst the more extreme foreign 
elements of the insurgency there was some recognition of this fact.750
                                                 
749 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 329. 
  Organizational norms had 
to adhere to some standard so as to not eventually jeopardize organizational goals: the latter had 
750 Zarqawi’s organization had substantial disagreements with al Qaeda’s foreign leadership on norms and 
behavior with the latter realizing that the brutality of AQI was disrupting the achievement of organizational goals. 
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to be in concert with the former as each helped shape organizational behavior.  At times, these 
ideologies and goals came into conflict.  This was certainly the case when AQI rejected 
moderation in favor of greater group cohesion751
Methods selected or accepted for achieving organizational goals in some ways reflect 
organizational norms and predilections: the looser the organization’s norms and the more 
expedient the method, the more likely extreme methods—like terrorism—will be adopted.  But 
method selection can have a decidedly negative impact on an organization’s ability to achieve its 
goals, despite contrarian intent, when long-term objectives are sacrificed for short-term gains and 
popular support is not appropriately respected or accounted for.  This is especially true when 
indiscriminate acts of violence are employed which, overwhelmingly and negatively affect the 
local population.  As Silverman and Jackson argue, “One factor which cannot be neglected when 
examining terrorism is the degree and quality of violence.  When the objectives of terrorism are 
ignored, and selective, discriminatory assassination and sabotage turn to wholesale, uncontrolled 
massacre, the effects of terrorism become counterproductive.  Any sympathy which the mass 
might have had for the insurgents is lost by the excesses of terrorism.  In situations of intense 
emotional involvement, however, it may be difficult for terrorist leaders to restrain brutality and 
savagery.”
 and as a result suffered a significant drop in 
popular support. 
752
                                                 
751 Fishman, Brian, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” The Washington 
Quarterly, Autumn 2006, p. 20. 
  Although norms and standards are difficult to maintain—even when their 
maintenance is critical to the organization receiving the support it needs to achieve its goals—
752 Silverman, Jerry M. and Peter M. Jackson, “Terror in Insurgency Warfare,” Military Review, October 
1970, p. 64. 
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controlling organizational behavior across a loosely defined network of individual organizations, 
each having a parochial set of norms, is nearly impossible. 
 Norms significantly defined how organizations in Iraq conducted operations and 
managed internal affairs.  Tribally based insurgents developed operational security based on 
cultural and social norms rather than the bureaucratic norms of the cells of former regime 
elements.753  Other groups set up tribunals and established specific rule books for the treatment 
of prisoners based on a standardized set of norms.754
 
  Standards of practice and behavior to 
include the treatment of friendly and enemy combatants were also shaped by organizational 
norms and by attitudinal changes based on positive interactions with counterinsurgent forces.  
The consequences for violating organizational norms, even when in contact with the enemy, 
were sometimes dire.  As one soldier explains: 
“My guy that got killed was an IED strike.  The guy that was the trigger man was 
killed by the insurgency because he chose the wrong target.  They looked at 
bumper numbers and my units always passed through with no issue.  When I went 
on a battalion operation and I had another unit cover down on me, they always 
got hit without fail.  There was no pattern to it because we did our operations at 
different days and different times so they had no ability to determine when we 
were going to be somewhere.  We caught a few guys and they knew exactly what 
we were doing.  We had local guys asking us, hey, are all these your vehicles?  
                                                 
753 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 166. 
754 International Crisis Group, Op Cit, p. 12. 
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Do they all have this on there?  Yeah, why?  It took us about a couple of days to 
figure out what they were doing.  We were nice and providing aid.  We had won 
the support of those people but the guys that were relieving me had pissed them 
off in some way so they were taking out their anguish and frustration on them.  
We were nice to them and helped them out and they respected us for that and they 
disrespected the units that didn’t do the right thing.  At the same time, they still 
have an obligation as part of their insurgency to do a mission but they picked and 
choose their targets accordingly.”755
 
 
Despite initial organizational goal confluence and a generalized set of commonly 
accepted violent insurgent practices, organizational norms for Iraqi insurgents were strikingly 
different than those for foreign organizations.   Shultz and Dew explain that violent resistance is 
an accepted cultural practice in Iraq and has been ingrained in tribal traditions, communal 
identity, and “values deep into the social fabric.”756  This social fabric is built upon kinship 
(tribal, clan, and family), association (former regime elements), local and nationalist interests 
with kinship being the most important of the three.757
                                                 
755 Soldier Deployed on Initial Invasion (September 2002-August 2003) and Baghdad (January 2005-
January 2006), Personal Interview, 8 October 2008. 
  Among the Iraqi population, “People who 
may not actively support the insurgency are still quite forward about expressing their admiration 
756 Shultz, Richard H. and Andrea J. Dew, Op Cit, p. 251. 
757 White, Jeffrey, Op Cit, p. 4. 
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for the insurgents and their activities”758 because of a common interest in ousting the Coalition, a 
perceived common threat, and a sense of solidarity with supported organizations.  Outside of a 
likely shared Arab descent, foreign born insurgents shared very few if any characteristics with 
indigenous Iraqi insurgents or the local population.  Therefore, violence inflicted by foreign-
based insurgent groups was not nearly as accepted as violence perpetrated by local Iraqi groups 
and individuals.  Organizational legitimacy and popular support waned as levels of barbarism 
increased and barbarism was usually perpetrated by foreigner-led or foreigner-dominated 
insurgent organizations.759
Organizationally, al Qaeda did little to support its cause as the population grew tired of 
the violence engendered by the insurgency.  As one insurgent formerly in cooperation with al 
Qaeda explains, “Anyone who has followed the impact of Al-Qaida in the Diyala province will 
generally find that wherever they go, they cripple daily life.  We can summarize their actions in 
the Diyala province as follows: demolishing mosques (as what befell the Kanaan Mosque) and 
interrupting prayers; stealing the salaries of deserving retirees; preventing rations from reaching 
the people of Diyala for allegedly supporting the Iraqi Ministry of Trade; stealing livestock, 
especially from the families of martyrs from the mujahideen; killing women and children, and 
mutilating their bodies, as what befell our brothers from Asaib al-Iraq al-Jihadiya and some of 
our mujahideen in Kanaan and Bahraz; shuttering hospitals and stealing many valuable pieces of 
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medical equipment, destroying them or else exporting them to unknown locations.”760  Al Qaeda 
intentionally perpetrated grotesque acts of violence to intentionally cow or provoke the local 
population:  the indiscriminate use of car bombs and chemical weapons;761 the outright fostering 
of chaos and instability in various locales;762 the use of Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs or SVBIEDs 
to maximize civilian casualties and; the assassination and desecration of tribal leaders.763  Al 
Qaeda’s lack of normative prescriptions limiting the use of indiscriminate violence and terrorism 
led to a split with other insurgent organizations and an almost total loss of support by locals.  
Rosen argues that, “In the end, Iraq’s Sunnis wanted a stable Iraq, but under their control.  Nor 
were they interested in Zarqawi’s puritan ideology.  It was probably disgruntled Iraqi Sunnis 
who provided the tip that cost Zarqawi his life.”764
Two interviews with Iraqi insurgents highlight the split between the Iraqi population and 
indigenous organizations and foreign organizations, chiefly al Qaeda.  First, an insurgent 
explains his organization’s rationale, “We are a movement established as a reaction to the 
foreign occupation of Iraq.  Our first goal is to liberate Iraq, and then to participate in the re-
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building of Iraq in accordance with the principles of justice, equality, and citizenship.”765  
Second, an insurgent explains the rift with al Qaeda and the effect that the latter has had on the 
Iraqi population, “We do appreciate their concerns about jihad and the mujahideen, and we 
apologize for those who have stepped beyond the boundaries of good Muslim behavior…after a 
series of criminal actions launched by the Al-Qaida network targeting innocent civilians and, 
separately, other jihad movements.”766  Lastly, an insurgent explains that his organization is in 
cooperation with other like-minded Iraqi organizations in support of goals in concert with local 
sentiment, “Since the establishment of the movement, we have tried to work in cooperation with 
all the other armed organizations, and that was through the creation of a liaison office in 2006 
with the Mujahideen Army, the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) and the Islamic Front for the Iraqi 
Resistance (JAAMI).”767
                                                 
765 NEFA, “Exclusive: An Interview with ‘Hamas al-Iraq’,” June 2008, 
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A failure to reconcile organizational norms and to realize the effect that disparate norms 
had on the local population eventually contributed to the dissolution of the foreign and 
indigenous elements of the Iraqi insurgency and a near total collapse of support for any foreign-
led or affiliated insurgent organizations in Iraq.  Organizational norms permitting behavior 
wholly unacceptable to the supporting population practically ensured operational failure in the 
long run. 
7.2.3 Tasks 
Insurgent tasks are derived from organizational goals and are shaped by environmental 
indicators.  There is no prearranged list of tasks attendant to a nascent insurgent organization; it 
has little if any inherent organizational memory and is free of bureaucratic direction.  This does 
not mean that organizational members do not have memories, were not involved in or did not 
seek to develop bureaucracies, are not subject to the rules and guidelines imposed by external 
group membership, and can perceive the environment well enough to prosecute tasks effectively 
but it does mean that the organization is essentially de novo and has significant freedom in task 
design and implementation.  Thus, insurgent organizations in Iraq designed tasks to support their 
organization’s goals (a combination of defeating the counterinsurgency and advancing 
organizational interests in the chaotic post-invasion environment: power, prestige, profit, 
security, influence, etc.).  The insurgency had few benchmarks for establishing task sets other 
than some recurring tasks involving attacks on Coalition forces, the Iraqi government apparatus, 
and civilians.  Organizational experimentation based on environmental changes became endemic. 
This made predicting insurgent behavior nearly impossible. 
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Organizational tasks predicated on defeating the counterinsurgency varied but followed a 
fairly straight line from less to more complex attacks as the conflict proceeded: 
 
“On my first trip, they would hit and run, they did not want to conduct ambushes.  
Second trip, they were conducting baited ambushes and suckering us into heavy 
attacks.”768
 
 
Violent activities were a large part of most insurgent organizations’ task sets.  Violence was for 
the most part, “neither spontaneous nor self-sustaining” and was used in an instrumental fashion 
to achieve organizational goals.769  Accordingly, small arms hit-and-run attacks were initial 
staples of most insurgent organizations.  Insurgent organizations built upon these tasks by 
incorporating a mix of automatic weapons and RPGs into coordinated and quickly evolving 
‘micro attacks’ that were short in duration but involved a respectable amount “planning, 
command and control, manoeuvre and the involvement of several elements.”770  Most of these 
types of tasks required only modest organizational resources but were difficult to defend against 
and typically generated the intended response by counterinsurgent forces: overwhelming force 
employed with significant civilian casualties and/or collateral damage.771
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Depending on an organization’s interpretation of the environment, different tasks were 
practiced, planned, and employed.  Terrorist style attacks were used to draw repressive responses 
from Coalition forces while and when the cost of these attacks remained low.772  Insurgent 
organizations also formed tasks based on the strengths of the networks they developed (quick 
assemblage and dispersal) and on perceived weaknesses of their targets (inability to predict 
attacks and defend).  To do so, the insurgency combined less complicated tasks into coordinated 
attacks by ‘swarming’ as opportunities and targets presented themselves.  Swarming allowed 
insurgent organizations to “move slowly, in cycles, and episodically, concentrating on highly 
vulnerable targets at the time of its choosing.”773
 As the conflict in Iraq progressed, an emerging task list appeared, evolved and was 
refined based on organizational goals: political and military operations (counter-coalition, 
counter-collaboration (against the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)); counter-mobility (convoys and 
transport); counter-reconstruction (infrastructure and contractors); counter-stability (civilians, 
religious sites, diplomats) and; counter-election.
 
774  Guido defines task evolution more broadly 
and in phases:775
 
 
• Phase 1—Classic guerrilla warfare (through 2003); 
                                                 
772 See, Rubin, Michael, “Asymmetrical Threat Concept and its Reflections on International Security,” 
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May 2007 and Merari, Ariel, Op Cit, p. 235. 
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• Phase 2—Spectacular acts of terrorism, kidnappings, and public relations efforts 
(2004 to Summer 2005); 
• Phase 3—Rise and competition of nationalist organizations (Spring 2005); 
• Phase 4—Intensified sectarian violence (February 2006); 
In each phase, and progressively, the insurgent task set became more complex and involved more 
than just violence against competing organizations and designated targets.  Correspondingly, 
fewer organizations had the capacity to carry out necessary organizational tasks and fewer 
organizations were capable of exploiting environmental changes to achieve organizational goals.  
Tasks including targeted violence, political maneuvering, and the defense of key territories and 
populations (to name a few) were difficult if not impossible for many organizations to 
accomplish.  As task sets became more complex and as the environment changed significantly, 
many organizations withered, consolidated, or became marginalized as they could no longer 
accomplish organizational goals effectively.  As organizations were co-opted, or more generally 
lost influence, sectarian violence erupted.  During Phase 4 (see above) in particular, 
organizational divisions over goals, missions, direction led to internecine violence and 
fragmentation largely among indigenous and foreign organizations. 
7.2.4 Group Design & Culture Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
• The Iraqi insurgency’s complexity derived from the number, type, and heterogeneity of 
networked groups operating in Iraq.  Its diverse composition made it exceptional as 
compared to previous insurgencies.  But the insurgency’s composition also disrupted 
coordinated goal achievement, organizational coherence, and cross-organizational 
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cooperation.  The insurgency’s diversity provoked organizational divergence and made 
partnering difficult.  A lack of central direction and leadership inhibited adaptation 
towards common goals. 
• Norms, which influence behavior, varied among groups.  Iraqi group norms were 
significantly different than those of foreign insurgent organizations.  Iraqi groups 
(generally) were more restrained in their behavior and actions while foreign groups were 
not.  Within the insurgency, conflicting norms disrupted the accomplishment of long-
term goals and the cohesion of cooperating organizations as groups treated each other and 
local populations differently. 
• Tasks are derived from goals and are shaped by changing environmental cues.  
Organizational tasks evolved as competency increased from the simple to the more 
complex and coordinated.  But as the environment changed and the capabilities required 
for success compounded, few organizations could reasonably adapt tasks to goals and 
requirements.  Most organizations did not have the capacity to accomplish multiple, 
coordinated, complex organizational tasks beyond tactical attacks.  The competency and 
organizational skill sets required to complete complex, multi-dimensional tasks generally 
did not exist and thus, many organizations were unable to appropriately adapt. 
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7.3 MATERIAL & TECHNICAL RESOURCES 
7.3.1 Equipment 
The coalition’s failure to secure weapons and explosives caches throughout Iraq ensured that the 
equipment necessary to wage an insurgency was not in short supply.  Military-grade explosives, 
weapons, ammunition, and specialized equipment, if not detritus from abandoned military posts 
or centralized in unprotected armories, could be found lying on roadsides or, in the case of rifles 
and other small arms, in many Iraqi households: 
 
“At that point in the war it hadn’t gotten as vicious as it turned out.  You got pot 
shots and hand grenades but IEDs weren’t born yet.  They didn’t really show up 
until the Summer of 2003.  I remember seeing our First Sergeant and 
Commanding Officer for a LOGPAC [Logistics Package] and he brought up the 
term IED, you know, roadside bombs, artillery rounds that are fused up.  Funny 
as it may be, there were artillery rounds all over the roads we had been 
travelling.  We would seem them every day but we never paid attention to them.  
The consolidation of that stuff hadn’t begun yet.”776
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Iraq was “awash in weapons of the types that are most useful in a resistance situation: light to 
heavy automatic weapons, hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mines, 
military-class explosives, and mortars.  These weapons are effective for engaging most coalition 
units and are mobile and easy to hide.”777
IEDs and small arms do not need to be sophisticated in order to be effective (to advance 
organizational goals) and do not intrinsically necessitate great skill in their manufacture or 
employment.  Each, alone, combined, or utilized as part of a simple or complex tactical operation 
(ambush, complex ambush, assassination, etc.), is effective for killing soldiers, government 
officials, and civilians and for causing significant environmental chaos and damage to 
infrastructure and vehicles.  But sophistication in IED construction and emplacement does add to 
the difficulty of detecting and defusing or counteracting the effects of these devices.  Increasing 
  Other items that the insurgency needed and used 
(wiring, washing machine timers, alarm clocks, vehicles, ball bearings, garage door openers, 
binoculars, cell phones, video cameras, etc.) could be found in one form or another in all modern 
and even many more primitive societies.  Furthermore, the expertise needed for assembling and 
employing this equipment as weaponry (if not available through organizational members) was 
published on the internet, contained in various how-to manuals like the Anarchist’s Cookbook or 
the Poor Man’s James Bond, and was published in various military manuals on tactics, booby-
traps, and improvised explosives.  For the higher-order construction, maintenance, and 
employment of small arms and IEDs, the knowledge contained within former government 
employees, former members of the military, and trained foreign terrorists and professional 
insurgents sufficed.  
                                                 
777 White, Jeffrey and Michael Schmidmayr, “Resistance in Iraq,” Middle East Quarterly, Volume 10, 
Number 3, Fall 2003, p. 3. 
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the sophistication IEDs (particularly when combined with the employment of small arms 
expanded the range of inputs to insurgent operations.  Consequently, outputs were also expanded 
as tactical operators could attack more varied targets while not exposing the insurgency and its 
members to greater physical risk or detection.  “Beginning in September 2003, IEDs became 
more sophisticated, evolving from simple suicide attacks to more complex remote-control, 
vehicle-borne IEDs and daisy-chained IEDs using tripwires.  Such a rapid increase in 
technological sophistication indicates the infusion of ‘expert’ knowledge into the process of 
building and deploying IEDs.  The increased sophistication of IEDs over time also indicates that 
their design and construction has become a specialized function within the insurgency, rather 
than a dispersed function.”778
Much of the skill needed to make more complex IEDs came from formerly employed 
members of Saddam Hussein’s government and military and this capacity was further augmented 
by the skills of many trained and experienced foreign fighters.  “The IEDs that are killing 
Americans in Iraq were not imported from abroad.  Saddam Hussein’s regime designed them.  
The insurgency’s expert bombmakers are mostly former members of the Iraqi Intelligence 
Service (IIS), the Mukhabarat.  The IIS unit called M-21 (also known as the Al Ghafiqi Project) 
operated a laboratory that designed IEDs.”
  As the organization benefitted from the use of IEDs, as standalone 
devices or in conjunction with other methods of attack, the IED became an organizational 
specialty. 
779
                                                 
778 McFate, Montgomery, “Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs,” Military Review, May-June, 2005, p. 37. 
  Furthermore, much of the skill needed to mount 
more complex operations with small arms and explosives came from these same former regime 
and military members.  As these skills proliferated and as more and more unskilled insurgents 
779 Ibid. 
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became skilled, the capacity of the insurgency grew and opportunities for successful adaptation 
expanded. 
 Although a proliferation of advanced tactics and skills pervaded the insurgency over 
time, at no point did the insurgency reach any sort of technological parity with the 
counterinsurgency (particularly not in resources or in their application).780
 
  This posed problems 
for the counterinsurgency since many of its assets were designed for detecting and neutralizing 
high-tech equipment and much of its training and intelligence was premised on its capacity for 
impeding, degrading, or destroying the capabilities of a technologically adept foe.  When the 
insurgency did employ advanced technological contrivances and equipment, it did so freed from 
the constraints and restrictions posed by SOP or convention and thus many times avoided the 
detection tools and methods employed by the counterinsurgency: 
“Our enemy is a parasite, and our own technological culture is the host.  Al 
Qaeda in Iraq and the Jaysh al Mahdi have no R&D and a rudimentary 
procurement chain.  It’s all our own technologies turned back on us.  But freed 
from any rules or law, the terrorists think up things that would not occur to us, 
like airliners ramming skyscrapers on 9/11.”781
 
 
                                                 
780 In fact, the insurgency became somewhat less sophisticated.  Small arms attacks increased over time and 
the insurgency attacked softer targets thus reducing the need for advanced technology and equipment in most of its 
attacks.  See Appendix B. 
781 Major General Bolger, Dan, Email Interview, 13 September 2008. 
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Paradoxically, the insurgency relied on capability multipliers (such as the population and 
membership skills) that defied technical collection methods and confounded the 
counterinsurgency’s ability to develop a clear intelligence picture or to predict future operational 
adaptations.782  The insurgency had no compelling need to pursue or adopt anything more 
advanced than what was available in Iraq: tactical success was being achieved with creative 
applications of what equipment and tools were readily available.  Any attempts to acquire or to 
use more advanced weaponry would have risked organizational safety by generating indicators 
observable to the counterinsurgency.783  For instance, when EFPs were imported or provided to 
the insurgency, the networks supplying these devices were uncovered and interdicted.  This led 
to a loss in capacity not only in relation to EFPs but also to the skills and capabilities that the 
members of these networks provided.784
                                                 
782 Moll argues that “Much of the current terrorist threat circumvents technical detection, since the main 
element of these organizations is the people making up the organization.”  Moll, Daniel C., U.S. Army Forces for 
the Global War on Terror, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003, p. 52. 
 
783 As Bonomo, et al, contend, “In many cases, terrorists already have roughly equivalent weapons at their 
disposal, and incremental improvements will not significantly increase their attack capabilities.  For example, 
although an improved explosive might enable terrorists to make a truck bomb smaller, existing truck bombs have 
been sufficient for most terrorist’s needs and desired targets.  Therefore, acquisition of some types of advanced 
weapons by terrorists would not significantly change the balance of capabilities between terrorists and security 
forces.”  See, Bonomo, James, et al, Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional 
Weapons,” RAND, Santa Monica, 2007, p. 111. 
784 The Iranian government aided both Sunni and Shi’a organizations in Iraq.  In addition to EFPs, Iranian 
agents sold or gave 81mm mortars and mortar rounds and other equipment to the insurgency.  See Kagan, Kimberly, 
“The Battle for Diyala,” The Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard, 11 February 2007-25 April 
2007, p. 12. 
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While low-tech small arms and relatively unsophisticated IEDs were employed in 
insurgent attacks, the insurgency did utilize higher-tech inter-netted communications to transmit 
information, images, and lessons gleaned from contact with counterinsurgency forces.  The same 
communications network created and used by the states and forces supporting the 
counterinsurgency actively benefitted the insurgency.785  The insurgency did not have to create 
or control the network; it only needed the network’s capacity for individual and organizational 
exploitation.  The insurgency, when not able to operate freely or with a high degree of personal 
contact, reduced the distance between groups and transmitted communications, technology, and 
knowledge electronically.786
The insurgency enhanced its survivability and the effectiveness of its operations by 
applying knowledge and experience to the equipment and resources that were available in 
Iraq.
 
787
                                                 
785 Weimann argues, “Paradoxically, the very decentralized network of communications that the U.S. 
security services created out of the fear of the Soviet Union now serves the interests of the greatest foe of the West’s 
security services since the end of the Cold War: international terror.”  Weimann, Gabriel, “How Modern Terrorism 
Uses the Internet,” Special Report 116, U.S. Institute of Peace, March 2004, p. 2. 
  This allowed the insurgency to plan and prepare for attacks while avoiding most 
counterinsurgent collection capabilities.  The availability of equipment and communicative tools 
also freed the insurgency from expending significant resources for its attainment and from 
786 For a discussion of how terrorist organizations share information see, Cragin, Kim, et al, Sharing the 
Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies, RAND, Santa Monica, 2007, p. 98. 
787 Taking advantage of and incorporating EFPs (although not available in Iraq but supplied by Iran to the 
insurgency) and Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions (or Mortars) (IRAMs) are a good example of this.  For 
discussion see, Cochrane, Marisa, “Special Groups Regenerate,” The Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly 
Standard, Summer 2007-Summer 2008, pp. 19-20. 
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relying on state-based partnerships that characterized previous insurgencies.  Whether or not 
adaptations based on the availability of resources were made consciously or were merely the 
result of convenient environmental factors, the insurgency nonetheless was capable of expanding 
its operational capacity while maintaining a low operational signature. 
7.3.2 Funds 
Iraq’s insurgents supported operations with funds obtained through various licit and illicit 
activities.  These activities changed as the marginal costs of their conduct changed over time and 
as differing opportunities availed themselves.   For instance, in 2004, the insurgency utilized 
courier infiltration of funds and accessed cached deposits of local and foreign currencies.788  In 
later years and during the infancy of the state’s security apparatus, the insurgency created or co-
opted smuggling operations, kidnapped for ransom, counterfeited, and charged fees for services 
normally provided by internal security and border control agencies.789
                                                 
788 See, Kilcullen, David, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Small Wars Journal, 2006, p. 7. 
  These funds were used to 
789 The insurgency was benefitted passively by patronage from foreign individuals, charities, religious 
organizations, and terrorist groups.  Actively, the insurgency engaged in fee collection for safe passage, kidnapping 
for ransom, extortion of legitimate services and government contracts, oil smuggling, racketeering, and robbery.  
See the leaked U.S. intelligence report on this subject, Burns, John F. and Kirk Semple, “U.S. Finds Iraq Insurgency 
has Funds to Sustain Itself,” New York Times, 26 November 2006.  See also, Oppel, Richard A., “Iraq Insurgency 
Runs on Stolen Oil Profits,” The New York Times, 16 March 2008, Paley, Amit R,. “Iraqis Joining Insurgency Less 
for Cause than Cash,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 20 November 2007, and Guidere, Mathieu and Peter 
Harline, “Withdraw, Move on and Rampage: Iraq’s Resistance Evolves,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 
http://mondediplo.com/2006/05/02irak. 
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help sustain the organization and individuals in the organization, pay for the services of part-time 
or auxiliary combatants, purchase information from the public and corrupt politicians and 
security services, and to enable other supporting and tangential criminal activities.  The system 
of financing insurgent activities in Iraq was vastly different in character, scope, and method than 
systems of external state support utilized during the Cold War and thus presented a range of 
unique consequences that flummoxed efforts to counter insurgent funding streams.790
Illicit behavior engaged in for monetary gain to support other operations, either by design 
or merely circumstantially, has the side effect of perpetuating environmental conditions 
anathema to law and order.  Crime, looting, kidnapping, and murder, to name a few illicit 
insurgent activities, engendered fear of the insurgency and a mistrust of government and 
counterinsurgent forces.
 
791
                                                 
790 “Having lost the support of great powers since the end of the Cold War, terrorist and insurgent groups 
have sought funding through smuggling, arms trafficking, kidnapping and extortion, piracy, counterfeiting, and 
other criminal activities.”  RAND, U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Must Address Ideological and Political Factors at 
the Global and Local Levels, RAND, Santa Monica, 2006. 
  This occurs whether or not the population, government, or 
counterinsurgent forces are the explicit targets of this activity and whether or not general chaos is 
a prevailing organizational goal.  The net result of the insurgents’ engagement in funding 
activities for the potential or actual realization of licit and illicit gains was highly flexible.  The 
insurgency developed an adaptive framework for monetary and in-kind resource gathering that 
791 “Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many Iraqis.  Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are 
commonplace in much of the country.”  Baker, James A., et al, The Iraq Study Group Report, ISG, 6 December 
2006, p. 11. 
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directly supported organizational objectives with, consequently, the added benefit of disrupting 
the mission of counterinsurgent forces.792
Periods of conflict and instability afford insurgent criminal enterprisers exaggerated 
access to excess and underutilized economic capacity: chiefly, an un- or underemployed 
population.  Regardless of official employment status, Iraqis seeking wages were used to gather 
or shield critical information, provide much needed skills from their previous professions (many 
times martial), and conduct contracted insurgent work.
 
793  As Kilcullen argues, the insurgents in 
Iraq “were wealthier than the population, and routinely paid locals to conduct attacks for 
cash.”794  The economic disparity between the insurgents and average Iraqis was substantial.  
Although a number of hired insurgent forces were quickly killed through “Combat 
Darwinism,”795
                                                 
792 This process appears common to a number of modern insurgencies.  Felbab-Brown describes a process 
where insurgents and other belligerents gain not only financially from illicit activities but also develop freedom of 
action and political capital from enterprise.  Each of these benefits are fungible in providing the resources to support 
organizational objectives.  See Felbab-Brown, Vanda, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2010. 
 the insurgency benefited by expanding the size and scope of its operations and 
by flooding the environment with potential and real combatants.  Regardless of how this pool of 
793 This does not imply that monetary gain was a sole motivation.  Certainly, grievances, nationalism, and 
religious fervor all combined to fuel the Iraqi insurgency as a grass roots movement.  Nonetheless, economic 
opportunity was another and sometimes principal motivator for attracting average Iraqis to the insurgent cause. 
794 Kilcullen, David, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Small Wars Journal, 2006, p. 7. 
795 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 159.  Combat Darwinism refers to the quick capture and or death of many poorly trained or 
inexperienced fighters at the beginning of the insurgency. 
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resources was specifically utilized, the insurgency manifested its own economy of force by 
paying for the services of an untapped and previously unpaid or underpaid resource.  If nothing 
else, the contract services paid for by insurgent funds freed professional or committed insurgent 
forces to conduct higher-order planning and for the organization of longer-term, complex 
operations. 
Supplementary income was an important motivator for many who participated in the Iraqi 
insurgency; a fact all too well known to insurgent organizations.  As Hashim notes, many 
insurgents “have to hold down a day job.”796
Siphoning excess labor capacity from an aggrieved and impoverished population 
provided the insurgency with resource gathering and provisioning flexibility not available to law 
  Supporting the insurgency, if not a primary job or 
chosen profession, was a form of moonlighting and, although dangerous, paid relatively well and 
was preferable to being paid little or nothing at all.  Creating an alternative marketplace for skills 
and services significantly weakened the legitimacy of the Iraqi government while simultaneously 
increasing the costs of counterinsurgent operations.  During a period of institutional failure and 
the breakdown of normal functioning society, this marketplace thrived and became self-
sustaining.  The revenue used to support insurgent activities was returned through criminal 
enterprising and created a cyclical market closed to organizations and individuals not in league 
with insurgent forces. 
                                                 
796 Ibid.  Figures for individual income for conducting attacks vary but notably increased as the conflict 
wore on.  “It used to cost just $50 to hire an Iraqi youth to fire a rocket-propelled grenade at American troops; it now 
costs $100 to $200” in 2004.  Oppel, Richard A., “In Northern Iraq, the Insurgency has Two Faces, Secular and 
Jihad, but a Common Goal,” The New York Times, 19 December 2004.  The cost for external organization hiring 
rose even higher over the next 4 years.   
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abiding organizations, particularly not in a post-conflict environment where state and private 
resources were few and where legitimacy was at a premium but difficult to establish.  “Conflict 
gives insurgents access to money and resources out of proportion to what they would have in 
peacetime.”797
Frequently, resources gained licitly but used illicitly funded behavior that further 
engendered support from the local population.  Insurgents received sponsorship from supporters 
of the resistance, Salafist charities, individual donors, and from mosques around the world.
  Contracting goods and services with licit and illicit funding streams during a time 
of conflict creates a shadowy market and insurgent controlled clearing house that paradoxically 
lends to stability, employment opportunities, and enhanced service provision outside the control 
of sanctioned or government forces and agencies.  But the benefits of creating alternative forms 
of stability accrue almost solely to insurgent organizations and not to the state or even the 
population at large.  At any time, those benefitting from the stability and employment provided 
by the insurgents’ alternative marketplace could become its targets. 
798  
These donations formed a large pool of funding to draw upon that was almost impossible to 
distinguish from other financial transactions carried out on a daily basis.799
                                                 
797 Metz, Steven, Rethinking Insurgency, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
June 2007, p. 44. 
  Donations and 
volunteered support came not only from foreign sources but also from the indigenous population.  
Active and passive volunteerism on the part of many average Iraqis supplemented the 
insurgency’s licit funding streams by reducing the potentially prohibitive costs of contracting out 
798 Nance, Malcolm W., Op Cit, p. 270.  See also, Looney, Robert, “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The 
Case of Islamic Charities,” Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 3, March 2006. 
799 Ibid. 
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major portions of insurgent activities.  This passive support was rewarded with the provision of 
security and in some cases access to social services largely unavailable after the fall of Saddam’s 
government.  Creating unconventional forms of stability and legitimacy enhanced the reputation 
of the insurgency and cast a pall over governmental and counterinsurgent operations. 
In addition to self-financing and licit support, the insurgency supplemented fund 
gathering with highly organized criminal activities that took advantage of circumstances and 
cleavages peculiar to Iraq.  In at least one case, the insurgency took active steps to protect a 
legitimate business to insure a lucrative smuggling operation.  Oil smuggling in an oil rich 
country surrounded by other oil rich countries would not seem, prima facie, to be a highly 
profitable exercise worthy of significant resource investment by the insurgency but this perfectly 
characterizes the relationship between the insurgency and the Baiji refinery in Northern Iraq.800  
The insurgency also conducted organized crime or worked with extant organized criminal groups 
as necessity or convenience dictated.  Organized criminal groups teamed with the insurgency (if 
not actively a part of the insurgency) to engage in a mutually beneficial kidnapping business.801
                                                 
800 Oppel, Richard A., Op Cit, 16 March 2008. 
  
By taking advantage of the circumstances peculiar to Iraq in the wake of the 2003 invasion and 
by utilizing criminal enterprise and licit funding streams, the insurgency became financially self-
sufficient.  This relationship was cyclical and dependent in its causes.  Crime was used to gain 
funding to support the insurgency and the chaos caused by insurgent activities was used to mask 
and cover rampant criminal enterprise.  Both gave cause for continued local and foreign 
volunteerism and for donations from abroad.  By 2006, the insurgency raised tens of millions of 
801 Steliga, Mark A., Why They Hate Us: Disaggregating the Iraqi Insurgency, Naval Post Graduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 2005, p. 74. 
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dollars a year from oil smuggling, kidnapping, counterfeiting, and “connivance by corrupt 
Islamic charities and other crimes” that the Iraqi government and coalition forces were, by and 
large, unable to stem.802
The accrual of benefits from this mutually symbiotic criminal-insurgent relationship 
ebbed and flowed between and among various illicit groups.  Variable and manifold funding 
mechanisms enabled the insurgency to adapt to and take advantage of changing circumstances 
and to circumvent counterinsurgent efforts to target any single source of exchange.  Once gained, 
these funds were used to perpetuate the insurgency and to take advantage of systemic 
employment problems through the utilization of a capable and talented but chronically underpaid 
population.  Unlike its 20
 
th century counterparts, the Iraqi insurgency was particularly and almost 
wholly entrepreneurial and was thereby capable of creating and realizing advantages on an as-
needed basis.  As Robb argues, “Guerrilla entrepreneurs…provide innovation in warfare, 
leverage sources of moral cohesion to grow the group through fictive kinship, find new sources 
of income through integration with transnational criminality, and much more.”803
7.3.3 Intelligence 
 
The insurgency developed an immense intelligence gathering operation that exploited existing 
social and technical architectures.  This apparatus consisted of (but was not limited to) and was 
                                                 
802 Burns, John F. and Kirk Semple, “Iraq Insurgency has Funds to Sustain Itself, U.S. Finds,” New York 
Times Late Edition, 26 November 2006. 
803 Robb, John, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, John Wiley & 
Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2007. 
 378 
enabled by: informal command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks; messengers; the internet; smuggling rings; human 
contact; street scouts with signals; runners; and cellular telephony.  Additionally, the insurgency 
learned about and developed the capacity to undermine many of the counterinsurgency’s most 
sophisticated intelligence gathering and analysis measures (including Communications 
Intelligence (COMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)).804  Formal and informal social 
networks were converted into information gathering, processing, and transmitting associations 
that defied conventional countermeasures.  Individuals, families, groups, and tribes acted as the 
eyes and ears of insurgent combatant cells.805
Having access to thousands of unidentifiable intelligence collectors, processors, and 
filters enabled a high degree of control of the information environment and an appreciable degree 
of adaptive capacity.  The insurgency collected information and deceived, misinformed, and 
deprived counterinsurgent forces with the same informal networks it used to inform its own 
operations and planning.  The insurgency’s ‘eyes and ears’ could be switched from passive to 
  The insurgency’s human network conducted 
active and passive intelligence collection and, perhaps more importantly, engaged in significant 
counterintelligence operations.  These counterintelligence operations not only identified 
adversarial collection methods and techniques but also took advantage of (mostly) undirected 
and passive deception and denial:  insurgent activities were concealed when the population 
refused to or did not voluntarily pass along counterinsurgent-relevant information or data. 
                                                 
804 Cordesman, Anthony H., Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success, Praeger Security International, 
London, 2006, pp. 45-46. 
805 For discussion see, Hashim, Ahmed S. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, New York, 2006, p. 159. 
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active, when necessary, to help identify critical nodes of the counterinsurgent network. When 
these passive measures were insufficient for protecting and informing the organization or when 
active supplementation was appropriate, the insurgency targeted the counterinsurgency’s 
collection and interpretive efforts by specifically attacking translators and HUMINT operators.  
Controlling the intelligence environment, maintaining the capacity to suppress environmental 
and population-based indicators, and targeting competing intelligence collection assets not only 
supported insurgent operational adaptation but degraded and confused key informational and 
intelligence inputs to the counterinsurgent adaptive cycle. 
 By far, the greatest strength of the insurgency’s intelligence system was its ability to 
actively and passively scan, observe, probe, and interpret ambient environmental conditions and 
counterinsurgent operations and activities through its own dedicated collectors and through the 
eyes of an adjunct Iraqi population.  The ability to use the Iraqi population as an intelligence 
gathering network was the sine qua non of the insurgency’s (particularly for the foreign elements 
of the insurgency)806
                                                 
806 In the later stages of the conflict, foreign elements, particularly al Qaeda, lost local favor, protection, and 
intelligence privileges and their capacity to engage in operations and to manipulate the environment diminished 
significantly.  See, International Crisis Group, “Iraq After the Surge I: The Sunni Landscape,” Middle East Report 
No. 74, International Crisis Group, 20 April 2008, p. 7. 
 intelligence collection apparatus.  Environmental changes are far easier to 
detect and interpret when an organization’s collection system is a constituent part of the 
environment being observed and/or operated in.  This is true for any organization struggling to 
adapt in a contested environment.  The insurgency augmented passive, population-centric 
collection methods with active (conducted simultaneously with attacks) probing and sensing 
techniques: 
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“There was always the threat of one VBIED being followed by another.  One part 
of their [the insurgency’s] process was to figure out how long it took us to 
respond to a VBIED.  They would set off one VBIED and you would get there, set 
up a cordon, and prepare.  They know how long it took you to get there so you 
would have to prepare for another one.”807
 
 
And, the insurgency regularly probed and observed U.S. Army units to determine if perceived 
superficial changes (uniforms, equipment, etc.) indicated potential or actual operational and 
behavioral changes: 
 
“In a report, someone on the council noticed that the people had become scared 
of our patches.  When a new unit came in without those patches that is when they 
decided to test to see if they were the same type of guys.  This happened in 
Falluja, Shula, and Ghaziliyah…the insurgency is very observant and watches 
every move—who is pulling security and who isn’t.”808
 
 
When operational constants, ROEs, and constraints were detected, they were exploited for 
maximum effect in ways that were difficult if not impossible to counter: 
 
                                                 
807 Soldier Deployed to Baghdad (March 2004-March 2005), Personal Interview, 22 September 2008. 
808 Soldier Deployed on Initial Invasion then to Samawah, Personal Interview, 18 September 2008. 
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 “The enemy understood that we had boundaries and would use the rivers to bind 
us geographically.  They would fire their indirect fire across the river in order to 
disrupt our boundaries.  It is impossible to hide anyone to do observation of this.  
As soon as you enter an area or a house, the locals start acting differently and the 
insurgents can pick this up.  Any change in behavior tips off the insurgents that 
the Americans are in the area.  You cannot blend.”809
 
 
Even minor changes were noted and exploited when possible: 
 
“They paid attention to the small details.  Sometimes it only took them a week and 
sometimes it took six weeks but they would overcome and adapt.  They were 
patient and it allowed them to get the edge sometimes and it forced us to readjust 
our game plan.”810
 
 
The insurgency exploited the U.S. Army’s use of and reliance upon SOPs, tools for developing 
the environment, and early weaknesses at gathering information in an anthropological conflict 
environment.  The insurgency learned that the Army likes to count and target things instead of 
people and that the counterinsurgency had difficulty measuring, developing, and capturing the 
                                                 
809 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi (November 
2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
810 Ibid. 
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multi-dimensional attributes of a complex insurgent environment with tools designed for more 
conventional operations:811
 
 
 “We could throw up UAVs all day long but the insurgents know what a UAV is.  
They have satellite TV and when they hear a lawnmower in the sky they go to 
sleep.  The insurgents can watch TV as well as we can.”812
 
 
  A secondary but more pernicious strength of the insurgency’s intelligence gathering 
operation was its ability to penetrate competing military and government organizations both 
directly (through corruption or targeted subversion) and indirectly (through close or inside 
observation).  “Their ability to assassinate or kidnap individuals, and assault convoys and other 
vulnerable targets has been the result of painstaking surveillance and reconnaissance.  Inside 
information about convoy and troop movements and the daily habits of Iraqis working with the 
Coalition has been passed to insurgent cells from within the Iraqi security services, primarily the 
Iraqi police force.”813
 
  As one al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) member recounts in his diary: 
                                                 
811 Cordesman, Anthony H., Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success, Praeger Security International, 
London, 2006, p. 47. 
812 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi (November 
2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
813 Hashim, Ahmed S. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 164.  See also, Hashim, Ahmed S., “The Sunni Insurgency in Iraq,” MEI Commentary, 15 August 
2003. 
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“our Jihadi Movement goals at the early stages were to recruit as many as 
possible of the government employees in order to have access, sources and 
supporters among them in order to gain more information about the Government 
security forces and the infidels’ military and tactical movements in order to ease 
our movements and missions against them.”814
 
 
This, in combination with other intelligence gathering operations, provided unparalleled depth to 
the insurgency’s ability to conduct and assess its operations in light of how its opponents 
observed and assessed the effects of these operations.  This facility gave the insurgency a Janus-
like observational power that was not similarly enjoyed by counterinsurgent forces.  The 
insurgency, for quite some time, was capable of not only adjusting its organizational inputs and 
outputs to achieve goals but also of viewing, in good detail, how the counterinsurgency did the 
same.  This multifaceted intelligence gathering architecture allowed the insurgency to efficiently 
hone its operational capacities while concurrently weakening that of its counterparts. 
 The insurgency also took advantage of the intelligence gathering capacities of other 
insurgent and terrorist organizations engaged in operations (against U.S. and other forces) in 
different theaters.  Vast, although mostly hidden, transnational information sharing networks 
enabled the collusion of various organizational intelligence collectors.  Intelligence was 
compiled in one area of conflict and was transmitted via various means to other areas in order to 
improve operational capabilities and to exploit weaknesses that otherwise might have gone 
undetected.  “The informational age has provided the insurgents a wealth of strategic 
                                                 
814 Abu-Tariq, Daily Diary of al-Qaeda Sector Leader Called Abu-Tariq, 15 October 2007, available at 
http://images.military.com/pdf/Col_Bacon_021108.pdf, accessed 16 October 2008. 
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intelligence.  Through personal visits, telephone, and email, the global jihadist and terrorist 
network has provided advice on tactics learned in places as diverse as Afghanistan and 
Chechnya.”815
 Although the insurgency maintained a durable and robust intelligence gathering network 
for quite some time, this network was by no means permanent and thus was never a ‘dedicated’ 
insurgent intelligence asset.  As provinces, cities, and neighborhoods slowly acceded to 
governmental or counterinsurgent control and later actively supported counterinsurgency 
operations, the insurgency’s intelligence capabilities diminished at an exponential rate.  What at 
one point was a great strength became a great weakness.  For the insurgency, absent other 
traditional (military or defense) intelligence collection capabilities outside of the Iraqi population 
and the direct observational power of organizational members, intelligence collection was truly a 
zero sum game: any loss was the counterinsurgency’s gain.  The Iraqi population was a low-cost 
and ready-made intelligence network that could enable either competitor in this conflict.  The 
insurgency’s adaptability was premised on intelligence gathering which was further premised on 
active and passive support from the population.  Transitively, adaptability and success was 
founded on support from the population.  As support waned, organizational adaptability quickly 
morphed into rigidity and the insurgency’s intelligence apparatus was reduced to the capabilities 
provided by its formal members. 
 
                                                 
815 Metz, Steven and Raymond Millen, Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and Continuity, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2004, p. 12. 
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7.3.4 Material & Technical Resources Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
• The insurgency had ready access to enormous amounts of military grade equipment, 
explosives, small arms, ammunition, user manuals, and communications devices.  In 
addition, the insurgency had access to other low-grade electronic equipment and 
industrial supplies used for booby-traps, IEDs, and observation.  Employed skillfully, 
insurgent organizations used all available equipment and tools to enhance their 
survivability, expand stand-off attack distances, and coordinate networked hit-and-run 
attack capabilities. 
• Licit and illicit funding streams were used interchangeably to finance operations, enable 
recruitment, and contract support from the local population with supplementary income 
streams.  Insurgent organizations paired with organized crime groups and adopted their 
tactics, techniques, and procedures when possible.  Insurgent organizations engaged in 
crime, looting, kidnapping to raise funds, took donations from external organizations and 
charities, and colluded with corrupt organizations and individuals.  The insurgency was 
largely self-financing and thus confounded counterinsurgent attempts to cut off or disable 
any particular source of funding. 
• The insurgency developed an expansive social and technical intelligence collection and 
sharing network to actively, passively, directly, and persistently observe the environment.  
Dedicated organizational assets and sensitively placed sources conducted express 
intelligence gathering while the population provided general information on coalition 
movement and the effects of organizational activities.  Pervasive intelligence on the 
terrain, government deliberations, and coalition actions was shared among insurgent 
organizations to inform and tailor the planning, training, and execution of operations. 
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7.4 EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE 
7.4.1 Consultation 
One of the many interesting and unique characteristics of the Iraqi insurgency was an almost 
complete absence of consultation with foreign powers and organizations not directly 
participating in or contributing to the insurgency.816  Although other countries did covertly or 
passively support the insurgency (i.e., Syria and Iran), for the most part, the insurgency did not 
seek out cooperative or consultative relationships with states.817  By its networked nature, the 
majority of the Iraqi insurgency did not need the support of states and could instead rely on intra-
organizational capacities to provide resources and counseling.  Likewise, when leadership was 
drawn from external sources it was still indigenously tied to participating organizations (unlike 
in many previous 20th Century insurgencies where external cadres helped guide insurgent action 
and behavior).  Guidance therefore loosely and extemporaneously came from within and across 
the organization.  “The insurgency’s leadership reportedly consists of eight to twelve individuals 
who meet from time to time, inside and outside of Iraq, to discuss organization and tactics.”818
                                                 
816 Linkages to any foreign powers were not singular in nature.  Insurgents and their organizations were not 
created by foreign states nor did they exist solely because of foreign sponsorship.  Linkages and ties existed prior to 
the evolution of the insurgency or were developed by members that had multiple organizational bonds.  Multi-
organizational membership (based on shared experiences, kinship, ethnicity, etc.) could inherently expand the scope 
of the network without the ties always being active or apparent. 
  
817 For discussion, see Nasr, Vali, “When the Shiites Rise,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2006. 
818 Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White, “Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency,” Policy Focus #50, the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2005, p. 14.  Leadership, where it explicitly existed, resulted 
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The very structure of networked organizations nearly obviates the need for consultation.  Indeed, 
by their very formation, they exist for goal accomplishment and therefore do not necessarily 
require consultation with or from other groups.  Information that would normally be received 
through external consultation was generated within the organization or was incorporated through 
the creation of mutually beneficial relationships with other like-minded groups. 
7.4.2 Direct Action 
Disentangling direct external support to the Iraqi insurgency is a difficult task.  The core of the 
insurgency franchised many of its operations to supportive locals and erstwhile communal 
groups.  Likewise, the insurgency was supported by the direct action of various unrelated tactical 
operators that might have consulted with distinguished insurgent organizations but were for all 
intents and purposes external or adjunct members of the broader movement.  Coincidentally, 
many members conducting direct action on behalf of the insurgency might have belonged to 
several groups at one time.  “An opportunist criminal might sign up as a member of a militia, or 
a foreign agent might hire a criminal to commit a certain act in exchange for payment.  What 
they all share in common is that they find a strong Iraqi Government that would operate in a 
manner acceptable to the United States extremely threatening and contrary to their individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
from internal promotions or status within the organization.  Even when external leadership emerged, it had links to 
organizations participating in the insurgency.  See, Shahzad, Syed Saleem, “The Changing Face of Resistance,” Asia 
Times, 23 June 2006, for example. 
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interests.”819
Many criminal groups, organized or spontaneous and without clearly articulated ties to 
insurgent organizations, conducted direct action missions that contributed to the insurgency.  
This occurred despite the fact that these organizations might have had no corresponding or 
shared political or ideological interests with insurgent groups.  “The vast majority of Iraqi 
criminals have limited or no ties to the insurgents, although some are clearly ‘for hire’ in terms 
of what they target or being willing to take pay for sabotage or acts of violence that help create a 
climate of violence in given areas.  Many U.S. and Iraqi intelligence officers believe that some 
criminal networks are heavily under the influence of various former regime elements or are 
dominated by them and that some elements of organized crime do help the insurgency.”
  Direct action for and with the insurgency then is perhaps best described as actions 
taken on behalf of the insurgency without explicit (and solitary) organizational membership or 
discretional guidance. 
820
Foreign and local fighters expanded the scope of the insurgency without any initial or 
even enduring organizational ties.  After the Coalition invasion, over one million Iraqi men and 
women “professionally trained in the use of Kalashnikovs, RPGs, mines and other non-
  
Many robberies, assassinations, thefts of resources, and smuggling efforts that contributed to the 
chaos in Iraq were conducted by criminal organizations or other profit driven syndicates. 
                                                 
819 Farrell, Kevin W., “The Challenge of Providing Security in the ‘Post-Combat Phase,’ Urban 
Environment,” Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors: Implications for the US Army, Eds Gott, Kendall D. and 
Michael G. Brooks, the Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2007 Military History Symposium, Combat 
Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2007, p. 183. 
820 Cordesman, Anthony H., Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success, Praeger Security International, 
London, 2006, p. 287. 
 389 
sophisticated weaponry perfectly fitted to the environment of the urban guerrilla warfare” melted 
into the Iraqi landscape, many of whom later actively supported the insurgency or were 
compelled into service:821
 
 
“The problem is that the local guy is the executer and AQI is the provider and the 
one that is giving the guidance, task, and purpose.  If I don’t do this, I am in more 
trouble than if I do.  What is the lesser of the two evils?”822
 
 
Scores of women fighters emerged to conduct missions to avenge family members and support 
al-Qaeda’s suicide bombing efforts despite not having organizational affiliation.  “Protected by 
cultural and traditional norms that disallow male security services to search, much less look at 
Muslim women, it is no wonder that al-Qaeda and affiliated groups view female suicide bombers 
as an attractive option to weaken the present Iraqi government and drive out coalition forces.”823
                                                 
821 Novikov, Gene, Op Cit, p. 5. 
  
Foreign fighters and volunteers swelled the ranks of the insurgency with zealous suicidal intent 
mostly absent from local populations and indigenous fighters.  “The influx of foreign terrorists 
and religious extremists is not a massive one.  More important than the relatively small numbers 
of these foreigners is that they constitute a force multiplier and are willing to engage in 
operations that most Iraqi insurgents would prefer to avoid, such as extremely bloody suicide 
822 Soldier Deployed on Initial Invasion (September 2002-August 2003) and Baghdad (January 2005-
January 2006), Personal Interview, 8 October 2008. 
823 Ali, Farhana, Rising Female Bombers in Iraq: An Alarming Trend, Counterterrorism Blog, 22 April 
2008, Accessed 21 June 2008 at http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/04/rising_female_bombers_in_iraq.php. 
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attacks.”824  At first, foreign fighters came from Palestinian camps, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.  
Later, militants emigrated from Europe and the greater Middle East.825  Most of these fighters 
were not veterans of other conflicts but instead were first time volunteers.826
 Direct action on behalf of the insurgency by ‘ordinary’ Iraqis, foreign fighters, and 
various exploitive individuals complicated counterinsurgent efforts to police the community and 
to generate useful information without tipping its hand to actual or potential insurgents.  
Furthermore, a suicidal foreign component significantly changed the costs of providing defense 
to key infrastructure and bases of operation.  Even if direct action did little to halt the overall 
momentum of the counterinsurgency, it certainly complicated its efforts and provided the 
insurgency with another, if unintended and undirected, arm to sow confusion and disrupt 
counterinsurgent operations. 
  
7.4.3 Cooperation 
Networks can form, coalesce, and decompose as needed in a nearly unobservable fashion aided 
by social, familial, and network ties and abetted by omnipresent information technologies.  The 
                                                 
824 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 139.  See also, Steliga, Mark A., Op Cit, p. 65. 
825 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, pp. 140-141. 
826 The Sinjar Records show that the mean reported birth year of fighters was 1982 and the median was 
1984.  “The fighters overall youth suggests that most of these individuals are first-time volunteers rather than 
veterans of previous jihadi struggles.”  Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A 
First Look at the Sinjar Records, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2008, p. 16. 
 391 
networked insurgency in Iraq was no exception despite the often competing or contradicting 
interests of its components.827
 
  Individuals and organizations were folded into other insurgent 
organizations based on similar interests, goals, ties, and motivations, while for the most part 
remaining hidden among the Iraqi population: 
“Our enemy survives by blending into the population.  These modern information 
technologies allow our foe to move as freely and swiftly as fish swimming through 
the sea of the people, just as Mao Zedong always said.”828
 
 
Many insurgent organizations cooperated with and hired other ‘insurgents’—in a practice 
not dissimilar to Coalition service contracting—and a core of dedicated insurgents planned and 
managed their operations (suicide bombings, emplacing IEDs, etc.).  Expanding existing 
networks and developing new networks and matrices based on organizational needs and 
membership ties and characteristics formed the basis cooperation for the insurgency in Iraq.   As 
Noel Williams contends, “The principal attribute of matrix warfare is the dynamic nature of its 
internal membership structure and its external alliance structure.  Membership is actualized to 
fulfill varying combinations of geopolitical, economic, and/or 
psychological/ideological/religious needs or desires.  For example, members can share common 
economic interests on one level and join together to accomplish a specific goal and then 
disengage and reshuffle to accomplish a different set of objectives.  However, these 
                                                 
827 Robb, John, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, John Wiley & 
Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2007, p. 74. 
828 Major General Bolger, Dan, E-mail Interview, 13 September 2008. 
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combinations need not be sequential, but rather can be concurrent and multi-various, such that at 
any given moment, numerous combinations and associations are possible between the same 
members, but for different objectives.”829  Cooperation along these lines made disambiguation of 
the insurgent structure almost impossible.  The insurgency was equal parts ephemeral and 
enduring: “This presents those who might oppose these organizations with a constantly changing 
matrix of interconnections, making simple nodal analysis difficult and requiring a multi-
dimensional mindset analogous to that required for three-dimensional chess.”830
 The compelled collapse of the Iraqi state and Iraq’s social structure and multimodal 
communal ties accelerated cooperation among various groups.  “Weak or nonexistent states and 
rapacious warlords with private armies facilitate the operation of all types of covert networks.”
 
831
                                                 
829 Williams, J. Noel, “Matrix Warfare: The New Face of Competition and Conflict in the 21st Century,” 
Small Wars Journal, August 2005, p. 3. 
  
Covert networks that existed in structure prior to the invasion gained purpose and cohesion 
during the insurgency without an appreciable amount of effort directed toward their formation.  
“Covert networks often don’t behave like normal social networks.  Conspirators don’t form 
many new ties outside of the network and often minimize the activation of existing ties inside the 
network.  Strong ties, which were frequently formed years ago in school and training camps, 
keep the cells interconnected.  Yet, unlike normal social networks, these strong ties remain 
830 Ibid. 
831 Milward, H. Brinton and Jorg Raab, “Dark Networks: The Structure, Operation, and Performance of 
International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking Networks,” Paper Presented at the International Conference on the 
Empirical Study of Governance, Management, and Performance, Barcelona, Spain, 4-5 October 2002, p. 49. 
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mostly dormant and therefore hidden.”832  These ties gave form to what Milward and Raab 
describe as ‘secret societies’ that are premised on preexisting social structures rather than on 
psychological factors.833
Some cooperative networks and coalitions formed out of the mass of unemployed 
potential insurgents created by the invasion.  These networks grew without warning and 
expanded and contracted despite lacking perceptible or public leadership
  The addition of motivation and common goals activated these ties and 
created a super-organization nearly imperceptible to outside observers. 
834 and obvious 
organizational structures governing their behavior.  Capabilities, availability, financial reward, 
and a desire to act bonded these groups.  “Action elements include insurgent groups and criminal 
organizations, each with its own leadership and decisionmaking process.  These make up a ‘web 
of networks;’ likewise linked by personal, tribal, or organizational ties, and communicating by 
various means, especially cell phones, the internet, and couriers.  Each group is believed to be 
involved in a range of activities, including recruitment, training, financing, propaganda, political 
activities, and guerrilla and terrorist attacks.”835
                                                 
832 Krebs, Valdis E., “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections, Volume 24, Number 3, 2002, p. 
49. 
  Insurgent organizational complexity, noted 
earlier, made fighting the insurgency much more difficult than originally anticipated.  “The fact 
that recent insurgencies have been coalitions is a critical component in understanding them.  For 
too long, American leaders stated that the insurgency in Iraq could not be genuine because it had 
833 Milward, H. Brinton and Jorg Raab, Op Cit, p. 47. 
834 “Each group operates with sophisticated leaders careful to stay in the background while relying on part-
timers to carry out attacks and killings on a pay-by-assault basis.”  Oppel, Richard A., “In Northern Iraq, the 
Insurgency has Two Faces, Secular and Jihad, but a Common Goal,” The New York Times, 19 December 2004. 
835 Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White, Op Cit, pp. 14-15. 
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no unifying cause or leader; therefore, it could not be a threat…the lack of unity in current 
insurgencies only makes them more difficult to defeat.  It is a characteristic that we have to 
accept and understand.”836
A sizable cooperative network also grew out of Iraq’s tribal population.  Tribes consist of 
khams (all male children who share the same great-great grandfather); biets or houses (vast 
extended families with hundreds of members); fakhdhs (group of houses or a clan) and; ahiras 
(tribal organizations consisting of a group of clans).  Tribes can vary widely in size, ranging in 
population from a few thousand to a million.  A group of tribes forms a confederation or 
qabila.”
 
837  Many tribal members had useful military experience left over from when they were 
supported and armed for defense during the Iran/Iraq war and after the Persian Gulf War.838
Despite vast networks of people with varying skills and levels of leadership, the Iraqi 
insurgency was a truly disjointed effort throughout most of 2003 and into 2004.  Nascent 
organizations lacked coherence and capability and individual members moved in and out of 
groups frequently.  Competition within groups and among individuals subverted cooperation 
among organizations.  This occurred despite the fact that this unorganized mass of insurgent 
forces was simultaneously imposing serious losses on counterinsurgent forces and disrupting the 
  
Alone, a single tribe could be a significant force, commanding the resources of thousands of 
potential fighters.  In collaboration, the tribes formed by far the largest and most pervasive 
constituent network of the Iraqi insurgency. 
                                                 
836 Hammes, Thomas X., “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” Military Review, July-August 2006. 
837 Hassan, Hussein D., Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities, CRS Report for Congress, 15 
March 2007, p. 2. 
838 Ibid, p. 3. 
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formation of a new Iraqi government.  Early attempts at cooperation usually took the form of 
disastrous mass attacks that caused Coalition casualties but came at a pyrrhic costs.  The power 
of networked cooperation did not reveal itself until later in 2003 and early 2004 and then only 
partially. 
   Cooperative efforts were blunted through mid-2004 by organizational disunity stemming 
from internal debates regarding differing organizational goals and interests.  General 
disagreement among organizations on political and ideological goals and even tactical methods 
and targets were a common feature of the insurgency throughout most of 2004.  “Sunni 
dissatisfaction and the insurgent perception that they could attain military success contributed to 
the slow progress of counterinsurgency in Iraq in 2004.”839  Notwithstanding intra-group 
disagreements and divisions and an almost complete disregard for what a successful insurgency 
would require of the victors, the insurgency did manage to develop cooperative methods by late 
2004 based on tactical realities and organizational needs.  As Hashim then noted, “the insurgency 
is not a united movement directed by a leadership with a single ideological vision.  Indeed, the 
insurgents may have calculated that their success does not now require an elaborate political and 
socioeconomic vision of a ‘free’ Iraq; articulating the desire to be free of foreign occupation has 
sufficed to win popular support.  Because they wish to avoid fratricidal conflict, these groups are 
cooperating with one another and coordinating attacks at the operational and tactical levels 
despite profound political differences.”840
                                                 
839 Malkasian, Carter, “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of 
Western Iraq, 2004-05,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 17, Issue 3, September 2006, p. 389. 
  Intermittent success against the counterinsurgency 
840 Hashim, Ahmed S., “Iraq’s Chaos: Why the Insurgency Won’t Go Away,” Boston Review, 
October/November 2004. 
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throughout late-2004 and early-2005, based on cooperatively planned and networked attacks, 
provoked greater cooperation among organizations despite competing organizational objectives 
and goals. 
Regardless of the initial ad hoc construction and motivation of the Iraqi insurgency the 
effort became increasingly better organized through successful tactical and operational 
cooperation.  With cooperation came sophistication and organizational articulation.841  By late 
2005 and early 2006, the insurgency was based on more permanent, though shifting and 
evolving, networks premised on competency and a capacity for augmenting external operations.  
Correspondingly, recognizable and geographically bound groups emerged based on shared 
interests, fitness, and local affiliations.842  Informal divisions of labor also evolved within and 
across a number of formerly competing groups.843  Among insurgent organizations, there was an 
“increase in sustained cooperation and coordination in training, resource-sharing and the conduct 
of joint operations.”844  There was also collaboration for specific missions based on interests in 
attacking the same targets.845
                                                 
841 Schnaubelt, Christopher M., “Wither the RMA,” Parameters, Autumn, 2007, p. 102.  See also, Middle 
East Report No. 50, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, International Crisis Group, February, 2006, 
p. 8, “Progressively, as a result of fierce competition, smaller, less effective groups disappeared or merged with 
more successful, well-established and prestigious ones…by 2005, what had begun as an assortment of isolated cells 
thus became a set of far wider and sophisticated networks.” 
  The insurgency was self-sustaining and actualizing; it had its own 
842 Guidere, Mathiew and Peter Harling, Op Cit. 
843 International Crisis Group, Op Cit, p. 8. 
844 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 187. 
845 Ibid. 
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experiential gravity:  “Friendships, webs of acquaintance and networks of mutual obligation 
stretch worldwide between and among groups.  Similarly, within jihad theaters, groups cooperate 
and develop bonds of shared experience and mutual obligation.”846  Organizational coordination 
developed and collective learning about insurgent and counterinsurgent methods ensued.847
Cooperation in Iraq among foreigners, particularly al Qaeda, and Iraqi insurgent 
organizations was “borne of opportunism and a narrow mutual interest in targeting coalition 
forces.”
   
This extended through native groups and to the foreign elements of the insurgency. 
848  Although al Qaeda had its own operational interests in Iraq, it provided 
organizational expertise, resources, and consultation to native groups in exchange for sanctuary, 
mostly among Sunni tribes and populations in the al Anbar province:849
 
 
“The insurgency received extensive support from the transnational network of al 
Qaeda and associated movements and organizations as well as the external 
regime of Saddam Hussein that resides primarily in Damascus and elsewhere as 
well.  So, they were able to establish bases of support within the country.  Al 
Anbar was a base of support.  North along the Tigris and Diyala rivers in the 
Diyala Province, South of Baghdad and the use of the Lutifiyah area.  All these 
                                                 
846 Kilcullen, David, “Countering Global Insurgency, Version 2.2,” Small Wars Journal, 30 November 
2004, p. 10. 
847 International Crisis Group, Op Cit, p. 3. 
848 Levitt, Matthew, “Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of 
Crossover Between Terrorist Groups,” SAIS Review, Volume XXIV, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2004, p. 43. 
849 Fishel, John T. and Max G Manwaring, Op Cit, pp. 261-262. 
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were safe havens that allowed the enemy to mobilize resources and access 
support (weapons, finance, munitions, assemble car bombs, those sorts of 
things).”850
 
 
Cooperation among al Qaeda inspired and linked organizations (especially those formed or 
supported by Abu Musab al Zarqawi) was initially based on mutual interest and the potential 
sharing of resources.  “For al-Qa’ida, the merger with Zarqawi proved to be a lifeline.  Al-Qa’ida 
was essentially gaining a franchise in the hub of global jihad at a time when the organization was 
weak around the world.”851   For Zarqawi, “the merger also had many benefits.  Afterward, he 
obtained access to both al-Qa-ida’s recruiting networks and, perhaps more important, received 
financial and logistical assistance, particularly from the Persian Gulf.”852  Sunni organizations 
also benefitted from Zarqawi’s largess and appeal.  But, generally, and despite notable successes 
against Coalition forces, Zarqawi’s methods were not well tolerated and his organization lacked 
support from the Iraqis, even though he was capable of attracting foreign fighters and 
resources.853
Although Zarqawi’s organization provided vast resources and expanded organizational 
capacity to associated groups, its ruthlessness also sowed division among once and newly 
cooperating organizations.  Notwithstanding mutual interests, Sunni groups allied with Zarqawi 
 
                                                 
850 Brigadier General McMaster, H.R., Telephone Interview, 8 September 2008. 
851 Byman, Daniel, The Five Front War: The Better way to Fight Global Jihad, John Wiley & Sons, 
Hoboken, NJ, 2008, p. 226. 
852 Ibid, p. 227. 
853 Beehner, Lionel, “Iraq’s Insurgency After Zarqawi,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9 June 2006. 
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became disaffected and “antagonized by the increasingly arrogant behavior of Al-Qaida fighters 
brandishing their pseudo-Islamic authority.”854 Cooperation was increasingly difficult to achieve 
because organizational objectives and attitudes collided.  “Al-Qaeda is an ideology-based, global 
movement whose paramount objectives are to mobilize Muslims for a worldwide jihad against 
the West and to topple ‘apostate’ regimes.  Its ideology is profoundly internationalist, attempting 
to contextualize local conflicts as part of the broader struggle.”855  Cooperating Sunni groups’ 
perceptions of the conflict significantly differed:  they saw their participation in the Iraqi 
insurgency not as a part of an international effort but instead as part of a local, Iraqi struggle.  
“The vast majority of militants in Iraq have nothing to do with al-Qa’ida, and they are focused on 
Iraqi problems: security, distribution of power and money, and sectarianism.”856
Increasing tensions among local and foreign insurgent groups led to a fierce and violent 
competition for the insurgency’s leadership mantle, the creation of consolidated organizations, 
and the eventual disintegration of cooperation between and among al Qaeda created and 
affiliated groups and most native Iraqi organizations (al Qaeda forced one of the 1920 
Revolution Brigades (Jaffar al-Tayyar Brigade) to officially join its ranks and conspicuously 
formed the MSC to consolidate like-minded groups).
 
857
                                                 
854 Kohlman, Evan F., Op Cit, p. 9. 
  “Al-Qaeda didn’t understand the Iraqi 
855 RAND, U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Must Address Ideological and Political Factors at the Global 
and Local Levels, RAND, Santa Monica, 2006. 
856 Felter, Joseph and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar 
Records, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 2008, p. 6. 
857 NEFA, “Statement from the 1920 Revolution Brigades,” 10 October 2007.  For an in depth discussion of 
the formation of the MSC and al Qaeda’s proclamations surrounding it, see, Abedin, Mahan, “Mujahideen Shura 
Council in Iraq: Fact or Fiction?,” Terrorism Focus, Volume III, Issue 12, 28 March 2006, p. 3.  See also, Zambelis, 
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mentality and tried to lead the community by establishing the Islamic State of Iraq, instead of 
coexisting with the different Iraqi groups.  The targeting of Shiites and their shrines aggravated 
the Sunni Iraqis as much as it did the Shiites because it upset the precarious balance between the 
Sunnis and Shiites.”858  AQI also began targeting competing and dissenting organizations859 with 
bloody attacks on tribal leaders throughout al Anbar province and Shi’a targets throughout 
Iraq.860  Al Qaeda’s machinations only backfired.  “In the end, only two significant Iraqi 
insurgent factions ever consented to join the MSC: the Army of the Victorious Sect (joined 
January 15, 2006) and the Army of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jammah (Joined January 28, 2006).”861
The effects of al Qaeda’s eventual failure and inability to cooperate along the lines of 
shared goals, or even in the organization’s own interest, extended throughout Iraq (with the 
emergence of the tribes and local citizens opposing al Qaeda)
 
862
                                                                                                                                                             
Chris, “Iraqi Insurgent Media Campaign Targets American Audiences,” Terrorism Focus, Volume IV, Issue 33, 16 
October 2007, p. 3. 
 and will likely be enduring: 
“Despite the possibility for transnational jihadist cooperation with other insurgent groups, it is 
likely that their extremist beliefs and methods will continue to set them apart from other 
insurgent groups, and make the prospect of long-term cooperation between these groups 
858 Bakier, Abdul, “Al-Qaeda Adapts its Methods in Iraq as Part of a Global Strategy,” The Jamestown 
Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume V, Issue 24, 20 December 2007, p. 6. 
859 Ibid, p. 3. 
860 See, Robinson, Glenn E., “The Battle for Iraq: Islamic Insurgencies in Comparative Perspective,” Third 
World Quarterly, Volume 28, Number 2, 2007, p. 272. 
861 Kohlman, Evan F., Op Cit, p. 3. 
862 See, Petraeus, David H., Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, 10-11 September 2007, p. 5. 
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unlikely.”863
7.4.4 External Assistance Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
  Al Qaeda’s behavior also made it abundantly clear that cooperation based on a lone 
intersecting organizational objective did not necessarily translate into the successful recognition 
of organizational goals.  
• External consultation with organizations (particularly states and their functionaries) that 
did not have ties to individuals and groups in Iraq was limited.  The variety or capabilities 
and resources brought to bear by manifold organizations participating in the insurgency 
allowed for significant inter-organizational consultation.  Thus, insurgent organizations 
were not subject to the controls and whims of external powers and were able to make 
decisions and engage in acts based on internal organizational interests. 
• Individual actors, external but indigenous Iraqi organizations, criminal groups, and 
foreign organizations all contributed to the Iraqi insurgency even if the effects of their 
actions were only tangentially or indirectly tied to the goals of insurgent organizations.  
The chaotic environment prevailing in Iraq permitted various activities that expanded the 
effects of the insurgency (crime, looting, revenge killings, etc.) and significantly 
disrupted counterinsurgent efforts.  Direct action on behalf of or benefitting insurgent 
organizations slowed the counterinsurgent adaptive cycle and allowed committed 
insurgent organizations the time and space to adjust organizational inputs and outputs 
with more discretion. 
                                                 
863 Steliga, Mark A., Op Cit, p. 68. 
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• Insurgent groups (tribes, FREs, foreign groups, various militias, and criminal 
organizations) cooperated when their goals aligned and when mutual benefits could be 
realized.  But while the diverse nature of the insurgency provided opportunities for 
cooperation, it also ensured organizational disunity as differing organizational goals and 
interests came into conflict.  Disunity led to friction and ultimately disrupted cross-
organizational capacities for adapting resources to organizational goals.  Competition for 
goal achievement caused a rationing of organizational capital. 
7.5 CRITICAL GROUP PROCESSES 
7.5.1 Application of Skills & Knowledge 
The insurgency’s skill and knowledge was derived from previous martial training and education 
and, as the conflict progressed, built upon on shared information and the experiences gleaned 
from operations.  Experiences from the Soviet-Afghan war, the conflict in Chechnya, the Iran-
Iraq war, and the more recent war in Afghanistan, all contributed to insurgent knowledge and 
skills.  Increasingly, these skills were enhanced by operations in Iraq.864
                                                 
864 The insurgency expanded its knowledge and skills through printed materials from other conflicts, 
military manuals, and experimentation.  For instance, insurgents began using ‘sticky’ or magnetic IEDs for targeted 
assassinations in late 2004 or early 2005.  These were likely derived from a combination of Limpet mines from 
WWII and magnetic booby traps used in Northern Ireland.  For discussion see, Londono, Ernesto, “Iraq Militants 
Turning to Use of ‘Sticky’ Bombs,” Washington Post, 10 October 2008 and Zoepf, Katherine and Mudhafer Al-
Husaini, “Militants Turn to Small Bombs in Iraq Attacks,” New York Times, 13 November 2008. 
  The manifestation of 
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the insurgency’s skills and knowledge appeared as unsophisticated yet creative responses to 
counterinsurgent behavior.  In response to the counterinsurgency, the insurgency was uncannily 
parsimonious and capable of combining skills, knowledge, and resources in application: 
 
“The insurgency’s level of desperation and their lack of technology was striking.  
They used the least sophisticated method to arrive at the same endstate: blow up a 
U.S. vehicle.  They would hide IEDs in dead animals, flower pots, etc.  It was so 
simple yet so difficult to track.  These people had, and we found, anarchist 
cookbooks, and stuff like that.  You had to have a good memory of where things 
were along routes.  It could be a new flower pot or it could be a new IED.  If you 
put a dead animal on the road we assume that someone hit the dog.  Nobody 
thinks that someone put an IED in the dog.  One, it would be ignored.  Two, it was 
disgusting and nobody wanted to look at it.”865
 
 
The insurgency was also capable of changing tactics and techniques adaptively to respond to 
counterinsurgent behavior while still achieving a desired organizational effect: 
 
“They might not have had the equipment but they made do with what they had 
and they reacted quickly to how we did things.”866
 
 
                                                 
865 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
866 Soldier Deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview, 
23 September 2008. 
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Skills and knowledge were used to quickly modify equipment simply but effectively: 
 
 “Most IEDs are not that sophisticated.  Yes, some work with IR [Infra-Red] 
sensors and such and it does take some skill to learn how to make them well but 
none are cutting edge technology.  Deadly IEDs are the deep buried ones that are 
artillery shells or homemade explosives and explosively formed projectiles, which 
are copper slugs that cut through the armor on all of our vehicles.”867
 
 
An ability to adapt skills and knowledge sets, however simple, based on experience ensured that 
the insurgency could effectively counter its competitors rapidly and in concert with 
organizational goals.  Maintaining simplicity enabled speed and also aided the propagation of 
skill and knowledge sets to other organizations.  This is reflected in the tactical vice strategic 
adaptability of insurgent organizations in Iraq: 
 
“I think that they had a greater capacity to adapt at the tactical level and at the 
technical level than they did at the strategic level.  You take AQI for instance, if 
we put armor on our vehicles ,then they built bigger bombs.  If we put counter-
EW [Electronic Warfare] devices on the vehicles, they used pressure plates.  If we 
used metal detectors to find the pressure plates, they would go to command wire.  
That kind of adaptation occurred regularly with the insurgents and AQI terrorists 
in Iraq.  What AQI couldn’t do as well was adapt at the strategic level.  For 
instance, once the tribes had begun to turn against AQI in Anbar Province 
                                                 
867 Lieutenant Colonel Crider, James, Email Interview, 22 September 2008. 
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because of the way AQI treated the tribal chieftains and the people of Anbar, and 
brutalized them, AQI was not nimble enough to alter their strategy.”868
7.5.2 Task Performance Competency 
 
To enhance task performance competency, insurgent organizations had to initially invent tasks 
and training regimens to accomplish their goals.  Few native organizations had any experience in 
planning or conducting insurgent operations.  Disparate organizations with inexperienced 
members suffered from its constituents: not knowing each other very well; having no operational 
familiarity with one another and; having, perhaps, wildly differing tactical capabilities.  
Although the detachment and secrecy accompanying insurgent anonymity did help with security 
it also had “unintended and deleterious consequences.”869  When insurgents don’t know each 
other very well or aren’t trained together, solidarity and capability suffer.  “Group cohesion 
among insurgents can be low, particularly between part-timers who come together for a mission 
or series of missions.”870
As the conflict progressed and as insurgents gained competency and experiential skill, so 
too did their competitors.  Thus, insurgent organizations had to expand and modify tasks 
  Furthermore, many insurgent tasks required coordination and an 
implicit knowledge of participating members’ tendencies and skills.  These were unknowable in 
the early stages of the insurgency. 
                                                 
868 Colonel (Ret.) Mansoor, Peter, Telephone Interview.  12 September 2008. 
869 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 193. 
870 Ibid. 
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continuously in order to accomplish their goals.  Insurgent competency increased for a number of 
reasons:871
 
 
• Proficiency in task accomplishment (many incompetent insurgents were killed off); 
• Organizations with experienced and professional operators joined the insurgency and; 
• Established tribal organizations expanded the operational reach and knowledge pool of 
the insurgency. 
 
Insurgent organizations incorporated experience and knowledge into combinative tactical 
proficiencies.  Simple tactics were blended into complex tasks to achieve organizational goals.  
Competency was increased by focusing on the perfection of these fairly simple tactical tasks in 
planning and in training:  
 
“We learned that the insurgents do the same things that we do.  We had video 
tapes showing that the insurgents rehearse their attacks, film them, and then 
conduct learning sessions.  It is like our squad STX [Squad Training Exercise] for 
Christ’s sake.”872
                                                 
871 Hashim, Ahmed S., “Iraq’s Chaos: Why the Insurgency Won’t Go Away,” Boston Review, 
October/November 2004.  This continuous process is reflected in the competitive evolution taking place between the 
insurgency and counterinsurgency over IEDs: wire triggered IEDs were countered by eliminating the triggermen; 
radio signaled IEDs were jammed and; continuous radio signals required active tracking when in contact.  Hashim, 
Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, pp. 191-192. 
   
872 Soldier deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad and Ramadi 
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But the insurgency both benefitted and suffered from small unit tactical proficiency: simple 
tasks, no matter how well performed, could only accomplish a limited set of organizational 
goals.  Additionally, simple tasks could at some point be predicted and countered, particularly if 
intelligence indicated the time and place of a likely attack.  Even as task performance 
competency increased, small units armed with a bevy of simple task skills were not capable of 
achieving more complex organizational goals despite significant adaptation to counterinsurgent 
methods, tendencies, and tactics.  Persistent and deliberate counterinsurgent operations against 
small insurgent units reduced the effectiveness of the overall organization.  Kagan argues that by 
late 2007, as “continuous operations fragmented the enemy into small groups, the enemy 
launched fewer complex attacks at longer intervals, with decreasing success.”873
7.5.3 Command, Control, and Communications 
  The smaller the 
group, whether competent or not, the less robust the effect of its attacks and the less likely that 
the attack could be synchronized with broader organizational goals. 
While only parts of the Iraqi insurgency were hierarchical in structure, hierarchical lines of 
control did exist.874
                                                                                                                                                             
 (November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
  What hierarchy was present was mostly insulated from quotidian operations 
873 Kagan, Kimberly, “Securing Diyala,” The Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard, June 
2007—November 2007, p. 22. 
874 Avoiding hierarchical structures or minimizing the appearance of hierarchical lines of control was 
critical to organizational security and this fact was well understood by insurgent organizations facing the Coalition 
in Iraq and elsewhere.  “[Abu Musab al-Suri’s] life’s work is a 1,600 page opus, ‘The Global Islamic Resistance 
Call’, which started to take form in the early 1990s.  In it, Mr. al-Suri argues that jihadis should avoid creating 
 408 
and busied itself instead with providing guidance to decentralized cells and combatant units.  
Organizational functions were given definition by leadership but action elements (sub-
organizational and contracted cells and small groups) operated without strict managerial 
constraints.  Al Qaeda and affiliated groups maintained some semblance of direct command and 
control of the organization through recruitment mechanisms, organizational rules, and by 
procuring and managing organizational resources.  Tribal and former regime led organizations 
similarly retained vestiges of control extending from pre-existing power and command 
relationships.  Other organizations maintained the direction and command of operations farmed 
out to an almost limitless pool of insurgents through various communicative means and chains of 
command.  Operators were assigned missions, were hired on an as-needed basis, or operated 
independently as necessary or expedient.  
As the insurgency expanded, mostly by the addition of small cells or the incorporation of 
foreign and local volunteers, it required enhanced management structures to ensure that goal 
accomplishment was tied to organizational activity and behavior.  This was made possible in 
smaller, cellular organizations by communications technologies linking organizational sub-parts 
and hierarchical leadership, when and where it existed.  Although small cells enhanced overall 
organizational security and expanded organizational capabilities, maintaining structural 
command and control with these lower organizational echelons was difficult to accomplish, even 
with the aid of technology.  This problem was compounded when larger organizations contracted 
support from operators and where local control was divested to local commanders.  While 
                                                                                                                                                             
hierarchical structures, which are vulnerable to attack by local or American security forces, and move instead to a 
decentralized system of individuals or small local cells linked only by ideology.”  The Economist, “The Brains 
Behind the Bombs,” 3 November 2007. 
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maintaining a large but loose network expanded organizational capability and was necessary for 
organizational security it also made unified goal achievement a complicated and difficult 
endeavor.  Despite the capabilities demonstrated by smaller organizations during the conflict, 
achieving organizational goals still required direction and coordination for coherence.  As 
Holohan argues, networks are in practice hierarchical and networked and therefore, “leadership 
is still important.”875
Internet communications provided the tools necessary for furtive correspondence 
between leadership and operators in reference to organizational goals and objectives and for 
organizational command and control before and after operations.
 
876  Although other electronic 
communicative devices and methods (disposable cell phones, radios and stations, text messaging, 
cyber-planning, targeting, encrypted messaging, social networks, word of mouth, etc.) were used 
by insurgent organizations (particularly during protracted operations), few provided the 
anonymity, applicability, security, and speed of the internet.877
                                                 
875 Holohan, Anne, Networks of Democracy, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2005, p. 53. 
  Critical information regarding 
876 See Hoffman, Bruce, Op Cit, Jackson, Brian A., et al, Aptitude for Destruction: Organizational Learning 
in Terrorist Groups and its Implications for combating Terrorism, RAND, Santa Monica, 2005, Nichiporuk, Brian, 
Alternative Futures and Army Force Planning: Implications for the Future Force Era, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 
2005, and Santora, Marc and Damien Cave, “Banned Station Beams Voice of Iraq Insurgency,” New York Times, 
21 January 2007.  See also discussion by Brigadier General Mark Kimmet in Smith, Steven Donald, “U.S. Must 
Network to Defeat al Qaeda, Kimmit Says,” U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service News 
Articles, 21 February 2006. 
877 For instance, cellular phones, when activated and even when using encryption software, “emit a signal 
so that base units know where it is and which apparatus it is so that a cal to or from it can be quickly routed.  This 
signal serves as a miniature tracking system unknown to the user and reveals the whereabouts of the apparatus at any 
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successful techniques and organizational information were transmitted via the internet.  This 
capacity obviated innumerable meetings between sources and end users that would have 
otherwise been required.  The internet greatly reduced transmission time (and thus enhanced the 
timeliness of control measures), was extremely low cost (the organization did not have to 
manage the infrastructure required for operation), and enabled extra-organizational connections 
that helped de-conflict operations and plans.878  The fragmentation and lack of coordination 
typically attributable to insurgencies was reduced by the use of the internet even though the 
organization was, for the most part, physically decentralized.879
The command and control exercised by a hybrid organization like al Qaeda is an 
instructive example of how many hybrid insurgent organizations operated.  “Al Qaeda operates 
around a core nucleus of individuals who lead a series of operations, logistics, finance, training, 
and command cells populated by surrogates and line or foot soldiers”
 
880
                                                                                                                                                             
given time.” Van Meter, Karl M., “Terrorists/Liberators: Researching and Dealing with Adversary Social 
Networks,” Connections, Volume 24, Number 3, 2002, p. 72. 
 but without a perceptible 
878 Weimann, Gabriel, Op Cit, pp. 9-11.  Insurgent organizations benefitted from the establishment of 
various websites: alneda.com; assam.com; almuhrajiroun.com, qassam.net and; jihadunspun.net. 
879 For discussion of insurgent fragmentation see, Stoker, Donald, “Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose: A 
Contrarian View,” Small Wars Journal, 2009.  See also, Cordesman, Anthony H., Success or Failure?:  Iraq’s 
Insurgency and Civil Violence and US Strategy, Developments through June 2007, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 9 July 2007. 
880 Bogart III, Adrian T., Op Cit, p. 8.  Al Qaeda is unique in so far as it can be described as an insurgency 
in waiting: it maintains structures that it can field to unstable environments to provoke, support, expand an existing 
insurgency. 
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leadership structure centrally commanding all of its related cells.881  Al Qaeda also established 
specialized councils (consultation, military, and alliance exploitation) to deliberate and provide 
guidance to disparate cells.882  To command and control the organization’s functions, al Qaeda 
used the internet to standardize tactics, unify organizational positions and goals, and to recruit 
new members and organizations.883
Absent the internet, insurgent organizations’ communications would have been limited to 
less secure/more detectable devices and methods.  Organizational command and control would 
have suffered for reasons of operational security and many insurgent organizations would have 
had to expose members and methods in order to better coordinate their actions.  But 
organizational effectiveness required sufficient command and control capabilities.  In turn, 
command and control required either physical or virtual centralization and centralization 
required the ability to share information and communicate freely.  Centralization, command, and 
control were thus intertwined and each variably influenced effectiveness: 
 
 
“Where they had a safe haven, they adopted a centralized organization.  Where 
denied a safe haven they would have to decentralize (making them less effective).  
Being centralized would allow them to have a better structure for coordination 
and mobilization of resources and thus be more effective.  Once denied a safe 
haven a key adaptation was to decentralize a) to survive, and b) to operate 
                                                 
881 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 18. 
882 Bogart III, Adrian T., Op Cit, p. 9. 
883 International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, International Crisis 
Group, Middle East Report No. 50, February, 2006, p. 4.  See also, Zambelis, Chris, Op Cit. 
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differently so as to still have some kind of effect against the population and 
against our forces.”884
 
 
Physical decentralization, forced by counterinsurgent action or by the population, required the 
ability to communicate effectively among cells and the larger organization.  Thus, command and 
control (and the capacity for realizing organizational goals in an adaptive fashion) required an 
ability to centralize operations either physically or though communicative tools like the internet. 
7.5.4 Cognition and Behavior 
Insurgent cognition and behavior was shaped by training, experience, and individual and group 
capacity for interpreting the environment.  Unlike the Coalition’s organizations, the insurgency 
lacked any significantly influential organizational culture.  Even as the insurgency grew in size 
and strength, an insurgent culture was slow to develop because of the frequent and sometimes 
rapid structural changes besetting insurgent organizations.  Furthermore, few insurgent 
organizations had any significant or enduring martial customs or institutional heritage.885
                                                 
884 Brigadier General McMaster, H.R., Telephone Interview, 8 September 2008. 
  Most 
insurgent operators and organizations were relatively—in comparison to their counterinsurgent 
competitors—free from the constraining influences of organizational culture.  Insurgent 
cognition and behavior was more closely tied to the learning that occurred during operations 
885 This is not to say that individuals were not affected or influenced by the culture of pre-existing 
organizations they belonged to but that insurgent organizations had few entrenched martial characteristics or much 
of a historical legacy beyond that developed after the 2003 invasion.  
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against the counterinsurgency and shaped by the training received throughout the campaign.  
Individual and organizational cognition and capacity for integrating and applying lessons in the 
face of environmental flux largely determined organizational behavior and subsequent 
adaptations.886
Because insurgent organizations lack organizational legacies and culture they can be 
either more or less adaptive depending on their level of training, their experiential knowledge, 
and their ability to interpret environmental changes in relation to organizational goals.  “Not 
every aspect of insurgent behavior is adaptive—adaptation does not and cannot explain all 
insurgent behavior, and some insurgent traits and behaviors can be nonadaptive.”
 
887  Free from a 
baseline of organizational training, martial ethos, and an institutionalized set of problem solving 
and goal accomplishment skills, insurgent organizations could respond to environmental cues 
either correctly and competently or randomly and incoherently depending on which cues were 
received and how they were processed in relation to organizational goals.  As White argues, an 
organization’s fitness for its environment is not static.  Fitness is a measure of the organization’s 
capacity for correctly responding to changes in the environment.888
                                                 
886 See, RAND, Heads We Win: Improving Cognitive Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency, RAND, 2007, p. 
1. 
  In this regard, the absence of 
organizational culture and historical legacy to shape and influence decision making can be either 
a constructive or harmful trait depending on whether or not these skills expanded or restricted the 
organization’s capacity to interpret and respond to the environment. 
887 White, Jeffrey, Op Cit, p. 7. 
888 White, Jeffrey, Op Cit. 
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Any conflict environment can change quickly and can thus render an organization more 
or less potent depending on the changes that take place.  “Networks can rise or fall in terms of 
fitness depending on changes in the environment and their ability to adapt to those changes.”889
7.5.5 Critical Group Processes Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
  
Cognition and behavior were thus variable individual and organizational traits that could either 
positively or negatively influence organizational adaptation.  An ability to control, manipulate, or 
correctly understand the environment were key cognitive and behavioral capacities determinative 
of organizational fitness. 
• Insurgent skills and knowledge were initially derived from membership skills and 
training but were later expanded by organizational experiences.  Skills and knowledge 
were applied to train and coordinate more complex task sets comprised of fairly simple 
but synchronized and—more importantly—repeatable organizational skills.  This 
enhanced the rapidity of organizational adaptation and the iterative propagation of skills 
in harmony with organizational objectives. 
• Initially, organizational members did not know each other well and had not conducted 
organizational tasks together.  The pace of competition required consistent and perpetual 
task modification to achieve organizational goals.  Limited by smaller units, insurgency 
task competency increased over time but had less effect on the achievement of 
organizational goals as organizations progressively required more complex task 
accomplishment capacity. 
                                                 
889 Ibid, p. 9. 
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• Hybrid organizations with small operational cells used the internet to coordinate 
operations and adaptations across and within organizations and to provide command and 
control guidance and direction.  Centralization, either physical or virtual, was required for 
greater comprehensive organizational effectiveness.  When organizations were penetrated 
or were dislodged from physical locations, the internet was used to centralize command 
and control virtually. 
• Cognition and behavior were variables shaped by organizational and individual abilities 
to receive, interpret, and incorporate environmental changes.  Cognitive capacity and 
behavioral adaptation were influenced if not determined by environmental changes. 
7.6 LEARNING 
7.6.1 Knowledge Collection 
Insurgent organizations took great care in collecting information about operations in order to 
learn and improve their tactics.  This was done overtly during operations, covertly through 
concealed observation, and surreptitiously through penetration of the counterinsurgency: 
 
“Some of the things that they would come up with were from people working on 
the FOBs pacing things off or using cameras.  They were sneaky about getting 
onto our FOBs for observation.  They knew as well as we did that in a country 
where there is no personnel tracking and on a FOB where there are, on any given 
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day, 300 people coming to the gate looking for work, it is very difficult to identify 
one individual that you kicked out.”890
 
 
Insurgent groups collected and compiled data (sometimes, with cameramen alongside 
combatants) that included the date and time of an operation, identification of the insurgents 
involved, and a record of military deeds:891
 
  While this information was used for propaganda 
purposes, its most critical application was in determining best practices and for sharing 
operational information across the organization: 
“Somehow they video tape and observe what they do.  They are trying to figure 
out what works best.”892
 
 
Collected knowledge was used to create visual records that other insurgents could 
emulate, incorporate into training, or learn from as part of a descriptive vignette.  In addition to 
capturing operational knowledge on video, in short films, or in testimonies, the insurgency 
created volumes of documentary data that recorded quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
insurgent operations to include: programmatic texts, inspirational texts, martyr biographies, 
poetry, operational reports, periodicals, radio broadcasts, biographies, books, recorded 
                                                 
890 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
891 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 50, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi 
Insurgency, International Crisis Group, February 2006, p. 20. 
892 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi (November 
2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
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statements, songs, and analytical statements.893
The ability to learn from collected knowledge allowed the insurgency to “purposefully 
adapt to ever-evolving circumstances by: 
  Sharing recorded and analyzed data gave other 
members of the insurgency a template for their own collection and analytical efforts.  Precise 
collection efforts ensured that preparation and successes and failures in application could be 
understood and incorporated across the insurgency.  Collectively, this knowledge formed a 
corpus of data that, when distributed either by hand or via the internet, enabled timely and 
relevant organizational learning without the loss of security normally associated with a training 
event or meeting by a largely clandestine organization. 
• Developing, improving, and employing new weapons or tactics that can enable it 
to change its capabilities over time; 
• Improving its members’ skills in applying current weapons or tactics; 
• Collecting and utilizing the intelligence information needed to mount operations 
effectively; 
• Thwarting countermeasures and improve its chance of surviving attempt to 
destroy it; 
• Preserving the capabilities it has developed even if some of its members are 
lost.”894
                                                 
893 Kimmage, Daniel and Kathleen Ridolfo, “Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas,” Radio 
Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Washington DC, 2007. 
 
894 Jackson, Brian A. et al, Op Cit, p. ix. 
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Since most of the sub-organizations of the Iraqi insurgency had vastly different experiences, 
levels of training, and operational skills and knowledge, collected knowledge expanded the 
insurgency’s core competency and developed a standardized set of tactics and techniques that 
could be modified or enhanced for particular operations.  Without collected knowledge, the 
insurgency would have suffered even more egregiously from knowledge gaps, lagged learning, 
and retarded operational capacity across the organization. 
Knowledge collection is critical for a networked organization.  Since many of the sub-
groups (particularly the smaller elements consisting of less than a dozen members) of an 
insurgent organization do not openly or regularly meet and might never have the opportunity to 
discuss operations, successes, and failures, collected knowledge becomes a static (archived) and 
dynamic (can be altered, added to, or changed) alternative source of learning.  When 
accompanied by oral or written communiqués, critiques, and analysis, this knowledge is 
converted into operational intelligence.  Knowledge collected this way expands learning 
geometrically as each organization makes inferences from the evidence provided and adapts this 
knowledge for application to local circumstances.  When this secondary application is also 
recorded, analyzed, and shared, the pool of operational intelligence expands further and becomes 
a broad dataset for intra-, cross-, and external organizational adaptation detailing both friendly 
and enemy operations.  Although knowledge collection alone cannot replace actual training 
events and collective AARs in utility, it can supplement organizational learning by providing 
instructive examples of actual operations.  Including critical details of each operation in the 
knowledge collection process allowed the insurgency to compare and contrast the efficiency and 
effectiveness of methods and counterinsurgent responses.  In the absence of collected knowledge 
disparate networked insurgent organizations would be cognitively limited and impaired; their 
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minimalist size, attendant security considerations, and a lack of analytical power would shrink 
the individual group’s erudition set to data gleaned from direct experience and distant inference.  
Each segment of collected and analyzed operational knowledge set expanded the knowledge pool 
that various insurgent groups could draw upon when planning and training for an operation.  
7.6.2 Knowledge Transfer  
Insurgent planners and practitioners alike have to be able to share knowledge within the group 
and with other groups in order to make even semi-coordinated organizational adaptations.  “Even 
if a group acquires useful knowledge, it must be able to absorb and apply it or it will not learn 
and its operations will not benefit.”895
The tangible representation of transferred knowledge is the spread of innovations. 
Innovations appear as creative, mimicked, yet uncoordinated responses to the changes in the 
  Adaptation is premised on knowledge assessment, 
transfer, implementation, and refined assessment.  This process is accelerated when and where 
knowledge is transferred across groups and geography and is implemented in alternative 
environments by organizations where critical input and output factors (training, task performance 
competency, learning, etc.) vary.  Combinatorial iterations of transfer and assessment amplify the 
salience of this process.  If an organization cannot fully assess its collective knowledge base and 
implement alternative options for action premised on this knowledge for the achievement of 
organizational goals, its adaptations will be at best random and at worst will compromise the 
organization’s coherence and existence.  Assessment and adaptation are thus premised on 
knowledge transfer and successful innovations based on this knowledge. 
                                                 
895 Jackson, Brian A., et al, Op Cit, p. 41. 
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environment that either degrade or enhance the likelihood of achieving organizational goals.  
When multiple organizations independently sense a change in the environment (a new 
counterinsurgent tactic, for instance), respond, and then share knowledge of success and failure, 
this results in further and more informed innovations.  A typical IED cell’s knowledge transfer 
procedure is illustrative: “IED cells often exchange information and transfer skills among one 
another by sharing videos of their respective exploits for training purposes. The IED unit 
includes several people, from those who procure the raw materials (usually from ammunition 
dumps), to the bomb-builder, undoubtedly the most technically skilled individual in the cell, who 
also doubles as training instructor.”896
Knowledge transfer effectively reduces the number of assumptions that an organization 
has to make regarding the effectiveness of its actions and responses and enables greater 
coordination within and among organizations with similar organizational goals and requirements.  
Devoid a capacity to share knowledge within and across groups, an organization would have to 
complete several response iterations to collect a similar amount of information relevant to the 
environment and the organization.  Furthermore, the information collected could or would only 
be analyzed by one organization’s members.  Therefore any information collected by an 
individual organization would lack robustness and would be less applicable to the refinement of 
an organization’s adaptive cycle.  Hence, the ability to transfer knowledge mitigates a number of 
networked organization weaknesses:  measurement and assessment capacity; the ability to 
correctly sense, probe, and respond to the environment; the external validity of organizational 
 
                                                 
896 Hashim, Ahmed S. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 161. 
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findings and; the number of assumptions made when planning and conducting operations.  
Organizational innovation and further adaptation is enhanced by knowledge transfer. 
Knowledge transfer spurs innovation in at least two ways: overtly (direct communication 
via personal connections) and passively (stigmergic environmental signals).897  Robb argues that 
there is a pattern to this process involving a cycle of innovation, adoption, and propagation.898  
The networked structure of the Iraqi insurgency enabled the organizational independence 
necessary for making timely and experimental innovations.  Additionally, these small and 
autonomous groups were motivated by survival and goal achievement and were thus intrinsically 
interested in improving their capabilities.  Eisenstadt and White contend that “Smaller groups are 
more likely to innovate, and their apparent propensity to share expertise and experience (either 
through face-to-face meetings or over the internet) ensures that innovations are passed on, 
allowing groups to achieve broader tactical and operational effects than they could on their 
own.”899
Personal, intra-organization, and inter-organizational knowledge transfer was abetted by 
a variety of procedures and enablers available to most if not all Iraqi insurgent organizations.  
The insurgency adopted media techniques from al Qaeda’s various internationally affiliated 
groups to support daily press releases, distribute printed materials, and offer various videos for 
  The tools and relationships necessary for sharing these innovations were omnipresent 
in Iraq. 
                                                 
897 Robb, John, Epidemic Insurgency (Part 1), 17 November 2004, 
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/11/epidemic_insurg.html. 
898 Ibid. 
899 Eisenstadt, Michael and Jeffrey White, Op Cit, p. 22. 
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download in a number of languages (German, English, Kurdish, Arabic, and Turkish).900  
Insurgent organizations were also adept at confounding attempts to shut down their knowledge 
transfer activities.  Content from disbanded websites was archived and presented on new 
websites, free uploads and downloads were made available, and compressed film files were 
developed for mobile phone transfer and viewing.901  Insurgent organizations developed and 
spread knowledge regarding tactical techniques and procedures via instructional articles, 
manuals, video films, books, PowerPoint presentations and Portable Document Format (PDF) 
newspapers.902  Weaponry, assassination techniques, and poison and explosives manufacturing 
were among a few of the subjects disseminated.  Websites were also used to announce policy 
positions, alliance formations, strategic shifts, breaking news, and to comment on Western 
media.903  Although intergroup personal contacts were likely the easiest and most used 
knowledge transfer methods, according to Kilcullen, “Terrorist and insurgent groups worldwide 
can access a body of techniques, doctrine and procedures that exists in hard copy, and on the 
Internet, primarily in Arabic but also in other languages.”904
                                                 
900 Kimmage, Daniel and Kathleen Ridolfo, Op Cit. 
  Provincial, regional, and 
international components of knowledge transfer also enabled the insurgency, “The Internet and 
901 Ibid. 
902 See for discussion, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 50, In Their Own Words: 
Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, International Crisis Group, February, 2006, p. 8. 
903 The Economist, “A World Wide Web of Terror,” 14 July 2007 and International Crisis Group, Middle 
East Report No. 50, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, International Crisis Group, February 2006, 
p. 15. 
904 Kilcullen, David, “Countering Global Insurgency, Version 2.2,” Small Wars Journal, 30 November 
2004, p. 12. 
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infiltration from other nations gives them [insurgents] knowledge of what tactics work from 
other areas.”905
Environments that allow the free association of insurgent members also significantly 
increase the likelihood of knowledge transfer.  This can occur in geographical areas controlled 
by the insurgency, in uninterrupted chat rooms or on blogs, or when insurgents are detained and 
confined together.  Prisons and holding areas accelerate knowledge transfer by bringing together 
disparate actors for what can be long periods.  Insurgents housed together in prison can: create 
relationships with other insurgents from diverse geographical areas and backgrounds; transfer 
knowledge of successful tactics and techniques; jointly recruit to expand the organization; 
conduct training and; pass information and guidance back and forth between leadership and 
associated members.
 
906  Upon release from prison or when geographically relocated,  insurgents 
can either rejoin their former organization, return to insurgent activities with expanded tactical 
knowledge, liaise with other organizations, or create broader partnerships with other insurgent 
groups.907
 The localized nature of insurgent organizations also contributed to knowledge transfer 
within and across organizations and through population-based channels of communication.  
Friendly populations, family members, and affiliates all contributed to the collection and then 
transfer of knowledge to insurgent organizations.  When the environment changed and if no 
 
                                                 
905 Cordesman, Anthony H., “The Iraq War and Lessons for Counterinsurgency,” CSIS, 16 March 2006, p. 
9. 
906 Teamey, Kyle B., “Arresting Insurgency,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 47, 4th Quarter, 2007, p. 119. 
907 Ibid. 
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insurgent organization or only one organization directly perceived this change, the population 
indirectly supplied evidence and descriptions of the change that took place: 
 
 “The insurgents are adaptive.  When they shot at us with AK-47s, we returned 
fire with 25 mm rounds that were explosive.  They didn’t like that action at all and 
they learned not to shoot at us.  People were watching and I am sure that our 
response was spread around to other people.”908
 
 
Most insurgent groups were indigenous to Iraq, did not leave the country for any reason, and in 
many cases had strong local knowledge and connections to the population even when operating 
outside of their home neighborhoods.  Where knowledge collection and transfer might have been 
difficult because organization members were interdicted, killed, or captured, and where 
collection and dissemination methods were problematical or impossible to employ, friendly 
locals collectively acted as a knowledge repository and transfer mechanism. 
7.6.3 Knowledge Integration 
Insurgent organizations collected operational and organizational information and actively 
integrated it into published manuals, pamphlets, and electronic media that were later used to 
modify organizational behavior and inputs to the organization’s adaptive processes.  This process 
occurred formally and informally as circumstance and speed permitted. “The insurgents have 
                                                 
908 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi (November 
2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
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produced copious internet documentation in which they assess past mistakes, evaluate their 
opponents’ weaknesses and formulate practical operational recommendations. While none of the 
major groups has publicised its strategy in detail, a military doctrine of sorts emerges from more 
informal internet chats and exchanges regarding specific military methods or lessons learned 
from particular armed confrontations.”909
 Integrating knowledge was important for organizational adaptation in a number of key 
respects: a group’s structure, if sufficiently variable or frequently disrupted, could dislocate or 
retard organizational memory;
 
910
                                                 
909 International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 50, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi 
Insurgency, International Crisis Group, February 2006, p. 23. 
 inexperienced newcomers could be taught lessons that most 
organizational members took for granted; change to organizational inputs and outputs could be 
progressive instead of random and; integration ensured that if sections of the organization were 
compromised or disabled, the rest of the organization could effectively carry on.  Organizations 
that took advantage of integrating knowledge collected by its members and by other 
organizations were capable of adapting more quickly and appropriately than organizations that 
failed to incorporate hard won lessons.  Knowledge integration is critical to organizations with 
rapid turnover.  This is particularly true for organizations that are smaller, networked, and rely on 
mutual lesson, risk, and capability sharing for organizational goal accomplishment.  For 
example, although al Qaeda was capable of refilling its membership quickly, its new members, 
lacking experience and the knowledge learned by previous fighters, were less disciplined and 
910 Jackson, Brian A. et al, Op Cit, p. 38. 
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resorted to less deliberate and more random violence.911
7.6.4 Learning Summary: Effects on Adaptation 
  A failure to integrate knowledge can 
lead to a failure to learn, an inability to tailor organizational changes to goals, and a general 
organizational breakdown in the face of a successfully adaptive competitor. 
• Knowledge collection was aided by overt collection and recording during operations, 
covertly through concealed observation, and surreptitiously through the penetration of 
counterinsurgent and government organizations.  Knowledge was collected by various 
means to shape training and learning upon its later distribution and integration.  
Collection expanded the adaptive capacity of disparate organizations by creating a record 
and database of organizational knowledge.  The collection of organizational knowledge 
enabled adaptation based on organizational successes and failures. 
• Knowledge transfer is reflected in innovations and the spread of innovations.  Transfer 
was enabled by assorted media: video and audio recordings; print and; internet web 
pages.  Transferring knowledge reduces the number of assumptions that an organization 
has to make in planning.  Weaknesses, such as the inability of small organizations to 
assess the environment and its own activities, an inability to consistently and correctly 
respond to environmental changes, and an inability to externally validate conclusions and 
adaptive changes to organizational inputs and outputs, were reduced by the transfer of 
knowledge. 
                                                 
911 International Crisis Group, “Iraq After the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape,” Middle East Report No. 
74, International Crisis Group, 20 April 2008. 
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• Lessons and knowledge were integrated in informal doctrine and through exchanges of 
information between and among organizations and their members.  Integration offset 
reduced and short organizational memory and helped shaped adjustments of inputs and 
outputs coherently across organizations for collective adaptive efforts. 
7.7 CONCLUSION: THE BROADER EFFECTS OF ADAPTATION 
The strength of the insurgency was its ability to operate in small groups aided by diversely 
capable and motivated membership.  Small unit adaptations were frequent and occurred across 
the Iraqi landscape on a daily basis.  Freed from many of the constrictive effects of norms, 
organizational culture, and bureaucratic inertia, insurgent organizations proceeded with tactical, 
technical, and organizational experimentation, enhancing individual and group performance for 
goal achievement, and exploiting the capabilities inherent to small, networked organizations.  All 
of this was accomplished while dodging the incrementalism that plagues more hidebound 
organizations:912
   
 
 “The insurgency adapts faster than the Army.  I think that they have been doing 
insurgency operations their entire lives.  That is how they fight...They understand 
                                                 
912 Structural and organizational dynamism are common traits of clandestine organizations.  Hashim, 
Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2006, p. 154. 
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the small group mentality.  They might not understand anything else but they 
understand their groups.”913
 
 
But the insurgency’s strengths were also its weaknesses.  Diversity of membership meant 
diversity of goals: persistent friction among organizations eventually dismembered the 
insurgency.  Capability did not necessarily translate into results.  Adaptation, which is only 
effective if it is directed toward organizational goals, suffered as unity was replaced by 
competition and divisiveness.  Insurgent organizations began to adapt to each other instead of 
towards shared organizational goals and external competitors.  Intransigence and disagreement 
over goal accomplishment, diminished resource sharing, and conflicting organizational visions 
and priorities all slowed and reduced the effectiveness of any effective adaptations that were 
being made. 
Organizational goals and methods diverged so sharply in the later stages of the 
insurgency as to precipitate a significant break among formerly cooperating organizations.  The 
brutal methods employed by al Qaeda and its affiliates against the Iraqi population and later 
against former partners, eventually backfired and ended up aiding the Coalition.  In 2008, polls 
showed that “support of suicide bombing and other violent tactics is declining among some 
Muslim populations; this drop off is partly due to the extreme methods employed by al-
Qaeda.”914
                                                 
913 Soldier Deployed to Irbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul (March 2003-June 2003) and Baghdad, Ramadi 
(November 2005-November 2006), Personal Interview, 21 June 2008. 
  Any insurgency can adapt but without goal harmonization, an insurgency cannot 
914 Echevarria, Antulio J., Wars of Ideas and The War of Ideas, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle, PA, June 2008, p. 33.  Hashim states that “The insurgency’s foreign element has had a greater 
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adapt effectively.  Resources are squandered, efforts are duplicated as organizations compete, 
inputs and outputs are adjusted inappropriately, and the adaptive cycle is slowed and corrupted.  
Even with a wealth of resources and observational perspicacity, irresoluteness and friction 
among participating organizations can doom a networked insurgency.  When goals are in conflict 
cooperation is in jeopardy, although this is not easy to avoid. 
 Waging a complex insurgency is a difficult task.  Coordination and cooperation must be 
endemic.  Learning must occur continuously or smaller constituent organizations will fall prey to 
competitors and threat organizations.915  The use of force and violence must at some point be 
replaced with more positive methods: engendering fear leads to resentment and the tactics of 
terrorism have a relatively short half-life.916  Despite claims to the contrary, the theoretical 
capabilities attributed to networked organizations do not necessarily obtain in practice.  Long-
term goal achievement, particularly the defeat of a major military power, requires some level of 
resource mobilization and coordination as demonstrated by insurgent organizations making 
strange bedfellows for logistical and operational reasons and engaging in bureaucratic behaviors 
all too familiar to hierarchical and centralized organizations.917
                                                                                                                                                             
impact than mere numbers would lead us to believe.”  This was true, but for different reasons, in the beginning and 
in the later stages of the insurgency.  See Hashim, Ahmed, “Foreign Involvement in the Iraqi Insurgency,” 
Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume II, Issue 16, 12 August 2004, p. 1. 
  “In the broadest terms, 
915 Jones, Douglas D., Op Cit, p. 17. 
916 Metz, Steven, Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, January 2007, p. 19. 
917 Records were kept on travel arrangements, coordinator details, mercenary logisticians, etc.  Some 
insurgent organizations looked less like a loose network than an under-sized bureaucracy.   Resources needed to be 
mobilized efficiently, even as resource mobilization efforts weakened organizational coherence.  See Felter, Joseph 
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insurgents need five types of resources: 1) manpower; 2) funding; 3) equipment/supplies; 4) 
sanctuary; and, 5) intelligence.  These can be provided, seized, or created.”918
If the primary objective of the insurgency was terror, chaos, and the disruption of the 
counterinsurgency then the insurgency succeeded for nearly 5 years.  Two objectives of terror 
campaigns, which significant portions of the insurgency engaged in for quite some time, are 
creating chaotic conditions and intimidating the population.
  Each step taken 
toward formalizing methods for resourcing organizations made the insurgency less of a 
spontaneous and amorphous network and more of a centralized bureaucracy.  This was 
necessary.  But to achieve organizational goals comprehensively required coordination capacities 
beyond the reach of disparate, small, and increasingly competitive networked organizations. 
919
 
  But outside of creating chaos and 
terror, the insurgency accomplished few, if any, positive goals.   Thus, organizations and 
cooperation were unsustainable if their goals extended beyond sowing mass disruption. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Brian Fishman, “Al-Qa-ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” Combating 
Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, 2008, pp. 24-26 and RAND, Getting Inside the Terrorist Mind, RAND, Santa 
Monica, 2007, pp. 1-2.  McMaster contends that “People talk about them [the insurgency] as amorphous 
organizations but they still need to mobilize resources, they still need access to external support.”  Brigadier General 
McMaster, H.R., Telephone Interview, 8 September 2008.  See also, Dillon, Dana, “The Civilian Side of the War on 
Terror,” Policy Review, October & November 2007. 
918 Metz, Steven and Raymond Millen, Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and Continuity, 
Strategic Studies Institute, United Sttaes Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2004, p. 3. 
919 Buchanan, William J. and Robert A. Hyatt, Capitalizing on Guerrilla Vulnerabilities, Military Review, 
August, 1968, p. 7. 
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“Eventually, if a networked terrorist organization like we saw in Iraq wants to 
prevail they have to coalesce into larger formations and actually do more than 
just fight but govern as well.”920
 
 
Almost all the adaptive qualities of the insurgency suffered or faded as the conflict 
progressed and few positive goals were achieved.  An ability to blend into the environment, 
membership replacement and recruitment, cohesiveness and cooperation, and defensive and 
offensive capacities were all weakened.921  Correspondingly, organizational weaknesses were 
exacerbated.  Competition (for resources, loyalty, and control of the population) increased, 
connectivity (relationships and ties among members and organizations) decreased, the need to 
surface (to carry out actions overtly) increased, inadaptability (due to a lack of organizational 
capacity as networks broke down) increased, contradictions (organizational differences) 
heightened, and self-interest (inability or disinterest in cooperation) became supreme.922
                                                 
920 Colonel (Ret.) Mansoor, Peter, Telephone Interview, 12 September 2008. 
  
 Organizational coherence broke down as some groups tried to attain positive goals while 
others continued to sow chaos; tasks no longer matched objectives, inputs and outputs were 
adjusted inappropriately, and adaptability was impeded.  Being decentralized and networked is 
really only effective in the short-term and if minimalist organizational goals are sought.  As 
Hashim points out, “I believe that journalists and observers used the term [decentralized and 
networked] because it sounded ‘sexy’ and because being ‘decentralized and networked’ seemed 
to be de riguer for terrorist or insurgent groups.  The reality is that you simply cannot be a 
921 For a discussion of characteristics benefitting insurgencies see, White, Jeffrey, Op Cit, pp. 12-13. 
922 For a discussion of weaknesses see, Ibid, p. 14. 
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wholly decentralized insurgent group and continue to exist for long or be able to carry out more 
than very limited operations in a limited geographical locale.”923
Like their counterinsurgent competitors, the insurgency had to be able to translate success 
in combat into political success in order to ultimately achieve its goals.  Jackson’s discussion of 
terrorist group decision making is edifying in this regard: “For some terrorist groups that are 
simply seeking to produce destabilization or chaos, nearly any outcome of a terrorist attack may 
suffice.  However, for groups with more subtle agendas, it may be difficult to anticipate whether 
a given attack or other action will be beneficial and whether or not it is may depend on the 
reactions of others or on events that are outside the group’s direct control.  As a result, the 
history of terrorism is replete with choices made by groups that believed at the time that the 
choice would be advantageous but, with more complete information and the benefit of hindsight, 
that proved to be ill-advised.  In many cases, actions undermining rather than advancing a 
group’s interests are driven by the response to the action, either alienating sympathetic 
populations…or catalyzing action by the group’s direct opponents that hurt it over the longer 
term.”
 
924
                                                 
923 Hashim, Ahmed S., Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 2006, p. 154. 
  Furthermore, not all insurgent groups or other similarly violent networked 
organizations “are equally gifted in terms of their ability to translate operational success in battle 
924 Jackson, Brian A., “Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups,” Social Science for 
Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, Eds. Davis, Paul K. and Kim Cragin, RAND, Santa Monica, 2009, p. 
226. 
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into political success.”925
 
  In fact, the more networked and complex an organization is, then the 
more difficulties it will have synchronizing competing organizational goals and objectives.  
Unless the network is homogeneous, which the Iraqi insurgency was not, organizational friction 
is bound to erupt and can be exploited either by competing internal or external organizations. 
Organizational adaptation requires the appropriate adjustment of organizational inputs and 
outputs to achieve organizational goals.  When organizational goal accomplishment is 
subordinated to fractious infighting and internecine competition, the capacity for adaptation is 
irrevocably slowed and weakened.  This was the fate of the insurgency in Iraq.  Although the 
insurgency might still exist in function and perhaps somewhat in form, its capacity for adaptation 
and even survival has diminished substantially. 
                                                 
925 Wirtz, James J., “Politics with Guns,” Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating 
Fourth-Generation Warfare, Eds. Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, Routledge Global Security Studies, 
NY, 2008, p. 49. 
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8.0  THE CYCLE OF MUTUAL ADAPTATION AND THE STABILITY OF THE LEGACY 
“Learn and adapt.  Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs 
as required.  Share good ideas.  Avoid mental or physical complacency.  Never forget that 
what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and that what works in one area 
may not work in another.  Strive to ensure that our units are learning organizations.  In 
counterinsurgency, the side that learns and adapts the fastest gains important 
advantages.”926
 
—MNF-I Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance 
The U.S. Army struggled in an iterative adaptive process for years in order to overcome its 
combat-centric design during OIF.  In doing so, the Army had to surmount legacy doctrine, 
culture, training, and education, while also prevailing against a highly adaptive foe.  Success in 
Iraq required full spectrum capability and not just victories in combat against other uniformed 
forces.927
                                                 
926 Headquarters, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency 
Guidance, Baghdad, Iraq, 15 July 2008. 
  Because of the inappropriateness of the U.S. Army’s design for achieving strategic 
requirements in Iraq, the Army had to make continuous adaptations to match organizational 
inputs and outputs to meet its objectives.  The simultaneously full spectrum environment of Iraq 
927 Cordesman, Anthony H., The Iraq War and Lessons for Counterinsurgency, CSIS, 16 March 2006, p. 
20. 
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was almost completely foreign and indecipherable to units on the ground despite the 
Transformation program’s promise of providing unparalleled situational awareness.  OIF became 
“one more illustration of the reality that the ‘fog of war’ evolves at the same rate as technology 
and tactics.”928  Power accrued to the organization(s) capable of accomplishing its organizational 
goals and objectives while in a competitive environment.  “The old notion that power is relative 
to the contingencies for which it is used has been underlined by the contrast between the rapid 
U.S. victory on the battlefield and the protracted difficulties it has faced in developing adequate 
responses to the challenges of security, stability, and reconstruction.”929
 The insurgency in Iraq engaged the U.S. Army in a competitive and mutually adaptive 
process.  Both competitors were invested in the adaptive aplomb of their sub-organizations to 
achieve goals and objectives.  Initially, the insurgency possessed a number of strengths: 
flexibility; few if any bureaucratic obstacles to information flow; strong environmental 
awareness and; almost limitless supplies of materiel and motivated personnel.  On the other 
hand, the U.S. Army was beset by weaknesses: an inability to scan, recognize, and interpret the 
environment; planning, equipment, and doctrine completely unsuited to full spectrum operations 
and; bureaucratic procedures and command relationships that stifled innovation and staunched 
the flow of information: 
 
 
“I have said for a long period of time that one of the reasons that this adversary 
has been so successful is that he doesn’t have all the bureaucratic obstacles in 
                                                 
928 Ibid, p. 16. 
929 Williams, Phil, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. 
Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2008, p. 20. 
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place to stop the flow of information.  We have bureaucratic obstacles that stop 
the flow of information even to leaders like me.  Information that I need for 
making decisions and could be passed to me almost instantaneously, unlike any 
other information, is held up because of non-technical bureaucratic obstacles that 
get in the way.”930
 
 
In mid-2003, the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation between the U.S. Army and the insurgency was in 
disharmony.  The tidy, sequential, systematic, and bureaucratic order assumed in plans and 
doctrine was replaced by chaos, ruthless and uncanny adversaries, unpredictability, and a total 
breakdown of the norms and rules of formal combat.  Initially, the insurgency could adapt faster 
and was more capable of marshaling resources appropriate for accomplishing its objectives.  
Conversely, the Army’s adaptive pace was slow and sometimes counterproductive and the 
resources that were available were tailored for a different, narrower type of conflict.  Of course, 
through expansive organizational adaptation, the Cycle of Mutual Adaptation came into harmony 
but not without the U.S. Army substantially reconfiguring for simultaneous full spectrum 
operations.  Neither failure nor withdrawal were tenable options in this competitive contest.  The 
U.S. Army would have to adapt not only to succeed in Iraq but to demonstrate to future 
adversaries that it was truly full spectrum capable and that terrorism and insurgency were not 
templates for victory.931
                                                 
930 General Chiarelli, Peter, Telephone Interview, 27 October 2008. 
 
931 Mansoor, Peter R., Baghdad at Sunrise, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2008, p. 341.  See also, 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, Washington DC, October 
2008. 
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Succeeding in Iraq required that the U.S. Army struggle with and fight against its 
legacy—which persisted and still persists almost 7 years later.  As in previous 
counterinsurgencies, “As insurgent operations became more sophisticated, military responses 
became more and more inadequate.  When insurgents abandoned the hope of military victory, 
they were less subject to military defeat.”932  The legacy became less and less useful as OIF 
proceeded.  Although weapons, tactics, and techniques designed for high-end employment in 
combat were at times of use in Iraq,933 the cognitive and cultural skills and planning processes 
associated with these systems and methods proved inadequate.  Operations across the full 
spectrum required soldiers and systems that could rapidly transition from the conventional to the 
irregular and vice versa in pursuit of the desired political end state.934
Interventions are immensely difficult operations and become ever more so when a 
complex insurgency develops in the aftermath of regular combat; objectives can be elusive and 
help might never arrive.  Responsibility for managing ‘post-conflict’ operations then falls to the 
organizations, or organization, present.  The forces on the ground are responsible for any 
transition linking tactical success with strategic victory,
 
935
                                                 
932 Fauriol, Georges and Andrew Hoehn, “Concluding Comments,” Latin American Insurgencies, Ed. 
Georges Fauriol, NDU Press, Washington DC, 1985, p. 195. 
 regardless of the tasks involved, and 
933 Combat vehicles in particular were useful for transport and supporting operations but they were also 
highly susceptible to loss from low-tech explosives employed by the insurgency.  See, Sloan, Elinor, Military 
Transformation and Modern Warfare, Praeger Security International, Westport, CT, 2008. 
934 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1-0, The Army, June 2005, and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, October 2008. 
935 Bensabel, Nora, et al, After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, RAND, Santa 
Monica. 
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regardless of who is responsible for these operations from an interagency perspective.936  This 
requires a full spectrum capability that negates the utility of traditional phased planning 
templates: the U.S. Army must be capable of conducting a range of operations throughout the 
course of a campaign or else risk precipitating the collapse and chaos it is trying to avoid.  “Thus, 
we must plant the seeds for effective civil security and civil order during, not after, a conflict.  
The military instrument, with its unique expeditionary capabilities, is the sole U.S. agency with 
the ability to affect the golden hour before the hourglass tips.  In other words, the military can 
take decisive action before security collapses altogether and the civil situation completely 
deteriorates.”937
                                                 
936 U.S. Army forces were responsible for carrying out functions normally assigned to no less than 7 
departments and one agency.  The agencies contributing to the U.S. State Department’s Counterinsurgency guide 
provide a glimpse of the complexity of the counterinsurgency effort: Department of State, Department of Defense, 
U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence.  U.S. Department of State, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009.  NSPD-44 does 
not force any interagency cooperation in post-conflict operations.  Instead, “The Secretaries of State and Defense 
will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.”  Bush, George, 
Bush, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, The White House, 7 December 2005, p. 5. 
  Because the seeds for effective civil security were not planted during the 
‘golden hour,’ the U.S. Army was forced to struggle against its physical (in structure) and 
cognitive (in culture and mindset) legacies to develop a full spectrum capable force able to 
translate tactical success into strategic and political victory all the while facing a large and 
rapidly adapting foe.  This was no mean task. 
937 Caldwell, William B., and Steven M. Leonard, “Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change,” 
Military Review, July-August 2008, p. 11. 
 439 
Table 2. Adaptive Accelerations and Decelerations by Phase938
  
 
  Initial Phase   
Initial Adaptive 
Phase   
Adaptive 
Phase   
    Army Insurgency Army Insurgency Army Insurgency 
Organizational 
Context Accelerate 
Robust 
Communications Unified Goals  
Relaxed 
Constraints 
Information 
Gathering; Local 
Support 
Training 
and 
Experience 
Training and 
Experience 
  Decelerate 
Inappropriate 
Goals and Training 
Inexperienced 
Members 
Overwhelming 
Information 
Increasing 
Violence 
Directed at 
Civilians 
Limited 
Training 
Formats 
Competing Goals; 
Local Support 
Group Design 
and Culture Accelerate 
Small Unit Task 
Organization 
Mass 
Membership; 
Simplified Tasks 
Decreased 
Controls and 
Increased 
Coordination 
Diverse 
Composition; 
Coordination 
Empowered 
Junior 
Leaders Unification 
  Decelerate 
Combat-Oriented 
Task Sets Uncoordinated 
Warfighting 
Norms 
Increasing 
Competition 
Restrictive 
Doctrine 
Complicated Task 
Sets; Norm 
Breakdown; Limited 
Membership 
Material and 
Technical  
Resources Accelerate Funding 
Access to 
Equipment 
Tailored 
Communications 
Tangible and 
Intangible 
Resources 
Relaxed 
Acquisition 
Controls Survivability 
  Decelerate 
Combat-Oriented 
Equipment; Tight 
Acquisition 
Controls 
Few Dedicated 
Assets 
Intelligence 
Gathering and 
Processing 
Increased 
Attacks without 
Commensurate 
Coordination 
Planning 
and 
Collections 
Tools 
Decreased 
Intelligence 
Gathering 
External 
Assistance Accelerate 
Coalition 
Participation 
Inculcation of 
Trained and/or 
Experienced 
Foreigners 
Increased Ties to 
Communities 
Uncoordinated 
but Contributing 
Actions by 
Various 
unaligned 
Groups 
Information 
Gathering 
and Joint 
Patrolling 
Enhanced Technical 
Assistance from Iran 
  Decelerate 
Little Contact w/ 
Local Leaders and 
Population 
Limited Material 
Inputs 
Nascent Local 
Forces 
Lack of 
Cooperation 
among Major 
Organizations 
Number of 
Trained 
Local 
Forces 
Limited Higher 
Echelon Analysis; 
Discord with Foreign 
Fighters 
Critical Group 
Processes Accelerate 
Command and 
Control at Small 
Unit Level 
Behavior tied to 
Local Interests 
Collaboration 
across Unit 
Boundaries 
Expanded 
Competency; 
Enhanced 
Communications 
Acquiring 
and 
Applying 
Skills 
Acquiring and 
Applying Skills 
  Decelerate 
Limited 
Knowledge Sets 
Unfamiliar 
Groups and 
Uncoordinated 
Behavior 
RFI Process and 
Procedures 
Massed but 
Limited Effects 
for 
Organizational 
Goals 
Formal Task 
Sets 
Inability to Interpret 
Environment; Poor 
Coordination 
Learning Accelerate Experimentation 
Overt Collection 
Capacity 
Informal 
Information 
Sharing 
Informal 
Doctrine 
Creation; 
Integration 
Knowledge 
Integration 
Coordinated Training 
and Knowledge 
Collection 
  Decelerate 
Formal Collection 
and Sharing 
Requirements and 
Restrictions 
Inability of Small 
Organizations to 
Interpret and 
Incorporate 
Information 
Unit Cycling and 
Leader Transfer 
Volume of 
Information 
Learning 
and 
Training 
Linkages 
Environmental 
Assessment Plagued 
by Speed of 
Operations 
                                                 
938 This table is meant to provide simplified (but not comprehensive) examples of adaptive accelerations 
and decelerations by phase and by organizational inputs and outputs.  The information and processes underlying this 
table are expanded upon in the following section and figures contained therein. 
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8.1 THE CYCLE OF MUTUAL ADAPTATION 
The COE is dynamic.  Although conventional forces have always had to adapt in conflict, 
adaptation usually occurred quickly as similarly equipped and disposed organizations reacted to 
each other over the period that opposing forces were in contact.  Immediate or even lasting 
changes to organizational inputs and outputs did not necessarily occur nor did they have to for 
organizations, at least partially or temporarily, to succeed in accomplishing their objectives.  This 
was true because conventional forces, by and large, behaved similarly, were similarly 
constructed, had similar if opposing objectives, and shared resource strengths that could 
overwhelm many (but by no means all) organizational faults.  While defeat would surely follow 
the organization that failed to adapt, conventional organizations shared enough strengths and 
weaknesses that their adaptive cycles were in near natural harmony.  The COE on the other hand 
pits manifold organizational types against each other and thus requires continuous adaptations 
for organizational success.  Disharmony in the adaptive cycles and the resource capacities of the 
competitors can lead to organizational ineffectiveness, inefficiency, or even defeat.  The COE 
requires significant and rapid coordination of organizational inputs and outputs to achieve 
organizational goals regardless of organizational type: 
 
“War is a continuous interaction of opposites in a continuous interaction between 
your forces and an enemy.  An enemy will always adapt to avoid your strengths 
and attack your vulnerabilities.  There are two main things: one is the 
proliferation of technology and innovative use of technology by our enemies as 
well as our own forces; another has to do with the application of that technology 
to be able to communicate more effectively, to organize more effectively, and to 
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coordinate efforts as well as mobilize people and resources in a network 
dispersed organization.”939
 
 
OIF, like many post-Cold War conflicts between conventional and irregular forces but 
more so, demanded an adaptive capacity of competing organizations.  The Cycle of Mutual 
Adaptation is a process whereby organizations adapt to each other in a continual and cyclic 
fashion.  Success in this cycle requires correctly and quickly modifying organizational inputs and 
outputs to achieve organizational goals in a rapidly changing environment and against an 
adaptive foe.  The organization that can adapt more rapidly is likely to achieve greater levels of 
organizational success.  When organizations adapt at the same or nearly the same pace, the better 
resourced organization is likely to achieve greater levels of organizational success.  This process 
is mapped out and analyzed in the next six sections. 
8.1.1 The Insurgent Adaptation Model 
The insurgency in Iraq was simultaneously global, regional, and local and consisted of terrorist, 
guerrilla, criminal, tribal, foreign, domestic, and other organizations rejecting the order being 
imposed by the nascent Iraqi government and Coalition forces.  This complex insurgency, like 
modern insurgencies in general, lacked well-defined and easily identifiable centers of gravity, 
was resilient and adaptive, and was unpredictable.940
                                                 
939 Brigadier General McMaster, H. R., Telephone Interview, 8 September 2008. 
  The insurgency was multiform, freed from 
940 Hoehn, Andrew R. et al., New Division of Labor: Meeting America’s Security Challenges Beyond Iraq, 
RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. 15. 
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bureaucratic barriers, and possessed manifold skills and capabilities.  But the insurgency, 
because of its structure, also had significant weaknesses: competing goals and objectives; 
fleeting participation; and poor overall coordination.  These weaknesses kept the insurgency 
from becoming a truly adaptive organization; its adaptive capacity did not significantly change 
over time and its greatest successes came more from the weaknesses of its competitor(s) as they 
struggled to cyclically adapt than from any inherent or coordinated capability. 
 
Figure 3. Insurgent Adaptation Model 
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8.1.2 Army Small Unit Adaptation Model 
U.S. Army organizations proceeded from a pre-adaptive posture early in OIF (where it was 
decidedly not capable of simultaneous full spectrum operations) to an adaptive organizational 
posture in late-2006.  Correspondingly, the U.S. Army was progressively more capable of 
making adaptations coherently and efficiently despite its legacy and in spite of its competitor’s 
efforts to disrupt its operations. 
 
Figure 4. Army Small Unit Adaptation Model 
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8.1.3 The Initial Adaptive Phase 
During the Initial Adaptive Phase, the U.S. Army’s tactical adaptations were almost wholly 
inappropriate.  The U.S. Army’s institutional legacy corrupted organizational attempts to bring 
adaptations in line with goals and objectives.  Superior conventional skills and weapons did not 
confer traditional advantages.941  Furthermore, customary approaches built on established 
patterns were ineffective counters to an adaptive insurgency.942
                                                 
941 Black, Jeremy, “War and Strategy in the 21st Century,” Watch on the West, Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, Volume 3, Number 4, February 2002. 
  Conversely, insurgent 
organizations, cooperating based on a shared goal of forcing the withdrawal of Coalition forces 
from Iraq, while at first clumsy, were capable of making organizational adjustments to 
counterinsurgent forces and towards increasing organizational effectiveness. 
942 RAND, Connecting the Dots in Intelligence, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2004, pp. 1-2. 
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Initial Adaptive Phase
Early 2003—Mid-2003Pre-Adaptive Posture
I/O
Pool
DEADSPACE
DEADSPACE
DEADSPACE
DEADSPACE
DEADSPACE
DEADSPACE
DEADSPACE
DEADSPACE
Adaptive Posture
I/O Pool
U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY
PACE OF ADAPTATION: SLOW OR NONE
RESOURCES FOR ADAPTATION: INPUTS—LOW; OUTPUTS—
LOW/NONE
MUTUAL ADAPTATION IN THIS PHASE
U.S. Army tactical adaptation is almost wholly inappropriate for 
achieving institutional goals and is ineffective/counterproductive against 
the insurgency.  
Limitations: Organizational Culture; Lack of Doctrine; Inappropriate 
Training and Equipment for Mission, Very Small I/O Pool.
Strengths:  Communications.
The insurgency ‘s tactical adaptation is directly tied to organizational 
goals and is highly effective against the U.S. Army counterinsurgency. 
The insurgency is capable of matching resources to limited 
organizational objectives.  Individual insurgent operators’ adaptation 
outpaces  counterinsurgency.
Limitations:  Resources; Communications; Leadership.
Strengths: Flexibility; Pool of Insurgents; Lack of Rules and Structure, 
Adequate I/O Pool.
INSURGENCY
PACE OF ADAPTATION:  FAST
RESOURCES FOR ADAPTATION: INPUTS—MEDIUM; 
OUTPUTS--MEDIUM
 
Figure 5. Initial Adaptation Phase 
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8.1.4 The Interim Adaptive Phase 
During the Interim Adaptive Phase, the U.S. Army’s tactical organizations began to experiment 
and innovate, sometimes effectively and sometimes with mixed or undesired results.  Differing 
leadership styles and personalities began to emerge, forcing radical changes throughout the force.  
Collectively, the U.S. Army began to collect, collate, and incorporate lessons from operations in 
Iraq into training and MREs.  Operations shifted from ‘drive-by COIN’943
                                                 
943 Smith, Niel and Sean McFarland, Op Cit, p. 45. 
 to more deliberate 
Clear, Hold, and Build and presence operations.  The insurgency reached its zenith in 
organizational effectiveness during this phase: resources were well matched with expanding 
organizational objectives while U.S. Army organizations were still trying to establish 
organizational goals in light of strategic ambiguity.  Only late in 2006 did the insurgency begin 
to significantly wither from inter-organizational friction.  This occurred at about the same time 
that the U.S. Army was developing a nearly adaptive posture. 
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Interim Adaptive Phase
Mid-2003—Late-2006Interim Adaptive Posture Adaptive Posture
I/O Pool
U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY
PACE OF ADAPTATION: SLOW TO MEDIUM
RESOURCES FOR ADAPTATION: INPUTS—MEDIUM 
OUTPUTS—MEDIUM
MUTUAL ADAPTATION IN THIS PHASE
U.S. Army tactical adaptation is expanding as Institutional goals are in flux.  
Operators form formal and informal ties and ties to the expanded I/O Pool  
are both direct and attenuated.
Limitations: Organizational Culture; Unclear Objectives. 
Strengths:  Communications; Flexibility.
The insurgency is capable of matching resources to expanded organizational 
objectives although the effect of operations is not entirely coordinated.  The 
insurgency takes advantage of increased (and unmatched) knowledge of its 
competitor (ROE, objectives, capabilities, limitations).  Individual insurgent 
operators’ adaptation outpaces  counterinsurgent peers.
Limitations:  Higher Order Analysis and Coordination; Leadership.
Strengths: Flexibility; Pool of Insurgents; Lack of Rules and Structure, 
Competitive Knowledge.
INSURGENCY
PACE OF ADAPTATION:  FAST
RESOURCES FOR ADAPTATION: INPUTS—HIGH; 
OUTPUTS--MEDIUM
I/O Pool
 
Figure 6. Interim Adaptive Phase 
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8.1.5 The Adaptive Phase 
In the Adaptive Phase, U.S. Army organizations realized the potential of expanded and mostly 
unrestricted information flows and the rapid incorporation of lessons and learning into 
institutional structures.  Efficiency and structure were subordinated to effectiveness.944
                                                 
944 “In management, relaxing assumptions of order means recognizing that not all effective solutions are 
efficient solutions.  It does not mean that trust has to be given blindly or that complex processes cannot be affected; 
it only means that when the means match the context, less energy need be expended for the same result.”  Kurtz, C. 
F., and D. J. Snowden, Ibid, p. 481. 
  The 
insurgency, meanwhile, suffered from significant organizational friction, dismemberment, and 
competition.  Although it still adapted quickly, its adaptation was not necessarily tied to 
organizational goals.  The Cycle of Mutual Adaptation in Iraq has thus favored the U.S. Army 
from late 2006 through the present. 
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I/O Pool
Adaptive Posture
Adaptive Phase
Late-2006—Present Adaptive Posture
U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY
PACE OF ADAPTATION: FAST
RESOURCES FOR ADAPTATION: INPUTS—
HIGH; OUTPUTS—MEDIUM TO HIGH
MUTUAL ADAPTATION IN THIS PHASE
U.S. Army tactical adaptation is nearly comprehensive (upon interaction with the insurgency and because of 
few barriers to information flow, expanded ties,  and pervasive analysis and feedback, knowledge and 
adaptive functions flow freely).  Because of in depth learning and environmental knowledge, experience, 
training, doctrine, and education, appropriate adaptations propagate and ineffective methods and 
information are filtered.  The pace of counterinsurgent adaptation nearly equals, equals, or outpaces that 
of the insurgency.  The counterinsurgency is far better resourced than the insurgency in both inputs and 
outputs.
Limitations: The Stability of the Legacy.
Strengths:  Communications; Flexibility; Unified Organizational and Institutional Goals.
The insurgency does not significantly change despite individual and group adaptations to the 
counterinsurgency.  A lack of robust institutional support, guidance, and leadership significantly limits the 
capacity of the insurgency to adapt inputs and outputs to organizational goals..  The strategic split between 
AQI and other elements of the insurgency significantly reduced  resources available (many of these 
resources accrued to the counterinsurgency).
Limitations:  Higher Order Analysis and Coordination; Leadership; Resources; Lack of Rules and Structure.
Strengths: Flexibility; Lack of Rules and Structure.
INSURGENCY
PACE OF ADAPTATION:  FAST
RESOURCES FOR ADAPTATION: INPUTS—
MEDIUM; OUTPUTS--MEDIUM
I/O Pool
 
Figure 7. Adaptive Phase 
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8.1.6 Accelerating Adaptation 
Accelerating effective organizational adaptation, particularly at the tactical level, requires a 
system that can rapidly translate success into organizational changes while recognizing failures 
and mitigating their recurrence.  Characteristics of such a system include: decentralized decision 
making, rapid movement, small-unit initiative, informed and imaginative organizational 
members, the freedom to communicate and operate laterally based on the goals and intent of the 
organization, and the capacity for open discussions and evaluations regarding organizational and 
individual effectiveness.945  Individuals and organizations must be capable of performing 
manifold tasks and responsibilities in order to adapt to the environment quickly and properly.946  
“In a serious breakdown of order the soldier has to be able to transform from being a security 
provider, border observer, trainer, secondee staff officer, and intelligence collector into a combat 
soldier.”947
To enhance speed and effectiveness, hierarchical organizations must be prepared to take 
on the capabilities and structures of networks (i.e., become decentralized) and networked 
organizations must take on the capabilities and structures of hierarchies (i.e., in resource 
 
                                                 
945 Millet, Allan R. et al, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” Military Effectiveness Volume I: 
The First World War, Eds., Millet, Allan R. and Williamson Murray, Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1988, p. 22.  See also, 
Hammes, Thomas X., The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 2006, p. 275. 
946 Beckett, Ian F. W., Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, Carlisle, PA, January 2005, p. 18. 
947 Mackinlay, John and Alison Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 
2008, p. 53. 
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distribution and coordination of effort).948  Although speed is important in the Cycle of Mutual 
Adaptation (it keeps competitor organizations off balance) it is not necessarily useful if 
adaptations made do not advance organizational goals and objectives.  Speed is important for 
organizational pro-activity but the ability to perceive opportunities and weaknesses and 
accordingly to alter organizational inputs and outputs to achieve organizational goals is 
paramount.  Having coherent goals to align institutional and organizational or organizational and 
organizational modifications to overall processes and performance is thus necessary for 
accelerating adaptation.949  This is all the more true in complex environments where individuals 
and organizations are expected to accomplish a range of tasks quickly and simultaneously to 
support institutional goals.950
                                                 
948 For discussion of the U.S. military taking on characteristics of networks see, Metz, Steven and Douglas 
V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, January 2001. 
  “We live in a dynamic world in which the pace, scope, and 
complexity of change are increasing.  The continued march of globalization, the growing number 
of independent actors, and advancing technology have increased global connectivity, 
interdependence and complexity, creating greater uncertainties, systemic risk and a less 
predictable future…In this environment, the key to achieving lasting strategic advantage is the 
949 See, U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operational Environment: Challenges and Implications for 
the Future Joint Force, JFC, 2008, p. 47. 
950 Wong, Leonard, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2004, p. 5.  See also, Gehler, Christopher P. 
Agile Leaders, Op Cit. 
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ability to rapidly and accurately anticipate and adapt to complex challenges.”951
8.1.7 Inhibiting Adaptation 
  Recognizing 
organizational adaptation accelerants and inhibitors is vital to retaining relevancy and the 
capacity to act strategically. 
Understanding what inhibits organizational adaptation is as important, if not more so, as 
understanding what accelerates organizational adaptation.  Understanding adaptive inhibitors is 
important not only for augmenting the effectiveness of U.S. Army organizations but also for 
diminishing the effectiveness of threat organizations.  While not all threat organizations are the 
same and not all U.S. Army organizations are the same, organizational processes for improving 
and for retarding adaptation in the achievement of organizational goals are similar.  “Since 
adaptation results in part from learning it is impossible to totally prevent adaptation.  The best 
that can be achieved is to limit the adaptability of the organization or to control the direction of 
adaptation.”952
An organization’s adaptability is in part a function of its organizational form.
 
953
                                                 
951 McConnell, J. M., Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise, Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, Washington DC, 2008, p. 4. 
  
Different organizational forms adapt differently based upon their ability to translate resources 
into organizational goals.  Eliminating excess capacity and reducing the redundancy of 
organizational members while increasing the functions that an organization has to perform will 
952 Carley, Kathleen M., “Stopping Adaptation,” CASOS, 21 June 2002. 
953 Ibid. 
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reduce its capacity for adaptation.954  Organizational adjustments of inputs and outputs will 
suffer accordingly.  Reducing the interaction among organizational members is also important 
for reducing the chances of spreading innovations.955  An inability to collaborate, either 
physically or virtually, not only reduces the likelihood of innovations being spread, it reduces the 
likelihood of innovations being spread properly.  Many times, interaction among members in a 
networked organization, particularly in a violent competitive environment, is reduced because of 
secrecy protocols, membership attrition, and because the network’s structure changes frequently.  
In this respect, the Iraqi insurgency would typify what Carley terms maladaptive organizations: 
“maladaptive organizations tend to spend excessive time bringing on and letting go.  This too 
destroys transactive memory as it makes personnel have to spend excessive time learning who is 
still in the organization or learning what personnel know.  Thus factors encouraging such 
personnel changes will also inhibit adaptivity.”956
Assuming that an organization is perfectly suited (or even well suited) for operations can 
also hinder organizational adaptation.  An overly focused organization, assuming that what it is 
good at doing is translatable into other types of operations, can weaken adaptive capacity: “we 
should recognize that over-focus on a single type of warfare—large-scale, conventional 
warfare—inhibited understanding of other types of warfare, and of warfare as a whole.  We 
should, therefore, beware the potential danger of over-focus on post-modern warfare having the 
same result.”
 
957
                                                 
954 Ibid. 
  Similarly, having an under-focused organization can reduce the likelihood of 
955 Ibid. 
956 Ibid. 
957 Kiszely, John, Op Cit, p. 23. 
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adaptations taking hold or spreading throughout an institution.  A lack of focus can be the result 
of or can contribute to organizational friction and decreased opportunities for collaboration and 
learning. 
Having inappropriate doctrine, goals, and strategies might all contribute to an 
organization being unwilling to change or, when changes are made, they might be made in the 
pursuit of poorly chosen goals.  Furthermore, assuming that organizations do constantly adapt 
when they do not might negatively alter perceptions of how that organization is performing; 
adaptations to perceived changes might thus be misguided.  For instance, many tribal 
organizations do not deviate from traditional ways of doing things and many military 
organizations have changed very little since the end of the Cold War.958  When adaptations are 
made they almost always prompt antidotal behavior by competitive adversaries.959
                                                 
958 “Deeply tribal societies often have great difficulty advancing beyond their traditional ways.”  Ronfeldt, 
David, Op Cit, p. 5.  “We are in a period of relative military stasis when compared to developments of 
approximately the past 150 years.”  Alach, Zhivan J., Slowing Military Change, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2008, p. 4.  In fact, in many ways, operations and tactics are regressing. 
   Assuming 
that an innovation has particular salience for a long period or assuming that doctrine and strategy 
can remain static is unwise.  Organizations are never perfect and neither are their methods; if 
they were, they wouldn’t be so for long.  This is particularly true in the rapidly changing post-
9/11 international security environment where so-called ‘revolutions’ tend to be short lived.  “By 
common discovery, imitation, theft, purchase, and espionage, especially if revolutionary change 
is demonstrated in war, the RMA of the day will be recognized and eventually comprehended.  
959 Gray, Colin S., Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of 
Context, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 2006. 
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When feasible and judged desirable, it will be copied in parts.  When borrowed, it will be 
domesticated to fit local cultural preferences and strategic circumstances.  If it cannot or should 
not be imitated, then the challenge will be to find ways of warfare that negates much of its 
potential.”960
8.1.8 Implications 
 
The Cycle of Mutual Adaptation in Iraq revealed a number of methods and practices for slowing 
or enhancing organizational adaptation.  Expanded sets of capabilities and competencies and the 
harmonization of organizational goals around coherent objectives all enhanced the ability to 
adapt.961  Technology proved to be a force multiplier when tied to enhancing organizational 
adaptation and information flows.  But technology can also create false perceptions of 
dominance and can cause an information overflow if not managed effectively.962
                                                 
960 Ibid, p. 46. 
  Applying 
traditional combat methods to overused and misunderstood concepts, such as Clausewitz’s center 
of gravity, at times was counterproductive and resulted in a more dispersed competitive network.  
“Destroying nodes and the ties between actors and organizations, as manifold as these nodes and 
ties are, is only a temporary solution; criminal organizations and their constituent actors will only 
961 See, Ancker, Clinton J., “Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,” Military Review, July-August 2003, p. 23. 
962 Watts, Barry D., Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair paper 68, National Defense University, 
Washington DC, 2004, p. 81. 
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adapt and re-emerge at a later date.”963  In fact, where communicative means are present, 
attacking a network directly might actually increase its effectiveness and efficiency and 
depending on the centrality or uniqueness of the target to the network.964  “Within a cellular 
network, efforts to destabilize it meet with mixed success.  In fact, such strategies can actually 
lead to improvement in the cellular networked organization’s performance depending on the 
nature of the task being done.  Cellular networks are in this sense extremely adaptive.  One 
reason for this is that the cellularization encourages rapid information flow.”965  Destabilizing 
organizations without understanding how they adapt can lead to unforeseen consequences.966  
Actions in a competitive environment can produce initial successes but with second and third 
order effects benefiting a competitor.  Collateral effects can cut both ways and can affect 
competing organizations differently at different times and in different locations.  “An 
organization must be aware of the second-order effects of its actions and understand that any 
intervention in a complex system creates positive and negative aftershocks.”967
                                                 
963 Serena, Chad, “Dynamic Attenuation: Terrorism, Transnational Crime and the Role of the US Army 
Special Forces,” Global Crime, Volume 8, Number 4, November 2007, p. 362.  See also, Tsvetovat, Maksim and 
Kathleen M. Carley, “Bouncing Back: Recovery Mechanisms of Covert Networks,” CASOS, p. v. 
  Understanding 
how various enablers affect the modification of organizational inputs and outputs is critical to 
understanding and positively or negatively affecting the adaptive cycle. 
964 Sparrow, Malcolm K., “Network Vulnerabilities and Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 5, Number 3, 1992, p. 264. 
965 Carley, Kathleen M., Stopping Adaptation, CASOS, 21 June 2002. 
966 Carley, Kathleen M., “Destabilizing Networks,” Connections, Volume 24, Number 3, 2002, p. 86.  See 
also, Carley, Kathleen M., “Dynamic Network Analysis for Counter-Terrorism, CASOS, Undated. 
967 Lopez, Rafael, Op Cit, p. 57. 
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Organization is one factor determinative of success in competitive adaptation.  Although 
the U.S. Army was and remains hierarchical, it was capable of decentralizing operational control 
and using enhanced communications to make itself more like a network.968  The insurgency, 
although networked, was capable of transcending its form, at least intermittently, to coordinate 
operations and tactical missions based on operational and tactical goals. Failing to recognize that 
these structures can also inhibit success is problematic.  In the long term, the insurgency was 
incapable of maintaining levels of coordination necessary to achieve organizational success and 
the U.S. Army has seemingly downplayed the adaptations required for success in Iraq by failing 
to recognize the weakness of its traditional organizational form for combating networked 
threats.969  “The Army, to its credit, is energetically adapting to the situations in which it now 
finds itself.  It is creating more combat brigades and more specialized units, e.g., civil affairs and 
military police.  Furthermore, tactics, techniques, and procedures are being developed and 
implemented to respond to the tactical lessons the Army in the field is learning.  Nevertheless, a 
review of the Army’s concepts for the future reveals a remarkable consistency in the belief that 
well-trained combat forces are capable of performing any task.”970
                                                 
968 Robhenberg argues that this might be the key for success against networked insurgent organizations.  
Rothenberg, Richard, “From Whole Cloth: Making up the Terrorist Network,” Connections, Volume 24, Issue 3. 
  Rearranging a centralized 
and hierarchical organization will not necessarily create or enhance organizational adaptation but 
969 As Keagle and Martin argue, “Almost all responsible voices acknowledge that the structures and 
processes built to respond to the threat environment of the Cold War are ill suited to deal with the security 
challenges of the 21st century and its new kind of war and peace.  Simply put, the status quo is not good enough.  
Keagle, James M. and Adrian R. Martin, Organizing for National Security: Unification or Coordination?,” Defense 
Horizons Number 60, December 2007, p. 7. 
970 Johnson, David E., Learning Large Lessons, RAND, Santa Monica, 2007, p. 205. 
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realigning management, processes, interactions, and information sharing will.971
 The appropriate use of IT is another factor contributing to success in competitive 
adaptation.  IT can enable new organizational forms to take shape or it can enhance existing 
organizational sub-parts’ coordination and communications.  “Information technology is a 
critical enabler of new ways of organizing.  Fluid and flexible patterns of working relationships 
are based on communications networks, yielding innovative contexts for interactions and 
collaborative work that span traditional organizational boundaries.  Point-to-point 
communication (communication directly between two people, with no intervening person or 
channels necessary) between groups, often supported by information technology, integrates 
borders between them.”
  Similarly, 
enhancing network capacity will not necessarily improve organizational adaptation; there is such 
a thing as being too networked for accomplishing durable long-term or robust organizational 
objectives. 
972
  Studied in isolation, adaptations appear differently than when examined as part of a 
whole.  Mutual adaptation occurred cyclically and across time.  Insurgent behavior affected the 
U.S. Army’s behavior and vice versa.  Accordingly, some methods and procedures were only 
effective for a short while until eclipsed by better methods or negated by counteractions.  For 
  Furthermore, IT can allow management or command and control 
mechanisms to be less hierarchical.  This benefits networks and hierarchical organizations 
equally.  Because of IT, small unit leaders in the insurgency and the U.S. Army alike were 
capable of carrying out decentralized operations. 
                                                 
971 Sigel, Michael B., “Military Culture and Transformation,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 49, 2d Quarter, 
2008, p. 106. 
972 Holohan, Anne, Op Cit p. 94. 
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instance, insurgent usage of IEDs fell from about 110 incidents per day in September 2007 to 26 
per day in 2008.  During this time EFP usage rose, IRAMs emerged, and building-borne IEDs 
(houses wired to explode) proliferated:973
 
 
“As soon as you could counteract what the insurgents were doing, they would 
turn around and counteract what we were doing.  So, if we could counteract their 
IEDs with armor then they would put bigger IEDs out.”974
 
 
IEDs and emplacement was crude at first but became more sophisticated.  Initial countering 
came in the form of speeding through possible kill zones, hardened vehicles, emitter interference 
(Warlock jamming devices) and specialized bomb clearance vehicles (Buffalo clearance 
vehicle).  More sophisticated, integrated, and persistent methods followed, incorporating snipers, 
patrols, and aerostat-mounted systems (on UAVs).975  Neutralizing IEDs was enormously 
difficult but neutralizing their emplacement proved somewhat effective.976  In combination with 
decreased IED usage, enemy-initiated attacks fell by about 70 percent from 180 attacks per day 
in June 2007 to about 50 per day in February 2008.977
                                                 
973 Dale, Catherine, Op Cit, p. 85. 
  This reflected changes in the insurgent 
organization (the split between the Sunni Tribes and foreign elements of the insurgency) and the 
974 Soldier Deployed to Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, Baquba (July 2006-November 2007), Personal Interview. 
975 Pirnie, Bruce R. and Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND, Santa Monica, 
CA, 2008, pp. 46-47. 
976 Rubin, Michael, Op Cit, 31 May 2007. 
977 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, Progress Report: 
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, June 2008. 
 460 
increasing effectiveness of the U.S. Army for countering insurgent operations and exploiting 
organizational weaknesses.  This process was continuous and sometimes favored the insurgency 
while at other times it favored the U.S. Army.  As one method was discovered, it would either be 
abandoned or shelved for a period of time based on competitor reactions and environmental 
changes.  For example, the insurgency began to effectively use napalm in attacks on coalition 
troops in Mosul in early 2005.  But once the U.S. Army uncovered large caches of ingredients 
for its manufacture, linked production to use, and specifically targeted napalm operations, the 
incidence of napalm attacks decreased dramatically: 
 
 “The enemy was adapting, we were adapting, and things were changing.  All the 
sudden we started getting hit with napalm.  Some of our targets were changing 
and some of our intelligence was changing so sometimes we had to go in and look 
for ingredients.  We would have to consult with JAG [The Judge Advocate 
General]: can we hold a guy when he has a whole roomful of soap when it is 
obvious that the guy isn’t that concerned with hygiene?  Is this enough given the 
tactics that they are using?  Well, after a couple of months, the napalm bombs 
that we were getting hit with disappeared.”978
 
 
Each competitor in Iraq also modified organizational forms to achieve its organizational goals 
when the environment changed: 
 
                                                 
978 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
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• The U.S. Army transformed from a vertically and hierarchically integrated 
organization to a hybrid vertically/horizontally integrated organization by taking 
advantage of communications, and inter-netted capabilities and by lifting centralized 
controls. 
• The insurgency transformed from a horizontally integrated organization (initial 
network structure based on existing social structures and communications 
capabilities) to a vertical/semi-conglomerated organization (when size and freedom of 
maneuver grew and operations expanded in scope) and back to a horizontally 
integrated organization (as the U.S. Army transformed). 
Adaptive responses were based on organizational strengths: 
 
• The U.S. Army used expensive and resource intensive institutional resources to 
conduct analysis and create pervasive responses informed by organization-level 
adaptations. 
• The insurgency (for the most part) used low-tech local analysis to create low-cost and 
rapidly manufactured responses based on organizational successes.  
 
Accordingly, recognizing a significant disparity in analytical skill and resource depth, the 
insurgency increasingly sought to take advantage of its strengths while undermining those of the 
U.S. Army: 
 
“They didn’t have our technology.  They came up with low-level answers to defeat 
our ability to track or intercept what they were doing.  Either consciously or 
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subconsciously, this worked.  You can’t track washing machine timers, soap, and 
dead dogs.  Their adaptation was that they were going backwards, knowing that it 
was difficult for us to track.  These things cost money and that is easy to track.  
Technology is expensive and in short supply, that is easy to track.  Low cost, hard 
to track, everyday items is what they…Once they dip down to a certain level of 
technology that is so low that you can’t track it, you have to go higher into the 
logical process as to why they are doing this.”979
 
 
And, each competitor sought advantages whenever they were perceived: 
 
“In COIN, both sides race for micro-advantages.  No weapon or tactic works 
forever.  So the pace of adaptation becomes critical.  And it’s not just the U.S. 
pace.”980
  
 
Understanding the operational environment is critical for braking or accelerating 
adaptation.  If an organization becomes too complex, its adaptive cycle will be slowed.  
Inherently, networked organizations have an advantage over conventional forces in this respect.  
But if an organization is too simple, it will not be able to understand environmental changes and 
thus won’t be able respond to changes.981
                                                 
979 Soldier Deployed to Mosul (November 2004-October 2005), Personal Interview, 29 September 2008. 
  Anticipating how actors and their organizations will 
980 Major General Bolger, Dan, E-mail Interview, 13 September 2008. 
981 Vinci, Anthony, “The ‘Problems of Mobilization’ and the Analysis of Armed Groups,” Parameters, 
Spring 2006, p. 61. 
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modify inputs and outputs to achieve adaptation is vital in any competitive adaptive struggle.  
Each is a catalyst for the other.982  “Today’s competent insurgents are adaptive and are often part 
of a widespread network that constantly and instantly communicates.  Successful COIN practices 
and appropriate countermeasures pass rapidly throughout the insurgency, and insurgents can 
implement changes quickly.  COIN leaders must avoid complacency and be at least as adaptive 
as the adversary.”983
Since the competition in Iraq has dwindled substantially in the past 2 years, it is unclear if 
the U.S. Army is going to maintain its decentralized capabilities and whether it will expand on its 
organizational capacity for adaptation.  Despite continuing efforts to rebalance and Transform, 
the U.S. Army has accepted stability operations in its new doctrine.  Furthermore, the DOD has 
required that intelligence efforts should incorporate an “optimal mix of capabilities to meet 
stability operations requirements” and that “stability operations skills, such as foreign language 
capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International 
Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all 
levels.”
 
984
                                                 
982 Wyszynski, Joseph L., Adaptability: Components of the Adaptive Competency for U.S. Army Direct 
and Organizational Level Leaders, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2005, p. 7. 
  How this is incorporated into future structures, doctrine, training, and most 
importantly, practice, remains to be seen. 
983 Cohen, Eliot, et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, 
March-April 2006, p. 53. 
984 England, Gordon, Op Cit, p. 4. 
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8.1.9 Returning to the Hypothesis 
When the U.S. Army did finally achieve near harmony in the adaptive cycle, it was capable of 
marshaling substantially more resources than the insurgency and in a fashion more consistent 
with institutional, and ultimately, national objectives.  Full spectrum capabilities were achieved 
and organizations were capable of matching and translating tactical actions into strategic 
objectives and vice versa.  While the insurgency was still very adaptive in 2007 and 2008, it was 
frustrated by organizational competition for resources within the insurgency and from external 
competitors.  Thus, although the insurgency was adaptive, diminishing resource pools 
contributed to its weakened capacity for competing with the counterinsurgency and for 
accomplishing organizational goals. 
8.2 CASES IN POINT: TRENDS IN THE FUSION OF THE SPECTRUM—A  SHORT 
REVIEW OF THE RECENT PAST 
In the post-Cold War period the spectrum of conflict was fused in many instances but perhaps 
most spectacularly in Iraq.  Humanitarian operations, developing civilian capacities and 
infrastructure, unconventional combat, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and regular combat 
were all tasks, in some combination, that had to be conducted simultaneously to achieve strategic 
objectives in a number of post-Cold War conflicts.  These operations were not OOTW; these 
operations were war as it came to be known in the post-Cold War international security 
environment.  In each case the enemy was adaptive, the environment was dynamic and required 
full spectrum capabilities, and the U.S. Army was to some degree incapable of adjusting 
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organizational inputs and outputs to achieve its goals and objectives, particularly in the long-
term.  A diverse combination of traditional and unconventional ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ tasks was 
required for even moderate success in limited missions in Panama, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and 
elsewhere.  Although these operations were quantitatively and qualitatively much less complex 
than operations in Iraq, they still represent the types of missions that prevail when strategy 
necessitates military involvement in stability operations whether they occur pre-, post-, or during 
conflict. 
To be sure, the substantial and enduring involvement of the U.S. military in some form of 
stability operations is not an historical aberration.  “It is not just current conflicts that require a 
long-term deployment of relatively large numbers of American forces; every successful major 
conflict since 1945—Germany, Japan, South Korea, Panama, Iraq (1991 and 2003), Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Afghanistan—has required the same thing.”985
                                                 
985 Donnelly, Thomas and Frederick W. Kagan, Op Cit, p. 142. 
  Recent operations like those 
conducted in Iraq reinforce and elongate this trend.  And despite short and selective 
organizational memories and protestations to the contrary, these conflicts all required substantial 
full spectrum capabilities, sometimes sequential but more often than not simultaneous.  Non-state 
adversaries in unstable areas armed with the propagated tools of a globalized world and 
operating in the convoluted post-Cold War international security environment are not deviations 
from the norm but instead are the evolution of the norm with more modern capabilities and 
differing strategic objectives.  Adversaries, considered being of substantial import, enough so to 
require the deployment of sizable forces and resources in Africa, South America, Eastern 
Europe, and across Asia were and are all, in some ways, facsimiles of the threat organizations 
that emerged, adapted, and evolved in Iraq.  The complexity and highly networked nature of this 
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threat type might be new in degree but it is hardly unique given that it is just a more 
contemporary version of a non-state adversary that has evolved since at least the end of the Cold 
War. 
Three categorical differences distinguish newer adversaries from those of the past: their 
increasingly non-state character; their complexity, capability, durability, and perniciousness and; 
their goals and objectives.  Non-state threat organizations have appeared and have conducted 
operations, with and without the support of states, on every populated continent, and in areas 
where state control was high and where it was absent.  Boundaries and bureaucracies are not 
hurdles that need to be overcome by modern non-state adversaries.  Threat forces in the 
Philippines, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Somalia have all demonstrated, to differing degrees, 
sophistication in their methods, a penchant for violence, and the durability of their cause.  These 
adversaries are hardly a fad, are likely to persist well into the future, and because of their 
perceived successes, are likely to accrete like-minded adherents and attract the support of 
friendly organizations.  Insurgents in Iraq, Colombia, India, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Afghanistan 
have dispensed with 20th Century notions of following structured paths towards control of the 
state and are instead content with its absence.  As Metz argues, these groups “have little hope of 
or even interest in becoming a regime—whether of their entire country or some break-away 
segment of it.”986
                                                 
986 Metz, Steven, Rethinking Insurgency, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
June 2007, p. 49. 
  It is quite possible that sub-state actors, organizations, tribes, and other 
assorted social groupings are not interested in being a part of the modern state system and are 
equally uninterested in adopting the traditional methods of warfare that modern states employ 
and expect other belligerents to adhere to.  Unless U.S. strategy changes significantly—and 
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demotes these enemies in prominence while also obviating the need for full spectrum capacities 
in unstable areas—doctrine and force planning will have to account for these facts.  Military 
victory against these actors, particularly when operating in populated areas—under state control 
or not—cannot be translated into serious political victory under current strategic guidance or 
with the force structure and doctrine of the past without significant and continuous 
organizational adaptation. 
States exist in a variety of forms.  Modern, pre-modern, tribal, fragile, weak, and strong: 
not all states are the same and non-state adversaries exist and differ in each.  Even when and 
where a state and its apparatuses tangibly exist the state might not function appropriately or in 
accordance with the basic characteristics attributed to a modern state.  Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that the forces of the state or non-state forces residing within a state’s boundaries will follow 
prescribed and preferred doctrines when engaging opposing forces, regardless of the opposing 
forces’ composition and intent and regardless of international perceptions of what is acceptable 
behavior.  Somalia, although typically treated as a worst case scenario and often relegated to its 
own special category of state-less existence, is not, as Little argues, “qualitatively different from 
other regions where states are shallow and weak and formal economies are moribund.”987
                                                 
987 Little, Peter D., Somalia: Economy without State, The International African Institute, Oxford, 2003, p. 
165. 
  
Warlord and terrorist activities in Somalia are legendary but are not exceptional.  Some states 
and regions in Africa, the Caribbean basin, South America, the Middle East, and South Asia are 
also notably shallow and weak, their economies fluctuate significantly from one decade to the 
next, and they typically fail to make long-term progress.  Accordingly, threat organizations in 
these areas ebb and flow in their accrued power and insidiousness.  On occasion they have drawn 
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the attention of U.S. forces as part of a persistent strategy requiring the provision and 
enforcement of global stability. 
Post-Cold War U.S. strategy generally and, in particular, post-9/11 U.S. strategy required 
and requires a capacity for achieving military victory and for the translation of military victory 
into the achievement of political objectives, regardless of the enemy faced in the process and 
regardless of the area where this adversary is physically located.  Conflicts in Iraq against state-
based forces (twice) and a networked insurgency, against Serbia, and in Afghanistan all were 
conducted on the premise that military victory could be translated into strategic success.  
Explicitly, the U.S. Army had to be full spectrum capable.   Implicitly, because the institutional 
Army was not full spectrum capable, the tactical Army had to radically adjust organizational 
inputs and outputs to achieve organizational goals.  Mandel’s observations on a number of post-
Cold War conflicts illustrates the difficulties of realizing and achieving this outcome:  “Although 
each case involved unquestioned military victory by the United States and its allies, who 
possessed overwhelming advantages in military force, and each achieved an immediate goal 
(freeing people in Kuwait, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq from an oppressive regime), in many 
ways each constitutes a vivid illustration of the pitfalls of pursuing strategic victory.  Indeed the 
general result has been decidedly disappointing long-term political consequences, to such a 
degree that—for some observers—it calls the value of these wars into serious question.  Virtually 
all were followed by regional instability (without the spread of peaceful democratic values), the 
presence of continued violence, the escalation of suffering for defeated states’ citizenry, and 
some significant international resentment: and none of the cases unambiguously achieved 
dramatic positive postwar changes fitting all of the war objectives.”988
                                                 
988 Mandel, Robert, The Meaning of Military Victory, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2006, pp. 109-110. 
  Organizational adaptation 
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was a problem for the U.S. Army in each case: it either did not engage in full spectrum 
operations (because it was incapable or it tried and was to a greater and lesser degree (depending 
on the complexity of the conflict and the foe) unsuccessful. 
An inability to conduct a range of operations across the spectrum of conflict, 
simultaneously or otherwise, continued to shadow the U.S. Army from the end of the Cold War 
through the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  The sense that the U.S. military, by being highly adept at 
conducting HIC missions, was equally endowed for the conduct of either sequential or 
simultaneous full spectrum operations, evaporated rather quickly after years of conflict in the 
sands and towns of Iraq.  “The air of hubris that some Army officers displayed just a few years 
ago, after victories in Panama, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan…has dissipated, replaced 
by a sense that they have a lot to learn about how to operate effectively in Iraq.”989
                                                 
989 Ricks, Thomas E., “Lessons Learned in Iraq Show up in Army Classes,” Washington Post, 21 January 
2006. 
  Given recent 
difficulties, the U.S. military needs to learn quite a bit more about how to conceptualize 
adversaries as dynamic entities that refuse to adhere to any doctrinal template, reject normative 
prescriptions for behavior and form, and are themselves adaptive and quite capable of creating 
chaos across the operational spectrum.  On this, the historical record is unequivocal.  Operations 
once derisively termed as OOTW or MOOTW are just as likely to derail strategic objectives as 
are conventional enemies if they are not treated and adapted to appropriately.  Technological 
might and the capacity for rapid conventional dominance will hardly deter motivated 
organizations that have watched events unfold in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Somalia; instead, it will 
provoke adaptive and amoebic responses like those that have confounded state-based forces for 
the better part of the past 2 decades. 
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Far from withering and receding in the face of the technological prowess of modern state 
militaries in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 international security environment, current 
adversaries seem to be embracing all available tactics and techniques to combat state-based 
forces or to thwart state-based interference in their operations and activities.  Although 
unconventional methods prevailed and continue to prevail in the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, other more conventional methods prevail elsewhere.  The Pentagon’s preferences 
notwithstanding, threat organizations embrace conventional or unconventional methods or 
modalities at their discretion.  Where possible, and at the total inconvenience of the forces they 
face, adversaries adapt to the enemies they are confronting with total disregard for what is 
acceptable or preferred in their enemies’ strategies and doctrines.  This, coincidentally, makes 
combating these adversaries all the more difficult and requires a significant amount of spectrum 
fusing legerdemain by U.S. and other modern conventional forces.  The ability to 
transubstantiate capabilities and thus demand multi-spectral responses, at times and places of the 
adversary’s choosing, is particularly confounding to modern, centralized, and hierarchical 
military institutions. 
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in July of 2006 illustrates this last point.  To 
counter the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah, aided and abetted by the activities of Lebanese civilians, 
engaged the Israeli military in a conflict that was closely watched by western observers.  
Inconveniently, and just as the U.S. Army reluctantly began to embrace the notion of irregular 
warfare in its doctrine in nearby Iraq, Lebanese fighters engaged in a sophisticated, and 
apparently unpredicted, conventional operation against invading Israeli forces.  As Steve Biddle 
argues, Hezbollah’s actions deviated from the “classical guerrilla model” employed in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan.990  But Hezbollah’s tactics were not unique.  As the post-Cold War international 
security environment has evolved, many non-state adversaries have increased their capacity for 
waging conventional conflict, with more and more success, and in more and more locations: 
Croatian Separatists in the Balkans; Rwandan Rebels; Chechens; al Qaeda in Afghanistan; and 
Lebanese fighters all used a combination of conventional methods and technologies to fight their 
wars.991  Although guerrilla and irregular warfare might be adopted by future adversaries, in all 
likelihood non-state actors will also look to incorporate more conventional capabilities into their 
conceptual and doctrinal arsenals.  “Irregular, un-modernized, adaptive forces will make use of 
conventional military capabilities with similar purposes, if dissimilar methods.  Hybridization, 
rapid technological advancement, and capability developed as a result of asymmetric concepts 
generate an environment of constantly changing requirements and needs.”992
Two characteristics of modern non-state actors and organizations are particularly 
threatening: 1) they can operate relatively independently and in a variety of configurations 
depending on the environment and; 2) they might or might not have a positive vision or tangible 
goals.  In short, non-state adversaries can mutate frequently and might have disorder as a 
  Whichever 
methods are most expedient and puzzling to their enemies will be those used by modern day non-
state threat organizations. 
                                                 
990 Biddle, Stephen D. and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: 
Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
September 2008, pp. 87-88. 
991 Biddle, Stephen, “Funding the U.S. Counterinsurgency Wars,” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 
2009. 
992 U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2030 and 
Beyond, May 2007. 
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principal organizational goal.  The Taliban in Afghanistan and Western Pakistan typifies the first 
characteristic: “The Taliban organization is a network of franchises, an arrangement that fits well 
with tribal traditions.  A small militant group begins calling itself ‘the local Taliban.’  It gains 
some form of recognition from the central Taliban hierarchy in return for its support and 
cooperation.  The new cell supports Taliban grand strategy, but retains local freedom of action.  
This modus operandi preserves tribal loyalties and territorial boundaries.”993
Future non-state adversaries, like their predecessors, if not already so disposed, will 
likely be collocated with civilian populations and in areas where state control is at its nadir.  To 
counter these enemies, the U.S. Army and associated agencies will have to maintain fused, full 
spectrum capabilities, and the ability to adapt in highly fluid environments.  Operations as far 
back as Vietnam and Lebanon and more recently in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan exposed the weaknesses of non-adaptive planning and operations and the 
struggles associated with armed and unarmed intervention in complex environments.
  The second 
characteristic is best embodied by al Qaeda and it affiliated organizations.  Other than a set of 
long-term and almost wholly unachievable goals, al Qaeda is interested most in influence 
building, self-replication, and survival.  Each of these interests is best met in environments where 
order is in short supply and where states and their agents are unwelcome. 
994
                                                 
993 Afsar, Shahid, et al, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” Military Review, May-June 2008, p. 
65. 
  
994 For further discussion see, Cordesman, Anthony H., “Afghanistan, Iraq & Self-Inflicted Wounds: The 
Strategic Lessons of Armed Nation Building,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2007, Collins, 
Joseph J., “The Perils of Planning: Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq,” The Interagency and Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, Eds. Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, 
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Moreover, these cases demonstrated the folly of assuming that tactical combat victories could 
translate into strategic success and that operations would unfold in the sequential manner 
depicted in military manuals and planning templates.  Static threat models and templates, even 
those based on non-state actors, are just that: templates.  They are not particularly useful as 
planning constructs in non-sequential operations, are not real, and do not adapt as they can or 
will have to in the real world.  Lessons learned from operations or models are only useful insofar 
as they are drawn upon for the modification of inputs and outputs in the adaptive cycle.  Despite 
its importance, incorporating tactical adaptations into institutional adaptation has been the bête 
noir of military planners and prognosticators throughout the course of modern U.S. military 
history. 
All of this is not to say that the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army specifically 
has not learned from recent encounters with non-state adversaries in full spectrum environments.  
To the contrary, the U.S. Army has learned quite a bit in the past two decades: 
 
• In Haiti—“The Army relearned the lesson that the tactical actions of the Army soldier 
have powerful strategic, diplomatic, and informational effects.  This lesson, gathered 
then, would be applied to great effect in desert towns and cities of Iraq.”995
• In Rwanda—“Perhaps the greatest lesson was that the Army led its deployment not with 
combat units and equipment (tanks and armored vehicles), but rather with combat support 
and combat service support personnel and systems.  The tip of the spear was not a 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 2007, and Nagl, John, Learning to Eat 
Soup with a Knife, University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 219. 
995 Eventually.  See, Fontenot, Gregory, et al, Op Cit, p. 12. 
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mechanized infantry company led by a burly male Ranger second lieutenant; it was a 
water purification platoon led by a female second lieutenant.”996
• In Bosnia—“The Army had the opportunity to wrestle with the challenge of applying 
overwhelming conventional force as an instrument of peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping.”
 
997
• In Kosovo—“In every way that mattered, air power won the fighting in Kosovo, while 
ground units served to consolidate that victory.  The services learned important lessons in 
joint and combined cooperation and coordination that continued effectively during OIF.  
Other lessons include movement away from prescriptive time-phased force and 
deployment data (TPFDD) force-deployment management system toward a more flexible 
request for forces (RFF) packaging system.”
 
998
 
 
But although learning contributes to it, learning is not the same as adapting and adaptation will 
be necessary in any environment where the adversary is dynamic and has the organizational 
acumen to adapt and where the U.S. Army is not almost ideally predisposed for conducting 
operations and translating tactical victory into strategic, political success.  Neither state-based 
nor non-state based adversaries can be excepted from this dynamic; encountering either or both 
will require successful organizational adaptations. Yogi Berra was correct in saying that it is 
tough to make predictions, especially about the future, but the recent past is a good starting point 
for judging the necessity of any prospective adaptive capacities. 
                                                 
996 Ibid. 
997 Ibid, p. 13. 
998 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
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8.3 THE STABILITY OF THE LEGACY—THE NEED FOR “BALANCE” AND A 
RETURN TO “FULL SPECTRUM CAPABILITIES” 
The U.S. Army’s legacy is one of being prepared to conduct HIC missions in support of MCO 
against highly regular and conventional foes.  The stability of this legacy and the acceptance of 
risk at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict contribute to a reduction in organizational 
capacities for adaptation to other threat organizations and for other missions.  That this legacy 
should still have relevance—state-based conventional enemies have not disappeared—and still 
reverberate through the culture, doctrine, and institution’s memory is no surprise.  That the U.S. 
Army has been unswerving in its official references to being full spectrum capable, despite 
experiential evidence to the contrary, is no surprise either.  What is surprising is that U.S. Army 
documents reflect that there: 1) is still an assumption of an even divide between threat types, a 
Scylla of non-state adversaries and a Charybdis of state-based enemies with the U.S. Army 
inescapably stuck in between; 2) is still an assumption that MCOs are a if not the dominant 
future mission despite overwhelming recent experience to the contrary and in light of defense 
strategies indicating at least the recognition that there is a range of threats that need to be 
addressed and; 3) that there is considerable discussion of a need to ‘re-balance’ the force for a 
return to legacy operations and a de-emphasis of irregular missions in force planning, doctrine, 
and training.  Given the U.S. Army’s understandable historical penchant for combat operations it 
is difficult not to assume that rebalancing does not really imply a rebalance but an unbalancing 
back towards conventional and preferred mission sets and a divergence away from true full 
spectrum capabilities. 
Sean Davis presents the rebalancing debate in terms that are reminiscent of full spectrum 
capability discussions in the 1990s insofar as there remains a distinct and obvious boundary 
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between combat and all other operations.  This is coupled with the curiously defunct, yet 
accepted notion that a combat capable force can succeed in all missions and that any other type 
of force is something less than satisfactory.  “One argument against COIN is the ‘readiness 
issue’; or by focusing on the non-kinetic COIN operations, U.S. troops are unable to kinetically 
defend the nation.  This issue advocates that we can fail in COIN operations and still survive as a 
nation.  Conversely, failure in Major Combat Operations (MCO) once results in our nation 
perishing.  Certainly, this has been true in the past but not so much today…Furthermore, is it 
possible that the readiness issue is a false dilemma?  That in developing COIN warfare the 
military could actually enhance our nation’s ability to fight MCO.”999
Conversely, Jeff McCoy argues that the U.S. Army, by having a multi-capable force, is 
accepting risk by focusing on the lesser—although more frequent and real—of two dichotomous 
threat types and that this error, if not corrected, is likely to have catastrophic consequences.  He 
contends that the U.S. Army has been forced to “adapt to defeat the current foe in 2008 which is 
often a motivated, super-empowered non-state actor.  But failure to be ready to fight the next 
war, potentially a decisive, conventional battle defending the interests if not the borders of the 
nation will have consequences beyond the scope of fighting terrorists or insurgents in small, 
‘gap’ areas of the world.”
 
1000
                                                 
999 Davis, Sean P., Making the Spoon: Analyzing and Employing Stability Power in Counterinsurgency 
Operations, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, 5 November 2007, p. 16. 
  Where this next war will occur is somewhat of a mystery.  Equally 
1000 McCoy, Jeff, Death of the Westphalia State System: Implications for Future Military Employment, 
School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 
April 2008, p. 42.  Diano argues, “The Army is not training full-spectrum operations as directed in the NSS, NDS, 
QDR, the Army Campaign Plan and ARFORGEN.  Regardless of the clear mandate from these documents the Army 
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mysterious is what combatant nations will be involved.  What is typically ignored in this 
argument is that threat organizations that are real, documented, and pervasive can manifest 
almost anywhere and with very little, if any, lead time revealed to their targets and can cause 
catastrophic damage.  What is also ignored is that other more conventional enemies are not 
currently on the march.  Furthermore, the amount of lead time conventional enemies will need to 
develop forces capable of inflicting damage on the interests or borders of the United States is 
great and these machinations will be largely visible.  Creating, let alone deploying, such an 
apocalyptic force is difficult to hide, can be deterred by conventional means, and can be 
significantly degraded if not defeated by existing strategic forces.1001
                                                                                                                                                             
is focused on training for stability operations and is losing expertise in traditional offensive and defensive operations 
which maintained the ability to defeat traditional maneuver battle threats.  These perishable skills are what had been 
trained at the CTCs prior to 2002, such as battalion on battalion force-on-force missions at NTC and JMRC.”  
Diano, Oscar F., The Combat Training Centers: Training for Full-Spectrum Operations?, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 June 2007, p. 40.  Linking the defeat of non-state organizations 
with strategic consequence has been a problem for politicians and has contributed to the loss of domestic support.  
See, Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, Op Cit, pp. 201-202. 
 
1001 This is the position of Secretary Gates, “”It is true that the United States would be hard-pressed to fight 
a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice, but as I have asked before, where on earth would we do 
that?  U.S. air and sea forces have ample untapped striking power should the need arise to deter or punish 
aggression—whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or across the Taiwan Strait.”  Gates, Robert M., 
Op Cit, p. 32. 
 478 
8.3.1  Balance, Full Spectrum Capabilities, and Modernization 
The definition of the term full spectrum is difficult to discern given the differing qualities 
that are attributed to this capability.  In one sense, being full spectrum capable refers to the 
capacity for fighting future combat-centric wars.  “To reset our force [because of the imbalance 
caused by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan] we must prepare our soldiers, units, and equipment 
for future deployments and other contingencies…retrain our Soldiers to accomplish the full 
spectrum of missions they will be expected to accomplish.”1002  In another sense, being full 
spectrum capable means being capable of fighting a range of threat organizations in a multitude 
of future environments.  “Because a return to the Army’s tradition of ‘small wars’ appears to be 
the primary characteristic of current and future operations, a transformation process that relies on 
long-range destruction of targets seems anything but ‘full-spectrum.’”1003  Although there is no 
published definition for full spectrum capability, a definition exists for full spectrum dominance 
that decidedly still suggests that combat capability neatly and fluidly translates into full spectrum 
capability:  Full Spectrum Dominance—“The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, 
maritime, and space domains and information environment that permits the conduct of joint 
operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference.”1004
                                                 
1002 Geren, Pete and George W. Casey, Op Cit, p. 8. 
  One need not hire a 
haruspex to divine that the official use of the term full spectrum does not really refer to the range 
1003 Calhoun, Mark T., Complexity and Innovation: Army Transformation and the Reality of War, School 
of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, pp. 
66-67. 
1004 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Op Cit. 
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of operations on this spectrum but only the narrower band(s) of combat.  Prevailing official 
wisdom and official proclamations indicate that skills falling outside of this band necessarily 
detract from full spectrum capabilities while skill within this band is transcendent and enables 
full spectrum capabilities.  Therefore, the legacy of mistaking combat capable and full spectrum 
capable endures. 
The term balance, related to but not yet synonymous with full spectrum, is nearly as 
indecipherable as is the term full spectrum.  On one hand, the current force, designed for HIC in 
MCO, is arguably unbalanced in favor of short-duration conflicts involving almost pure combat 
capabilities at the expense of future war-making capacity.  “Today’s wars are being fought with 
armed forces designed in the 1980s to excel in a different kind of combat—short-term, high-
intensity combat that was expected to lead to rapid and complete victory or defeat in one major 
theater.  Priority was given to getting soldiers and tanks into the fight quickly in the belief that 
support elements, headquarters, and reinforcements could follow more slowly.  But this priority 
is out of sync with today’s needs and has created an imbalanced active-duty force that faces 
grave challenges in sustaining long-term deployments and carrying out its varied, numerous 
missions.”1005  On the other hand, as Admiral Mullen argues, the current force is unbalanced in 
favor of long-duration conflicts involving everything but combat capabilities at the expense of 
future war-making capacity.  “The pace of ongoing operations has prevented our forces from 
training for full-spectrum operations and impacts our ability to be ready to counter future threats.  
This lack of balance is unsustainable in the long-term.  We must balance the strategic depth 
requirement for long-term national security against the pace of on-going operations.”1006
                                                 
1005 Donnelly, Thomas and Frederick W. Kagan, Op Cit, p. 142. 
  It is 
1006 Mullen, Mike, CJCS Guidance for 2008-2009, 18 November 2008, p. 2. 
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supposed then that current conflicts are anomalies that will not be repeated—either by choice or 
because these enemies will not rematerialize elsewhere---strategy has changed or will 
significantly change from its present form,1007 and that the future is full of enemies radically 
dissimilar than those currently populating the international security environment.1008
The amount of time that the U.S. Army spent tactically adapting to achieve goals and 
objectives in the simultaneous full spectrum environment of Iraq indicates just how unprepared 
(or out of balance) the Army was for full spectrum operations despite claims to the contrary.  
Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, organizational inputs and outputs were almost exclusively tied 
to the conduct of combat to the detriment of any other conceivable or actual operations.  This is 
the nature of adaptation: if an organization is perfectly suited to accomplishing one objective 
(i.e., combat), then it is inherently less suited to accomplishing other, differing objectives (i.e., 
the rest of the spectrum).  Paradoxically, the U.S. Army’s 2008 Modernization Strategy flips this 
 
                                                 
1007 This is unlikely.  Democracy promotion—a derivative of the Democratic Peace Theory—and all of the 
attendant military sub-tasks associated with democracy promotion (to include substantial stability operations 
dependent upon or separate from combat operations) are historically bound to the vision and strategies of 
consecutive U.S. administrations.  The rationale is thus, “Because democracies are the most responsible members of 
the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening 
international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and 
extending peace and prosperity.”  Bush, George W., The National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 
September 2006, p. 2. 
1008 “Iraq, the Army’s main effort for the foreseeable future, has been described by some as a warfighting 
anomaly, essentially a problem to be dealt with before we move on to more conventional threats.  Unfortunately, this 
seems to be the prevailing opinion among those authoring the QDR.  The technologically enabled force they 
envision is well suited to fight cold war threats and ill suited to combat insurgencies or conduct other stabilization 
and reconstruction missions.”  Harper, David, Op Cit, p. 95. 
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relationship on its head and argues that expanding spectral capabilities to meet strategic 
objectives has made the force less full spectrum capable.  The authors contend that “The pace of 
operations coupled with insufficient time between deployments is forcing the Army to focus on 
counterinsurgency training and equipping to the detriment of preparing for full spectrum 
operations.”1009  The Modernization Strategy suggests that the U.S. Army’s efforts to become a 
full spectrum capable force actually diminished its full spectrum abilities by thinning its 
capacities for engaging in HIC.  There is some truth to this claim.  As Admiral Mullen argues, 
“The imbalance between our readiness for future global missions and the wars we are fighting 
today limits our capacity to respond to future contingencies, and offers potential adversaries, 
both state and non-state, incentives to act.”1010  There is also quite a bit of truth to the argument 
that were the U.S. Army not so fundamentally incapable of conducting full spectrum operations 
on the eve of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, such a radical adaptation would not had to have taken 
place and the force would not be out of balance, however balance is defined.  Additionally, it is 
highly likely that potential future adversaries learned quite a bit from this process.1011
                                                 
1009 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army’s Modernization Strategy, 2008, p. 7. 
  It should 
also be noted that combat is only one band of the spectrum of conflict and that many other bands, 
tied to force and mission requirements, exist and the capabilities required for their execution 
have expanded dramatically in the course of recent conflicts. 
1010 Mullen, Mike, Op Cit, p. 3. 
1011 Fonetnot, Gregory, et al, Op Cit, p. 387. 
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8.3.2 The Legacy of Transformation 
In order to return to a ‘balance’ and regain ‘full spectrum capability’ the U.S. Army, as 
part of its sustained Transformation program, continued to develop the FCS.  There is still a 
prevailing assumption that by designing the right type of force, with the right kind of equipment, 
the U.S. Army will accomplish a structural transference of full spectrum capability against any 
enemy, whether state or non-state in character, and in any environment.  In this respect, FCS 
assumed two critical roles:  it provided consummate full spectrum capabilities and was the key to 
force rebalancing.  In their 2008 submission to the U.S. Congress on the posture of the U.S. 
Army, former Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and General George Casey used the term 
balance 23 times when referring to what the U.S. Army needed to do and how the FCS would 
help accomplish this objective.  They argued that modernization “is the key to enhancing our 
capabilities and maintaining a technological advantage over any enemy we face.”1012  
Additionally, they argued that the FCS is “the core of our modernization effort and will provide 
our Soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision 
and lethality, and enhanced survivability.  These improved capabilities cannot be achieved by 
upgrading current vehicles and systems.”1013
A reminiscent and recurring supposition in this argument is that a technological edge has 
not already been achieved over non-state adversaries (or for that matter, state-based adversaries) 
  These arguments linking modernization and 
capability, however detached from experience, are not substantively different than those 
advocated early in the transformative years of the near post-Cold War era discussed previously. 
                                                 
1012 Geren, Pete and George W. Casey, Op Cit, p. 5. 
1013 Ibid. 
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and that soldiers will receive an “unparalleled understanding” of any environment via a 
significant upgrade in equipment and materials.  Given that an incredible and unbridgeable 
chasm separated the technological capacities of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
U.S. Army forces (even at the tactical level) and that soldiers did not have—for a very long time, 
if ever—an unparalleled understanding of their environment or their enemies, the assumption 
that the FCS or any other modernization program would provide this capacity is puzzling.  
Equally as puzzling is the assumption that the majority of enemies facing the United States are 
interested in engaging in a technological arms race reminiscent of those occurring during the 
Cold War.  This assumption makes much more sense if recent experience is rejected and non-
state adversaries are ignored.  The determinative calculus of what the FCS and any similarly 
structured modernization program provides defense against balances much better when future, 
near-peer conventional forces are substituted for technologically crude non-state actors.  Not 
surprisingly, and despite claims to the contrary, the 2005 modernization plan describes the FCS 
as optimized for offensive operations.1014
Conveniently recalculating enemies is the province of professionals and analysts alike.  
“After six years of essentially waging an irregular war of global scope, the U.S. military has 
adapted at great costs in sacrifice and treasure to the exigencies of counterinsurgency…but 
incredulously, there are pundits already at work who aim to reverse these hard won changes 
because they prefer that the U.S. military revert to a big regular warfare focus.”
 
1015
                                                 
1014 Johnson, David E., Op Cit, p. 206. 
  But U.S. 
defense strategy and emergent threat organizations have yet to accommodate the U.S. Army’s 
1015 Cassidy, Robert M., Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars Versus Non-State 
Irregulars, Baltic Security & Defence Review, Volume 10, 2008, p. 77. 
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preferences.  It is apparently much easier to ignore strategic requirements and recent experience 
and instead claim that the planned combat-centric future force will be full spectrum capable and 
that adversaries will be compliantly doctrinal and will knowingly and willfully subject 
themselves to vanquished status.1016  “The fundamental problem with the U.S. military’s 
aversion to counterinsurgency and stability operations is that it has confused the undesirability of 
these missions with an actual ability to avoid them.”1017
Fundamentally, the argument for rebalancing to achieve full spectrum capabilities rests 
less on strategic requirements and the nature of the enemy and more on the fear of the 
catastrophic—which, inconveniently, has morphed in defense strategy from a singular Cold War 
notion of a state-based competitor to a nefarious and amorphous multi-capable non-state 
organization—and the preferences of the service chiefs.  “The principal rationale for the 
reluctance to reduce the emphasis on heavy forces in the standing army is the fear of being 
unprepared for a classical-style mechanized war.”
 
1018
                                                 
1016 The strategic requirement for creating or restoring peace is has not changed since at least the 1990s.  
“US forces’ continued roles in interventionary operations must be accepted as a given.  Operationally, this means the 
central objective of US military intervention in the post-Cold War era will be to restore peace as the normal 
condition.”  Johnson, Wray R., Op Cit, p. 73. 
 Despite having been engaged in 
significantly demanding counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and providing support to 
other non-combat related operations across the globe, the U.S. Army is still predisposed to the 
combat-centric strategic visions of the 1990s and to the Transformation program spawned by 
1017 Ucko, David, “Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,” Orbis, 
Spring 2008, p. 291. 
1018 Arquilla, John, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military, Ivan R. Dee, 
Chicago, 2008, p. 45. 
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these visions.  And, as in the 1990s, the U.S. Army is receiving copious guidance from the other 
service chiefs for how it should continue to transform its forces, without regard to likely 
adversaries and the requirements necessary for defeating these enemies.1019  “There are hints of a 
desire to return to the 1990s focus on wars against larger and more conventional enemies in the 
wake of the painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Service chiefs are increasingly hostile 
to sustaining the current operations in Iraq because they are straining the ground forces and 
drawing resources from the air and sea forces…It is time to stop talking about the relative 
priority of conventional forces, asymmetric capabilities, long-range strike, special forces, and 
other structural characteristics of the armed forces and time to start talking about enemies, 
threats, challenges, and requirements.”1020  Potential or possible enemies have once again 
replaced the real and probable enemies that the U.S. Army was supposedly transformed to face 
over a decade ago.  “The U.S. military was redesigned in the 1990s to face numerous possible 
threats at a time when it was thought that we had no enemies…any discussions of defense reform 
that attempt to skip over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and design armed forces for the 
‘postwar’ period are worse than useless.”1021
                                                 
1019 Accordingly, as Bennet writes, “He [Mullen] wrote that the military’s combatant commanders and the 
uniformed chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines share his worries about the reset and training 
‘imbalance.’”  Bennett, John T., “Mullen: Iraq War Leaves U.S. Military Vulnerable,” Army Times, 1 December 
2008, p. 12. 
  Yet, the FCS program continued regardless of 
strategic trajectories and evidence severely undermining the premises of this program. 
1020 Donnelly, Thomas and Frederick W. Kagan, Op Cit, p. 13. 
1021 Ibid, p. 16. 
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Kimball describes an ideological myopia surrounding the selected Transformation and 
force modernization programs embodied by the FCS.  “FCS promises to revolutionize warfare 
with a ‘system of systems’ approach, tied together with a seamless network ‘that allows’ 
seamless delivery of data ‘in the heat of combat…That such a ‘seamless’ environment rarely 
exists in the controlled environment of the Combat Training Centers and never in the realities of 
combat is not permitted to counter the argument.  In one video scenario outlining possible uses 
of the FCS, non-line-of-sight (NLOS) fires always land exactly when and where they are needed, 
enemies obligingly separate themselves from the civilian population, and supplies arrive exactly 
on time, negating the need for basic loads.  None of this borne out by the current operating 
environment.”1022  Ucko argues similarly that despite recent history, the U.S. Army’s force 
structure continued on a linear path remaining optimized for HIC.  “Even though a number of 
steps taken by DoD improved the ground forces’ suitability for counterinsurgency, their primary 
aim was to improve the military’s usability—and its anticipated ‘use’ remained major combat 
operations.  Despite all the benefits inherent to modularization, for example, the Army’s new 
unit, the brigade combat team was designed primarily for conventional combat.”1023  And, 
notwithstanding a compelling requirement for true full spectrum capabilities in various national 
and defense security strategies, “this outlook has persisted despite the absence of a near-peer 
competitor who might challenge the U.S. military in high-intensity warfare.”1024
                                                 
1022 Kimball, Raymond A., Op Cit, p 21. 
 
1023 Ucko, David H., The New Counterinsurgency Era, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 
2009, p. 173. 
1024 Ibid. 
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Recognizing that the FCS program embodied pre-9/11 preferences rather than reflecting 
current strategic realities, and despite proponents’ claims that “FCS has the full spectrum of 
combat capabilities and functions ‘built in’”1025 a compromise of sorts was made: force 
modernization would continue but the FCS program would be cancelled.  Because of cost 
overruns and because Secretary Gates “expressed a specific concern that the portion of the FCS 
program to field new manned combat vehicles did not adequately reflect the lessons of 
counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan” the Future Combat 
Systems Brigade Combat Team (FCS BCT) was terminated.1026  The FCS was officially 
rescinded through an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) that also disrupted the 
development of the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) so prominently displayed in videos 
supporting the program.  To replace the FCS and to supposedly achieve full spectrum 
dominance, the U.S. Army is instead pursuing a BCT modernization program that is more 
“versatile” and will “leverage mobility, protection, information, and precision fires to conduct 
effective operations across the spectrum of conflict.”1027  Like the FCS, the BCT modernization 
program is supposed to support the Army’s imperatives by bringing the Army “back into balance 
by the year 2011.”1028
                                                 
1025 TACOM, Future Combat Systems, TACOM, FCS Case 04-076, 26 August 2004. 
 
1026 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Future Combat System (FCS) Program 
Transitions to Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization, U.S. Department of Defense, 23 June 2009.  See also, 
Osborn, Kris and John Bennett, “FCS Takes Big Hit,” The Army Times, 20 April 2009, p. 8.  Scales concurs, 
“Dominance in the close tactical fight is dependent as much on human as technological factors.”  Scales, Robert H., 
“Infantry and National Priorities,” Armed Forces Journal, December 2007. 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army’s Modernization Strategy, Memorandum, 2008. 
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The BCT modernization program, although it expands the size and inherent 
interoperability of the U.S. Army’s combat systems, is not a significant departure from previous 
transformative visions predating the attacks of 9/11.  Arquilla contends that “While there was 
agreement about the need for more units, once again there was spirited debate about just what 
size and shape they should be.  And once again the traditionalists triumphed, and the lessons of 
Enduring Freedom were neglected.  Instead of a radical redesign centered on small units, closely 
interconnected with friendly indigenous forces, the choice was made to create more brigades—
albeit slightly different looking ones, in the form of ‘brigade combat teams’ (BCTs).”1029  Instead 
of applying the many lessons learned from tactical organizational adaptation in Iraq and 
elsewhere regarding the capabilities that accrue to smaller units empowered with technology and 
the freedom to maneuver independently, the U.S. Army remains wedded to the concept of larger, 
combat oriented tactical structures.  And, despite experiences and revolutionary tactical 
innovations, the continued research and development of advanced digitization, sensors, and 
communications are not intended to expand the capabilities of the adaptive force that has 
emerged over the past 7 years but instead are intended to revitalize the force as it has existed for 
decades.  “Many in the Pentagon hope these developments will keep big units strong, even 
though every technological advance along these lines is actually empowering smaller 
formations.”1030
                                                 
1029 Arquilla, John, Op Cit, p. 43. 
  If the U.S. Army switched the B (in BCT) from brigade to battalion or if the 
Army truly believed in the power of networking displayed in Iraq, then it would be possible to 
strengthen smaller units of more utility in current and likely future operations, regardless of the 
foe faced.  As Arquilla argues, “Here the greatest gains could be made, conveying to the U.S. 
1030 Ibid, p. 54. 
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Army a hitherto undreamed of operational capacity.  In the war against widely distributed small 
terror cells, this new organizational structure would give us much more ability to seize and hold 
the initiative, mounting raid after raid against their training camps and their units in the 
field.”1031
 The U.S. Army’s vision of future war is still bound to the legacy of the institution even 
though, as Peters argues, “There is not a single enemy in existence or on the horizon willing to 
play the victim to the military we continue to build at crippling expense.”
  This capacity could also prove effective against slow moving and state-based HIC 
forces as well.  But any shift towards a multi-capable force is unlikely as the Army continues to 
pursue rebalancing through its Transformation program. 
1032  This legacy 
endured, almost unscathed, throughout OEF and OIF and will survive well into the future.  “In 
its budget requests DoD continued to pour money into costly programs with questionable value 
in today’s and tomorrow’s likely campaigns.  Although the extrabudgetary supplemental 
appropriations did help to cover the costs of ongoing operations, such funds were never intended 
to develop a general capability to conduct counterinsurgency.  Most disturbingly, even these 
supplementals were at times used to fund conventional weapons systems unrelated to the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.”1033
                                                 
1031 Ibid, p. 47. 
  These weapons systems are more powerful, networked, and 
interoperable with other U.S. Army combat systems but do little to contribute to full spectrum 
capabilities.  The real intent of their designers is to integrate higher levels of firepower into more 
mobile combat units.  Accomplishing this feat obviates the need for echeloned support from 
1032 Peters, Ralph, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” Weekly Standard, 6 February 2006. 
1033 Ucko, David H., The New Counterinsurgency Era, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 
2009, p. 173. 
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traditional corps and division fires and support units.  The end result is combat capable brigades 
operating independently or in tandem without tether to cumbersome and largely static higher 
headquarters support elements and logistical bases. 
Macgregor contends that the concept of breaking down larger combat units into smaller 
combat units—from division to brigade—does little to advance any real transformative effort: 
“chopping up the existing division into smaller pieces does not change the current warfighting 
paradigm, reduce or eliminate echelons of unneeded C2, or advance jointness on the operational 
level where it must be seamless.”1034  The standard division configuration being replaced by a 
new Modular Force1035
 
 of BCTs is merely a reshuffling of the deck chairs.  As Crane argues: 
“The current BCT structure where you have this division to fight the HIC in the 
Fulda Gap and then you modularized the pieces for it and you end up with BCTs 
that can do a great job of fighting in the Fulda Gap.  That is what they are 
designed to do.  They have a lot of combat power in them.”1036
 
 
                                                 
1034 MacGregor, Douglas, Army Transformation: Implications for the Future, Testimony before the House 
Armed Services Committee, 15 July 2004. 
1035 The Modular Force consists of the Unit of Execution y (Uey), the Unit of Execution x (Uex), and the 
Brigade Combat Team.  “These three levels of command and control are equivalent to an Army, Corps and Division, 
and Brigade or Regiment.  Additionally, Units of Action (UAs) at the theater (Uey level) is recognized as part of the 
Modular Army.”  Parks, Timothy D., Full Spectrum Forces or Special Purpose Forces? A Strategic Decision, School 
of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 May 
2005, p. 29. 
1036 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Crane, Conrad C., Personal Interview, 5 November 2008. 
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Divisions are effectively being collapsed into brigades with greater combat capabilities than the 
typical legacy brigade.  “The centerpiece of the Modular Force is the consolidated redesign of 
the Army’s various BCTs into 3 standard fixed designs: Heavy BCT, Infantry BCT, and Stryker 
BCT.  Design features include: only two combined arms maneuver battalions; a reconnaissance, 
surveillance and target acquisition battalion; a smaller, but organic artillery battalion; an organic 
forward support battalion; and a brigade troops battalion that contains some additional combat 
support such as military police, engineers, chemical and military intelligence.  In general, the 
BCT is a fixed organization optimized for combat operations.”1037  Ironically, the modular BCT 
might be less capable of conducting full spectrum operations because of how CS and CSS units 
are being trimmed to make the BCT smaller thus retaining scant organic support capabilities.  
The trend towards making the U.S. Army almost solely combat capable (with the reduction of 
CS and CSS units and the progressive rise of contractors to fill the gap) continues.  “Confronted 
with an unaffordable structure and tough decisions, the Army is again resorting to its old ways.  
The current plan reduces the number of support brigades in the active force in order to retain the 
full 43 active component BCTs.  Consequently, the Army’s active structure is designed to 
provide the combat forces necessary for two near-simultaneous major combat operations, but 
without the capacity to concurrently conduct progressive stabilization.”1038
The creation of the modularized BCT within the modularized force seems to belie the 
doctrinal logic supporting its creation.  The new Field Manual 3.0, Operations, ostensibly raises 
the importance of stability operations to the same level as offensive and defensive operations but 
it is doubtful that modularized BCTs will be nearly as capable of achieving similar levels of all 
 
                                                 
1037 Watson, Brian G., Op Cit, p. 12. 
1038 Ibid, p. 16. 
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three types of operations.  Stability, by design, will take a distant third position in the ordering of 
capabilities achievable by the BCT, otherwise there would be more organic stability capabilities 
in these units.  Crane contends that: 
 
“If we are really going to put stability operations at the same level as combat 
operations then we should have more capability for stability operations in these 
BCTs.”1039
 
 
Watson concurs: “The present course of the Modular Force effort seems, however, to discount 
the importance of generating the viable stabilization capability that is essential to future 
expeditionary campaigns.  Specifically, Army Modularity fails in three areas: 1) it has not 
focused on providing the modular and scalable force pool of stabilization capabilities that can 
augment brigade combat teams; 2) it does not provide the land force with a multifunctional 
brigade capable of exercising mission command for area-wide stabilization efforts to free 
forward BCTs for maneuver; and 3) it does not generate an adequate mix of modular brigades 
within the active and reserve components given the characteristics of future land campaigns.”1040
                                                 
1039 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Crane, Conrad, C., Personal Interview, 5 November 2008.  See also, Watson, 
Brian G., Op Cit. 
 
1040 Ibid, p. 12. 
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8.3.3 Stability Operations and the Legacy Mindset 
Visibly, the legacy mindset still weighs heavily on strategic thought and influences force 
planning and structuring.  The stability of the legacy is evidenced in almost slavish alliance and 
partnership retention premised on relationships formed during the Cold War, which have much 
less relevance in the post-9/11 international security environment as former partners’ interests 
and capabilities have evolved on different trajectories and as threat perceptions have changed 
dramatically.1041  The stability of the legacy is also evidenced—in the form of desired capability 
that would free U.S. Army forces for combat operations—in the assumption that the much 
ballyhooed and oft cited as a panacea “interagency” process will fix itself and will replace the 
U.S. Army in the role of strategic conductor of durable stability operations.  Where fixes haven’t 
been made, the problem has been structurally ignored.  “Much of our government and 
interagency seems to be in a state of denial about the requirements needed to adapt to modern 
warfare.”1042
                                                 
1041 See, Daskal, Steven E., Changing the Paradigm of the War, 7 November 2003, Accessed 18 October 
2008, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/daskal_changing_paradigms.htm. 
  It has even been suggested that legacy divisions, or their combat-centric BCT 
replacements, can be retained if the U.S. Army were to create some form of constabulary 
stability divisions.  There are five obvious drawbacks to the creation of stability divisions: 1) 
even 2 new stability divisions would not have been sufficient in Iraq; 2) stability divisions, 
although they would absorb an enormous amount of personnel, would not be anywhere near as 
capable of conducting MCO as regular units; 3) they would be almost constantly deployed with 
1042 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Stephen M. Smith, Op Cit, p. 3.  Interagency projects can often have deleterious 
effects or result in pyrrhic victories.  See, Cragin, Kim and Peter Chalk, Op Cit, 2003. 
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no substitutable counterparts, 4) as the requirement for simultaneous full spectrum operations in 
Iraq demonstrated, stability is no longer a singular and sequential mission and; 5) since 
operational phases have less and less relevance in the post-9/11 security environment and since 
threat organizations don’t seem to respect the sequential conceptualization of combat success 
then withdrawal paradigm, it would be very difficult indeed to determine when stability divisions 
or brigades would take over for traditional combat units, or vice versa:1043
 
 
“Some people ask: shouldn’t we have constabulary divisions or COIN divisions?  
I say that you have to have organizations that can do multiple tasks because the 
enemy is going to shift on the ground.  Even if you have a constabulary division 
that is trained to do peacekeeping missions, you never have enough.  So, when 
that unit’s rotation is up you have to replace them and then you have to put a 
conventional unit in there anyways.  You might as well have multi-purpose 
units.”1044
 
 
In the current international security environment, constabulary stability divisions would be less 
useful than a multi-capable force, would not be capable of conducting simultaneous full 
                                                 
1043 For a discussion of the utility in creating a stability force see, Andrews, Frank L, A Stability Force: The 
Missing Link in Achieving Full-Spectrum Dominance, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 2004, p. 49.  See also John Nagl’s discussion of and 
recommendation for the creation of a large, standing advisor corps, Nagl, John, Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s 
Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps, Center for a New American Security, June 2007. 
1044 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Crane, Conrad, Personal Interview, 5 November 2008. 
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spectrum operations, and would prove much easier (because of their limited capabilities) for 
adversaries to adapt to than a multi-purpose force. 
Stability operations have always been subordinated to, if not outright rejected in favor of, 
combat operations and the U.S. Army has continually sought to shift responsibility for these 
operations onto erstwhile allies or to a hapless or otherwise nonexistent interagency consortium.  
Inevitably, these failures lead to serious discussions of constabulary or stability units of various 
stripes.  When these options are cognitively and structurally exhausted or are proven impossible 
to implement—as was the case in Iraq—military planners then try to engage in these operations 
indirectly or through host-nation operators.  Former Secretary Rumsfeld aptly describes how this 
was supposed to work in Iraq: “Anyone who takes those three words and thinks it means the 
United States should clear and the United States should hold and the United States should build 
doesn’t understand the situation.  It is the Iraqis’ country.  They’ve got 28 million people there.  
They are clearing, they are holding, they are building.  They’re going to be the ones doing the 
reconstruction in that country…and we do not have—with 160,000 troops there—the idea that 
we could do that is so far from reality.  Nor was there any intention that we should do that.”1045  
Where host-nation forces don’t exist, military planners then try to create them from whole cloth, 
usually in the most rapid fashion possible (as was tried in Iraq up until and through the issuance 
of the NSVI and is now suggested for Afghanistan).1046
                                                 
1045 Rumsfeld, Donald H. and Peter Pace, Department of Defense News Transcript, 29 November 2005. 
  But instead of this job falling to the 
historically most qualified organization in the services, SF, this responsibility inescapably falls 
upon regular forces that have the least (until recently) historical experience in developing cadres 
1046 The 2006 QDR suggests that insurgents and terrorists could be combated by local security forces 
trained and equipped by the U.S. military, particularly its SF. 
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of ‘host-nation’ fighters.  The perpetual shift away from full spectrum capabilities, across the 
government but most acutely in the U.S. Army, has paradoxically corrupted even the possibility 
of transferring responsibility for stability operations to any other agency, be it foreign or 
domestic.  Strategy demands various stability skill sets and missions regardless of service 
preferences and whether or not host-nation forces exist or are even available. 
In spite of the strategic need and despite not wanting the task of providing stability and 
doing everything possible to shift this responsibility to existent but incapable agencies or non-
existent partners, the DOD and, because of its size and terrestrial responsibilities,1047
                                                 
1047 “The primary functions of the Army, as outlined in Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, are to 
organize, equip, and train forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land.”  It is hard to 
determine if the use of the term ‘combat’ is meant to include stability operations or not.  But since stability 
operations, however relegated as an afterthought, are part of full spectrum operations, and since it is the U.S. Army’s 
responsibility to be able to conduct ‘sustained’ operations of all sorts on land, they must be included.  See England, 
Gordon, Op Cit, p. xi.  Additionally, “The United States is currently engaged in two large-scale 
counterinsurgency/counterterrorism wars and maintains small but long-term presences in two peacekeeping 
operations (Kosovo and the Sinai).  It is committed to a long-term deterrence/engagement mission in South Korea, 
and is engaged in global counterterrorism effort against al Qaeda.  The sum of these ongoing deployments weighs 
disproportionately on the ground forces.”  Donnelly, Thomas and Frederick W. Kagan, Op Cit, pp. 37-38. 
 the U.S. 
Army, are stuck with this mission.  As Ucko argues, “history has shown that DoD’s preference 
for indirect engagement in irregular operations has not precluded the eventual deployment of 
U.S. troops, by the president, for stability and counterinsurgency operations.  A failure to 
internalize this historically consistent fact has contributed to the U.S. military being less than 
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ready for such missions.”1048  The indirect approach, although compelling if an organization is 
uninterested in or incapable of conducting anything other than combat operations, is inherently 
flawed:  “First, there is only so much that can be achieved through the deployment of SOF: Their 
numbers and—in the case of the U.S. military—markedly combat-oriented disposition render 
these elite forces ill suited to the sustained provision of security in contested areas and to the 
engagement in ‘softer’ advisory and nonmilitary tasks, particularly if on a large scale.  Second, 
the employment of local security forces as surrogates clearly relies on such forces’ existence and 
their ability to conduct operations as wanted.”1049
                                                 
1048 Ucko, David H., The New Counterinsurgency Era, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 
2009, p. 175. 
  Thus, using SF for this purpose is an unlikely 
solution.  Even more damning to the indirect approach as a solution is the fact that the U.S. 
Army gets tasked with stability and counterinsurgency operations in areas specifically because 
no indigenous security forces exist.  This was true in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and just about 
anywhere else where full spectrum capabilities were needed and is likely to be true in future 
operations as well.  Enduring legacy preferences and visions have put the U.S. Army (and thus 
the whole of U.S. forces) in the bizarre position of having to conduct a task that it has done 
everything in its power to avoid but still has responsibility for despite having less capacity than 
ever for its completion. “Today, the U.S. military is the only national organization able to 
conduct some of the most critical tasks associated with rebuilding war-torn or failed nations.  
Indeed, since the end of the cold war, the capabilities of some of the interagency organizations 
1049 Ibid. 
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that have traditionally played a large role in nation-building have decreased dramatically, even as 
the requirement to conduct these operations has multiplied.”1050
8.3.4 Transformation of the Legacy 
 
The promises of the Transformation program never bore fruit when exposed to actual operations 
against real adversaries in uncontrolled environments.  “This image of war transformed derived 
from—but also meshed with and seemed to validate—the technology-hyped mood prevailing 
during the final decade of the twentieth century.  By common consent, the defining 
characteristics of this age were speed, control, and choice.  Information empowered the 
individual.  It reduced the prevalence of chance and surprise and random occurrences.  
Everything relevant could be known and, if known, could be taken into account.  In the computer 
age, even when something ‘crashed,’ no one got hurt and nothing was damaged.  The expected 
result was to lessen, if not eliminate, uncertainty, risk, waste, and error and to produce quantum 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness.”1051
                                                 
1050 Chiarelli, Peter W. and Stephen M. Smith, Op Cit, pp. 6-7. 
  Although information did empower the 
individual in OIF and OEF, chance, surprise, seemingly random occurrences, uncertainty, and 
risk all prevailed upon operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Efficiency and effectiveness were 
reduced as the Army transformed away from strategic requirements, away from full spectrum 
capability, and along a glide path towards an imagined conventional combat utopia.  Even in the 
wake of vast institutional experience in simultaneous full spectrum operations requiring mass 
1051 Bacevich, Andrew J., The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 21. 
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organizational adaptation, the legacy and Transformation still persist.  Organizational design has 
only changed in the margins and really only for the enhancement of combat capabilities.  
Successful experimentation and innovation in the field has been rejected for the institutional 
canon of doctrine supporting large units functioning in combat roles. 
In discussing Transformation Krepinevich recommends field exercises and 
experimentation to identify the proper mix of legacy systems and innovations derived from these 
systems: “to identify the proper mix of new and legacy systems required to meet emerging 
challenges, one would expect the administration to give new life, and far greater emphasis, to 
Service and joint transformation exercises oriented principally at the operational level of 
warfare.”1052
                                                 
1052 Krepinevich, Andrew, “The Bush Administration’s Call for Defense Transformation: A Congressional 
Guide,” CSBA, 21 June 2002. 
  This is exactly what occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan as operational and tactical 
level operations occurred on a regular basis in the latter and a daily basis in the former.  But once 
presented with the results of this experimentation, Transformation proceeded along the same 
course with little interruption.  Doctrine, force structure, and the interpretation of strategic 
requirements have all suffered as a result.  “History shows a more balanced approach would 
combine the search for improved technologic capabilities with equal vigor in improved 
operational and organizational design, honed experimentation and critical self-assessment.  
Instead, Army Transformation has resulted in the migration of future concepts to current 
doctrine, force structure changes are currently driving the need to create more units to satisfy 
overseas commitments; the few experiments that occur are manipulated to make future vision a 
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current ‘reality,’ and critical thinking is rejected in favor of the inculcation of transformation 
dogma.”1053
In 2002, General Dubik wrote that “War never discards a proven tactic or weapon.  War 
is patient; it waits for another opportunity to use ‘what worked’ before.  Mutatis mutandis, the 
old Latin phrase says: ‘the more things change, the more they remain the same.’”
 
1054  The same 
could be applied to the Army’s legacy and Transformation program in the wake of OEF and OIF 
but with a twist:  Transformation never discards a disproven tactic or operational concept and 
despite how much things change, Transformation will remain the same.  A risible but useful 
account from Afghanistan in 2002 demonstrates just how interested the U.S. Army was in 
returning to its legacy operations and protocols.  “U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan 
have been ordered to shave and wear regular uniforms to look more like U.S. soldiers rather than 
locals, according to an official at the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida…The 
decision came after the perception that the grooming standard of the troops was out of hand and 
that the time had passed for the need of the soldiers to blend in.”1055  This is an interesting 
anecdote for an Army in Transformation for the 21st
                                                 
1053 Calhoun, Mark T., Op Cit, p. 66. 
 Century and foreshadowed an inexorable 
drive towards Transformation irrespective of adversaries, experience, or strategy.  Preferences 
and dogma propelled by institutional inertia would not go off course and proceeded with almost 
absolute indifference to changes in the international security environment and strategic 
requirements. 
1054 Dubik, James M. “Has Warfare Changed? Sorting Apples from Oranges,” Landpower Essay, Number 
02-3, Institute of Land Warfare Publication, July 2002, p. 4. 
1055 Mount, Mike, “Close Shave for Special Ops Forces in Afghanistan,” CNN, 13 September 2002. 
 501 
The Transformation program, prior to 9/11 and now, assumes a static if not entirely 
conventional enemy is always looming on the horizon.  At one time, this made at least some 
semblance of sense: “Before 9/11, the services could make a plausible case that in the absence of 
any specific enemy, their time was best spent preparing to defeat a worst-case peer adversary in 
the next big war.”1056  This thinking not only confuses the definition of the threat but it also 
mistakes the increasingly blurred line between conventional and unconventional and single band 
and full spectrum for a clearly delineated boundary. These operations are not so dissimilar or 
neatly separated anymore and the definition of each has changed.  “Some armchair generals, 
legacy-thinking academics, and poorly informed professionals may say that we will not conduct 
UW in modern times.  They think that if you don’t parachute into occupied territory, link up with 
a partisan group, and overthrow an occupying army like the OSS [Office Strategic Services] did 
six decades ago, it is not UW.”1057
                                                 
1056 Waghelstein, John D., “What’s Wrong in Iraq or Ruminations of a Pachyderm,” Military Review, 
January-February 2006, p. 117. 
  Moreover, U.S. strategic decisions and actions (or inactions) 
drive adversary responses.  The U.S. military does not operate in a vacuum and adversaries are 
not inert.  Demonstrating an inability and unwillingness to confront unconventional threat 
organizations is one ingredient in a recipe for making these adversaries appear more often and in 
more conspicuous forms.  “Our own actions and strategic choices will drive the nature of the 
asymmetric threat.  As we refine operational practices, potential adversaries will look to find 
ways to counter.  This process of action-reaction is inescapable.  Responses by potential 
adversaries will come from two broad currents: their specific operations and historical-military 
heritage and outlook, and their reaction to the nature of the perceived threat from the United 
1057 Bogart III, Adrian T., Op Cit, p. 3. 
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States.”1058  Another ingredient in this mix is continued proclamations indicating that the U.S. 
Army is uninterested in non-standard or unconventional missions in the future.  For instance, 
from the U.S. Army’s 2008 Modernization Strategy: “We cannot mortgage the future to support 
the current fight.  We must restore balance and build readiness through modernization for 
Soldiers both now and in the future.”1059 As Ancker suggests, “Dealing with the unexpected 
requires rapid adjustment to the actual situation.”1060
8.3.5 Transcendent Effects of the Legacy 
 Certainly, the opposite holds true for 
adversaries: dealing with the expected requires almost no adjustment to the actual situation.  And 
creating the expected is what the Transformation and modernization program is seemingly all 
about. 
The stability of the legacy signifies not only the inertia of the U.S. Army as an institution insofar 
as it “has developed over time a singular focus on conventional warfare”1061
                                                 
1058 McKenzie, Kenneth F., “The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR,” 
McNair Paper #62, National Defense University, 2000, p. 11. 
 but also that it is 
rejecting the hard won organizational adaptations painfully conducted in Iraq that made the force 
more full spectrum capable than perhaps it had ever been.  Despite witnessing firsthand the 
adaptive struggles the U.S. Army went through to achieve organizational goals and objectives in 
Iraq, then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld published the following proclamation in the 2006 
1059 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army’s Modernization Strategy, 2008, p. 79. 
1060 Ancker, Clinton J., “Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,” Military Review, July-August 2003, p. 22. 
1061 Alwin-Foster, Nigel, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review, 
November-December 2005, p. 9. 
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QDR: “The ability of the future force to establish an ‘unblinking eye’ over the battle-space 
through persistent surveillance will be key to conducting effective joint operations.  Future 
capabilities in ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance], including those operating in 
space, will support operations against any target, day or night, in any weather, and in denied or 
contested areas.”1062
Preference for a return to the pre-OIF balance and pre-OIF full spectrum capabilities is 
not difficult to understand given how difficult true full spectrum missions are to accomplish and 
given how these missions put the U.S. Army at the center of operational attention in defiance of 
joint requirements and a supposed interest in conducting joint operations.  Pre-OIF full spectrum 
dominance is what the U.S. Army has historically excelled at and would again like to excel at in 
the future; the other service chiefs would like this as well.  Conversely, post-OIF full spectrum 
capabilities and full spectrum dominance imply a set of training, doctrine, and skills that are 
difficult to discern and would likely require significant organizational adaptation to achieve, no 
matter what structural changes are made in the foreseeable future.  Determining the meaning of 
full spectrum capable seems necessary for determining what direction the U.S. Army will be 
going in and how long it will take to get there.  If official proclamations, statements before 
Congress, and doctrine are the Rosetta stone for this decipherment, then it seems that the pre-
  Any target, day or night, in any weather, and in denied or contested areas 
implies a capacity that has not been achieved against targets yet availing themselves.  The future, 
in legacy terms, always seems to be just that, the future: it has its own relativity and never quite 
follows the strictures of time to become the present.   
                                                 
1062 Rumsfeld, Donald H., Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 
February 2006, p. 55. 
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9/11 definition of full spectrum capable obtains and the U.S. Army will continue a gradual shift 
back towards a combat-centric force.  But this remains to be seen. 
Outside of the related definition of full spectrum dominance, it is difficult to determine 
what the term ‘full spectrum capable’ means.  Supposedly, the force that was sent to Afghanistan 
and later Iraq was full spectrum capable because of its technical capacities: this was disproven 
rather profoundly by sheiks, warlords, militias, criminal entrepreneurs, insurgents for hire, no 
less than 4 years of rampant instability in Iraq, and a solid 3 years of organizational adaptation to 
influence strategy enough to align it with tactical success.  “During the conventional phase of 
combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, network centric warfare showed great promise; but in 
subsequent phases, the technology and operational concepts have been of little utility in fighting 
insurgencies and terrorist movements.  To support the nation’s policies effectively, the military 
must continue to pursue a wide range of emerging technologies and not become so enamored 
with a single technological concept that it forsakes other capabilities.”1063
                                                 
1063 Reynolds, Kevin, Defense Transformation: to What, for What?, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2006, p. 2. 
 But shifting the 
Army’s focus to the lower end of the spectrum apparently did not expand full spectrum 
capabilities either, “this recent focus of training on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict in 
stability and reconstruction operations has come at the cost of training preparation for more 
traditional threats, and the Army’s ability to attack and defend.  Neglecting training for conflict 
on the higher end of the spectrum of conflict degrades the Army’s ability to conduct full 
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spectrum operations.”1064
It seems as if the combat-centric full spectrum capable proponents are winning despite 
DOD leadership that is pushing for a different outcome.  Secretary Gates has repeatedly made 
the case for expanding the capability of the forces across the spectrum and for learning from 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan: “Even the biggest wars will require ‘small wars’ 
capabilities.”
  Being full spectrum capable then is a matter of perspective: one 
perspective holds true in garrison and peacetime training against possible enemies and the other 
holds true in conflict against actual enemies.  Neither is assured in the future as the U.S. Army 
continues to transform and rebalance itself. 
1065  He also argues that while “having a military skilled in fighting major 
conventional ground wars is essential…such a war is unlikely in the near future.”1066  He 
continues by adding that “the Pentagon has placed comparatively too much emphasis on 
developing high-technology weapon systems aimed at potential state adversaries such as China 
or Russia that take years to develop” noting that the 2009 budget contains more than $180 billion 
for such conventional systems.1067  Despite Gates’ stewardship and management, many in U.S. 
Army leadership positions make a powerful contrarian case and continue to follow the standard 
prescriptions of the legacy.1068
                                                 
1064 Hawkins, Jerome K., Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21st Century Challenges, School 
of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 May 
2008, p. 37. 
  Change is difficult for any entrenched organization and the risk 
1065 Gates, Robert M., Op Cit, p. 30. 
1066 Tyson, Ann Scott, Op Cit, p. 4. 
1067 Ibid, p. 4. 
1068 Wipfli and Metz contend that “Even the military is not fully committed to transforming for the COIN 
mission.  As the Army and Marine Corps increase in size, they will simply add more units of existing types.”  
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for failure or in making the wrong change when your organization is charged with provisioning 
national defense can be at first daunting and then potentially catastrophic.  “Often it is said that it 
is more difficult to expel an old idea than to introduce a new one.  Because we only have one 
army, we cannot afford to deprogram our regulars, even were such mental surgery possible.”1069
The stability of a legacy is natural for any organization, even when confronted with direct 
evidence that the legacy is roundly unsuitable for current and likely future operations.  “If 
anyone is stunned and amazed that the U.S. Army is having difficulties in Iraq, they should not 
be.  There is seemingly something in the Army’s DNA that historically precludes it form 
preparing itself for the problems of insurgency or from studying such conflicts in any serious 
way until the dam breaks.”
 
1070  But the results of the stability of the legacy are troubling.  
Warfare, always a messy business, is becoming messier and commonly accepted paradigms for 
categorizing aspects of warfare are mutating.  According to Secretary Gates, “The categories of 
warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes.”1071
                                                                                                                                                             
Wipfli, Ralph, and Steven Metz, COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy, Colloquium Brief, Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 22 October 2007, p. 3. 
  Despite the significant and 
nearly comprehensive tactical adaptations that the U.S. Army made in Iraq and is making in 
Afghanistan, it is still locked in a battle to ‘balance’ capabilities with current real missions and 
with perceived future missions.  Balancing to become full spectrum capable truly defies the 
ostensible definition of the term and confounds the adaptations made in Iraq.  Full spectrum 
1069 Gray, Colin S., “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Winter 
2007, p. 47. 
1070 Waghelstein, John D., Op Cit, p. 112. 
1071 Gates, Robert M., Op Cit, p. 33. 
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capable is as oxymoronic a term now as it was in the past as is the concept and progress of 
Transformation.  “In a culture such as the military, change is a constant.  But transformation 
represents a shift in fundamental rules.  That type of shift is not always a comfortable experience 
for everyone involved.  Once the shift has been recognized and made, however, comfort zones 
return.”1072
8.4 THE DEVOLVING STATE AND A RETURN TO NEW/OLD FORMS OF 
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT: IRAQ IS NOT UNIQUE 
  Seemingly, comfort zones never left as the legacy continues to persist. 
Changes in the international security environment make the Iraq conflict less unusual in U.S. 
security policy and strategy than might otherwise be supposed.  Of course, the Iraqi state was 
destabilized to the point of collapse by the 2003 Coalition invasion, the subsequent dismantling 
of the state’s security apparatus, and the emergence of a massive, complex insurgency.  
Nevertheless, the conflict that took place could quite possibly emerge in other states with similar 
demographic and social characteristics and with or without direct U.S. involvement.  
Breakdowns in traditional state sovereignty and control in many states are more the norm than 
the outlier in the 21st
                                                 
1072 U.S. Department of Defense, “Cultural Change,” 
 Century.  Organizations built on traditional relationships and power 
structures, outside of the control of the state, still exist and in increasingly large numbers.  As the 
conflict in Iraq demonstrates, motivated organizations with the potential to marshal thousands of 
supporters do not require significant technological resources, modern bureaucracies, advanced 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/about_transformation.html, accessed 1 October 2009. 
 508 
logistics, charismatic leadership, or prodigious external funding to foment mass chaos, 
dislocation, and calamity.  Furthermore, these organizations can sow tremendous violence across 
a wide swath of terrain even in the face of the best resourced and most capable military force in 
existence.  Although not all states are similarly strategically important in U.S. strategy and not all 
transgressing organizations are similarly disposed or capable, the devolution of states and the rise 
of complex violent groups with interests in alternative forms of governance is cause for alarm for 
policymakers and military strategists alike.  States have contributed to this possibility by creating 
the implements for and fostering of the motivation for their own dissolution: technologies for 
communications, transportation, funding, and information sharing; cheap, available, precise, and 
incredibly deadly instruments of violence and; significant grievances ranging from apostasy, 
secularism, revenge, and mass dislocation. 
At a minimum, there is enormous potential for instability on nearly every continent and 
the sources of this instability are manifold.   Demographic trends towards urbanization in 
disparate areas, areas where governments are most incapable of handling significant population 
growth in terms of infrastructure or employment, do not bode well for stability.  “Demography in 
today’s world makes urban insurgency more frequent.  There are more cities today than a 
hundred years ago, and a larger number of potential rebels live in them.  Sites which once were 
villages or were even unsettled, in one or two generations have become towns and cities: 
Leopoldville, Aden, Lagunillas, Nha Trang, Limassol.  And today’s village could become 
tomorrow’s town with the population explosion progressing as it is.”1073
                                                 
1073 Defense Research Corporation, Op Cit, p. 8. 
  Persistently weak states 
are expanding to generate weak regions with little hope of reversal.  “Many, if not the majority, 
of weak and failing states will center in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and 
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North Africa.  A current list of such states much resembles the lists of such states drawn up a 
generation ago, suggesting a chronic condition, which, despite considerable aid, provides little 
hope for solution.”1074 States cobbled together during the colonial period are fracturing along 
ethnic, cultural, and religious fault lines despite continuous efforts at unification.  “Culturally- 
and religiously-motivated movements are emphasising ethnic particularities and the preservation 
of independence and cultural traditions.  This increasing trend towards cultural fragmentation 
based upon sub-cultural identities may clash with opposing movements attempting to force 
unifications.”1075  The end of the colonial period coupled with the subsequent end of the Cold 
War irreversibly released centuries’ worth of cultural and structural tensions.  “So think about 
300 to 500 years, in some cases 200 years, of European pressure to push the world into the 
artificial forms they wanted it to be in, and then suddenly remove the pressure.  Human societies, 
from Iraq to Somalia to Nigeria, and well beyond, Indonesia, are trying to find a natural 
equilibrium again.”1076
Max Weber famously asserted that a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence is the 
defining characteristic of a state.  “Control over the use of violence brings three distinctive 
  Globalization gives these populations the capacity to find this 
equilibrium either peacefully or violently but certainly at the expense of the foreign system that 
they find themselves trapped within. 
                                                 
1074 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Op Cit, p. 35. 
1075 Multinational Interoperability Council, Future Coalition Operating Environment: Interoperability 
Challenges for the Future, Part I, Version 3.0, Multinational Interoperability Council, 16 June 2008, p. VII. 
1076 Peters, Ralph, “The Nature of Irregular Conflict in the 21st Century,” Warfare in the Age of Non-State 
Actors: Implications for the US Army, Eds. Gott, Kendall D. and Michael G. Brooks, The Proceedings of the 
Combat Studies Institute 2007 Military History Symposium, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 
2007, pp. 332-333. 
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processes together.  The first is the establishment of a monopoly over the means of destruction 
and the use of force.  The second is the establishment of the legitimacy needed to subordinate 
violence to decision making.  The third is the use of force, according to certain rules, against 
those citizens of the state who challenge its legitimacy.”1077  Where legitimacy is in question, 
forces, either state-based or more traditional, inevitably come into conflict.  When the state 
cannot control the use of violence or has receded just far enough to allow for surrogate 
legitimacy three results are possible: 1) an external force either helps to restore the state’s 
legitimacy and monopoly over the use of violence; 2) non-state organizations establish an 
alternative form of government that can either resemble a state with centralized functions or be 
far removed from the state and resemble pre-modern disaggregation of peoples or; 3) there is a 
complete degeneration of any social order as it is commonly recognized.  Kaplan argues that “A 
predominant socio-political trend will be a dynamic tension between the continuing struggle for 
democratisation and the desire to maintain alternative systems of governance.” 1078  In an age 
where “democracy and technology will make the world more complex, more unstable,”1079
                                                 
1077 Ghani, Ashraf and Claire Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 
128. 
 this 
can be dangerous for existing states, whole regions, and perhaps eventually, formal global 
governance. 
1078 Multinational Interoperability Council, Op Cit, p. VII. 
1079 Kaplan, Robert D., “The New Evils of the 21st Century,” Essay Presented at the Conference of Midwest 
Consortium for International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Midwest Center, Chicago, 
IL, December 1997, p. 17. 
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 The international security environment is in an unprecedented state of flux.   If, as Smith 
claims, populations that accept collective security and cooperation amongst states are set against 
“large, encapsulated pockets of culture and ideology that have little real stake in the modern state 
solution,”1080 then strategies that only treat the former while ignoring the latter are myopic at best 
and suicidal at worst.  And if the disorder that characterizes weak states and feral cities does 
spread to the developed world, as Williams warns is possible, then strategists are right to reject 
intervention in or concern for these areas: this enemy will come to them soon enough.1081
8.4.1 The Absence of the State 
 
The disintegration or absence of state power has led to what Kaldor describes as ‘New Wars’.  
New Wars are conducted by state and non-state actors, battle is rare, violence is directed at 
civilians, distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate break down, and sectarian 
identifications flourish.  New Wars undermine a shared political identity and “recreate the sense 
of political community along new divisive lines through the manufacture of fear and hate.”1082
                                                 
1080 Smith, Anton K., Beyond Iraq: The Lessons of a Hard Place, USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. 
Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 30 March 2007, pp. 2-3. 
  
Conflicts in places like Bosnia and Somalia typify the types of wars that Kaldor describes.  
Although, as Little argues, “The state remains the main means of international validation, either 
1081 Williams, Phil, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. 
Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2008, p. 31. 
1082 Kaldor, Mary, “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror,” International Politics, 2005, 
pp. 492-493. 
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by governments or international organizations,”1083 other actors are gaining increasing 
importance as state controls weaken, disintegrate, or are abandoned in favor of more traditional 
or alternative forms of governance.  Visions and strategies that fail to account for these 
differences or blindly adhere to notions of governance as it existed between the conclusion of 
World War II and the end of the Cold War, also fail to recognize non-state adversaries for what 
they really are: challenges to the prevailing global order.1084  Despite wide acceptance by states, 
the modern state system is hardly an accepted form of governance by all peoples.  Tribal 
governance and other forms of localism and even regional governance are rapidly returning to 
prominence.  “The modern states system growing out of European history, which fixed borders 
as a means to limit conflict, established the ground rules for diplomacy and interaction of 
peoples, and imbued those states with a monopoly on the use of violence, remains far from 
universal acceptance.”1085
Where the state has broken down and where alternative forms of governance have taken 
its place, modern methods for quelling violence and sowing order no longer work very well; the 
architecture required by these methods disintegrates along with the state.  Weak states not only 
provide haven to nefarious groups they also progressively fail to provide many of the tools 
 
                                                 
1083 Little, Peter D., Op Cit, p. 167. 
1084 For an in depth discussion see, Williams, Phil, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The 
Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2008, 
p. 5. 
1085 Smith, Anton K., Op Cit, p.2.  In fact, al Qaeda and other groups are not interested in governing states 
but instead are interested in the ability to exercise a state’s power in the vacuum created by its absence.  See, Robb, 
John, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 
NJ. 
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necessary for combating these groups.  Traditional doctrines for returning state control within its 
geographical boundaries require at least a semblance of state-based forces and at a minimum an 
echo of bureaucratic competency or experience.  Without these forces and capacities, foreign 
intervention to restore even the façade of a modern state will either fail or will be prohibitively 
costly.  But what remains of these state apparatuses after a gradual or rapid breakdown diminish 
even further as control is progressively divested and as power accrues to sub-state groups and 
individuals.  “A weak and dysfunctional government is particularly important, because in such 
cases even small groups can effectively use violence without being shut down by the 
government.  Indeed, the very shortcomings of the regimes often are major reasons for the 
existence of an insurgency.  Thus, at times the very causes of insurgency also create problems for 
fighting it.”1086
  According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) “Fragile 
states have long posed a problem for the United States and are now recognized as a source of our 
nation’s most pressing security threats.”
  The more protracted a state’s decline and the further alternative forms of 
governance are allowed to progress, the less likely any restorative intervention is to be successful 
and the more likely that groups hostile to internationally accepted norms, customs, and laws will 
have the opportunity to flourish. 
1087
                                                 
1086 Byman, Daniel L., “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War of Terrorism,” International 
Security, Volume 31, Number 2, 2006, p. 102. 
  This problem grows more pernicious as non-state 
adversaries realize the benefits of globalization for funding, information transfer, 
communications, proselytization, and travel.  Diminishing state control further enables and even 
empowers sub-state actors and ideologies to emerge:  “Added to the destruction of the state is the 
1087 U.S. Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy, January 2005, p. 11. 
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prominence of identity politics, whether nationalist, tribalist, or communalist.  In the absence of 
state institutions, organization around ethnic or family identity may be the only form left for 
collective action.”1088  States are interested in order and require the presence and acquiescence of 
other states to maintain order.  As Echevarria argues, “globalization seems to aid the nonstate 
actor more than the state, but states still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist 
groups or insurgencies.”1089
8.4.2 Civilians and Urbanization:  Why Weak States Matter to Security 
  Strategies and doctrine to defeat or quell violent non-state actors 
and organizations require the support of other states, particularly states hosting these actors and 
organizations.  The state, as a form of governance, is therefore a critical part of any strategic 
interest in international order.  Thus, a declining state’s ‘statehood’ must be supported prior to or 
early on in the processional breakdown of normal state apparatuses and the rise of sub-state 
groups.  Otherwise, maintaining a state-based order will be progressively more difficult to 
achieve and strategies and force packages based on the existence of this order will become less 
and less relevant. 
Military operations increasingly occur amongst populations in urban areas.  Military forces are 
drawn into cities because the world is increasingly urbanizing and because seemingly ubiquitous 
                                                 
1088 Benedict, Kennette, “International Relations in the Global Village,” Essay Presented at the Conference 
of the Midwest Consortium for International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Midwest 
Center, Chicago, IL, December 1997, pp. 118-119. 
1089 Echevarria, Antulio J., Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2005, p. vi.  See also, Echevarria, Antulio J., Globalization and the Nature of 
War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2003, p. 21. 
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non-state adversaries take advantage of urban terrain and environments that suit their operations 
and keep them close to their lines of support and provision.  While still possible, seemingly gone 
are the days of force marching infantry divisions into the face of dug in opposing forces and 
open terrain tank battles.  Although geographical terrain is still used when advantageous, as it 
was in Vietnam and is in Afghanistan and elsewhere, combatants are increasingly using urban 
terrain to mask, support, and complicate operations.  “By 2030, greater than 60 percent of the 
world’s population is expected to live in urban areas.”1090
 Urbanization, particularly in poorer or less developed nations, lends to creeping disorder 
and the emergence of alternative forms of justice and governance based on local preferences, 
allegiances, loyalties, or identities.  Urban disorder is the product of individuals and groups being 
dislocated from traditional ways of life and of states being less capable of providing or unwilling 
to provide support to these populations in the form of improved infrastructure, opportunities for 
upward mobility, or expanded social services.  Moreover, “Formal state institutions provide only 
a minority of the justice and security service in fragile states.”
  Where these populations choose to 
live or will live, violent non-state actors and organizations will assuredly follow. 
1091
                                                 
1090 Multinational Interoperability Council, Op Cit, p. VII. 
  Disorder arises in the absence 
of the state but is replaced in many instances be alternative forms of order.  In the long term, 
alternative forms of order and governance lead to a further weakening of the state and the greater 
legitimization of sub-state organizational controls.  “So long as there is a continued juxtaposition 
between concentrations of people and the absence of services and opportunities, the trends 
towards urban disorder and the rise of alternative forms of governance are likely to continue and 
1091 Scheye, Eric, and Louise Andersen, “Conclusion,” Fragile States and Insecure People?, Eds. Louise 
Andersen, Bjorn Noller, and Finn Stepputat, Palgrave, NY, 2007, p. 231. 
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even intensify.”1092  Mass groupings of disaffected people tend to adopt the forms of governance 
most available to them, despite state preferences that they would do otherwise.  “Impoverished, 
poorly educated people do not make good democrats.  They are too easily manipulated by the 
powerful, and the choices they make are seldom in the collective best interest.”1093  In some 
cases, the powerful don’t even have to manipulate the population; it might be a willing 
participant in or supporter of the prevailing alternative form of governance.  “Sometimes non-
state providers are the choice of first resort, because the values embedded in the non-state justice 
and security systems correspond more closely to those held by the citizenry, whereas state 
systems are considered to house foreign principles and standards and are, therefore, to be 
shunned.”1094
Urban environments are complicated mazes of buildings, infrastructure, and people.  
Urban settings can be confusing and daunting to outsiders while at the same time they can 
provide comfort, protection, and cover to those familiar with their environs.  In Iraq, towns and 
cities provided actors “both the personal anonymity of the big city and the impenetrability of 
closed neighbourhood-based social groups, making the task of finding individuals difficult and 
forcing the coalition to rely on informers and denunciations.”
 
1095
                                                 
1092 Williams, Phil, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. 
Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, June 2008, p. 25. 
  This is true for most congested 
or urban environments where civilians are massed and outsiders are quickly recognized and 
denied access to the social networks that connect the city’s people and organizations.  Networks 
1093 Smith, Anton K., Op Cit, p. 7. 
1094 Scheye, Eric, and Louise Andersen, Op Cit, p. 231. 
1095 Knights, Michael and Jeffrey White, Op Cit, pp. 20-21. 
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of civilians can be impenetrable to outsiders, can enhance the difficulties of conducting 
operations in urban environments, can be an asset to whichever group or person commands their 
allegiance, might reject interference from a less-than-legitimate state or foreign force, and 
invariably complicate actions or operations, either directly or passively, where they live and 
work.  Civilians either individually, in groups, or en masse can and often times do amplify the 
strengths and capabilities of violent non-state actors and therefore, “friction with them cannot be 
avoided.”1096
Urban operations are complicated even when towns are mostly empty and when fears of 
collateral deaths and damage are at a minimum.  When urban environments are populated, 
operational conduct becomes infinitely more difficult to plan and coordinate: the environment is 
rife with confusion.  Urban operations are particularly difficult for military organizations that are 
designed for open terrain warfare or conventional operations.  ISR and communications all 
wither in urban environments and maneuver can be ground to a halt by crowds or traffic in an 
instant.  Commanding and controlling troops and units in urban operations is not only confusing 
because of the terrain and the presence of civilians, it is confusing because urban operations, 
particularly against non-state actors, have been studiously avoided and neglected in doctrine and 
training.  “Battle command is not the only doctrinal concept to suffer when viewed through the 
lens of urban operations.  Processes, terms, and concepts designed to aid commanders in 
decisionmaking need to account for the mix of missions and tasks a commander is likely to find 
  This is all the more true when the only available response to disturbances in urban 
environments is the deployment of military or heavily armed police forces skilled more in heavy-
handed conventional operations than in conducting civilian-sensitive probing and discrete raids. 
                                                 
1096 Amidror, Yaakov, “Winning the Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience,” JCPA Strategic 
Perspectives, 23 June 2008, p. 38. 
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confronting him in a city…unfortunately the commander’s ‘tool box’ has too many implements 
designed for decades now past, eras in which urban operations were the exception rather than the 
norm they are rapidly becoming.”1097
In light of strategies that require providing stabilization and order in disorderly places and 
in light of greater urbanization and the collocation of civilians and hostile actors, the U.S. Army 
will have to maintain a robust capacity for conducting the types of operations that occurred in 
Iraq on a daily basis.  Full spectrum tactical capacities will be at a premium and organizational 
adaptation is a must.  Unless violent and other criminal non-state actors decide to separate 
themselves from their supporting population, urban operations—despite the U.S. Army’s 
disinclination for conducting them—will be a staple of stabilization and full spectrum operations 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
8.4.3 The Actors:  Why Weak States Will Matter Even More 
There are a number of states that suffer from persistent low level (and occasionally high level) 
conflict.  In each case, governments have lost their monopoly over the legitimate use of violence 
and the market for security has been effectively deregulated: multiple actors and organizations 
fill the vacuum to provide services or to exploit environmental vulnerabilities left in the state’s 
absence.  This process is essentially zero-sum and cumulative.  Conflict leads to state erosion 
and vice versa until one organization or a coalition of organizations establish some form of new 
equilibrium.  What is troubling is that this equilibrium does not necessarily favor the resumption 
                                                 
1097 Glenn, Russell W. and Gina Kingston, Urban Battle Command in the 21st Century, RAND, Santa 
Monica, 2005, p. 16. 
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of state control and the provision of state services.  Instead, organizational Darwinism takes over 
and those most capable of exploiting the environment and imposing their will, however corrupt, 
end up commanding or at least sharing in the marketplace of violent dispensations and the 
distribution of justice. 
Persistent conflict, like that which occurred in Iraq or is occurring in Somalia and 
elsewhere, opens the door to all shapes and forms of disorder.  Disorder in turn attracts or 
releases organizations that thrive off of and sow even more disorder through criminal and violent 
enterprising.  “States are most vulnerable to collapse in the time immediately before, during, and 
after conflict.  When chaos prevails, terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other 
forms of organized crime can flourish.”1098  Many weak states are particularly vulnerable to 
dismemberment by preexisting informal organizations and networks erupting when formal state 
structures are removed.  If and when these organizations’ operations begin to sap legitimacy 
from the government, they become de facto insurgencies.  But unlike most 20th Century 
insurgencies, these modern insurgencies do not necessarily have to start out as a coordinated or 
designed effort to replace or subsume the government; in fact, they might have no interest in this 
role at all.1099
                                                 
1098 Krasner, Stephen D. and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 84, 
Number 4, p. 153. 
  Because of preexisting structural characteristics and intrinsic networks and 
because the state is already losing control of its borders and territory within its borders, modern 
insurgencies might merely evolve as an organizational response to changes in the environment 
1099 But, in some cases, these organizations go so far as to form parallel governments operating alongside 
accepted governments.  See, Devenny, Patrick, “All Available Tools: Parallel Governance and Modern 
Insurgencies,” smallwarsjournal.com, Small Wars Foundation, 2009, p. 6. 
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and the evaporation of state service provision or ability to provide law and order.  “The modern 
insurgency represents an evolved form of warfare that takes advantage of the capabilities that 
certain tribal societies demonstrate, the pre-existing and affiliated social, economic, and military 
networks that are easily adaptable to combat, and often extending across traditional boundaries 
and borders.  This is the reality of today’s global environment, and it will remain so far into the 
future.”1100  As these insurgencies expand, they not only continue to erode state controls further, 
they also provoke regional instability.  Localized insurgencies spread for no less than 2 reasons: 
1) insurgent organizations often have membership across borders and; 2) borders become 
increasingly difficult to police and enforce as the state withers and the insurgency expands.1101
Weakened states are also the target of organizations with transnational linkages and 
reach.  Because of relaxed state and social controls, these organizations can operate relatively 
unmolested by host-nation forces and police in weakened or failing states.
   
1102
                                                 
1100 Reed, Brian, “A Social network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” Parameters, Summer 
2007, p. 29. 
  The leadership of 
al Qaeda, for instance, has made a habit of moving from sanctuary to sanctuary mostly in 
weakened states.  Like other but far less capable groups, al Qaeda exists principally as a terrorist 
organization but also functions as a mobile insurgency capable of fomenting anti-state violence 
1101 Lynn, John A. “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, July-August 2005, p. 
22. 
1102 “For example, al Qaeda in Iraq and drug lords in Afghanistan are fighting against the government that 
represents order.”  Terriff, Terry, et al, “Can We Adapt to Fourth Generation Warfare,” Global Insurgency and the 
Future of Armed Conflict: Debating Fourth-Generation Warfare, Eds. Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp, and Regina Karp, 
Routledge Global Security Studies, NY, 2008, p. 281. 
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and resistance wherever it goes.1103  Because of its diverse membership, funding, and operational 
capabilities, al Qaeda can manifest in one form or another or can support affiliates in a number of 
weakened states simultaneously.  Support for transnational organizations, like al Qaeda, 
operating in weak states can come from “diaspora communities, foreign mercenaries, organized 
criminal organizations, and regional, rather than super, powers.”1104  When support is limited or 
is not substantial enough for ongoing or expanding operations, these organizations can engage in 
self- and situationally-reinforcing criminal activities.  “They develop because a government 
cannot control its territory.  Their growth then contributes to the instability in the region and 
results in the government ceding more territory.  In some cases, a single group takes over that 
territory…the basic failure of the state to provide security combined with the easy availability of 
arms creates a downward spiral that results in ever increasing instability.”1105
                                                 
1103 For discussion see, Nagl, John A., Asymmetric Threats to U.S. National Security to the Year 2010, U.S. 
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2001, p. 44. 
  Weakened states 
also invite the comingling of variously motivated groups and, paradoxically, foment increasingly 
criminal behavior by these groups.  “The absence of the rule of law in places such as Somalia, 
Kosovo, and Afghanistan provides ideal conditions for the blending of criminal and terrorist 
activities…terrorist groups who otherwise might rely on charitable contributions or even 
‘legitimate’ businesses have little or no access to either in a failed state, leaving trafficking and 
1104 Benedict, Kennette, Op Cit, p. 119. 
1105 Hammes, Thomas X., “Transnational and Non-State Actors and the New Landscape of War,” Paper 
Prepared for the Seminar on Transnational and Non-State Armed Groups, HPCR, Cambridge, 9-10 March 2007, pp. 
6-7. 
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other forms of crime as the obvious and easier alternatives.  An organic criminal capability 
becomes paramount and the sole method by which to sustain the organization.”1106
Organized crime, terrorist, and insurgent groups are not the only types of organizations 
that thrive in weakened states.  Militias and warlord-led organizations also evolve and prosper 
where state controls are absent or weak.  The existence and actions of these groups further 
weakens the legitimacy of the state and its ability to be the sole arbiter of violence or even social 
services.  “Militias represent armed groups, irregular yet recognizable as an armed force, 
operating within ungoverned areas or in weak failing states.  They range from ad hoc 
organizations with shared identities to more permanent groups possessing the ability to provide 
goods, services, and security along with their military capabilities.  Militias challenge the 
sovereignty of the state by breaking the monopoly on violence traditionally the preserve of 
states.”
 
1107  Warlords operate in a fashion similar to militias: “Given the collapse of state control, 
warlords represent an attempt to re-establish stability within anarchy.  All warlords, to an extent, 
are rebuilding patronage networks and means to enforce contracts—quasi-government operating 
a monopoly of violence within established, although flexible areas.”1108
                                                 
1106 Sanderson, Thomas M., “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS 
Review, Volume XXIV, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2004, p. 51. 
  Both militias and 
warlord-led organizations, while providing alternative governance and stability, weaken the 
formal state and tend to do so over very long periods. 
1107 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Op Cit, p. 36. 
1108 Jackson, Paul, “Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 1 June 
2003, p. 147. 
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Perhaps more nefarious than warlords and militias and equally as capable of transcending 
borders as terrorist and internationally capable insurgent groups are gangs.  Many modern gangs 
can be characterized as an amalgamation of warlords, militias, and in most cases, organized 
criminal groups: they share or emulate the capabilities, structures, and motivations of each of 
these actors.  Transnational gangs form, burgeon, and emigrate from weakened and destabilized 
urban areas in developing and developed countries.  “Gangs emerge, prosper, and solidify their 
position as a viable social organizational form in housing projects, neighborhoods, prisons, 
slums, cities, urban regions, and even entire countries that have undergone (or are undergoing) 
varying forms of societal failure.”1109  Gangs, that are transnational in character (and many are 
increasingly so disposed), like their other non-state contemporaries can sow significant disorder 
wherever they choose to operate.  Gangs exist in practically every society but have expanded 
their capacities in weakened states and cities.  The threat they pose is not unlike that of the 
insurgent organizations that evolved in Iraq.  “In Central and South America, gangs are now 
nothing less than out of control.  Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are all being 
directly threatened by the Maras.  In addition, Brazilian society was recently brought to its knees 
by a powerful prison gang that instigated a limited duration state wide insurgency that resulted in 
numerous killings and decapitations—much like the ritual Jihadi beheadings witnessed in 
Iraq.”1110
Although all of these non-state organizational types have existed in one form or another 
for centuries, their presence, growth, and continued influence is expanding in correlation with the 
 
                                                 
1109 Bunker, Robert J. and John P. Sullivan, “Iraq and the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects,” 
Small Wars Journal, Volume 8, May 2007, p. 3. 
1110 Ibid, p. 4. 
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weakening of states.  As states cede more and more formal control over their territory, by choice 
or circumstance, and as globalization continues to spread the tools requisite for enhanced 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness, non-state organizations and collections of people 
will fill the void.  And as these organizations gain strength, expand their resources, and spread 
disorder and/or alternative forms of governance, they will progressively threaten the nation-state 
arrangement that has for the most part of the last century effectively suppressed or disrupted their 
operations.  These organizations or their ideological or motivational progeny then will 
increasingly threaten U.S. interests and thus must be taken into due account in strategy. 
8.4.4 Weak States, Cities, and Actors: Effects on Military Strategy, Rebalancing, and the 
Spectrum of Conflict 
For the foreseeable future, threatening state and non-state organizations will adopt methods that 
help them achieve their strategic objectives.  Threat organizations will also adopt almost any 
methods that help them deny the strategic objectives of their competitors.  Some convergence of 
the threat types can be expected, particularly as each continues to draw lessons from all the 
others.  The U.S. Army will have to be able to influence and counter all types of threat 
organizations within the full spectrum of conflict, and might have to do simultaneously.  Thus, it 
will have to plan for, train, and maintain full spectrum capabilities.  In the absence of a full 
spectrum capability, or if and when the U.S. Army rebalances back towards being combat-
centric, the U.S. Army will have to be prepared to spend significant time and resources, 
depending on the mission, adapting to the environment and potential adversaries.  The less 
amenable adversaries are to the capabilities the Army brings to bear, the more time and 
 525 
adaptation will be required to appropriately counter these adversaries and achieve organizational 
objectives. 
Strategy will have to acknowledge that the path to achieving national security and 
protecting national interests is not so clear cut.  Unless the United States is willing to give up a 
sizable amount of influence and capacity in areas where the unconventional is the conventional 
and against adversaries that are amorphous and adaptive, its forces will have to maintain full 
spectrum capacities.  “Leaders should abandon any vestiges of fixed, linear, monotonic single-
dimensioned security policy pursued under the false assumption that such behavior would not 
cause significant problems in other defense-related matters; and the public, in assessing such 
policies, needs to anticipate and accept conflicts in goals and methods and not demand black-
and-white security strategies and outcomes.”1111
                                                 
1111 Mandel, Robert, The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis, Greenwood Press, 
Westport, CT, 1994, p. 138. 
  Given the likely future threat environment and 
rather permanent U.S. interests, adopting simple and immutable strategies with ‘victory’ as an 
outcome is unacceptable.  Strategies that achieve stability through a variety of measures against a 
variety of enemies make much more sense.  Black-and-white strategies assume black-and-white 
enemies and require or at least permit black-and-white force structures, training, and capabilities 
or something less than full spectrum.  When and where national interests intersect with enemies 
that are not so monochromatic, the U.S. Army will have to adapt, perhaps significantly so, unless 
of course the conflict environment is nearly perfectly suited to hosting the U.S. Army and the 
enemy is thoroughly amenable to the capabilities this force fields.  Given the ambiguous and 
adaptive nature and the range of potential and possible threat organizations, this is increasingly 
unlikely.  “To mitigate risk to the future requirements to national security, it is imperative that 
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the military take a step back and look at all of the factors at work within the world that are 
shaping the future threat to American security and interests.”1112
Strategy is defined as: “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 
multinational objectives.”
 
1113  Enemies would be prudent to inject lessons from the insurgencies 
in Afghanistan and Iraq into their strategies.  Although the strategies and tactics adversaries 
employed in Afghanistan and Iraq are not positive, states and non-state actors do not necessarily 
have to defeat the United States to achieve their strategic aims; merely disrupting its forces might 
suffice.  In a sense, states and non-state actors can employ a Clausewitzian negative strategy or 
take actions to get the United States to renounce its aims without generating any positive benefits 
for themselves.  Prudence would dictate that the United States maintain an Army capable of 
confronting any likely strategic adversary so as to obviate weaknesses and deter enemies from 
trying to exploit these weaknesses.1114
                                                 
1112 Armstrong, Charles S., Beyond Westphalia: The Emergent Globalization Paradigm, School of 
Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 2006, 
p. 48. 
  Prudence would also dictate that the U.S. Army, despite 
notable accomplishments in Iraq, not assume that it has built a successful and durable template 
for conducting simultaneous full spectrum operations.  Although it is in the nature of 
organizations to continue to do what they perceive as effective—as witnessed in calls for a 
‘surge’ in Afghanistan—this is a recipe for failure in the current international security 
1113 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Op Cit. 
1114 This may not be possible in all cases.  The mere deployment of any type of force, however necessary 
strategically, will fuel threat perceptions.  See Treverton, Gregory F., et al, Exploring Religious Conflict, RAND, 
Santa Monica, CA, 2005. 
 527 
environment.  Enemy doctrine is not fixed and U.S. Army doctrine should not be either.  What 
was painfully learned in Iraq was not that there is winning one-size-fits-all strategy for 
conducting simultaneous full spectrum operations but instead that in the absence of a full 
spectrum capacity the U.S. Army will have to be prepared to conduct wrenching organizational 
adaptation to accomplish its goals.1115
 Recent and successive U.S. Defense Strategies have emphasized the importance of poorly 
performing countries and ungoverned territories to U.S. national security and global stability.
 
1116  
“Poorly performing developing countries are linked to humanitarian catastrophes; mass 
migration; environmental degradation; regional instability; energy insecurity; global pandemics; 
international crime; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and, of course, 
transnational terrorism.”1117  Strategies emphasizing stability, whether global, hemispheric, or 
even regional, require the U.S. Army to be able to conduct simultaneous full spectrum operations 
in ungoverned and alternatively governed territories.  Alternatively governed territories, like 
many parts of Iraq following the collapse of the central government, tend to be unstable and 
require significant resources to be ‘re-governed.’1118
                                                 
1115 The spirit of this is embodied in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Op Cit.  “FM 3-24 is not general enough to 
be applicable for every future insurgency.”  Alderson, Alexander, “US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally’s 
Perspective,” Parameters, Winter 2007-08, p. 43. 
  Providing stability to alternatively and 
1116 For an expanded explanation of this relationship see, Bush, George, National Security Presidential 
Directive/NSPD-44, The White House, 7 December 2005, p. 1-2. 
1117 Patrick, Stewart, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?,” The Washington Quarterly, 
Volume 29, Number 2, 2006, p. 27. 
1118 RAND defines ungoverned territories as “areas in which a state faces significant challenges in 
establishing control.  They can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, or areas within 
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ungoverned areas requires unique skill sets, ones that are neither inherent nor trained for in the 
conduct of offensive and defensive operations:  the sequential provisioning of security, justice 
and reconciliation, social and economic well being, and governance and participation1119 are all 
important to the stabilization and re-governance of alternatively and ungoverned territories.  
Reconstructing or creating state institutions is necessary to stabilize ungoverned areas, a fact 
recognized by the United States government and the international community1120 if not entirely 
accepted by the U.S. Army.  Despite its recognition of this fact, the international community 
does not have the wherewithal to accomplish this mission.  The United States, largely through 
the U.S. Army, is perhaps the only country or entity capable of accomplishing this task.1121
                                                                                                                                                             
otherwise viable states to which the central government’s authority does not extend.”  RAND, Ungoverned 
Territories, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. 1. Drapeau argues that there is a contest between authority and 
rebellion over political space (“hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the general population”) rather than physical 
space.  In political space, “nonkinetic techniques are at least as valuable as traditional kinetic techniques.”  Drapeau, 
Mark D., et al, “So Many Zebras, So Little Time: Ecological Models and Counterinsurgency Operations,” Defense 
Horizons Number 62, February 2008, p. 2. 
  To 
make matters worse, because of the nature of some failing or weakened states, these operations 
1119 CSIS, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” Task Framework, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
and the Association of the United States Army, May 2002, p. 3.  This is later echoed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-24: 
“Successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and the ability to provide basic 
services, economic opportunity, public order, and security.”  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency Operations, Revision First Draft, 2008, p. X-1.   
1120 Jones, Seth G., et al, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2005, p. 
205. 
1121 “The international community is not, however, adequately organized to deal with governance failures.”  
Krasner, Stephen D. and Carlos Pascual, Op Cit, p. 153. 
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might have to be conducted in a bureaucratic and institutional vacuum: “In many parts of the 
world, there are no civil institutions; there are no strong, functioning institutional bureaucracies 
because a functioning bureaucracy does not take one but often takes several generations of 
literacy to function well.  Also, in many parts of the world, it is unclear where the borders 
are.”1122  This possibility is not covered in existing doctrine:1123
 
 
 “This idea of a vacuum though, nobody wants to wrestle with the fact that in 
some parts of the world there is just no structure at all.  Everybody assumes that 
there is something to work with, some tribal structure or something…I don’t know 
of any doctrine anywhere that does not assume that there is something or 
someone that you can work with, some kind of authority structure that you can 
work with and try to build up.”1124
                                                 
1122 Kaplan, Robert D., Op Cit, p. 4.  Compounding this problem is the fact that many jihadist insurgent 
organizations think and act globally.  To them, “territorial and governmental control are relatively unimportant.”  
Therefore, current conflicts against insurgents are not for control of a government or a territory but for order against 
ideology.  See, Gompert, David C., Op Cit, p. 20. 
 
1123 But this problem has been recognized for over a decade.  “American counterinsurgency strategy and 
doctrine must be revised to reflect the post-Cold War strategic environment…the definition of insurgency itself must 
be expanded to reflect the complexity of the new security environment.”  Metz, Steven, Counterinsurgency: Strategy 
and the Phoenix of American Capability, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 28 
February 1995, p. 26. 
1124 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Crane, Conrad C., Personal Interview, 5 November 2008.  Even where 
structure exists, it may be totally ineffective or even counterproductive.  “In postconflict environments, local police 
are normally unprepared, unwilling, or unable to perform police functions.  Even when local security personnel are 
re-equipped, retrained, and escorted by international police advisers, they still have difficulty adapting to new 
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Commonly used concepts and definitions assume that there is a recognizable and formal partner 
government in place to assist or be supported by counterinsurgent efforts: 
  
“Because of the definition of COIN that we were stuck with, there is an 
assumption that we are supporting a government. That is an assumption.”1125
 
 
Rebalancing away from full spectrum capacities does not help secure strategic interests in these 
circumstances; in fact, this kind of rebalancing ensures that a number of strategic objectives 
cannot be met or can only be met at substantial cost.  If stability is the goal, then maintaining full 
spectrum capabilities and a capacity for intervention is required.  “From a cost-benefit analysis, 
too, it is much less expensive to prevent state failing and failure than it is to provide post-conflict 
humanitarian relief and/or funds for post-conflict reconstruction.”1126  Although progress in 
failed or failing states “continues to be judged in large part on the basis of international resources 
expended or programs implemented,” 1127
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances, providing police services, and gaining public acceptance.  In addition, police institutions need to be 
reformed and new police officers need to be recruited.”  Perito, Robert M., Op Cit, p. 2. 
 capability is still measured by the capacity of an 
organization to support strategic objectives and to accomplish organizational goals.  “Few major 
combat operations alone, no matter how decisive, can achieve the nation’s strategic 
1125 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Crane, Conrad C., Personal Interview, 5 November 2008. 
1126 Rotberg, Robert I., “Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?,” NIC 2020 Project Paper, 6 
November 2003, p. 8. 
1127 Cohen, Craig, Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction, U.S. Institute of Peace, 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 1, March 2006, p. 3. 
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objectives…because no other agency is capable of taking the lead in post-conflict, the U.S. 
military should accept its role as the lead agency, plan for it, and be ready to execute as the next 
phase of operations until relieved of responsibility by a civilian authority.” 1128
8.5 FUTURE ADVERSARY STRATEGIES: THE CASE AGAINST THE LEGACY 
AND FOR THE INCORPORATION OF ADAPTATION 
 
The military planning, programming, and budgeting system, or PPBS, is a slow and laborious 
arrangement designed to match strategy with force structure over a period of years and 
sometimes up to a decade.  Acquisition, despite notable rapid acquisition procedures (the RFI in 
particular) employed during OEF and OIF is also a significantly protracted process.  This 
sclerotic system was serviceable during the drawn out competition of the Cold War but now 
poses significant constraints on potential organizational adaptation.  In fact, the PPBS system or 
any similarly entertained derivative of this system, constrains organizational adaptation while at 
the same time requiring it to occur for the prosecution of strategy.  As was demonstrated in Iraq, 
some adversaries adapt very quickly and can rapidly marshal significant personnel and material 
to accomplish their organizational goals seemingly out of thin air.  Matching this capability with 
a system designed to respond in, say, 5 years or longer, invites jeopardy.   Strategies and doctrine 
reflecting the protracted timelines of the PPBS also assure that no matter how forward looking 
                                                 
1128 Rooms, Travis E., Beginning with the End in Mind: Post-Conflict Operations and Campaign Planning, 
School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 
May 2005, p. 49. 
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and innovative the planner, military organizations will have to be prepared to adapt.  Only if, or 
until, enemies decide to cooperate with U.S. planning and procurement procedures, future 
leaders will have their policy options tied to structural and force decisions made 10 years earlier.  
Thus, organizations will have to be prepared to adapt to achieve organizational goals.1129
Many aspects of the U.S. Army’s institutional legacy, from top to bottom, inhibit 
organizational adaptation.  Strategy premised on the primacy of state-based enemies and the 
control of territory is limited in its applicability to adversaries that don’t respect national borders.  
“A strategy focused on controlling territory is not useful against a geographically dispersed and 
mobile adversary.”
  This 
puts organizational leaders in the awkward position of having to adapt to a recently manifesting 
enemy with a force structure and attendant equipment developed for a decade’s old strategy.  
Developing flexible strategy is difficult: interests, and the structures securing these interests, do 
not change often even though threat organizations might.  In an age where the international 
security environment is populated with both slowly developing and nearly instantaneously 
developing threat organizations, organizational adaptation is critical for supporting fairly stable 
strategies, defending national interests, and ultimately for survival. 
1130  Whether al Qaeda operates in Afghanistan or Pakistan is of limited 
concern to that organization but poses significant and perhaps insurmountable challenges to U.S. 
military strategy.  Doctrine reflecting static preferences rather than a dynamic reality is also 
inhibiting.  “Doctrine must evolve with the changing requirements of the operational 
environment to ensure an organization remains relevant and viable.”1131
                                                 
1129 See, Reynolds, Kevin, Op Cit, p. 1. 
  Words and pictures, 
1130 Gompert, David C., Op Cit, p. 2. 
1131 Sigel, Michael B., Op Cit, p. 106. 
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codified in documents that are only occasionally updated and typically only when events have 
overcome the organization, can keep the adaptive process in stasis.1132   It is difficult to capture 
the variability of the enemy in carefully scripted lexicon and in sentence format; the tendency to 
use Manichean terms or literal chiaroscuro creates false boundaries and an inappropriate sense of 
definition.  Such misleadingly neat distinctions have cascading effects on efforts to separate the 
preferred, possible, and probable and ultimately affect training and environmental 
understanding.1133
                                                 
1132 Terriff, et al, argue that “Cookie-cutter ‘how to’ doctrines that often have far too much in common with 
manuals for how to strip a rifle or fix an engine may work in one specific place but may not work nearly as well in 
another conflict—indeed, they are a potential recipe for failure.  What is required are new ways of thinking about 
war and warfare, and concepts and doctrines that stress ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ rather than specific 
practices and implementation if our military organizations are to be able to deal successfully with the evolution of 
war and the resultant challenges across geography and cultures.”  Terriff, Terry, Op Cit, p. 282. 
  Training limited to one type of adversary but posed in various circumstances, 
however coherent with legacy training apparatuses, does not make an individual or an 
organization adaptive or full spectrum capable; instead, it dulls the innately adaptive spirit and 
cognitive curiosity of the soldier.  Learning and adapting are continuous processes that shape 
both friendly and threat forces.  “It is interesting to note that this pathologic resistance on the part 
of the military to ‘lessons learned’ on counterinsurgency (and counterterrorism for that matter) 
rarely affects the opponents in a given conflict (i.e., guerrilla groups or terrorist organizations), 
who consciously study and learn both from their own past mistakes as well as from the 
successful operations of their enemies.  This is no less true among insurgents in Iraq than it has 
1133 See, Gray, Colin S., “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War 
Adapt?,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2006, p. 54. 
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been for guerrillas and terrorists elsewhere.”1134  The Warrior Ethos needs to be supplemented 
with the Adaptive Ethos: a matching of brawn and brains to make the full spectrum soldier.1135
Adversary variability and willingness to regress into older forms of combat confounds the 
linear progression assumed by many military planners and strategists.  This can occur over a long 
period as adversaries find utility in cruder and less expensive forms of warfare and equipment or 
over a short period (such as when in frequent contact)
   
1136
                                                 
1134 Hoffman, Bruce, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2004, p. 7. 
 as adversaries discover that trying to 
keep pace with ultra-modern militaries, like that fielded by the United States, is not a winning 
proposition.  Adversary regression is sometimes consciously chosen and at other times the 
product of environmental conditions favoring low-tech methods and skills.  Adversary regression 
can either be the result of the security dilemma in reverse or one occurring in parallel.  Posen 
describes the security dilemma as such, “Because neighbors wish to remain autonomous and 
secure, they will react by trying to strengthen their own positions.  States can trigger these 
reactions even if they have no expansionist inclinations.  This is the security dilemma: What one 
does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less 
1135 “To be effective at counter-insurgency and stabilization operations, an army needs its members to 
perceive themselves as something other than, or more than, just warriors.  Unless they do, they are liable to apply a 
warrior ethos, approach and methods, for example exercising hard power (in particular, ‘kinetic solutions;) when 
they should be exercising soft power…To be effective at both combat and counterinsurgency, the army needs to 
have sufficient warrior ethos, but not so much that it cannot adapt, otherwise warrior ethos becomes an obstacle to 
versatility and success.  Combining these two cultures is highly problematic.”  Kiszely, John, Op Cit, p. 10. 
1136 For evidence of this pattern, See Appendix B.  Insurgents in Iraq actively took measures to operate 
below the threshold of technical sophistication of the U.S. Army whenever possible. 
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secure.”1137
  History is replete with actors failing and succeeding to adapt according to a changing 
international security environment.  Exploiting or failing to exploit elements and combinations of 
mass, firepower, and maneuver have enabled or disabled forces of all stripes across the historic 
range.  Depending on the environment, one competitor’s strengths can be another’s weaknesses 
and vice versa.  Adaptation thus serves dual purposes.  The ability to adapt and to act across the 
full spectrum of conflict allows an organization to exploit all necessary means of accomplishing 
its strategic objectives and at all the traditional levels of warfare.  Moreover, the ability to adapt 
and to act across the full spectrum denies competitors the opportunity to exploit weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities.  As conflict and the actors participating in conflict change, competitors must 
adapt accordingly to remain relevant or survive.  It the United States continues to pursue 
strategic monism, other states and non-state actors will adjust accordingly and rapidly.  A 
strength is not a strength for long when competitors adapt.  Maintaining a lead requires 
maintaining the ability to remain ahead in the adaptive cycle.  Modernization and combat 
capabilities contribute only a small portion of that ability. 
  This relationship does not have to progress as a linear competition, though.  States 
can trigger reverse reactions (an anti-modernization) in competitors or it can trigger parallel 
reactions (alternative modernization) where competitors don’t pursue dominance or parity but 
instead pursue capabilities that undermine dominance, particularly when these capabilities come 
at low cost, are easily produced, and are imitable. 
                                                 
1137 Posen, Barry R., “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security, Ed. Michael E. Brown, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993, p. 104. 
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8.5.1 The Conventional (The Good)—Unlikely and Requires Slight Adaptation1138
It is assumed that highly conventional, state-based enemies will remain highly conventional and 
will defend their interests or will attempt to undermine U.S. interests by sequential and 
traditional means.  Conventional enemies, however unlikely in the future, are convenient: 
countering them would only require slight and incremental adaptations to the traditional 
force.
 
1139
                                                 
1138 Three traditional threat scenarios are considered unlikely: global war against a near peer; an anti-U.S. 
alliance and; war in the open ocean or massed air-to-air engagements.  Tangredi, Sam J., “All Possible Wars? 
Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001-2021,” McNair Paper #63, National Defense 
University, 2000, p. 136.  See also, Nagl, John A. and Paul L. Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” Armed 
Forces Journal, October 2006. 
  Technological strengths in precision and firepower could be exploited expeditiously.  
Standard examples include a mechanized infantry war in Korea, an air and sea battle in the 
Taiwan Straits, or a tank battle somewhere in the Middle East.  It is further assumed that 
unconventional methods would not be employed, in the main, by any of the participants 
regardless of how effective these methods might be at undermining U.S. strategy and interests. 
But if the United States’ adversaries are deterred at the upper end of the spectrum of conflict by 
high-end strategic air, naval, and missile forces but not at the lower end, obviously a competent 
enemy would deny U.S. strategic goals through strategies emphasizing lower-end of the 
spectrum capabilities.  Doing so would be remarkably inconvenient to an institution that desires 
1139 Williams contends that this preference has two parts: the Congressional-Military-Industrial Complex 
and mirror imaging, that “future adversaries would be like us—fight like us, equip like us.”  Williams, J. Noel, Op 
Cit, p. 9. 
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a return to combat-centric doctrine and capabilities.  But wherever there is a weakness, it will be 
exploited by state-based and non-state enemies alike. 
State-based enemies are not quite as static as this generic as the preferred threat paradigm 
would assume.  State-based enemies and impartial observers alike have adapted their strategies, 
operations, and tactics based on the U.S. Army’s performance in conflict.  In response to 
Operation DESERT STORM, one high-level Indian observer wrote: “The Indian political 
leadership needs to review their political philosophy which precludes any pre-emptive action 
against an enemy concentrating its forces in preparation for war.  More so, if the enemy has a 
preponderance of military power as the coalition fielded against Iraq.  The defensive posture 
must be designed to inflict attrition at all stages of the conflict so that the accumulative effects 
exceed the point where the enemy can continue to prosecute his offensive.  Military commanders 
must integrate the entire force spectrum and direct their energies to degrade the enemy’s total 
potential by striking at critically vulnerable places and times.  They must be permitted to apply 
their resources before, during and after the hostilities.”1140
                                                 
1140 Nair, VK, War in the Gulf: Lessons for the Third World, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1991, p. 
228. 
  In response to OIF the Russians 
“found much to applaud from a military point of view in what they perceived to be innovation, 
adaptation, and effective use of information and an integration among the services that is new.  
On the other hand, they were critical of Iraq’s performance and believed that the Iraqis had the 
means to defeat US forces in the field.  General of the Army M. L. Gareyev argued that the Iraqis 
did not effectively defend the approaches to Baghdad.  He argued that ‘with thorough 
camouflage, combined with a large number of decoy targets and minefields, they (troops 
defending the approaches to Baghdad) could have played an important role in repulsing the 
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invasion of the Anglo-American troops.  Gareyev also argued that Russia could learn from the 
US experience in combating guerrilla warfare.  For example, US operations in Iraq suggested to 
him that Russia should train and organize units to operate in ‘maneuver intensive raids’; and that 
greater attention must be paid to ‘reliable protection for lines of communication, command and 
control posts and logistics.’  For the most part, these Russian observers did not believe the 
coalition handled urban warfare well and felt that a well-executed urban fight would give the US 
pause.”1141
 
  It must be assumed that states witnessing operational struggles in Afghanistan and 
Iraq would exploit the full spectrum of conflict in any confrontation with the United States.  This 
demands that the U.S. Army maintain the capacity to adapt accordingly: 
“I think that a fight against a near-term competitor sometime in the future would 
be a fight dominated by all of these elements [offense, defense, HIC, and LIC] 
and we need an adaptive soldier and leader on the battlefield that can quickly 
move from one to the other and knows when to apply on and the other.”1142
 
 
As Nagl and Yingling argue, “Even states with the resources to generate conventional combat 
power find insurgent tactics effective.”1143
                                                 
1141 Fontenot, Gregory, et al, Op Cit, p. 387. 
  Non-state actors surely must have learned the same 
lessons. 
1142 General Chiarelli, Peter, Telephone Interview, 27 October 2008. 
1143 Nagl, John A. and Paul L. Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” Armed Forces Journal, October 
2006. 
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Conventional threat assessment and thinking proceeds under the following guidelines 
offered by Kiszely:1144
 
 
• The end state that matters is the military one; 
• Operational success is achieved by the application of lethal firepower which, in 
turn, is largely a question of targeting and physical manoeuvre; 
• The effects to be achieved are physical ones; 
• The means to the end are largely attritional: destroying targets until there are none 
left; 
• Technology will disperse or at least penetrate ‘the impenetrable fog of war’; 
• Given sufficient resources, all campaigns are winnable—and quickly; 
• The world is divided into ‘enemy forces’ and ‘friendly forces’ and; 
• The operational picture can be seen in distinct colours: black and white. 
The conceptualization of modern conventional adversaries is flawed for a number of reasons: 1) 
some peer traditional conventional adversaries are a shadow of their former selves and have no 
real interests in directly challenging U.S. military superiority for quite some time, if ever;1145
                                                 
1144 Kiszely, John, Op Cit, p. 9. 
 2) 
China’s military growth, although impressive and expanding, is not outpacing U.S. military 
growth in any significant traditional categories and won’t be for quite some time, if ever; 3) 
mitigating threats to strategic goals and interests does not necessarily require a large and highly 
conventional ground force—many of these threats can be deterred or punished with existing air 
1145 See, Gates, Robert M., Op Cit, p. 32. 
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and sea forces and; 4) conventional enemies are no more likely to disturb global stability and 
threaten vital U.S. interests than non-state or unconventional adversaries.  Although nuclear and 
major wars waged by states might be the most catastrophic threats the United States faces, they 
are still the least likely.  As argued in a Joint Operational Environment (JOE) assessment 
conducted by Joint Forces Command, “Irregular wars are more likely, and winning such 
conflicts will prove just as important to the protection of America’s vital interests and the 
maintenance of global stability.”1146  Additionally, capabilities premised on traditional threats 
cannot and will not prevent other kinds of conflict, which might be equally destabilizing if not as 
well resourced or managed.  The most important kind of war then will be ““the kind waged not 
by states against one another but by guerrillas, terrorists, and similar organizations against states, 
or the other way around.”1147
Conventional enemies will likely become more unconventional as they are capable, 
particularly because non-state organizations armed with irregular capabilities are proliferating 
and states have had trouble handling the threats these organizations pose.
  
1148
                                                 
1146 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Op Cit, p. 46. 
  Accordingly, an 
unconventional capability is useful against both non-state and state-based actors.  Iraq, and 
domestic, military, and government responses to the conduct of operations there, indicated to 
other potential adversaries that there is much to gain by emulating insurgent organizations in 
their operations: 
1147 Creveld, Martin van, The Culture of War, Ballantine Books, NY, 2008, p. 297. 
1148 “The armed forces of the most advanced countries, and certainly of the United States, all formidable 
against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable formations, are least effective in fighting insurgents.”  
Luttwak, Edward, “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Harper’s, April 2007. 
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“I think that in many ways, Iraq has been very revealing.  It has given us the 
basic components of the new kind of fight and I think that anybody that we were to 
get into a similar type of confrontation with in the future is going to surely learn 
from those lessons.”1149
 
 
The conduct of RDO and the subsequent failure to accomplish strategic objectives in Iraq 
because of a lack of full spectrum capabilities demonstrated that conventional dominance will 
not necessarily produce stability or favorable conditions in a target country.  In fact, 
“overwhelming success in RDO produces 2nd and 3rd order effects detrimental to creating the 
conditions for a free and open society to emerge within a region—the chief objective of military 
intervention in the modern environment.”1150
To counter U.S. forces, unconventional capabilities and strategies that exploit the lower 
end of the spectrum of conflict—or anything causing mass instability—are much cheaper to 
pursue but no less strategically effective.  For smaller states, this might mean that the 
maintenance of WMD capabilities and significant numbers of unconventional forces is sufficient.  
For larger states this might mean the development of strategies of denial or attrition requiring the 
 
                                                 
1149 General Chiarelli, Peter, Telephone Interview, 27 October 2008.  See also, Bansahel, Nora, “Preventing 
Insurgencies after Major Combat Operations,” Defence Studies, Volume 6, Number 3, September 2006, p. 278, and, 
Arquilla, John, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Op Cit, 1999.  See also, Smith, Anton K., Op Cit, and Perry, 
Walter L. and John Gordon, Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies, RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, 
p. 51. 
1150 Watson, Brian G., Op Cit, p. 4. 
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imposition of U.S. ground forces is sufficient.  Both types of states might “couple low 
technology expedients with creative operational or tactical concepts” to achieve greater degrees 
of effectiveness.1151  In either case, conventional enemies will likely perceive a need to maintain 
the “minimum military capacity essential to drive American political and military risk 
calculations toward prohibitive or unacceptable levels.”1152  Paradoxically, the arguments for 
modernization and RDO that the NDP made in 1997, although intended otherwise, indicate quite 
precisely that traditional enemies will be much less likely to maintain a conventional course in 
the future: “we can safely assume that future adversaries will have learned from the Gulf War.  It 
is likely that they will find new ways to challenge our interests, our forces and our citizens.  They 
will seek to disable the underlying structures that enable our military operations.”1153
 Conducting successive full spectrum operations throughout the 1990s and then 
simultaneous full spectrum operations in OIF should have been bellwether events indicating just 
how strategically dangerous the Transformation program could be if it was allowed to 
conceptually replace likely enemies with the convenient and preferred.  Were Transformation not 
interrupted, at least temporarily, by operations in Iraq, there would be much less debate over the 
direction and posture of the U.S. Army.  State-based, conventional enemies would still be the 
  Ironically, 
the United States might end up being the only country unable to learn from its operations in the 
Persian Gulf War, OEF, and OIF. 
                                                 
1151 Isaacson, Jeffrey A. et al, Op Cit, p. 8. 
1152 Freier, Nathan, Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, 
Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
May 2007, p. 51. 
1153 National Defense Panel, Op Cit. 
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primary, and perhaps only, threats on the U.S. Army’s radar.  As Hoffman argues, “Had the 
United States achieved the transformation agenda it put forward, I think it would have been at a 
substantial strategic disadvantage in the real world today.  No doubt, its capacity to defend 
against ballistic missiles and to attack the space-based assets of a mythical peer competitor 
would be superb.”1154  Adversaries are adaptive.  Despite the U.S. Army’s interest in putting 
adversaries into neat boxes and its assumption that the onward lockstep march towards 
technological capabilities will translate into full spectrum capacity against all types of threat 
organizations, the enemy has a vote in this process.  As Gray warns, “If the American way of 
war becomes formulaic, albeit technologically impressive, it invites smart enemies to wage the 
kind of conflict wherein U.S. strengths would be at a heavy discount.  Any belief that U.S. 
military power, somewhat transformed by the exploitation of information systems, can plan to 
fight almost without regard to enemy preferences and abilities, should be hastily buried.”1155  
Conventional enemies do not have to fight conventionally in order to be effective, “they only 
have to create conditions similar to those we see today in Iraq on a wider regional level.”1156
                                                 
1154 Hoffman, Frank G., 4GW as a Model of Future Conflict, Boyd 2007 Conference, 13 July 2007. 
  It is 
likely the conventional will not be quite as conventional as it was once assumed: strategy and 
planning should take due account of this possibility. 
1155 Gray, Colin S., National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities, Potomac Books, Washington 
DC, 2009, pp. 42-43. 
1156 MacGregor, Douglas, Army Transformation: Implications for the Future, Testimony before the House 
Armed Services Committee, 15 July 2004, p. 10. 
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8.5.2 The Unconventional (The Bad)—Likely and Requires Significant Adaptation 
Two future unconventional missions that the United States will likely have to conduct are the 
‘Active Management of Purposeful Unconventional Threats’ and ‘Armed Stabilization’:  
Unconventional Threats—“The challenges of both terrorism and organized crime are increasing 
in strategic impact and lethality.  Their lethal and nonlethal management requires persistent 
commitment of land forces with specialized capabilities.  These forces must penetrate foreign 
territory and populations and operate with discrimination, precision, and low visibility;”1157 
Armed Stabilization—“Armed stabilization is undertaken in concert with other states in 
coalition. But is also remains a unilateral U.S. option.  It includes substantial combat action, 
simultaneous provision of basic public goods to affected populations, and the initiation of early 
reconstruction.”1158  A third mission, “Facilitation of Limited, Whole-of-Government 
Stabilization and Reconstruction,” is also likely.  In this mission, land forces will “need to 
demonstrate increased competency in a number of essential nonmilitary functions associated 
with complex unconventional contingencies.  For example, the more violent the environment, the 
likelier it is that U.S. land forces will fill essential nonmilitary capacity gaps until conditions are 
more conducive or hospitable to large-scale civilian deployment.”1159
                                                 
1157 Freier, Nathan, The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower, 
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 
PA, April 2009, p. 72. 
  Conducting any of these 
missions with traditional configurations and training or with proposed ‘rebalanced’ capabilities 
1158 Ibid, p. 74. 
1159 Ibid, p. 79. 
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will be difficult.  The challenge of unconventional operations, whether against traditional or 
unconventional threat organizations or in the conduct of stability operations, is compounded by 
the U.S. Army’s “grounding in conventional war and cultural predisposition to focus almost 
exclusively on these types of campaigns.”1160
Planning, training for, and conducting unconventional operations requires significant 
adaptive capacities of the organizations charged with translating tactical success into strategic 
victory.  This is all the more true when the DOD institutionally avoids or applies conventional 
approaches to these operations.  Throughout OIF and OEF the elements of the institutional U.S. 
Army and other DOD subordinates and affiliates, instead of thinking and acting 
unconventionally, applied conventional methods and means to unconventional missions and 
problem sets.  The DOD has described the challenges posed in counterterrorism missions as 
“being able to find, identify, track, and eliminate terrorists.”
  These three mission sets are likely but are not well 
covered by combat-centric modernization programs other than in rhetoric.  Even if the future 
force is well disposed for the kinds of missions that Freier discusses (and this would be because 
of organizational and individual memory and skills developed during OEF and OIF, not force 
design), it will still have to adapt to a rapidly changing environment and therefore must be 
capable of conducting simultaneous full spectrum operations.  Conducting these missions will 
require the U.S. Army to adapt nearly as much if not more so than it had to in Iraq. 
1161
                                                 
1160 Ucko, David, “Innovation or Intertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency, Orbis, 
Spring 2008, p. 308. 
  This is a highly conventional 
approach to this mission.  Finding, identifying, tracking, and eliminating terrorists is an endless 
task and the resources devoted to this mission could be put to better use as part of a more 
1161 Gompert, David C., Op Cit, p. 38. 
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unconventional strategy: “the drone campaign is in fact part of a larger strategic error—our 
insistence on personalizing this conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Devoting time and 
resources toward killing or capturing ‘high-value’ targets—not to mention the bounties placed on 
their heads—distracts us from larger problems, while turning figures like Baitullah Mehsud, 
leader of the Pakistani Taliban umbrella group, into Robin Hoods.  Our experience in Iraq 
suggests that the capture or killing of high-value targets—Saddam Hussein or Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi—has only a slight and fleeting effect on levels of violence.”1162
Ucko contends that “the learning of counterinsurgency is understood as an Iraq exit-
strategy”
  When the DOD frames 
all conflict in a conventional sense, the Joint Staff concurs, and many units are then dedicated to 
the prosecution of a conventional war against a highly unconventional foe, organizational sub-
units find their goals that much more difficult to achieve. 
1163
                                                 
1162 Kilcullen, David and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” The New 
York Times, 16 May 2009. 
 and that unconventional adversaries should not distract from the more important 
mission of preparing for more dangerous state-based enemies.  The idea that adversaries will be 
unconventional and that OIF portends a likely future is only partially accepted by the U.S. 
Army—perhaps more so by the U.S. Marine Corps—but is almost wholly rejected by the other 
services.  “The interpretation of this campaign [Iraq] as signifying a need to learn 
counterinsurgency clashes with that of other DoD components, which view it as a temporary 
aberration that will not be repeated.  All too often, Iraq is cast as an exception to the rule: the 
specific political circumstances leading to the invasion were so peculiar, the United States’ 
1163 Ucko, David, “Innovation of Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,” Orbis, 
Spring 2008, p. 302. 
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international isolation so inauspicious, and the initial occupation so bungled, that it is thought 
unlikely that a similar scenario will ever occur.”1164
8.5.3 The Unpredictable (The Ugly)—Likely and Requires Continuous Adaptation 
  Given noticeable changes to the 
international security environment, this interpretation of OIF is mistaken. 
To counter unpredictable adversaries, which might be best characterized as a complex mix of 
diverse adversary types that are variously motivated will require continuous adaptation by the 
U.S. Army.  The greatest threat facing the United States is not that posed by formal states,1165
                                                 
1164 Ibid. 
 
instead it is by some, yet unknown, amalgamation of various non-state organizations or state-
supported organizations operating independently across the spectrum of conflict and potentially 
in league with other differently motivated organizations (i.e., insurgents cooperating with 
organized criminals and state forces simultaneously).  This is true in part because the lethality 
and capability of organized groups is increasing, while the incentives for states to exploit 
nontraditional modes of warfare are on the rise.  The preponderance of U.S. conventional power 
is another reason that threat organizations will adopt many forms and methods.  “The United 
States, by virtue of its massive nuclear and conventional capability, has driven almost all 
potential opponents to embrace terrorism and insurgency as their only potentially viable theory 
1165 Ressler, Steve, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and 
Future Research,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume II, Number 2, July 2006. 
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of victory.”1166  These contentions have been at least somewhat validated by experiences in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Because of continued U.S. predominance in conventional warfare (and 
unconventional weaknesses) successes in both places are likely to be replicated by variously 
composed organizations.1167
The lines between conventional and unconventional conflict have blurred significantly:  
concepts such as front and rear no longer apply and boundaries are of little significance.
  
1168  This 
proved true OIF and OEF where the range of operations conducted by both sides on a continuous 
basis had “little resemblance to familiar doctrinal concepts.”1169  Trying to separate the two is 
conceptually very difficult to accomplish unless it is done in doctrinal terms.  But doctrinal terms 
accurately describing the range of unpredictable adversaries either do not apply or have not been 
invented yet.  Distinguishing between conventional and irregular, combatants and 
noncombatants, and physical/kinetic and virtual accurately is thus nearly impossible.  Threat 
organizations can assume almost any form and the methods available to them for achieving 
organizational goals are infinite.1170
                                                 
1166 Long, Austin, “On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research,” 
RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2006, p. 73. 
  Even organizational goals are difficult to qualify since 
1167 Steinberg, Guido, Op Cit, p. 19. 
1168 Blank, Stephen J., Rethinking Asymmetric Treats, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA, September 2003.  See also, RAND, Building Partner Capacity is the Key to a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Strategy, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2006. 
1169 Emery, Norman E., “Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, 
Capabilities, and Effects,” Military Review, November-December 2008, p. 27. 
1170 Hoffman, Frank G., Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy 
Studies, Arlington, VA, December 2007, p. 57.  See also, Mandel, Robert, Security, Strategy, and the Quest for 
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many organizations are reactively motivated and/or have no identifiable positive, constructive, or 
definable objectives.  Unpredictable adversaries might: compete for uncontrolled spaces; engage 
in crime, weapons trafficking, and money laundering for profit; are mostly casualty insensitive; 
operate with or without the support of states and; might conduct isolated terrorist operations.1171  
“Today, the United States finds itself confounded by lightly-armed and loosely organized 
opponents that use violence illegitimately; information and the media indiscriminately; and in 
practice, appear more violent communities of interest than suitable military rivals.  In spite of 
their obvious weaknesses, however, these nonstate opponents and malcontents have proven 
remarkably equal to the task of effective competition with the United States and its range of 
advantages in military power, resources, and prestige.”1172
                                                                                                                                                             
Bloodless War, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2004 and Sallot, Steven M., Defeating a Cause: Anatomy of Defeat 
for Conflicts Involving Non-Nation States, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 
2006. 
  Developing templates or plans for 
countering these unpredictable threat organizations is no less difficult, cognitively or physically, 
than is predicting and controlling crime that is going to happen in the future.  These actors and 
1171 Metz, Steven, Rethinking Insurgency, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
June 2007, p. 11.  See also, RAND, Countering Insurgency in the Muslim World: Rethinking U.S. Priorities and 
Capabilities, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, Larabee, F. Stephen, The Middle East: The Changing Strategic 
Environment, RAND, Santa Monica, 2006, and Hoffman, Frank G., Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid 
Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA, December 2007. 
1172 Freier, Nathan, Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, 
Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 
May 2007, pp. 53-54. 
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organizations operate almost exclusively at times and places of their own choosing, can be 
durable or ephemeral, and can blend into almost any environment. 
As states further devolve and non-state organizations expand in size, scope, and 
influence, predicting their actions and planning operations against these organizations will prove 
to be nearly an impossible task.  No matter the organizational form the U.S. Army assumes, 
adaptation will be required.  Once engaged these organizations will mutate, expand or contract as 
organizational inputs and outputs are modified, and will attract or repel support from all sorts of 
variously motivated groups.  “All over the world, citizens of states are transferring their primary 
allegiance away from the state to other things: to tribes, ethnic groups, religions, gangs, 
ideologies and so on.  Many people who will no longer fight for their state will fight for their 
new primary loyalty.  In America’s two wars with Iraq, the Iraqi state armed forces showed little 
fight, but Iraqi insurgents whose loyalties are to non-state elements are now waging a hard-
fought and effective guerrilla war.”1173
8.5.4 Achieving a Sustainable Balance through Adaptation 
  The U.S. Army will have no choice but to rapidly react 
and adapt to these unpredictable organizations should strategy necessitate that they be countered 
by military force. 
There are several likely future threats to U.S. security and each will employ a range of 
strategies, operations, and tactics, as capable.  Although some of these threat organizations are 
potential while others are probable and some are definite, each will challenge the U.S. Army, as 
                                                 
1173 Wheeler, Winslow T. and Lawrence J. Korb, Military Reform, Praeger Security International, 
Westport, CT, 2007, p. 196. 
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the United States’ premier land-based force, to be full spectrum capable.  The range of threat 
organization types, available methods, and motivations, is expansive: adversaries can be single 
individuals; massive networks of smaller organizations; states or; a dizzying and unpredictable 
combination of all of these.  Operational purity and organizational homogeneity are unlikely 
traits for future threat organizations.  Consequentially, singularly capable forces should be 
anathema to U.S. Army planners.  But as the Transformation program continues into a period of 
rebalancing, “U.S. military force posture appears increasingly at odds with the emerging 
strategic environment.”1174
The U.S. Army’s rebalancing effort, which should otherwise be known as a return to 
Transformation, is quixotic.  Many commentators, analysts, practitioners, and strategists doubt 
that the U.S. Army will have to fight a conventional war against a near-peer enemy anytime in 
the future but that is the premise on which the rebalancing drive is founded.  Moreover, if such a 
conflict were to occur, it would be unlikely to involve a massive deployment of land-based 
forces for purely conventional operations.  Thus, whatever traditional conventional capability 
deterioration has occurred over the past 8 years might not be so consequential.  “Ultimately, the 
erosion of U.S. high-intensity warfare capabilities may not matter, since the United States is 
unlikely to face a serious competitor at the high end of land conflict in the near term.”
 
1175
                                                 
1174 Record, Jeffrey, Beating Goliath, Potomac Books, Washington DC, 2007, p. 109. 
  Even 
if a serious competitor did appear, it would do so slowly and perceptibly and would allow plenty 
of time for preparation, provisioning, and training.  Furthermore, the doctrine, basic skills, 
training regimens, and equipment requisite to such an eventuality are all still largely in place 
1175 Long, Austin, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 
1960-1970 and 2003-2006, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Paper 6, 2008, p. 28. 
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despite resource shifting throughout OEF and OIF.  Given that this is a very unlikely scenario, 
especially in the near term, the focus of rebalancing should be on capturing and institutionalizing 
the adaptive skills (charted in this study) that individuals and organizations developed throughout 
the course of OIF: adaptive decentralization, learning, experimentation, innovation, and 
information sharing against a set of truly full spectrum adversaries.  The U.S. Army should 
specifically avoid assuming that the OIF experience provides a template for successful 
operations in the contemporary environment.  The environment is too dynamic and adversaries 
are too adaptive for doctrine and training to assume past successes can be replicated with past 
actions.1176
If the chosen organizational form, doctrine, training, and education are not appropriate 
for effectively and efficiently achieving organizational goals and objectives, in light of strategic 
interests, changes in the international security environment, and likely enemies, then they should 
all be rejected.  Although any organization created by the U.S. Army will have to adapt when it 
comes into contact with the threat environment, its focus should be on adapting its organizational 
inputs and outputs in coherence with strategic imperatives and superior resources, not to 
  Strategy, potential enemies, and organizational goals should shape any rebalancing 
effort, not vice versa. 
                                                 
1176 “The Army should not adopt the Iraqi model as the basis for determining the operating environment.  
Instead, the OIF experience can inform the design of threats and scenarios.  Replicating the operational environment 
must be so dynamic that operating in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity becomes second nature to soldiers and 
their units.  What can be imported from the Iraqi model is the range of threats (Special Republican Guard, regular 
army, Fedayeen, terrorists, etc.); the combination of enemy conventional, unconventional, and information 
operations; and the variety of conditions.  These conditions range from terrain and weather combinations, 
simultaneous combat and humanitarian assistance, and changing political/social factors.”  Fontenot, Gregory, et al, 
Op Cit, p. 385. 
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institutional flaws.  Any organization formed should be done so in order to maximize its adaptive 
potential by responsively flooding resources to the smallest sub-units appropriate for any given 
mission.  Inappropriate force design slows the adaptive process significantly as organizations 
have to adapt to an ever changing enemy while also adapting to institutional defects predicated 
on a misreading of the environment and strategic needs.  Adapting to both is inefficient and 
ineffective: resources are wasted while the enemy is allowed to freely exploit any advantages 
obtained by its organizational form, resources, and inherent capabilities.  Until organizational 
inputs and outputs are aligned to achieve organizational goals without significant structural 
interference from the institution, adaptation will suffer and the achievement of organizational 
goals will be subject to substantial setbacks and losses.  
Redeveloping combat skills and capabilities that have been allowed to atrophy during 
recent campaigns is appropriate but it should not come at the expense of the ability to adapt or to 
the detriment of newly developed simultaneous full spectrum capabilities.1177  Combat skills 
should be trained and incorporated as they enhance full spectrum capabilities and enable support 
for strategic initiatives.  Essentially, organizational surprise should be eliminate; there should be 
few non-doctrinal missions for the future U.S. Army.  Fundamental changes—needed but not 
achieved in the post-Cold War period—accomplished during the OIF campaign must be 
permanently incorporated into doctrine, training, and education.1178
                                                 
1177 U.S. predominance in traditional warfare is not unchallenged, but is sustainable for the medium term 
given current trends.”  Gates, Robert M., The National Defense Strategy, U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, pp. 20-
21. 
  Rebalancing should also 
1178 After Somalia, the U.S. Army failed to grasp the lessons of that conflict (dynamic nature of tribal 
society, in particular).  Furthermore, despite the need, the U.S. Army inadvertently avoided organizational learning 
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duly reflect that while many, many organizational adaptations were made, the institutional Army 
resourced these adaptations, and strategy was altered to reflect the effectiveness of these 
adaptations, some things did not change.  Although unit training strongly reflected ongoing 
operational needs as OIF progressed, by 2008, education at the U.S. Army War College 
overwhelmingly reflected an institutional preference for education on traditional operations and 
concepts—6.2% of the courses and 4.8% of the hours in the core curriculum were dedicated to 
ongoing operations.1179
Ultimately, it matters not whether the legacy or the adaptive organization prevails as long 
as the future force is best suited to conducting operations in support of strategy, within the 
confines of the international security environment, and against threats to U.S. interests.  
Adaptation will occur regardless of the choices made.  But the United States government (and 
the security of its strategic interests) should not have to rely on the ingenuity and adaptability of 
soldiers if it reasonably could have anticipated the adaptations which needed to be made.  The 
degree and level of adaptation necessary for achieving organizational goals within these 
parameters will serve as indicative indictment of the design’s removal from the ideal 
organizational form.  History will duly record this separation.   
  Separation from the currently desired balance might be a bit overstated, 
at least in the educational and cognitive realms.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that the U.S. Army’s 
overwhelmingly conventional and combat-centric culture has changed so much as to require 
rebalancing, particularly among more senior leaders and members of the combat arms branches. 
                                                                                                                                                             
by rejecting the fundamentals of the post-Cold War international security environment.  Of course, this changed 
during the course of OIF.  Lopez, Rafael, Op Cit, p. 19. 
1179 Ucko, David, “Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency,” Orbis, 
Spring 2008, p. 301. 
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9.0  IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
“No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.”—Helmuth von Moltke 
 
The U.S. Army crossed an operational rubicon during OIF.  There is no longer a combat 
equivalent equilibrium to return to because the spectrum of conflict has essentially been 
collapsed, perhaps irrevocably.  Since there are potentially infinite combinations of 
organizational forms and operational methods available to threat organizations, there is neither 
definition to nor finality on any band of the spectrum of conflict.  Thus, success in modern 
warfare will require an ability to fuse and complete full spectrum tasks simultaneously.  As long 
as national interests demand military strategies that provide some degree of stability and world 
order and as long as instability and violence plague the international security environment, the 
U.S. Army will have to be prepared to conduct the entire range of military operations and 
likewise will have to maintain a robust capacity for organizational adaptation.1180
Even if the U.S. government chooses not to intervene in destabilized areas where national 
interests are at stake, the U.S. Army must still maintain a capacity for restoring stability.  In the 
 
                                                 
1180 While strategy may change, national interests are fixed in the near- to mid-term.  Threats on the other 
hand will continue to evolve and undermine the current global order.  Manwaring, Max G., Shadows of Things Past 
and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in our Midst, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, Carlisle, PA, November 2004. 
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future, events in the Western Hemisphere might overflow to directly threaten the continental 
United States.  The key to retaining strategic flexibility will be continually resourcing the 
adaptability of the individual soldier and tactical organizations so that regardless of the 
environment they are deployed to they will be able to adapt and accomplish their missions, 
whether broad or narrow in scope.  Considering the adaptive potential of numerous state and 
non-state adversaries, any organizational and operational weaknesses can and will be exploited.  
Organizational adaptability will keep open a range of strategic options whether or not they are 
pursued.  With a larger force this is prudent; with a smaller force, this is necessary. 
Leadership is important in this endeavor.  Although not examined specifically in this 
study, leadership was at least in part responsible for freeing small-unit leaders to conduct 
independent operations and adapt in support of organizational goals.  Decentralization in a 
hierarchical organization does not happen without managerial acquiescence and leader assent.  In 
an adaptive contest, capacity must be massed while capability is dispersed among subordinate 
organizations.  In Iraq, decentralization allowed for the generation of a patchwork quilt of 
innovation.1181
                                                 
1181 I would like to give credit for the term ‘patchwork quilt of innovation’ to Phil Williams.  The U.S. 
Army shifted from a top-down system of innovation to a top-down/bottom-up system of innovation to a more 
flattened system where innovations went in and out of and across organizations.  The insurgency largely maintained 
an in and out and across system of innovation (in the case of more centralized organizations like AQI, the system of 
innovation was top-down and across). 
  A centralized, directed, and deliberate program of innovation would not have 
been nearly as effective in taking advantage of localized environmental and organizational 
knowledge or for spurring creative but effective changes to organizational inputs and outputs for 
mission success.  But leadership was essential for ensuring that successful innovations and 
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adaptations made by unencumbered small unit leaders spread within, across, and among 
organizations and were incorporated into the institution.  Massing adaptive capabilities ensured 
that resources were efficiently and effectively appropriated (for the most part) in a coordinated 
fashion.  Eventually, organizations were conducting well resourced adaptations that 
overwhelmed the adaptive and responsive capacities of the insurgency.  In the near future, 
leadership will be critical for recognizing that individual soldiers are central to any 
organizational adaptation: 
 
“To institutionalize adaptability really takes attention to the Soldier as the key 
adaptable agent.  Organizations do not ‘learn,’ but the people in them do.  
Empowered, those people can make necessary changes.  Encouraging 
adaptability requires a combination of policy, recruitment/selection, and 
education.”1182
 
 
Although technology, systems integration, and doctrine can contribute to a soldier’s and an 
organization’s adaptive capabilities they do not translate directly into capacity without the 
intervening influence of soldiers and organizations.1183
                                                 
1182 Major General Bolger, Dan, E-mail Interview, 13 September 2008. 
  Leadership can also ensure that 
subordinate organizations’ adaptive capacities are resourced through education, training, 
1183 Scales warns against a fixation on technology.  “Our fixation on technology—our very technological 
success—has led us to believe that the soldier is a system and the enemy is a target.  Soldiers are now viewed, 
especially by this U.S. Defense Department, as an ‘overhead expense,’ not a source of investment.”  Scales, Robert 
H., Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 April 2007, p. 1. 
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informal communication, changes in organizational culture,1184
It is important to note that promoting organizational adaptation will not automatically 
translate into organizational success.  If inappropriate plans, strategies, doctrines, and structures 
persist despite their ineffectiveness, organizations will find that they can adapt but not properly.  
For instance, even though lessons and adaptations drawn from operations in OIF are being 
applied in Afghanistan they might not be applicable to this environment especially if guided by 
an unsuitable strategy.  While tactical U.S. Army units did adapt in Iraq despite a deeply flawed 
initial strategy and operational plan, efforts to resource this endeavor suffered accordingly and 
adaptation was slowed.  A similar struggle might be unfolding in Afghanistan.  Although the so-
called ‘surge’ in Iraq allowed for the prosecution of a new strategy based on successful tactical 
adaptations, an equivalent surge in Afghanistan might be misguided.  The findings of this study 
suggest that difficulties faced in Afghanistan are the result of at least three possibilities:  1) the 
Afghan insurgency is capable of making adaptations faster than the U.S. Army; 2) the Afghan 
insurgency is better resourced for making adaptations than the U.S. Army or;
 and relaxed controls on 
operations in conflict environments and exercises in garrison.   
1185
                                                 
1184 Long argues that changes to organizational culture occurring during OIF may only be temporary.  
Long, Austin, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 
2003-2006, RAND Counterinsurgency Study Paper 6, 2008, p. 28. 
 3) U.S. Army 
1185 Although this would seem unlikely given the preponderance of resources the United States (and other 
nations) is flooding into Afghanistan, resources are most effective when organizations are adapting in harmony, 
strategies and objectives are coherent and agreed upon, and when resources are dedicated to supporting 
organizational goals.  If organizational goals are inappropriate, resourcing can have little effect or can be 
counterproductive—this depends on how inappropriate these organizational goals are.  Furthermore, Afghanistan’s 
insurgent organizations seem to suffer from minimal organizational friction.  Afghanistan’s insurgent network will 
 560 
tactical organizations are adapting to an inappropriate strategy and thus inappropriate 
organizational goals.1186
Insurgencies and other unconventional operations are adaptive contests.  “Each tries to 
learn, adapt, and change what they are doing more quickly than the other.
  If the strategy employed in Afghanistan is misaligned with strategic 
intent, then all 3 possibilities could be true. 
1187
 
  Forming an 
adaptive organization and inculcating an adaptive mindset is a difficult task, no matter what the 
environment nor the threat organization being faced.  In the absence of leadership emphasizing 
the necessity of and fostering organizational adaptation, the U.S. Army will likely rebalance 
towards a more familiar but less adaptive organizational form: 
“The Army’s natural tendency will be to gravitate back towards conventional 
high-end, high-intensity fighting and training for that.  This is where the civilian 
leadership comes into play in the DOD and White House where they have to make 
it very clear to the armed forces that they have to be prepared for a wide range of 
conflicts and they can’t train to fight the kind of wars that they want to fight.”1188
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
inherently have vast adaptive potential and will be able to appropriately marshal even limited resources quickly, 
effectively, and efficiently. 
1186 For instance, if U.S. Army organizations are adapting towards an exit strategy (like what was tried in 
Iraq prior to a change in strategy and was suggested by President Obama at the United States Military Academy) 
then certainly their effectiveness at adapting and combating the insurgency will be reduced. 
1187 Metz, Steven, Current Operations and the Political Transition in Iraq, Testimony before the Committee 
on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 17 March 2005, p. 29. 
1188 Colonel (Ret.) Mansoor, Peter, Telephone Interview, 12 September 2008. 
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As Wong argues, “Adaptive leaders learn to live with unpredictability.  They spend less time 
fretting about the inability to establish a routine or control the future and focus more on 
exploiting opportunities.”1189
9.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ARMY POLICY 
  Failing to institutionalize the lessons of the adaptation that 
occurred during OIF will leave the U.S. Army unable to properly handle unpredictability and less 
capable of recognizing and exploiting opportunities as they present themselves in the future. 
9.1.1 Strategy 
Recognizing instability as a threat to U.S. interests is a common theme of recent defense 
strategies and presidential directives.  Developing supporting military strategies that correctly 
and effectively account for instability in the international security environment is thus 
fundamental.  States and non-state actors and organizations can threaten stability by taking 
actions that disrupt the current world order and system of states.  If stability of the global order 
(as it currently exists or has historically existed) is a desired end state and principal goal of 
strategy, then that is what military organizations should be primarily tasked to support and 
provide using a full spectrum of capabilities and methods.  Supporting strategy with structures, 
doctrine, and training premised on a spectrum of conflict, in light of this strategic imperative, 
makes little sense.  In a contest between forces of order and disorder, military strategy must 
                                                 
1189 Wong, Leonard, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2004, p. 11. 
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recognize that conditions dictate methods and not vice versa.1190  Political and strategic contexts 
therefore should shape the future strategic direction of the U.S. Army.1191
Since the beginning of the Transformation program, the Joint Staff, including the U.S. 
Army, has been mistaking objectives for actual strategy, capabilities for end states, and the 
preferred for the likely.  This has caused confusion in threat perceptions and has masked the need 
for organizational adaptation to support national interests.  Krepinevich argues that strategic 
publications in the 1990s, like Joint Vision 2020, indicated that ‘information superiority’ was the 
means for enabling ‘dominant maneuver,’ ‘precision engagement,’ ‘focused logistics,’ and ‘full-
dimensional protection.’  Strategy was thus reduced to assertions “that the conditions desired will 
be achieved” and the need for considering resource limitations or enemy action was obviated.  In 
  Combat, 
counterterrorism, humanitarian, and unconventional are terms used to describe operations or 
methods and capabilities merely facilitate operations.  Stability is a condition or a desired end 
state that has political relevance and vitality.  Creating stability in the types of likely future threat 
environments under consideration in this study requires full spectrum and significant 
organizational adaptation capabilities. 
                                                 
1190 Rogers contends that the current U.S. security paradigm is based on maintaining international stability 
premised on the status quo but that many states and sub-state groups are antagonistic to this security paradigm.  See 
Rogers, Paul, “Losing Control—War and the Modern World,” International Relations, Volume 17, Number 1, 2003.  
See also, Fishel, John T. and Max G. Manwaring, Op Cit. 
1191 For discussion of transformation and the future of the U.S. Army see, Gray, Colin S. Recognizing and 
Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of Context, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 2006. 
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sum, the need for real strategy was assumed away.1192  Other strategic requirements, such as the 
need for significant stability provisioning capabilities were also assumed away creating a 
substantial capability gap unrecognized by those enchanted with the possibilities engendered by 
Transformation, many of whose proponents argued for a shift away from threat-based planning 
to capabilities-based planning and operations.  Ignoring the need for other-than-combat 
capabilities and mistaking objectives for strategy had significant operational consequences 
throughout the entire post-Cold War period.  Strategy necessitates that this must change.  “To be 
successful in future operations, the Army cannot look at operations today as temporary 
interruptions in preparing for major combat operations against a near-peer enemy.  Nor can it 
afford to view operations dominated by the offense and defense and those dominated by stability 
as either/or propositions.  Both usually occur simultaneously.”1193
 Differing levels of stability are likely to be acceptable in different areas of the world 
given national interests, strategic priorities, and perceptions of the enemy and risk.  Stability in 
Europe is certainly strategically more important than say stability in Central Asia and providing 
stability in Bosnia might be less complex of a task than providing stability in Pakistan.  In 
strategy and doctrine then, stability should be viewed on a continuous spectrum.  Although Field 
Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability, does develop a fragile states framework and a fairly comprehensive 
  U.S. Army strategy must 
reflect national interests and be formed with due respect to organizations threatening these 
interests. 
                                                 
1192 Krepinevich, Andrew F., 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century, 
Bantam Books, New York, 2009, Pp. 291-292. 
1193 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum 
Operations, December 2008, p. 1-6. 
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set of stability operations tasks, this is not the same as developing a spectrum of stability; the 
spectrum of conflict is still the backdrop for Army operations.1194
 
  In this new paradigm, the 
level of stability required would dictate the operations and tasks chosen (combat, stability, 
offensive, defensive, humanitarian, counterdrug, counterterrorism, etc.).  Instead of modifying 
conditions to tasks trained, tasks trained could be modified to effect desired conditions.  
Although this might seem like sleight of hand, it makes more sense to link tasks to desired end 
states than it does to link tasks to different levels or types of conflict.  Conflict implies achieving 
victory through the imposition of military force; stability implies achieving a condition through 
the performance of a variety of fused tasks: 
“I think that they best thing that we can do would be to stop thinking about it 
[COIN] as a variant of war if we want to be effective at it and that is why I 
actually like the idea of stabilization operations…it implies that the endstate is a 
tolerable situation rather than decisive victory.”1195
 
 
                                                 
1194 I would like to credit Steve Metz for this concept.  It evolved out of a conversation regarding future 
military strategy.  From Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, “The spectrum of conflict is the backdrop for Army 
operations.  It places levels of violence on an ascending scale marked by graduated steps.  The spectrum of conflict 
spans from stable peace to general war.  It includes intermediate levels of unstable peace and insurgency.  In 
practice, violent conflict does not proceed smoothly from unstable peace through insurgency to general war and 
back again.  Rather, general war and insurgencies often spark additional violence within a region, creating broad 
areas of instability that threaten U.S. vital interests.”  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-
0, Operations, February 2008, p. 2-1. 
1195 Metz, Steven, Personal Interview, 6 November 2008. 
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The concept of victory is untidy in today’s international security environment.  “In modern wars 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, there are no conventional enemies to be defeated on the battlefield, 
no opposing government from whom to formally accept surrender.  Victory, in the end, is likely 
to involve a messy political compromise, perhaps with a remnant of low-level violence, and a 
more-or-less responsive government that is largely in control of its territory.”1196
 
  A spectrum of 
stability would largely preclude any notions of victory in the traditional military sense and 
instead would put a focus on creating conditions to support national interests.  This more 
accurately reflects the disposition of persistent enemies, their ability to sow instability, and the 
impossibility of causing their total surrender: 
“What I expect to happen as a phenomenon is for there to continue to be these 
kind of swarming insurgencies of small groups that are as much organized crime 
as they are political movements.  And, at least my own belief is that, these things 
are really, really hard to eradicate but on the other hand, they are pretty easy to 
get to controllable levels to the point that they don’t actually threaten to take 
down the state.”1197
 
 
It also recognizes the likelihood that the U.S. Army will be involved in stability operations for 
quite some time:1198
                                                 
1196 Payne, Kenneth, “Waging Communication War,” Parameters, Summer 2008, p. 50. 
  “The spectrum of conflict provides an exceptional tool to visualize and 
1197 Metz, Steven, Personal Interview, 6 November 2008. 
1198 Szayna, Thomas S., et al, “Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency 
Issues, RAND, Santa Monica, 2007.  As Cragin and Gerwehr argue, “No one has discovered a ‘silver bullet’ to 
 566 
describe the nature of the operational environment, but offers little insight about the actual 
operations conducted by military forces.”1199
Focusing on stability in military strategy not only would better align military planning 
with national interests it would also help to synchronize tactical operations with political needs.  
Military strategies would then be less prone to failure, as in Vietnam and in Iraq prior to the 
surge.
  The spectrum of conflict should thus be replaced 
with a spectrum of stability in U.S. Army strategy and doctrine. 
1200  It would also elevate the importance of various forms of early intervention to provide 
stability before instability spreads from a city to a state or even to a region.  As McMaster 
argues, “The best opportunity to defeat an insurgency is in its nascent stage.”1201
                                                                                                                                                             
remove the threat of terrorism.”  Cragin, Kim and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the 
Struggle against Terrorism, RAND, Santa Monica, 2005, p. 70. 
  The amount of 
time and resource shifting required for an organization to adapt to a given environment for the 
accomplishment of a mission is a measurement of the inappropriateness of organizational design 
and its preparation for goal accomplishment.  Given current and likely future national and 
strategic security interests, preparing for operations on the spectrum of stability would ultimately 
reduce the severity of painful and lengthy prospective organizational adaptations. 
1199 Turner, Frank L. II, “Full Spectrum Operations: an Analysis of Course Context at the Command and 
General Staff College,” School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, 22 May 2008, p. 13. 
1200 Stephens, Bret, “There is a Military Solution to Terror,” Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2008. 
1201 McMaster, H. R., Assessment of the Counterinsurgency Effort in Iraq, Memorandum for General 
Abizaid, 10 December 2003, p. 2. 
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9.1.2 Planning 
The U.S. Army’s traditional planning procedures significantly disrupt the adaptive capacities of 
its subordinate organizations and leaders.  Planning tends to assume sequential operations and a 
more static than dynamic or adaptive enemy.  In fact, traditional planning procedures do not 
account well for adversary variability at all and tend to look past the possibility of multiple threat 
scenarios occurring within a single operation.1202  The MDMP is far less abstract or multifaceted 
than what is required for unconventional operations against complex and adaptive threat 
organizations.1203
 
  Although useful against a doctrinal enemy and for teaching sequential 
modeling, modifying the MDMP for current operations is a difficult proposition at best: 
“In education, MDMP should be banned.  It has run its course, and frankly, few 
real combat guys ever used it much.  TLPs [Troop Leading Procedures] make 
sense, but in our schooling, we need to give leaders opportunity after opportunity 
to quickly (in minutes) formulate a working COA and get on with it.”1204
 
 
Traditional planning tools, models and methodologies are premised on the conduct of more 
conventional operations against near-peer forces than on modern threat organizations and 
                                                 
1202 Lamb, Christopher J., Transforming Defense, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 
September 2005, pp. 32-33. 
1203 Hales, Samuel E., Op Cit, p. 49. 
1204 Major General Bolger, Dan, E-mail Interview, 13 September 2008. 
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actors.1205  These tools overemphasize process and simplicity over support and complexity.  As 
Gray argues, “Happy is the defense planner who must devise ways to contend with a single kind 
of foe, in combat of known and predictable character, conducted by familiar methods with a 
stable arsenal, over issues, and in geography, that are thoroughly familiar.”1206
 Although planning is important for command, control, and resourcing, it tends to restrain 
subordinate leader’s cognitive searches for alternatives and obstructs decentralized decision 
making when units are confronted with contingencies not accounted for in the initial plan—this 
occurs by design and by consequence depending on the leader and his or her confidence in 
subordinate leaders and their ability to rapidly and correctly adapt.  “Lack of authority may 
neutralize a leader’s effectiveness, while detailed planning may substitute for leadership and 
make the leader redundant.”
 
1207
                                                 
1205 Clancy, James and Chuck Crossett, “Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare,” Parameters, 
Summer 2007, p. 88. 
  Adaptive adversaries are discounted in the planning process and 
unorthodox environments are poorly treated.  Freedom of maneuver and decision making can 
suffer if a plan is too tightly followed.  “Planning is an important and valuable C2 activity.  
However, focusing on the process for its own sake can lead to overcontrol and mechanical 
thinking.  A properly framed commander’s intent, effective planning guidance, and judicious 
1206 Gray, Colin S., Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty of 
Context, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 2006, p. 15. 
1207 Wong, Leonard, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2004, p. 13. 
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participation by commanders create plans that foster mission command.  Executing them creates 
a high tempo that allows maximum opportunity for exercising subordinates’ initiative.”1208
 Traditional planning procedures also fail to take into account the adaptive interactions 
between enemy and friendly organizations in dynamic environments and thus fail to help manage 
the second- and third-order effects of operations.
 
1209  This problem is aggravated further when 
planning is premised on phased operations in environments where traditional phases are difficult 
to discern, run in reverse, or are desynchronized.  Dispensing with phases and sequencing is vital 
for adaptive planning and for resourcing flexible operations.1210  Instead of a meticulous and 
sequential plan, commander’s intent and detailed operational guidance might be sufficient to 
allow for self-synchronization and adaptation by subordinate leaders in a competitive 
environment.  Recent experience supports this claim.1211
                                                 
1208 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and 
Control of Army Forces, August 2003, p. 6-11. 
  Plans should be tailored to be more 
responsive and less prescriptive.  Trying to script the adaptations of an enemy is a near 
impossible task, even with accurate intelligence.  But forecasting friendly unit adaptations based 
on enemy tendencies and environmental conditions is possible and necessary, especially when 
operations are decentralized.  Latitude must be given to subordinate leaders in plans.  Planning 
1209 Henke, Glenn A., “Planning Full Spectrum Operations: Implications of FM 3-0 on Planning Doctrine,” 
Military Review, November-December 2008, p. 100. 
1210 Bensahel, Nora, et al, After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq, RAND, Santa 
Monica, 2008, p. 242. 
1211 Vandergriff, Donald E., Future Leader: The Journey of Developing (and Nurturing) Adaptability, The 
Future is Now, Futures Center (Forward), 2 December 2005, p. 3. 
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then should focus on providing resources to leaders armed with a commander’s guidance and 
with an end state in mind. 
 
“I think that the big change is, given the current operational environment, is to 
decentralize to the point of discomfort.  You have to give young folks sufficient 
latitude to do that which they know needs to be done based on their personal 
understanding of the operational environment and try to fight the tendency to 
over-control your subordinates because that doesn’t work in this current 
operational environment.”1212
9.1.3 Doctrine 
 
Since the end of the Cold War doctrine has reflected the legacy of the U.S. Army and its 
conditioned bias for planning, training, and conducting combat operations.  Even recent doctrinal 
publications still retain vestiges of biased concepts that have significantly less relevance in the 
post-9/11 international security environment, however well disguised.  For instance, Field 
Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, defines military power in more narrow traditional terms and 
extends the legacy argument that the military sets conditions while other elements of national 
power complete operations (despite a notable unavailability or uselessness of other elements of 
national power in recent conflicts): “Military power alone cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee 
stable peace.  It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow the 
other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—to exert their 
                                                 
1212 General (Ret.) Wallace, William, Personal Interview, 21 November 2008. 
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full influence.”1213
The previous quotation from FM 3-0 defies what is defined as the Army’s ‘new 
operational concept’: “The Army’s new operational concept has changed Army operations 
significantly.  All operations are now full spectrum operations.”
  Not only does this description of military power neglect what the U.S. Army 
was called upon to do in OIF and OEF, it also fails to account for operations in areas or 
environments where there is an absence of government and centralized and responsible decision 
makers—a fundamental likelihood in future operations.  Diplomatic and economic instruments 
of national power are decidedly less effective in ungoverned areas or in complex insurgencies 
devoid of discernable leadership. 
1214  Field Manual (FM) 1 
indicates a similar respect for and doctrinal shift in favor of current operations: “The skills and 
organizations required for operations against today’s threats are different from those of the recent 
past.  The twentieth century required an Army with a large capacity focused on combat 
capabilities.  Today’s operational environment requires an Army with more diverse capabilities 
as well as the capacity for sustained operations.”1215
                                                 
1213 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, February 2008, p. 2-1. 
  The first description (from FM 3-0) of what 
military power cannot do differs substantially from what it has been required to do and what 
doctrine says it should do.  This description of military power is far less a ‘new operational 
concept’ than it is an old operational concept repackaged in ambiguous terms.  Setting conditions 
for a stable peace does not obviate responsibility for then establishing and enforcing the peace: 
recent operations attest to this fact.  Despite being published in 2008, FM 3.0 defines concepts 
and terms and describes conditions more relevant to 1989 than to the post-Cold War, post-9/11 
1214 Ibid, p. 1-3. 
1215 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army, June 2005, p. 4-8. 
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international security environment.  The talking points used in newer versions of operations 
doctrine are updated for contemporary operations and duly note that full spectrum capabilities 
are now a priority (although ample evidence has been provided in this study to demonstrate that, 
at least rhetorically, full spectrum operations have been a ‘priority’ since at least 1991):  “The 
Pentagon will adopt a new strategy that for the first time orders the military to anticipate that 
future conflicts will include a complex mix of conventional, set-piece battles and campaigns 
against shadowy insurgents and terrorists, according to senior officials.  The shift is intended to 
assure that the military is prepared to deal with a spectrum of possible threats.”1216  A description 
of what full spectrum operations entail (continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, 
defensive, and stability or civil support tasks) is contained in both FMs 3-0 and 3-07.1217
Despite these changes and a renewed emphasis on full spectrum operations, doctrine is 
flawed in a number of significant ways.  The lexicon used in doctrinal publications (to include 
terms defined in Joint Publication (JP 1-02) DOD Dictionary of Military Terms) still reflects an 
institutional bias for combat operations despite contemporary operational and strategic 
requirements.  A lack of a common and relevant lexicon, particularly for simultaneous full 
spectrum operations, and a lack of new terms relevant to these operations can cause significant 
problems beyond the confusion created by ineffectively meshing old concepts with new 
operational realities.  If EBO lexicon is used “for instance, in a disaster relief mission, the 
military viewing all the inhabitants of a country as ‘enemy decision makers’ may conflict with 
the view of the people held by several non-governmental agencies assisting in the relief effort.  
 
                                                 
1216 Shanker, Thom, “Pentagon to Outline Shift in War Planning Strategy,” The New York Times, 22 June 
2009. 
1217 Pages 3-1 and 2-1, respectively. 
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This conflict of viewpoints could negatively affect the effective planning and execution of the 
mission.”1218
Doctrine provides fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements 
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.  It is authoritative but requires 
judgment in application.  If doctrine is flawed, it can inappropriately guide military forces or 
direct them in a fashion that does not support national objectives.  If varying elements of doctrine 
are out of synch, military forces can be confused as to which doctrine is appropriate, whether or 
not new doctrine is prefaced with language indicating what other doctrine is superseded by the 
new publication.  This is a fundamental flaw in post-Cold War and post-9/11 doctrine: it fails 
properly, comprehensively, and temporally to synchronize military actions with national 
objectives across the range of publications. 
  Language is important as it symbolizes perceptions, intentions, and actions.  
Concepts are equally important.  Breaking asunder simultaneous full spectrum operations into 
constituent parts creates an impression that operations are indeed separable and can be planned 
and trained for separately.  Delineating between offensive, defensive, and stability operations 
does not really capture the complexity of the COE and leads U.S. Army units to suppose that 
these operations can be tangibly or cognitively separated into boxes as they appear in doctrine.  
Language to define and conceptual descriptions of operations contained in doctrine are vital for 
the conduct of operations: each shapes perceptions and both are used as authoritative guides for 
planning, training, and execution.  Flaws that are the result of challenges associated with 
meshing old and new concepts must be removed lest they allow leeway for improper 
interpretation or cause confusion. 
                                                 
1218 Davidson, Michael L., Culture and Effects-Based Operations in an Insurgency, School of Advanced 
Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 May 2005, p. 43. 
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In a rapidly changing security environment, doctrine must be dynamic but not so much 
that it is in constant flux.  Without some continuity, doctrine would not provide fundamental 
principles but instead would generate confusion and would disrupt training and operational 
cycles.  But doctrinal concepts should be reevaluated (again) in light of current strategic 
requirements and prospective operational realities.  The publication of all doctrine (and the terms 
and concepts therein) should be synchronized on a timetable that is long enough to retain 
relevance but short enough to inculcate changes in the operational environment, lessons learned, 
and potential strategic shifts.  Doctrine that is confusing, out of date, or in conflict with other 
doctrine can cause substantial problems limiting the adaptability of units (they are either 
improperly informed or are training to standards and concepts that are no longer relevant) and 
can disrupt the planning of and training for the conduct of operations (terms and tasks do not 
exist or are much less useful for simultaneous full spectrum operations). 
9.1.4 Training and Education 
Experiences in OIF demonstrated that decentralization and the rapid adjustment of organizational 
inputs and outputs was necessary to overcome an adaptive adversary.  Decentralization requires 
leaders to disperse authority and responsibility in operations and in training.  Subordinate leaders 
must be prepared to handle this authority in challenging environments and must be able to think 
and act quickly.  Therefore, commanders must determine appropriate levels and balances of 
education and training and ensure that both are incorporated into any instructive program.  
Education provokes thinking and deliberation while training provokes reaction and reflexivity 
but both are requisite for conducting operations and for individual and organizational adaptation: 
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“I think that it is possible to educate officers to be adaptive.  I draw a distinction 
between training and education.  Training is for a specific instance and is often 
reflexive.  Officers have a responsibility for steering the shift and can be 
educated, for instance, in the theories of innovation, the strategic environment 
that they are going to face, changes to that environment, and taught to think 
through all those things.  They can be taught patterns of thought and can be 
encouraged to think through those patterns of thought.  And I think that when they 
do this they become more adaptive and help the institution become more adaptive 
as a result.”1219
 
 
Kiszely agrees: “To be well prepared, officers will thus need to be both well trained and well 
educated (that is to say, having well-developed minds and understanding of the nature of the 
subject).”1220
 Future operations are likely to require decentralization and adaptation to similar levels 
experienced in Iraq.
  Officers and soldiers will need to be trained on and according to the adaptive 
process to achieve full spectrum capabilities. 
1221
                                                 
1219 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Nagl, John, Telephone Interview, 14 September 2008. 
  Leaders and subordinates alike will have to:  think “in terms of 
continuous, vice sequential, operations; lead widely dispersed, disparate forces to conduct 
operations while maintaining command and control via expanded and continuous commander’s 
1220 Kiszely, John, Op Cit, p. 16. 
1221 For discussion of the requirements of modern warfare see, Janowitz, Morris, Military Institutions and 
Coercion in the Developing Nations, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, p. 196. 
 576 
intent.”1222  Tillson makes a similar point, “A team that focuses on achieving the commander’s 
intent is more adaptable than a team that focuses on plan accomplishment.  Similarly, a focus on 
predetermined performance standards and management objectives tends to reduce adaptability by 
preventing a team from setting its own goals.”1223
 
  Understanding a commander’s intent, the 
desired end-state, and key tasks necessary for achieving the commander’s intent and desired end-
state are critical to the conduct of decentralized operations and for rapid organizational 
adaptation:  
• Commander’s Intent: “A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the 
desired end state.  It may also include the commander’s assessment of the adversary 
commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during 
the operation.”1224
• End State: “The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s 
objectives.”
 (expands range of tasks—should be left up to commander’s initiative 
with broad guidelines for tasks to be figured out by commander, assessed, and passed to 
other units, additionally, commanders can be assessed on their ability to foster adaptation 
in training). 
1225
                                                 
1222 Multinational Interoperability Council, Op Cit, p. 2. 
 
1223 Tillson, John C. F., Op Cit, p. 36. 
1224 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, Washington DC, 12 April 2001 (As amended through 17 October 2008), p. 105. 
1225 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Ibid, p. 187.  Although there is no definitive characteristics 
of a successful end state, it can be evaluated according to a unit’s specific mission.  Hunt, John B., “Thoughts on 
Peace Support Operations,” Military Review, October 1994. 
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• Key Tasks: “Those tasks that the force must perform as a whole or the conditions the 
force must meet to achieve the end state and stated purpose of the operation.  Key tasks 
are not tied to a specific COA; rather, they identify what the force must do to achieve the 
end state.  Acceptable COAs accomplish all the key tasks.  In changed circumstances—
when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no longer 
fits the situation—subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving 
the commander’s intent.  Examples of key tasks include terrain that must be controlled, 
the operation’s tempo and duration, and the operation’s effect on the enemy.”1226
A clear and practical commander’s intent will allow small unit leaders and soldiers to adapt tasks 
according to what is required by a particular mission.
 
1227
 
  This will allow for flexibility in 
responses to unplanned for changes in the environment and unpredictable enemy actions: 
 “I think that intent becomes more and more important, especially as you have 
operations that occur solely at a lower and lower level or more dispersed or are 
somewhat ambiguous, which, COIN, quite honestly can be.  In the end, even if the 
task is done properly, if the mission is not accomplished or the intent is not 
accomplished, they realize that they might have to modify the task or use a 
different one because, especially in the environment that we are seeing here in 
Iraq, we have dispersed operations going on that are commanded and controlled 
                                                 
1226 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders 
Production, January 2005, p. 3-6. 
1227 Smith, Niel, “Retaking Sa’ad: Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar,” Armor, July-August 2007, p. 
35. 
 578 
at a much lower level than you would have if you were moving an entire brigade, 
say, across the desert and therefore those decisions are made at a lower level and 
the response time becomes less and less.”1228
 
 
Interestingly, this is not a new lesson nor is its applicability relevant only to modern operations; 
lessons regarding leader freedom to achieve a desired end state come out of operations from at 
least as far back as the Philippine Insurrection and actions taking place there: empowering 
leaders to experiment with tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve missions while 
“adapting to local conditions” has been a staple of successful operations in challenging 
environments.  “It was the initiative by soldiers at different levels that derived the principles and 
techniques that won America’s first victory in quelling an overseas insurrection.”1229
 Accelerating adaptability and decentralization will require significant changes to standard 
training practices.  Training will have to incorporate enhanced information sharing, dispersed 
decision making, and full spectrum capabilities and tasks: 
 
 
 “I think that one of the key critical lessons that we’ve got to learn is the 
importance of the soldier in this particular kind of fight.  We’ve got to be looking 
at systems that push information down to him.  He as the strategic corporal can 
become better informed and better prepared to work in this new environment.  
Now, you can do that through training, you can do that through doctrine, but I 
                                                 
1228 Major General Perkins, David, Telephone Interview, 21 September 2008. 
1229 Deady, Timothy K., “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902,” 
Parameters, Spring 2005, p. 67. 
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think that it is absolutely critical that we get the training right, that we don’t go 
back to that old spectrum of conflict, that linear kind of depiction of LIC on one 
end and HIC on the other end and that you train for either LIC or you train for 
HIC.  I think that is absolutely wrong.”1230
 
 
Additionally, training will have to focus more on destabilizing standard modes of thought and 
will have to force soldiers and leaders out of their comfort zones.  Mastering tasks is not nearly 
as useful for expanding the adaptive capacity of soldiers as is forcing soldiers to incorporate and 
modify tasks to achieve a commander’s intent.  “Training for mastery places too much emphasis 
on mastering the routines of a particular task rather than on building a problem-solving 
repertoire.”1231 Preparing soldiers and leaders for conducting simultaneous full spectrum 
operations to achieve commander’s intent will also improve their capacities for conducting 
individual tasks across the range of military operations.1232
                                                 
1230 General Chiarelli, Peter, Telephone Interview, 27 October 2008. 
  Education and training should be 
meshed in a mutually beneficial program of instruction based on operational experience.  
1231 Tillson, John C. F., Op Cit, p. 36. 
1232 “Despite its disadvantages, an officer with better interpersonal and conceptual skills is often preferable 
to an officer with better tactical and technical skills.  This fact alone prevents one from stating that a shift from a 
warfighting-based METL to a MOOTW-based METL would have a negative impact on the development of 
company grade, combat arms officers.”  Birchmeier, Joseph F., The Impact of MOOTW-based Unit Training on 
Leader Development, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, 2000, pp. 39-40. 
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“Competencies are developed, sustained, and improved by performing one’s assigned tasks and 
missions.”1233
Adjusting training regimens to effectively incorporate full spectrum capabilities in the 
achievement of commander’s intent will require changes to the traditional, Cold War devised, 
standards-based model currently used in training.  “The Cold War military learning system was 
predicated on individuals and units progressing so they could perform tasks sufficiently well to 
meet the standard.  This standards-based system was revolutionary because it induced individual 
and collective accountability and demanded that all perform to a measurable level: The training 
proficiency of large organizations could therefore be collectively categorized with some degree 
of reliability.  Today, it is no longer sufficient to merely meet the standard: A revised, more 
demanding measurement is necessary to determine squad and platoon proficiency.  Meeting the 
standard should be replaced with a new set of open-ended performance criteria.  The standard is 
now a limiting factor in shaping the performance of highly capable and well-bonded units.  Thus, 
units today really do not know how good they can actually be.”
  Performance can be enhanced in training for application in real-world operations. 
1234
 
  While the U.S. Army is 
interested in creating pioneering and adaptive leaders through training, it has created a hidebound 
system that stifles innovation: 
“We used to criticize the Soviets for a lack of innovation and guess what we did?  
We created a system that stifles initiative.  We used to say that the biggest 
                                                 
1233 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, 
Confident, and Agile, October 2006, p. 2-8. 
1234 Scales, Robert H., “The Second Learning Revolution,” Military Review, January-February 2006, pp. 
39-40. 
 581 
advantage that we have over the Soviets is that they don’t have any initiative.  We 
then created a system to counter that but it stifles initiative.  It is ironic.  I think 
that everyone is catching on but in garrison it is really difficult to do.  QTBs 
[Quarterly Training Briefs] are not briefed on how well you developed your 
leaders, it is briefed on your vehicles, your training, and it is very quantitative 
when you are talking about something that is very qualitative.  If you are the boss, 
you don’t want to risk USR stats and develop a leader at the risk of your USR 
stats.”1235
 
 
The current training regimen of Tasks, Conditions, and Standards should be replaced with 
something that incorporates current operational experiences, commander’s intent, and enhanced 
evaluative practices.  Traditional training for tactical and technical capacities should be 
supplemented with training that emphasizes adaptability, deliberation, thinking, and reflexivity.  
Scarce time must be managed effectively: training will have to be as full spectrum as current 
operations.  Therefore, any new training format should include Intent, Conditions, and 
Evaluation to better reflect expanded operational needs.1236
                                                 
1235 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Wong, Leonard, Personal Interview, 6 November 2008. 
  Moreover, training and operations 
should specifically address adaptation, both friendly and enemy, in the reporting and review 
1236 Although ‘Evaluation’ may appear to be too generalized, this should not be considered a fault.  A 
directed but open evaluation methodology would enable commanders, trainers, observers, controllers, and small unit 
leaders to apply their own operational knowledge and experience to the evaluative process.  Evaluations would be 
standardized in form but not in content and thus would provide rich descriptive material for incorporation across 
units and the force. 
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process occurring after any organizational action or exercise.  “After Action Reviews (AARs), 
must expand to address adaptability, innovation, and outcomes rather than performance to 
standard.  Mentors and observer/controllers must focus more on the thinking process that led to 
an operational decision more than on the correctness of the decision itself.  The focus must be on 
how to think more than what to think.”1237
 These changes are not only desirable, they might be necessary for incorporating well 
experienced junior leaders into the force and for ensuring that the adaptations that they made 
during OIF are put to good use by the institution.  “Considering that most newly minted O-1’s 
have not known the world of the Cold War and its relatively static strategic and operational 
constructs there is no need to break them of a Cold War mode of thinking.  In fact the military is 
seeing in Iraq that younger officers are welcoming of the challenges they are confronting. They 
are doing a good job, but many may vote with their feet if they are required to return to a system 
that once back from the battlefield operates in an Industrial Age fashion and stifles creativity and 
 
                                                 
1237 Tillson, John C. F., Op Cit, p. 36.  All units are required to send AARs and other lessons learned 
materials to CALL.  Furthermore, the U.S. Army has implemented a program requiring unit members attend the 
CALL course.  The lessons learned process (LLP) is “a deliberate and systematic process for collecting and 
analyzing field data and disseminating, integrating, and archiving observations, insights, and lessons collected from 
Army operations and training events.”  Lessons Learned is defined by CALL as “Validated knowledge and 
experience derived from observations and the historical study of military training, exercises, and combat operations 
that leads to a change in behavior at either the tactical (standard operating procedures (SOP), TTP, and so forth), 
operational, or strategic level or in one or more of the Army’s DOTMLPF domains.”  See, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP), Washington DC, 
17 October 2006, pp. 3-10.  Certainly, given its importance, adaptation(s) can be added to this process and its 
supporting procedures. 
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opportunities to learn.  Unfortunately the current leadership system continues the practice of 
producing technical/tactical experts that are offered no incentives for thought or experiences 
outside the relatively narrow confines of branch or community norms regarding career 
progression.”1238
9.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
9.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
Mutual adaptations made in Iraq by the insurgency and the U.S. Army are perceptible based on 
empirical evidence and are understandable when tempered by organizational behavior theory.  
Although the findings of this research might not necessarily be generalizable outside martial 
organizations in hostile competitive environments, the functions charted in the process of mutual 
adaptation illuminate the strengths, weaknesses, and adaptability of networks and hierarchies in 
competition.  This analysis is based on the pace and resourcing of adaptations determined by 
each organization’s capacity for manipulating organizational inputs and outputs in the 
achievement of organizational goals and objectives. 
Although theoretically, hierarchical organizations are slow to adapt in rapidly changing 
environments, they can enhance their adaptive capacity through decentralization.  
Decentralization is aided by robust communications, the devolution of command relationships, 
                                                 
1238 Jones, John-Michael, Building Leaders and Staffs: Ensuring Mastery of the Non-Major Combat 
Aspects of War, School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS, 16 May 2005, pp. 37-38. 
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and junior leader empowerment with training, experience, and enhanced communications.  
Adaptation is accelerated by infusing the hierarchical institution with adaptations developed at 
the organizational level; in this case, at the tactical unit level.  The hierarchical organization can 
morph into a well resourced and networked organization by using higher-level institutional 
elements to provision resources and conduct analysis and by using lower-level organizational 
elements for action, environmental interpretation, and manipulation of organizational inputs and 
outputs to achieve organizational goals. 
Theoretically, networked organizations are quick to adapt in rapidly changing 
environments and can quickly inculcate lessons and innovations into organizational processes 
and procedures to effect goal-directed organizational change.  While this is true, networks that 
are too diverse and have too many competing organizational goals tend to suffer from inter-
organizational friction and internal competition.  Adaptive speed is retained but it might be 
directed towards competing and redundant goal accomplishment thus reducing the overall 
effectiveness of the network for accomplishing shared organizational goals. 
9.2.2 Summary of Findings 
• Organizational adaptation in a competitive environment is by and large an informal 
process but can be accelerated or retarded by organizational composition and design.  
Though human actors are the change agents in an organization and their skills, 
knowledge, training, education, capability, and experience are determinant of any 
organizational change, the organization (via design and informal barriers such as culture 
and knowledge bases) has significant influence over whether or not this potential for 
change is actualized. 
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• Small networks tend to adapt faster than large organizations, particularly in respect to 
large hierarchies in a competitive environment.  But as small networks demonstrate an 
ability to adapt faster, there is a tradeoff for this adaptive capability: robustness and 
aggregated effects (i.e., an ability to accomplish mission or organizational goals) are 
weakened by organizational size and composition.  Size limits the breadth of effects and 
composition creates a diversity of objectives and cleavages that weaken cooperative 
efforts in the achievement of mutually shared organizational goals.  A hierarchy is better 
situated to accomplish more complex, durable, and layered goals requiring greater 
analysis and with broader effect while a network is better situated to detect changes in 
environmental stimuli and adapting tactically, locally, and in the short-term. 
• The organization with greater resources and a corresponding ability to support smaller 
attendant organizations maintains a greater capacity for swarming (by developing better 
situational understanding and communications among subordinate organizations) and 
rapid dispersal (by providing organic protected transportation and various other means of 
logistical support): a significant tactical capability in a complex environment that 
contributes not only to force protection but also to adaptation as fewer organizational 
resources need to be dedicated to covering and concealment operations and situational 
force protection. 
• Time is a significant factor for organizational adaptation.  A hierarchical organization 
takes longer to adapt but can have a greater effect in the long run.  A network can adapt 
rapidly but has a diminished capacity for accomplishing organizational goals (because of 
its structure and inherent capacity) in the short- and long-run.  Its only means for 
achieving broader effects is by sufficiently controlling (and thus diminishing the strength 
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of) an informal network of similarly goal oriented smaller organizations through close 
collaboration.  Thus, if larger and better resourced, hierarchical organizations can adapt at 
a greater or equal pace to their competitor(s), by supporting or creating informal and 
formal structures that aid internal and external networking, they will be more successful 
in a competitive environment.  Creating a capacity to adapt rapidly will allow a 
hierarchical organization to accomplish its mission or goals more quickly, while bringing 
to bear greater resources, and will diminish the capabilities of any competing networked 
organization operating in the same environment. 
• For comprehensive organizational adaptation to occur—to achieve tactical, operational, 
and strategic goals and objectives—an organization must have a range of resources 
available to adapt at levels that the organization aspires to affect.  If an organization does 
not have the tools necessary to adapt at the strategic level then its ability to affect that 
level with any significant or coherent impact is necessarily truncated.  This is not to say 
that tactical operations do not have strategic effects in a complex insurgency, they do, but 
making organizational adaptations across multiple levels requires resources and 
capacities dedicated to achieving this effect. 
9.3 CONCLUSION 
Combat is being supplanted by stability as the principal task for U.S. Army forces in the current 
international security environment.  This does not mean that combat is less important than it once 
was or that it is unimportant.  Rather, combat and offensive and defensive operations should be 
thought of with respect to how they support national security and the strategic objectives of 
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preserving international stability and suppressing adaptive threat organizations.  Instead of 
thinking of traditional tasks separately, “the military and other government agencies must pursue 
ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multi-dimensional 
threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.”1239  Although the U.S. Army 
“has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation’s major wars”1240
 
 it must 
now be organized and trained to accelerate its adaptive capacity and to exploit the beam of fused 
full spectrum strengths it developed during the course of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 
 
 
                                                 
1239 Wipfli, Ralph, and Steven Metz, Op Cit, p. 1. 
1240 Crane, Conrad C. and W. Andrew Terrill, Op Cit, p. 54. 
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APPENDIX A 
KEY TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
A.1 KEY TERMS1241
Commander’s Intent A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the 
desired end state.  It may also include the commander’s assessment 
of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where 
and how much risk is acceptable during the operation.
 
1242
 
 
Contingency A situation requiring military operations in response to natural 
disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by 
appropriate authority to protect U.S. interests.* 
 
Counterinsurgency Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and 
civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.* 
 
Course of Action  Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow.* 
Doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements 
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.  It is 
authoritative but requires judgment in application.* 
 
                                                 
1241 * Indicates that the term is defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 31 October 2009. 
1242 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2006. 
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End State The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the 
commander’s objectives.* 
 
Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner 
incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or 
incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, 
or distract.  It may incorporate military stores, but is normally 
devised from nonmilitary components.* 
 
Insurgency An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to 
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, 
occupying power, or other political authority while increasing 
insurgent control.1243
 
 
Key Tasks Those tasks that the force must perform as a whole or the 
conditions the force must meet to achieve the end state and stated 
purpose of the operation.  Key tasks are not tied to a specific COA; 
rather, they identify what the force must do to achieve the end 
state.  Acceptable COAs accomplish all the key tasks.  In changed 
circumstances—when significant opportunities present themselves 
or the concept of operations no longer fits the situation—
subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on 
achieving the commander’s intent.  Examples of key tasks include 
terrain that must be controlled, the operation’s tempo and duration, 
and the operation’s effect on the enemy.* 
 
Military Transformation A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition 
and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, 
capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s 
advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to 
sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and 
stability in the world.1244
 
 
Mission A duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.* 
 
Mutual Adaptation A complex process of learning and change where two 
organizations are engaged in a cycle of action, reaction, and 
subsequent organizational adaptation. 
 
                                                 
1243 Ibid. 
1244 Rumsfeld, Donald, Transformation Planning Guidance, U.S. Department of Defense, April 2003. 
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Objective The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which 
every operation is directed.* 
 
Operation A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, 
tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission.* 
 
Organizational Adaptation A complex process of learning and change where organizational 
actions are taken and assessed leading to an adjustment of 
organizational inputs and outputs to synchronize adaptation(s) with 
organizational goals and missions. 
 
Procedures Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific 
tasks.* 
 
Simultaneous 
Full-Spectrum 
Capability A capacity for conducting a number of tasks across the range of 
military operations within a single mission or operation or in the 
achievement of a single objective. 
 
Strategy A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve 
theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.* 
 
Tactics The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to 
each other.* 
 
Techniques Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, 
functions, or tasks.* 
 
Troop Leading Procedures Sequence of actions that enable the company commander (or 
platoon leader) to use available time effectively and efficiently in 
the planning, preparing, executing, and assessing of combat 
missions.1245
                                                 
1245 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-21.91 Tactical Employment of Antiarmor 
Platoons and Companies, 26 November 2002, p. 2-1. 
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A.2 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AAN  Army After Next 
AAR  After Action Report (or Review) 
ABCS  Army Battle Command System 
ACR  Armored Cavalry Regiment 
ADM  Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
AFATDS Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
ALLP  Army Lessons Learned Program 
AMDWS Air and Missile Defense Work Station 
AOR  Area of Responsibility 
AQI  Al-Qaeda, Iraq 
AR  Army Regulation 
ARFORGEN Army Forces Generation 
ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces 
ASAS  All Source Analysis System 
BCKS  Battle Command Knowledge System 
BCS3  Battle Command Sustainment Support System 
BCT  Brigade Combat Team 
C2  Command and Control 
C3  Command, Control, and Communications 
C4ISR  Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
  Reconnaissance 
CA  Civil Affairs 
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CAC  Combined Arms Center 
CALL  Center for Army Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth, KS) 
CBRN  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
CENTCOM Central Command (also USCENTCOM) 
CFLCC Combined Forces Land Component Command 
CGSS  Command and General Staff School (Fort Leavenworth, KS) 
CJCS  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJTF  Combined Joint Task Force 
CLCs  Concerned Local Citizens 
CMET  Core Mission Essential Task(s) 
COA  Course of Action 
COE  Contemporary Operational Environment 
COIN  Counter-insurgency (Operations) 
COMINT Communications Intelligence 
COP  Combat Outpost 
COTs  Commercial Off-The-Shelf Technologies 
CPA  Coalition Provisional Authority 
CS  Combat Support 
CSS  Combat Service Support 
CTC  Combat Training Centers 
CTR  Close Target Reconnaissance 
DA  Direct Action 
  Department of the Army 
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DA PAM Department of the Army Pamphlet 
DMET  Directed Mission Task 
DOD  (U.S.) Department of Defense 
DOS  (U.S.) Department of State 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities 
DVD  Digital Video Disc 
EBO  Effects-Based Operations 
EBP  Effects-Based Planning 
EFP  Explosively Formed Penetrators (or Projectiles) 
EW  Electronic Warfare 
EXORD Execution Order 
FA  Field Artillery 
FAO  Foreign Area Officer 
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 
FCS  Future Combat System 
FID  Foreign Internal Defense 
FIST  Fire Support Team 
FM  Field Manual 
  Frequency Modulation 
FOB  Forward Operating Base 
FRE  Former Regime Elements 
FSO  Fire Support Officer 
GIG  Global Information Grid 
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GWOT Global War on Terror 
HIC  High-Intensity Conflict 
HMMWV High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle 
HN  Host Nation 
HOA  Horn of Africa 
HSOC  Home Station Operations Centers 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
IAI  Islamic Army in Iraq 
ICBM  Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
ICE  IED Countermeasures Equipment 
ID  Infantry Division 
IED  Improvised Explosive Device 
IIS  Iraqi Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat) 
ING  Iraqi National Guard 
INP  Iraqi National Police 
INTSUM Intelligence Summary 
IO  Information Operations 
IP  Internet Protocol 
IR  Infra-Red 
IRAM  Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munition/Mortar 
IRGC  Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
IPB  Intelligence Preparation (of the) Battlefield 
ISF  Iraqi Security Forces 
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ISI  Islamic State of Iraq 
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
IT  Information Technology(ies) 
JAG  Judge Advocate General 
JAM  Jaysh al Mahdi 
JAMI  Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance 
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JFC  Joint Force(s) Command (or Commander) 
JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
JMRC  Joint Multinational Readiness Center (Grafenwoehr, Germany) 
JOE  Joint Operational Environment 
JP  Joint Publication 
JRTC  Joint Readiness Training Center (Fort Polk, LA) 
JTF  Joint Task Force 
JV 2010 Joint Vision 2010 
KFOR  Kosovo Force 
LACE  Liquids, Ammunition, Casualties, Equipment (Report) 
LIC  Low-Intensity Conflict 
LLP  Lessons Learned Process 
LNO  Liaison Officer 
LOGPAC Logistics Package 
MCO  Major Combat (or Contingency) Operations 
MCS  Maneuver Control System 
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MCTC  Maneuver Combat Training Center 
MDMP Military Decision Making Process 
MET  Mission Essential Task(s) 
METL  Mission Essential Task List 
MICCC Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course 
mIRC  (Multi-User) Internet Relay Chat 
MNF-I  Multi-National Forces-Iraq 
MOE  Measures of Effectiveness 
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War 
MOS  Military Occupational Specialty 
MOUT Military Operations on Urban Terrain 
MRAP  Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (Vehicle) 
MRC  Major Regional Conflict 
MRE  Mission Readiness Exercise 
MSC  Mujahideen Shura Council 
MTOE  Modified Table of Organization & Equipment 
MTT  Mobile Training Team 
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer 
NDP  National Defense Panel 
NDS  National Defense Strategy 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NIRF  Neutralizing Improvised Explosive Devices with Radio Frequency 
NLOS  Non-Line of Sight 
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NLOS-C Non-Line of Sight Canon 
NSS  National Security Strategy 
NSVI  National Strategy (for) Victory (in) Iraq 
NTC  National Training Center (Fort Irwin, CA) 
OASD- 
SO LIC Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special OperationsLow-Intensity 
Conflict 
OCF-I  Other Coalition Forces-Iraq 
ODA  Operational Detachment-Alpha 
OEF  Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
OER  Officer Evaluation Report 
OIF  Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 
OOTW Operations Other Than War 
OPFOR Opposing Forces 
OPSUM Operations Summary 
OSS  Office of Strategic Services 
PA  Public Affairs 
PH IV  Phase Four (Operations) 
PL  Public Law 
PMC  Private Military Contractor 
PME  Professional Military Education 
POI  Program of Instruction 
POM  Program Objective Memorandum 
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PPBS  Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
PSP  Private Security Personnel 
PSYOP Psychological Operations 
PVO  Private Voluntary Organization 
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review (Report) 
QTB  Quarterly Training Brief 
RDO  Rapid Decisive Operations 
RFF  Request for Forces 
RIF  Reduction in Forces 
RFI  Rapid Fielding Initiative 
  Request for Information 
RMA  Revolution in Military Affairs 
ROE  Rules of Engagement 
ROTC  Reserve Officers’ Training Corps 
ROW  Rest-of World 
RPG  Rocket-Propelled Grenade 
RSTA  Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
RTV  Remote Television (Camera) 
S2  Unit Intelligence and Security Staff Officer 
SALT  Size, Activity, Location, Time (Report) 
SALUTE Size, Activity, Location, Uniform, Time, Equipment (Report) 
SBCT  Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
SF  Special Forces 
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SFOR  Stabilization Force Bosnia and Herzegovina 
SGC  Special Group Criminals 
SIPRnet Secret Internet Protocol Router (Network) 
SO  Special Operations 
SOF  Special Operations Forces 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure(s) 
SOSO  Stability Operations and Support Operations 
SR  Special Reconnaissance 
SRO  Stability and Reconstruction Operations 
SSR  Stability, Support and Reconstruction (Operations) 
SSTR  Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction 
STX  Squad Training Exercise 
SVBIED Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
TLP  Troop Leading Procedure(s) 
TO&E  Table of Organization and Equipment 
TPFDD Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Monroe, VA) 
TTP  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
UAV  Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UEx  Unit of Execution (x) 
UEy  Unit of Execution (y) 
UGV  Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UN  United Nations 
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USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
USR  Unit Status Reporting 
UW  Unconventional Warfare 
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
VTC  Video Tele-Conference 
WARNORD Warning Order 
WMD  Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction 
WOT  War on Terror 
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APPENDIX B 
INSURGENTS, TARGETS, AND TYPES OF ATTACK1246
B.1 INDICATIONS AND PATTERNS 
 
                                                 
1246 This analysis broke down over 13,000 incidents and insurgent attacks drawn from three incident 
tracking websites: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide Incident Tracking System (witc.nctc.org); 
icasualties.org and; iraqbodycount.org.  This analysis focused on the 7 most violent provinces in Iraq (as measured 
by frequency of incidents and casualties) and the major cities in these provinces.  These websites provide 
information on attacks (both lethal and injurious) but are not comprehensive (in the course of events, some attacks 
were not reported or were not reported accurately); duplicates were removed.  The purpose of these charts is to 
demonstrate a pattern of insurgent attacks and targets across provinces from the beginning of OIF through mid-2008.  
Attribution is almost impossible: “Experts indicate any efforts to make precise attributions of attacks by attacker 
were uncertain.”  See, Cordesman, Anthony H., Iraq’s Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa-ida, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 16 July 2007.  The list of insurgent groups was drawn from MNF-I and from the 
incident tracking sites referenced above.  The patterns observed in each province (and the city(ies) examined 
therein) is generally similar (type of attack and target selection).  Deviations were small but include: 1) In Ramadi, 
attacks on police increased as compared to attacks on various targets and; 2) In Kirkuk, IED attacks increased as 
compared to armed attacks. 
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• Over the period of time analyzed, insurgent attacks became more complex (combined 
assaults, multi-method attacks), catastrophic (number of deaths and injuries), and exotic 
(use of chemical-laden explosives, propane tank bombs, female suicide bombers, etc.).  
This evolution indicates adaptations made by the insurgency in response to increased and 
improved security measures taken by the counterinsurgency.  For instance, in reaction to 
better tactics and responses by military forces, the insurgency increased the use of IEDs 
against the counterinsurgency (to improve stand-off distances); increased attacks on 
softer targets (police and civilians) and with less sophisticated weapons (small arms 
assaults, simple bombs, fire-bombs).  Even as insurgent methods shifted toward more 
powerful and catastrophic attacks, these attacks were targeted against softer targets 
(police and civilians).1247
• The general pattern of insurgent attacks indicates an increasing interest in avoiding direct 
contact with well armed counterinsurgent forces and a preference for attacking ‘softer’ 
civilian targets to achieve similar effects (disorder, disruption of state forces, portraying 
the Coalition as illegitimate and ineffective, etc.).  In an attempt to create chaos and 
disrupt the counterinsurgency, the insurgency could support the same strategy (either to 
cause chaos or disrupt the counterinsurgency) by attacking different targets or by 
increasing the frequency of attacks. 
 
                                                 
1247 Cordesman argues that much of insurgent activity consisted of “bombings of soft civilian targets 
designed largely to provoke a more intense civil war or halt the development of an effective Iraqi government, rather 
than progress towards control at even the local level.”  See Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War and Lessons for 
Counterinsurgency, CSIS, 16 March 2006, p. 3. 
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• Insurgent modifications indicate not only a shift in targeting over the long term (military-
police-civilians) but also the weakness of the insurgency as a networked organization.  
Because of a requirement for a degree of if not total anonymity, the insurgency was 
unable to take full advantage of networking resources (internet, communications, 
enduring synchronized attacks, etc.) and mass its effects through sustained and 
coordinated attacks or complimentary and organized military-style operations over long 
periods of time.  The method of the insurgency was one of ‘pinpricks’ to cause general 
disruptions and to use time, dispersion, and secrecy as weapons.  The networked 
insurgency had to make significant modifications because it was not an ideally formed 
organization for the realization of broader organizational (or strategic) goals (defeating 
the counterinsurgency, subverting the Iraqi government, forcing the U.S. Army to vacate 
the counterinsurgent effort, etc.).  In effect, the insurgency was only truly capable of 
sowing mass disorder and chaos but was incapable of accomplishing few long-term or 
positive goals. 
• The insurgency in Iraq was sophisticated in its ability to independently coordinate efforts 
through spontaneously developed (and dissolved) and persistent networks but 
unsophisticated in its methods (e.g., IEDs (although deadly), the use of small arms, and 
the intermittent use of cellular telephony and the internet).  The methods of the Iraqi 
insurgency are not indicative of a ‘technologically advanced’ adversary imagined in 
many strategic planning documents.  Instead, the insurgency, over time, used less and 
less sophisticated means (within complex methods) to achieve organizational ends.  The 
realization of technical, material, and tactical superiority of the U.S. Army and other 
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counterinsurgent forces, through multiple and varied interactions and mutual adaptations, 
in many ways dictated insurgent adaptation to this effect. 
• The insurgency in Iraq demonstrated that an unsophisticated but networked force could 
cause significant disruptions to the operations of a massive, hierarchical, and 
technologically advanced force by resorting to means that defy the strengths of the 
stronger force.  Once the hierarchical force itself adopted sophisticated networked 
operations, and as the insurgency fractured over varying and conflicting organizational 
goals, many insurgent advantages diminished and/or accrued to the counterinsurgency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 605 
B.2 INSURGENT GROUPS IN IRAQ 
Table 3. Insurgent groups that have operated or have conducted attacks in Iraq 
 
1920 Revolution Brigades Islamic Army in Iraq 
Abu al-Abbas Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance Salah-al-Din-al-Ayyubi Brigades 
Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Fundamentalist Brigades Islamic Jihad Brigades 
Abu Nidal Organization Islamic Movement of Holy Warriors 
al-Ahwal Brigades Islamic Mujahadeen Battalion 
al-Bara bin Malek Brigades Islamic Rage Brigade 
al-Faruq Brigades Islamic Resistance Brigades 
al-Fursan Brigades Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura 
Ali Bin Abu Talib Johad Organization JAM 
al-Imam Ali Brigades Jama'at al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad 
Al-Muslimin Army Jaysh al-Muslimin 
al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers Jihad Pegah 
Ansar al-Din Jihadist Squadrons 
Ansar al-Islam Just Punishment Brigades 
Ansar al-Jihad Karbala Brigades 
Ansar al-Sunnah Kat'ib al-Junayd al-Jihadiyah 
Arab Liberation Front Kurdish Democratic Party 
Arab Revolutionary Brigades Kurdistan Freedom Hawks 
Army of the Followers of Sunni Islam Mahdi Army 
Banner of Islam Movement of Islamic Action of Iraq 
Battalion of the Look-out for Iraq MSM 
Brigade of Ansar al-Tawhid Wa-Sunna Muad Ibn Jabal Brigade 
Brigades for the Defense of Holy Shrines Muajhadeen Army 
Brigades of Imam al-Hassan al-Basri Mujahadeen Shura Council 
Brigades of Martyr Ahmed Yassin Mujahadeen-e-Khalq 
Brigades of the Victorious Lion of God Ninawa Mujahadeen in the City of Mosul 
Death Squad of Mujahadeen of iraq Palestine Liberation Front 
Dhi Qar Organization Partisans of the Sunni 
DII Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
Divine Wrath Brigades Protectors of Islam Brigade 
Fallujah Mujahadeen Punishment Brigade fo rthe al-Jaafari Government 
General Command of Jihadist Armed Forces QJBR 
Green Brigade of the Prophet Reform and Jihad Front 
Hawk Brigades Saad bin Abi Waqas Brigades 
IAI Saraya al-Shuhuada al-Jihadyah fi al-Iraq 
Imam Hussein Brigades Saraya Usud al-Tawhid 
Iraq Liberation Army Shield of Islam 
Iraqi Democratic Front Soldiers of the Prophet's Companion 
Iraqi Jihadist Leagues SSP 
Iraqi Legitimate Resistance Swords of Righteousness Brigades 
Iraqi Revenge Brigades Tawid and Jihad 
Islamic Action in Iraq The Group for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice 
Islamic Action Organization The Holders of the Black Banners 
Islamic al-Waggas Brigade United Organization of Halabjah Martyrs 
Islamic Anger Brigade Usd Allah 
Islamic Army in Iraq   
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B.3 NOTES ON TARGETS AND TYPE OF ATTACKS 
Table 4. Modifications and Categorizations of Target Types 
 
Target Type: Commercial Target Type: Educational Target Type: Foreign Government 
Comedian Scholars Association Member Embassy 
Contractor Teacher UN 
Day Laborer School   
Defense Lawyer University   
Doctor Professor   
Healthcare Worker Student   
Pharmacist     
Pipeline     
Hospital     
Security Contractor     
Security Guard     
Body Guard (unless otherwise indicated)     
Shops     
Marketplace     
Contractor Relatives     
Theater     
      
Target Type: Government Target Type: Iraqi Army Target Type: Media 
Communications Tower FPS to Iraqi Army Radio Station 
Election Worker   Journalist 
Drive of Official   Media Cameraman 
Government Contractor     
Judge     
Near Passport Office     
Party Members and Leaders     
Political Affiliate     
Political Party Member     
Politically Affiliated Person     
Politician     
      
Target Type: NGO Target Type: Police Target Type: Religious 
Humanitarian Firefighter Cleric 
  Man in Police Car Mosque 
  
Neighborhood Patrols and 
Security Religious 
  Paramedic Pilgramage 
  Police Station Near Mosque 
  Police Training   
  Rescue Worker   
      
Target Type: Translator Target Type: Tribal Target Type: U.S. Military 
Interpreter Sheik U.S. Military 
  Tribes   
      
Target Type: Various     
Civilian     
Vehicles     
Houses     
Communities     
General     
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Table 5. Modifications and Categorization of Attack Types1248
 
 
Attack Type: Armed Attack Attack Type: Arson Attack Type: Assassination 
Stabbing Incendiary Assassination 
Assault Firebombing   
Small Arms     
      
Attack Type: Beheading Attack Type: Bombing Attack Type: Booby Trap 
Decapitation Explosion Booby Trap 
      
Attack Type: CBRN Attack Type: Drowning Attack Type: EFP 
CBRN Drowining EFP 
Chlorine Bomb     
      
Attack Type: Execution Attack Type: Female Suicide Bomber Attack Type: Grenade 
Execution Female Suicide Bomber Grenade 
      
Attack Type: Hanging Attack Type: Helicopter Attack Type: Landmine 
Hanging Helicpoter Crash (if hostile) Landmine 
      
Attack Type: Missile Attack Type: Mortar Attack Type: Rocket 
Missile Indirect Rocket 
      
Attack Type: RPG Attack Type: Sniper Attack Type: Suicide IED 
RPG Sniper Suicide IED 
      
Attack Type: Torture Attack Type: Unknown Attack Type: VBIED 
Where known Unknown VBIED 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1248 The Iraqi insurgency varied its attack methods and targets in response to changes in the environment 
and to the efforts of the counterinsurgency.  These attacks were in many cases exotic and differed in their degree of 
violence, power, and method.  Some of the methods used include: coordinated triple IED attack; coordinated single 
type attack; coordinated multiple method ambush; fuel tanker VBIED; bicycle bombing; Katyusha rockets; minibus 
and minivan VBIED, dump-truck IED; motorcycle VBIED; push cart bombing; female suicide bombing and; 
wheelchair suicide bombing. 
 608 
B.4 ATTACKS IN AL TAMIN PROVINCE, IRAQ, 2003 THROUGH MID-2008 
 
Table 6. Attacks in and near Kirkuk, Al Tamin Province, Iraq, 2003 
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Table 7. Attacks in and near Kirkuk, Al Tamin Province, Iraq, 2004 
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Table 8. Attacks in and near Kirkuk, Al Tamin Province, Iraq, 2005 
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Table 9. Attacks in and near Kirkuk, Al Tamin Province, Iraq, 2006 
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Type of Attack %
Total: 466
 612 
 
 
Table 10. Attacks in and near Kirkuk, Al Tamin Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
Police
Commercial
Government
Educational
U.S. Military
Media
Religious
Tribal
Iraqi Army
NGO
Kirkuk 2007
Attacked %
Total: 493
0 20 40 60
IED
Armed Attack
VBIED
Rocket
Suicide VBIED
Combined
Mortar
Bombing
Grenade
Arson
Landmine
Poison
Kirkuk 2007
Type of Attack %
Total: 493
 613 
 
 
Table 11. Attacks in and near Kirkuk, Al Tamin Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
Police
Iraqi Army
U.S. Military
Government
Educational
Religious
Kirkuk 2008
Attacked %
Total: 33
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Suicide VBIED
Torture
Unknown
Kirkuk 2008
Type of Attack %
Total: 33
 614 
 
 
B.5 ATTACKS IN ANBAR PROVINCE, IRAQ, 2003 THROUGH MID-2008 
Table 12. Attacks in and near Ramadi, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
U.S. Military
Various
Police
Tribal
Ramadi 2003
Attacked %
Total: 11
0 10 20 30 40
IED
Armed Attack
VBIED
RPG
Bombing
Ramadi 2003
Type of Attack %
Total: 11
 615 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Attacks in and near Ramadi, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
U.S. Military
Various
Police
Government
Iraqi Army
Commercial
Media
Tribal
Ramadi 2004
Attacked %
Total: 55
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
VBIED
RPG
Ambush
Bombing
Sniper
Suicide VBIED
Combined
Ramadi 2004
Type of Attack %
Total: 55
 616 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Attacks in and near Ramadi, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
U.S. Military
Various
Commercial
Police
Government
Iraqi Army
Religious
Ramadi 2005
Attacked %
Total: 79
0 10 20 30 40
Armed Attack
IED
Sniper
Mortar
Bombing
Execution
RPG
Ambush
Grenade
Helicopter Crash
Missile
Suicide VBIED
Suicide IED
Ramadi 2005
Type of Attack %
Total: 79
 617 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Attacks in and near Ramadi, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
U.S. Military
Various
Police
Government
Tribal
Educational
Media
Iraqi Army
Foreign Government
NGO
Religious
Ramadi 2006
Attacked %
Total: 145
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
Suicide VBIED
Mortar
Combined
RPG
VBIED
Sniper
Grenade
Ramadi 2006
Type of Attack %
Total: 145
 618 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Attacks in and near Ramadi, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Police
U.S. Military
Various
Government
Tribal
Media
Ramadi 2007
Attacked %
Total: 66
0 10 20 30 40
Suicide VBIED
Armed Attack
IED
Combined3
VBIED
Mortar
Rocket
Suicide IED
Bombing
Grenade
Sniper
Ramadi 2007
Type of Attack %
Total: 66
 619 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. Attacks in and near Ramadi, Anbar Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Police
U.S. Military
Commercial
Ramadi 2008
Attacked %
Total: 5
0 10 20 30 40 50
Suicide VBIED
Female Suicide
Suicide IED
VBIED
Ramadi 2008
Type of Attack %
Total: 5
 620 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18. Attacks in and near Falluja, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
U.S. Military
Various
Commercial
Media
Religious
Falluja 2003
Attacked %
Total: 20
0 10 20 30 40
Armed Attack
IED
RPG
Ambush
Bombing
Grenade
Helicopter Crash
VBIED
Falluja 2003
Type of Attack %
Total: 20
 621 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19. Attacks in and near Falluja, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
U.S. Military
Various
Commercial
Police
Media
Falluja 2004
Attacked %
Total: 82
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
VBIED
Ambush
Helicopter Crash
Combined
Sniper
Falluja 2004
Type of Attack %
Total: 82
 622 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Attacks in and near Falluja, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
U.S. Military
Various
Religious
Police
Commercial
Government
Educational
Falluja 2005
Attacked %
Total: 35
0 10 20 30 40 50
Armed Attack
IED
Suicide VBIED
Mortar
Bombing
Grenade
Rocket
Torture
Falluja 2005
Type of Attack %
Total: 35
 623 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21. Attacks in and near Falluja, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Police
Various
U.S. Military
Religious
Government
Educational
Iraqi Army
Commercial
Tribal
Media
Falluja 2006
Attacked %
Total: 138
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Combined
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Grenade
Sniper
Falluja 2006
Type of Attack %
Total: 138
 624 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Attacks in and near Falluja, Anbar Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
U.S. Military
Tribal
Media
Iraqi Army
Falluja 2007
Attacked %
Total: 161
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Suicide IED
VBIED
Combined
Rocket
Arson
Grenade
Helicopter Crash
Falluja 2007
Type of Attack %
Total: 161
 625 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23. Attacks in and near Falluja, Anbar Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
Police
U.S. Military
Iraqi Army
Media
Religious
Tribal
Falluja 2008
Attacked %
Total: 14
0 10 20 30
Suicide IED
IED
Armed Attack
Suicide VBIED
Torture
Unknown
VBIED
Falluja 2008
Type of Attack %
Total: 14
 626 
 
 
 
 
 
B.6 ATTACKS IN BAGHDAD PROVINCE, IRAQ, 2003 THROUGH MID-2008 
Table 24. Attacks in and near Baghdad, Baghdad Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Police
Various
Commercial
Government
U.S. Military
Educational
Media
NGO
Baghdad 2003
Attacked %
Total: 86
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Bombing
Rocket
Suicide IED
Combined
Baghdad 2003
Attacked %
Total: 86
 627 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25. Attacks in and near Baghdad, Baghdad Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 628 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26. Attacks in and near Baghdad, Baghdad Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
0 10 20 30 40
U.S. Military
Various
Commercial
Government
Police
Religious
Media
Educational
Tribal
Foreign Government
Iraqi Army
Translator
NGO
Baghdad 2004
Attacked %
Total: 365
0 10 20 30 40
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
RPG
Ambush
Rocket
Bombing
Combined
Suicide IED
Beheading
Sniper
Grenad
Hanging
Strangulation
Helicopter Crash
Baghdad 2004
Type of Attack %
Total: 365
 629 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27. Attacks in and near Baghdad, Baghdad Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
U.S. Military
Police
Government
Commercial
Religious
Media
Educational
Tribal
Translator
Iraqi Army
Foreign Government
NGO
Baghdad 2005
Attacked %
Total: 775
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
Suicide VBIED
Mortar
Bombing
Beheading
RPG
Sniper
Arson
Grenade
Strangulation
Unknown Baghdad 2005
Type of Attack %
Total: 775
 630 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28. Attacks in and near Baghdad, Baghdad Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
Police
Government
Commercial
U.S. Military
Religious
Media
Educational
Iraqi Army
Foreign Government
Tribal
NGO
Translator
Baghdad 2006
Attacked %
Total: 2413
0 10 20 30 40 50
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Mortar
Combined
Suicide VBIED
Rocket
Suicide IED
Bombing
Grenade
Arson
Landmine
Unknown
Baghdad 2006
Type of Attack %
Total: 2413
 631 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29. Attacks in and near Baghdad, Baghdad Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Various
Police
U.S. Military
Government
Commercial
Media
Educational
Iraqi Army
Religious
Tribal
Foreign Government
NGO
Baghdad 2007
Attacked %
Total: 2098
0 10 20 30 40
IED
Armed Attack
Mortar
VBIED
Suicide VBIED
Combined
Rocket
Bombing
Suicide IED
RPG
Grenade
Arson
Sniper
Ambush
CBRN
Helicopter
Baghdad 2007
Type of Attack %
Total: 2098
 632 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
U.S. Military
Police
Iraqi Army
Government
Commercial
Media
Educational
Religious
Tribal
Foreign Government
Baghdad 2008
Attacked %
Total: 216
0 10 20 30 40 50
IED
VBIED
Rocket
Unknown
Suicide VBIED
Combined
EFP
Grenade
Baghdad 2008
Type of Attack %
Total: 216
 633 
B.7 ATTACKS IN BASRA PROVINCE, IRAQ, 2003 THROUGH MID-2008 
Table 30. Attacks in and near Basra, Basra Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 31. Attacks in and near Basra, Basra Province, Iraq, 2004 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Various
Government
Basra 2003
Attacked %
Total: 5
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
Assassination
Basra 2003
Type of Attack %
Total: 5
 634 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 32. Attacks in and near Basra, Basra Province, Iraq, 2005 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Commercial
Various
Police
Government
Basra 2004
Attacked %
Total: 20
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Bombing
Mortar
VBIED
Basra 2004
Type of Attack %
Total: 20
 635 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 33. Attacks in and near Basra, Basra Province, Iraq, 2006 
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Assassination
Suicide IED
Basra 2005
Type of Attack %
Total: 38
0 5 10 15 20 25
Government
Police
Various
Media
Religious
Commercial
Educational
Iraqi Army
Translator
Basra 2005
Attacked %
Total: 38
 636 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
Police
Commercial
Government
Religious
Educational
Foreign Government
Iraqi Army
Tribal
Media
Basra 2006
Attacked %
Total: 171
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Rocket
Grenade
Suicide VBIED
RPG
Bombing
VBIED
Arson
Suicide IED
Combined
Basra 2006
Type of Attack %
Total: 171
 637 
Table 34. Attacks in and near Basra, Basra Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
Police
Government
Commercial
Religious
Educational
Iraqi Army
Foreign Government
NGO
U.S. Military
Translator
Media
Basra 2007
Attacked %
Total: 150
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Rocket
Grenade
Combined
Arson
Bombing
Landmine
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Basra 2007
Type of Attack %
Total: 150
 638 
Table 35. Attacks in and near Basra, Basra Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Police
Commercial
Various
Government
Tribal
U.S. Military
Basra 2008
Attacked %
Total: 24
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
RPG
Suicide IED
IED
Assassination
Bombing
Mortar
Sniper
Basra 2008
Type of Attack %
Total: 24
 639 
B.8 ATTACKS IN  DIYALA PROVINCE, IRAQ, 2003 THROUGH MID-2008 
Table 36. Attacks in and near Baquba, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
U.S. Military
Various
Commercial
Government
Baquba 2003
Attacked %
Total: 19
0 10 20 30 40
IED
Armed Attack
RPG
Bombing
Mortar
Grenade
Landmine
Baquba 2003
Method of Attack %
Total: 19
 640 
Table 37. Attacks in and near Baquba, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Police
Various
Government
U.S. Military
Commercial
Iraqi Army
Media
Religious
Baquba 2004
Attacked %
Total: 64
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Bombing
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Ambush
Assassination
Baquba 2004
Method of Attack %
Total: 64
 641 
Table 38. Attacks in and near Baquba, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
Police
Government
Commercial
Religious
U.S. Military
Iraqi Army
Translator
Media
Baquba 2005
Attacked %
Total: 131
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Suicide IED
Mortar
Bombing
RPG
Grenade
Helicopter Crash
Baquba 2005
Method of Attack %
Total: 131
 642 
Table 39. Attacks in and near Baquba, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
Government
Religious
U.S. Military
Media
NGO
Baquba 2006
Attacked %
Total: 655
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Combined
Bombing
Suicide VBIED
Arson
Rocket
RPG
Baquba 2006
Method of Attack %
Total: 655
 643 
Table 40. Attacks in and near Baquba, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
Police
U.S. Military
Government
Commercial
Religious
Educational
Iraqi Army
Tribal
Baquba 2007
Attacked %
Total: 263
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Bombing
Suicide IED
Combined
VBIED
Arson
Beheading
Rocket
Baquba 2007
Method of Attack %
Total: 263
 644 
 
Table 41. Attacks in and near Baquba, Diyala Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
Police
Iraqi Army
Government
Commercial
Religious
Baquba 2008
Attacked %
Total: 42
0 10 20 30 40
IED
Armed Attack
Female Suicide
Booby Trap
Mortar
Combined
Beheading
Bombing
Execution
Suicide IED
VBIED
Baquba 2008
Method of Attack %
Total: 42
 645 
Table 42. Attacks in and near Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0.5 1 1.5
1
Muqdadiyah 2003
Attacked %
Total: 1
0 0.5 1 1.5
1
Muqdadiyah 2003
Method of Attack %
Total: 1
 646 
Table 43. Attacks in and near Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Police
Various
Religious
Tribal
Muqdadiyah 2004
Attacked %
Total: 6
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
Mortar
VBIED
Muqdadiyah 2004
Method of Attack %
Total: 6
 647 
Table 44. Attacks in and near Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
U.S. Military
Police
Various
Government
Religious
Muqdadiyah 2005
Attacked %
Total: 6
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Muqdadiyah 2005
Method of Attack %
Total: 6
 648 
Table 45. Attacks in and near Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
Police
Commercial
Government
Religious
Iraqi Army
U.S. Military
Educational
Muqdadiyah 2006
Attacked %
Total: 143
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
VBIED
Combined
RPG
Bombing
Suicide IED
Muqdadiyah 2006
Method of Attack %
Total: 143
 649 
Table 46. Attacks in and near Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Various
Police
U.S. Military
Religious
Government
Commercial
Iraqi Army
Educational
Muqdadiyah 2007
Attacked %
Total: 106
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Suicide IED
Bombing
VBIED
Arson
Suicide VBIED
CBRN
Helicopter Crash
Rocket
Combined
Muqdadiyah 2007
Method of Attack %
Total: 106
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Table 47. Attacks in and near Muqdadiyah, Diyala Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
U.S. Military
Police
Commercial
Muqdadiyah 2008
Attacked %
Total: 8
0 10 20 30 40
Beheading
IED
Suicide IED
Muqdadiyah 2008
Method of Attack %
Total: 8
 651 
B.9 ATTACKS IN  DIYALA PROVINCE, IRAQ, 2003 THROUGH MID-2008 
Table 48. Attacks in and near Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
U.S. Military
Police
Government
Various
Commercial
Media
Translator
Educational
Tribal
Mosul 2003
Attacked %
Total: 35
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
Assassination
IED
RPG
Ambush
Grenade
Helicopter Crash
Mortar
Mosul 2003
Method of Attack %
Total: 35
 652 
Table 49. Attacks in and near Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
Various
Police
U.S. Military
Commercial
Government
Iraqi Army
Religious
Media
Educational
NGO
Tribal
Foreign Government
Mosul 2004
Attacked %
Total: 135
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Ambush
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Beheading
Bombing
Sniper
Suicide IED
Grenade
Hanging
Rocket
Torture
Combined
Mosul 2004
Method of Attack %
Total: 135
 653 
Table 50. Attacks in and near Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
Police
Government
U.S. Military
Media
Commercial
Iraqi Army
Educational
Religious
Tribal
Translator
Mosul 2005
Attacked %
Total: 181
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Mortar
Bombing
Suicide IED
Ambush
Arson
Grenade
Sniper
Torture
Combined
Mosul 2005
Method of Attack %
Total: 181
 654 
Table 51. Attacks in and near Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Police
Various
Government
Commercial
Educational
U.S. Military
Religious
Media
Iraqi Army
Tribal
Mosul 2006
Attacked % 
Total: 460
0 20 40 60 80
Armed Attack
IED
Suicide VBIED
Mortar
VBIED
Combined
Bombing
Suicide IED
RPG
Arson
Sniper
Mosul 2006
Method of Attack %
Total: 460
 655 
Table 52. Attacks in and near Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Police
Various
Government
Commercial
Educational
Media
Iraqi Army
U.S. Military
Religious
Tribal
NGO
Mosul 2007
Attacked %
Total: 636
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
VBIED
Suicide VBIED
Combined
Suicide IED
Bombing
Grenade
Arson
RPG
Mosul 2007
Method of Attack %
Total: 636
 656 
Table 53. Attacks in and near Mosul, Ninawa Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
Police
Iraqi Army
U.S. Military
Educational
Commercial
Government
Religious
Media
Mosul 2008
Attacked %
Total: 119
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Beheading
RPG
Bombing
Mortar
Suicide IED
Torture
Unknown
Mosul 2008
Method of Attack %
Total: 119
 657 
Table 54. Attacks in and near Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0.5 1 1.5
1
Tal Afar 2003
Attacked %
Total: 2
0 0.5 1 1.5
1
Tal Afar 2003
Method of Attack %
Total: 2
 658 
Table 55. Attacks in and near Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
U.S. Military
Police
Various
Tal Afar 2004
Attacked %
Total: 3
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Mortar
VBIED
IED
Tal Afar 2004
Method of Attack %
Total: 3
 659 
Table 56. Attacks in and near Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
U.S. Miliary
Police
Commercial
Government
Tal Afar 2005
Attacked %
Total: 47
0 10 20 30
Armed Attack
Mortar
IED
Suicide VBIED
RPG
VBIED
Combined
Beheading
Booby Trap
Bombing
Sniper
Tal Afar 2005
Method of Attack %
Total: 47
 660 
Table 57. Attacks in and near Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Police
Various
Iraqi Army
U.S. Military
Commercial
Government
Tal Afar 2006
Attacked %
Total: 44
0 5 10 15 20 25
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Armed Attack
IED
Suicide IED
VBIED
Combined
Rocket
Tal Afar 2006
Method of Attack %
Total: 44
 661 
Table 58. Attacks in and near Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
Police
Iraqi Army
Government
Commercial
Educational
Tribal
Tal Afar 2007
Attacked %
Total: 41
0 10 20 30 40
IED
Armed Attack
Rocket
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Suicide IED
VBIED
Combined
Tal Afar 2007
Method of Attack %
Total: 41
 662 
Table 59. Attacks in and near Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
U.S. Military
Religious
Tal Afar 2008
Attacked %
Total: 7
0 10 20 30 40
IED
Suicide IED
Rocket
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Tal Afar 2008
Method of Attack %
Total: 7
 663 
B.10 ATTACKS IN  SALAH AD DIN PROVINCE, IRAQ, 2003 THROUGH MID-2008 
Table 60. Attacks in and near Balad, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
U.S. Military
Various
Commercial
Balad 2003
Attacked  %
Total: 8
0 1 2 3 4
Armed Attack
IED
Ambush
Bombing
RPG
Balad 2003
Type of Attack %
Total: 8
 664 
Table 61. Attacks in and near Balad, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
U.S. Military
Police
Various
Commercial
Government
Iraqi Army Balad
2004
Attacked  %
Total: 30
0 10 20 30 40
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Rocket
Suicide VBIED
RPG
Beheading
Sniper
VBIED Balad
2004
Type of Attack %
Total: 30
 665 
Table 62. Attacks in and near Balad, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
U.S. Military
Commercial
Iraqi Army
Police
Religious
Government
Translator
Tribal Balad 2005
Attacked %
Total: 55
0 10 20 30 40 50
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
VBIED
Suicide VBIED
Suicide IED
Beheading
Sniper
Type of Attack %
Balad 2005Total: 55
 666 
Table 63. Attacks in and near Balad, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Various
U.S. Military
Police
Commercial
Government
Iraqi Army
Tribal
Educational
Religious
Total: 100 Balad 2006
Attacked %
0 10 20 30 40 50
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
RPG
Bombing
VBIED
Total: 100 Balad 2006
Type of Attack %
 667 
Table 64. Attacks in and near Balad, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
Various
Police
U.S. Military
Iraqi Army
Commercial
Government
NGO
Balad 2007
Attacked %
Total: 87
0 10 20 30 40 50
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
Suicide IED
VBIED
Arson
Combined
Balad 2007
Type of Attack %
Total: 87
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Table 65. Attacks in and near Balad, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
Police
Various
U.S. Military
Media
Religious
Balad 2008
Attacked %
Total: 17
0 1 2 3 4 5
IED
Mortar
Armed Attack
Female Suicide
VBIED
Bombing
Ambush
Combined
Balad 2008
Type of Attack %
Total: 17
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Table 66. Attacks in and near Samarra, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
U.S. Military
Police
Commercial
Total: 6
Attacked  %
Samarra 2003
0 10 20 30 40
Armed Attack
IED
Grenade
Mortar
Type of Attack %
Samarra 2003Total: 48
 670 
Table 67. Attacks in and near Samarra, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
U.S. Military
Police
Commercial
Government
Media
Samarra 2004
Attacked  %
Total: 48
0 10 20 30
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
VBIED
Bombing
Ambush
RPG
Drowning
Execution
Landmine
Rocket
Sniper
Suicide VBIED
Combined
Samarra 2004
Type of Attack %
Total: 48
 671 
 
Table 68. Attacks in and near Samarra, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
Police
U.S. Military
Commercial
Government
Iraqi Army
Translator
Tribal
Educational
Religious
Samarra 2005
Attacked %
Total: 90
0 20 40 60
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Bombing
Execution
Landmine
Samarra 2005
Type of Attack %
Total: 90
 672 
 
Table 69. Attacks in and near Samarra, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50
Various
Police
Commercial
Religious
U.S. Military
Government
Educational
Media
Samarra 2006
Attacked %
Total: 110
0 10 20 30 40 50
IED
Armed Attack
VBIED
Mortar
Combined
Bombing
Suicide VBIED
Rocket
Suicide IED
Samarra 2006
Type of Attack %
Total: 110
 673 
Table 70. Attacks in and near Samarra, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80
Police
Various
U.S. Military
Government
Religious
Comercial
Educational
Samarra 2007
Attacked %
Total: 79
0 10 20 30 40 50
Armed Attack
IED
Mortar
Combined
Suicide VBIED
VBIED
Bombing
Samarra 2007
Type of Attack %
Total: 79
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Table 71. Attacks in and near Samarra, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Police
Various
Iraqi Army
U.S. Military
Commercial
Religious
Tribal
Samarra 2008
Attacked %
Total: 19
0 10 20 30 40 50
Armed Attack
IED
VBIED
Bombing
Execution
Sniper
Suicide VBIED
Suicide IED
Samarra 2008
Type of Attack %
Total: 19
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Table 72. Attacks in and near Tikrit, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60
U.S. Military
Commercial
Various
Foreign Govt.
Translator
Tikrit 2003
Attacked %
Total: 17
0 10 20 30 40
Armed Attack
IED
RPG
Bombing
Ambush
Helicopter Crash
Landmine
Missile
Mortar
Tikrit 2003
Type of Attack %
Total: 17
 676 
Table 73. Attacks in and near Tikrit, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40
Various
U.S. Military
Police
Commercial
Government
Tribal
Tikrit 2004
Attacked %
Total: 21
0 10 20 30 40
Armed Attack
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Table 74. Attacks in and near Tikrit, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2005 
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Table 75. Attacks in and near Tikrit, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2006 
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Table 76. Attacks in and near Tikrit, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, 2007 
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Table 77. Attacks in and near Tikrit, Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq, through mid-2008 
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APPENDIX C 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
1. How many times have you deployed to Iraq? 
a. When and where were you deployed? 
b. What type of operations did you conduct (High-Intensity, Low-Intensity, 
Counterinsurgency? 
 
2. At what level of operations did you lead/participate (Brigade, Battalion, Company, 
Platoon, or Squad)? 
a. What was your Task Organization/Configuration? 
 
3. What was your unit’s Task and Purpose? 
 
4. Can you describe your train-up for deployment to Iraq? 
a. Did you attend a Combat Training Center? 
b. Did a Mobile Training Team travel to your homestation? 
c. Can you describe your training emphasis and essential tasks prior to deployment? 
 
5. Execution 
a. What sort of Higher Support/External Assistance did you receive prior to or 
during operations? 
b. Were your tactics, techniques, and procedures effective? 
c. Did (and how) you record debriefs/AARs? 
d. How was information/lessons gathered, shared, and stored? 
e. Did you apply lessons learned on your next operation? 
f. Did you apply lessons learned @ homestation? 
g. Was your gathering of information/lessons more formal or informal? 
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6. Insurgency 
a. Can you describe adaptation of the insurgency while you were deployed? 
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